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ABSTRACT 
Humanitarian disasters are expected to increase 5-fold over the next 50 years.  In 2010 a 
total of 385 separate disasters killed over 297,000 people worldwide, affected more than 
217 million others and caused US$ 123.9 billion of economic damages.  It is suggested that 
the scale of resource dedicated to logistics provision in response to disasters accounts for 
upwards of 80% of the total budget, hence humanitarian logistics both as a practice and a 
research topic is very much in the spotlight. Consequently, this research addresses what is 
argued to be the under-representation of humanitarian logistics in the literature and the 
associated lack of empirical research focussed on the management of the supply chain.  
Collaborative working has been promoted as a Silver Bullet in many areas of Supply Chain 
Management and is contended to be a mechanism to prevent organisations optimising 
solely their own results rather than integrating their goals and activities with others to benefit 
overall end user value. Collaborative techniques inherent within commercial supply chains 
have not been observed in the humanitarian relief chain. This study investigates why this is 
the case, as this lack of collaboration is reported to lead to inefficiency; which at worst 
results in increased humanitarian suffering and additional loss of life. Hence, the findings 
reveal ways to advance collaborative working within the humanitarian relief supply chain. 
Criticism is levelled at the predominance of quantitative methodologies in current research 
within humanitarian logistics. This study addresses this gap as well as the calls for more 
cross-organisational case studies within the field, by adopting a multi-case, qualitative 
approach based on the triangulation of data gathered during a series of in-depth interviews 
and focus groups across 4 separate humanitarian relief organisations. Data interpretation 
is through content analysis to identify specific patterns and themes. The research concerns 
itself with the response immediately following the onset of a disaster. This limited scope 
helps to address issues surrounding the generalisability of a purely qualitative approach 
whilst also maintaining control over data volume; however, there are still ample 
opportunities for significant theoretical and practical contribution.  
The findings identify specific barriers to collaborative working within the sector; in particular, 
themes and patterns within management and control, understanding and training, 
relationships, and military involvement have surfaced. Outcomes also have implications for 
commercial supply chain managers who are increasingly faced with challenges that no 
longer obey the traditional rules of forecast driven certainty and predictability, and are 
therefore, expected to adopt the more event driven, agile and flexible approaches that are 
already a reality for their humanitarian sector counterparts.  
The study concludes with the development of a conceptual generic model of the 
humanitarian supply chain that includes a number of significant issues which, if addressed 
will improve collaboration and thereby benefit overall efficiency and effectiveness to the 
general betterment of future relief provision.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
“As in previous years, there has been an increase in demand for humanitarian assistance 
while the operating environment for delivering such assistance becomes more complex.  
Humanitarian responders are more numerous and diverse…..It will be essential over the 
coming years for the international system to find ways to take full advantage of the 
opportunities offered by this new environment and to respond more effectively to its 
challenges and demands”. 
(UN, 2013, p.2)  
 
1.1 Introduction 
During the final writing of this thesis Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines.  The 
devastation caused as a result of this natural disaster (see Fig 1.1) illustrates that disasters, 
either artificial or natural, may occur at any time around the world with enormous 
consequences (Decker et al, 2013; Haavisto and Kovács, 2013; Day et al, 2012; Carroll 
and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada 
et al, 2006).   
 
 
 
Fig 1.1  Aerial Images of Before and After Typhoon Haiyan (BBC News, 2013a) 
 
In 1883, Krakatoa in Indonesia erupted causing over 100,000 deaths and the eruption was 
heard over 3000 miles away.  However, it took weeks for people in the Western World to 
learn the true extent of the disaster (Day et al, 2012, p.21) and even longer for any kind of 
response to be generated.  Contrast that with the devastation caused by the Tohoku 
earthquake and tsunami in 2011 which was watched in real time across the world.  Modern 
day humanitarian relief operations are likely to be conducted in the spotlight of the media 
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and will be afforded heightened public and political attention (Heaslip, 2011).  In 2010, a 
total of 385 separate natural disasters killed over 297 000 people worldwide, affected more 
than 217 million others and caused US$123.9 billion of economic damages (Guhu-Sapir et 
al, 2011).  The earthquake in Haiti affected at least 3 million people with between 217,000 
to 230,000 deaths and flooding in Thailand affected over 12.8 million people with the World 
Bank estimating economic damages exceeding US$45 billion (Tang, 2011).  Moreover, 
disaster relief is and will continue to be a growth area with both natural and man-made 
disasters expected to increase another five-fold over the next 50 years (Thomas and 
Kopczak, 2005).  Consequently, disasters will continue to generate an impact and a public 
awareness that demands immediate action aimed at reducing humanitarian suffering as 
well as speeding up overall response and recovery times.   
 
The provision of timely and appropriate humanitarian aid has developed into a global and 
multinational industry (Carroll and Neu, 2009) and more and more focus is being placed on 
the optimisation of the logistics and supply chains that are charged with transforming public 
and private donations into tangible aid1.  Whilst commentary (Blansjaar, 2011; van 
Wassenhove, 2006) debates the actual scale of resource that is dedicated to logistics 
provision in response to disasters, (somewhere between 50 and 80% of the total budget) 
what is clear is that humanitarian logistics both as a practice and a research topic is now 
very much in the spotlight.  Emergency logistics and Supply Chain Management (SCM) 
have emerged as worldwide-noticeable themes, as there now exists a fierce need to 
coordinate the logistics resources of the public and private sectors to avoid arbitrary 
resource allocation during disasters (Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and 
Spens, 2007; Yamada et al, 2006).  Collaborative working has been promoted as a ‘Silver 
Bullet’ in many areas of SCM and is contended to be a mechanism to prevent organisations 
within the supply chain optimising solely their own results rather than integrating their goals 
and activities with others to benefit overall end user value (Porter, 1998; Cooper et al, 1997).  
However, collaborative techniques inherent within commercial supply chains have not been 
observed in the humanitarian relief chain and ineffective coordination of efforts between 
relief suppliers, logistics servers and demanders is still a major concern (Day et al, 2012; 
Heaslip, 2012a, 2011 and 2010; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 
2009).  Whilst acknowledging the attention that the field of humanitarian logistics and SCM 
has gained as a research area, and the fact that researchers have begun to lay the 
foundations for a core body of knowledge, numerous academic commentators (Fawcett and 
Waller, 2013; Day et al, 2012; Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Overstreet et al, 2011; Kovács and 
                                                             
1 As will be discussed within section 2.3.2 a unionist perspective (Larson and Halldórsson, 2004) will be 
adopted within this thesis, whereby logistics is regarded as a fundamental part of SCM as an overall 
discipline. 
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Spens, 2011, 2008 and 2007; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; 
Mangan et al, 2012; Thomas and Fritz, 2006; Beamon, 2004; Yamada et al, 2006; Lyles, 
2005; Murray, 2005; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005; Rickard, 2003) suggest that the field is 
relatively new and is still in its infancy.  Moreover, criticism is also levelled at the 
predominance of quantitative methodologies in current research within humanitarian 
logistics and there are calls for the collection of more qualitative empirical data within the 
field (see section 2.11 and Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 2011).  Hence, this 
qualitative study addresses this gap as well as the calls for more cross-organisational case 
studies within the field, focusing on the participant narratives and responses of logistics 
practioners engaged in the delivery of humanitarian aid immediately following the onset of 
a disaster.   
 
Having set the scene for the reader, this first chapter serves as an introduction to the thesis, 
detailing the rationale and context of the research and setting out the final research 
objective, question and aim for the investigation.  A short introduction to the final 
methodology adopted is included as well as a summary of the research findings and overall 
contribution to knowledge.  The final conclusion to the chapter is preceded by a short 
explanation of the overall structure of the thesis.  
 
1.2 Origins of Interest, Research Rationale and Context 
It is suggested that any narrative depends on the perspective of its author (Hatch and 
Cunliffe, 2013, p.viii).  Hence, it is appropriate to begin with a short description of the 
author’s background which will serve to establish the personal perspective, whilst giving the 
reader the context and rationale behind the overall research, thereby forming the basis of 
the on-going discussion within this thesis.  Prior to taking up a role within academia, the 
researcher served for almost 26 years in the Royal Air Force (RAF), during which time he 
was involved in numerous overseas military operations, on behalf of the UK Government, 
NATO and the United Nations.  In particular, time spent on a variety of overseas operations 
gave first hand exposure to the challenges and frustrations of working alongside 
organisations engaged in the practical provision of humanitarian relief and support to 
affected populations in need of life saving aid.  The researcher recalls being struck at the 
time by the common drive amongst all participants within the humanitarian supply chain to 
improve the provision of aid and to alleviate suffering, but also by the reticence of some 
organisations and individuals to avoid and, in some cases to actively reject the attempts 
made by military personnel and their chains’ of command to step away from a solely security 
based role and to involve themselves in the practical provision of the relief effort itself.  On 
leaving the RAF, the author took up a position as a senior lecturer in logistics and operations 
management within higher education and as such was given responsibility by his institution 
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for the leadership of under and post graduate programmes in logistics management.  As 
such, along with the student body, he attended a wide variety of guest lectures and 
presentations given by logistics practioners.  One such lecture, delivered by a senior 
logistics manager with in excess of 25 years practical association with humanitarian relief 
provision, highlighted what was perceived to be the vital importance, yet frustrating lack of 
a collaborative approach within the sector.  These practical observations chimed with the 
military experiences of the author, and served to ignite personal academic interest within 
the field.  Further research and consideration of what was a somewhat limited array of 
academic articles at the time (early 2009), left the author convinced that he had identified 
an area of study that was at the time, lacking in academic rigour and, hence presented an 
attractive area to dedicate a period of doctrinally focussed research to.  Of particular interest 
was the opportunity to engage in an area of academic knowledge that was at a relatively 
early stage in its development but also in one that, given the life and death realities of 
associated outcomes also demanded not only significant academic contribution but 
perhaps, of equal importance a practical development of existing managerial strategy.                  
The initial UN response to Typhoon Haiyan was to launch an appeal for $301 million (£190 
million) to help the relief effort (BBC News, 2013b).  Moreover, the quotation at the start of 
this Chapter is taken from the annual United Nations (UN) report on the strengthening of 
the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance issued in July 2013 (UN, 2013); it 
serves to illustrate the increasing demand for humanitarian aid, and to support the view that 
the operating environment for delivering such assistance is becoming ever more complex 
due to the involvement of an increasingly numerous and diverse group of responders and 
organisations.  In reporting on progress in the coordination of humanitarian assistance the 
document goes on to discuss the need to: 
 
“Improve humanitarian leadership, coordination and accountability both in 
headquarters and in the field” (UN, 2013, p6) 
 
In short, this research is both timely and pertinent as it investigates themes and issues that 
have significant financial implications but that are also associated with what the UN currently 
regard as key areas for future development and progress within the humanitarian relief 
supply chain.   
 
As discussed earlier numerous academic commentators agree that the research field of 
humanitarian logistics is relatively new and still in its infancy; indeed Kovács and Spens 
(2007) suggest that “Literature on humanitarian logistics is scant” (p100) and Day et al 
(2012) determine that relief activity coordination in a changing environment is amongst the 
most pressingly significant challenge areas in which researchers can contribute to the field 
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of humanitarian relief disaster SCM (p32).  Moreover, Fawcett and Waller (2013) contend 
that SCM is the newest business discipline and that as such, it is going through what they 
describe as “growing pains” (p.183) as it seeks to chart its future course and define a 
meaningful destiny for itself.  Although the number of beneficiaries of humanitarian aid has 
grown year-on-year (Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 2011; Tatham 2011), until 
the inception of The Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management 
(JHLSCM) in June 2011 no dedicated journal existed within the field nor was there any 
journal or other outlet focusing on this topic alone.  Academic interest has been growing in 
this area, yet publications still remain fragmented and generalised; however, 
acknowledgment is now made of the increasing number of special issues of scientific 
journals that have been dedicated to the humanitarian logistics field since 2005 (Kunz and 
Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 2011).  Hence, whilst lessons have been learned from 
past aid operations, operational failures still occur at the point of contact for humanitarian 
missions.  Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) comment on the growing body of practice-based 
literature on humanitarian SCM and Logistics, but note that this work seldom refers to well-
established concepts within academic supply chain literature; they go on to postulate that if 
attempts were made to apply such concepts from the business model to the humanitarian 
aid supply chain, we may identify many important parallels, but also many equally important 
differences (p.115).  Similarly, Beamon (2004) observes that the majority of existing supply 
chain research focuses on managing and/or optimizing the commercial supply of goods and 
services and that whilst the humanitarian relief process is an important domain for SCM it 
has received little academic attention.   
 
Chandes and Paché (2009) discuss the absence of collaboration between humanitarian 
actors (Kovács and Spens, 2008) and highlight that this results in lost time, wasted 
resources and ultimately a deeply disorganised supply chain (p337); they go on to suggest 
that the opening of a research agenda on the critical need for a more collaborative strategy 
is of the highest priority.  Dash et al (2013) suggest that “Disaster response supply chain 
management is an emerging field and there is great potential for research in emergency 
logistics and disaster response initiatives” (p60) and Kumar and Havey (2013) highlight the 
need for more research on disaster relief supply chain management in light of frustrations 
with the delays in receiving aid following the Haiti earthquake in 2010.  Finally, by way of a 
summary of current thinking in the field, Fawcett and Waller (2013) suggest that: 
 
“Recent research indicates that the top barrier to more effective humanitarian aid 
and disaster relief is inadequate logistics, followed by weak governance and 
insufficient collaboration” (p187) 
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1.3 Appropriate Research Boundaries 
 
As will be developed in more detail in Chapter 3, a qualitative, inductive, approach was 
adopted (Garfinkel, 1967 and Sacks et al, 1974 both cited by Bryman and Bell, 2007).  A 
variety of carefully selected methods were utilised to produce the rich data needed to 
establish similarities and, perhaps more importantly differences between key organisations 
(Gill and Johnson, 2010, Saunders et al, 2009, Bryman and Bell, 2007).  Noting that 
generalisability and justification of a purely qualitative approach would be key concerns, 
distinct barriers (Gieryn, 1983) were put around the research at an early stage.  Whilst 
acknowledging the importance of all phases of humanitarian relief provision (Kovács and 
Spens, 2008, 2007) (see Fig 2.9 and Section 2.6.1), the expected outcomes of a piece of 
doctrinally focussed research, volume of information and the need for focussed research 
effort, resulted in the decision to concentrate on the Immediate Response phase of 
humanitarian relief provision (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007).  Moreover, for the same 
reasons, whilst the importance of all types of disasters is noted, the overall emphasis of the 
study took as its focus the sudden onset - natural  type of disasters (Van Wassenhove, 
2006) (see Fig 2.5 and Section 2.4.1).  
 
1.4 Final Research Objective, Question and Aim  
 
Within this context, the overall objective of this research was to fill the identified gap in 
knowledge surrounding the effective planning and coordination of the provision of 
humanitarian logistics during the immediate response phase (see Fig 2.9, Kovács and 
Spens 2008, 2007), and to evaluate how effective collaboration might be achieved within 
the humanitarian relief supply chain.  The research question was therefore: 
 
When considering the Immediate Response to Natural Disasters what are the key 
drivers within the Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain that will help to improve future 
collaborative working? 
 
The aim of the thesis was to make a theoretical contribution to contingency theoretic 
perspectives and a functional contribution to existing humanitarian and commercial supply 
chain practice, by revealing what factors restrict effective collaboration between actors 
(Kovács and Spens, 2008) within humanitarian relief environments and suggesting how 
these issues might be addressed in the future. 
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1.5 Research Methodology 
 
Whilst the range of issues that bear, both directly and more peripherally, on the research 
approach adopted are developed and discussed within Chapter 3 of this thesis, by way of 
introduction the final research approach was split into 3 distinct stages (see Fig 3.4).  The 
aim of the first stage was to establish contact with prospective participants whilst also 
confirming the relevance of the etic issues developed during the literary review process.  
Stages 2 and 3 were designed to gather the rich data that would be needed to address the 
overall aims and research question of the study; furthermore the emic issues which were 
used to formulate the final contribution to knowledge were also identified.  All 3 stages lent 
themselves to a qualitative approach and to the use of multiple methods of data collection.  
Once analysis was complete the related findings and interpretations were confirmed with 
participants through a checking and feedback process.   
 
The use of case studies and in particular the merits afforded by a multiple-case approach 
(Yin, 2013; Simons, 2009; Stake, 1995) were exploited and given the perspectives sought 
here, the use of a multi-site cross comparison served to increase confidence in the overall 
findings, whilst addressing the concerns levelled at the qualitative researcher’s door 
regarding reliability of data and generalisability of findings.  Hence, four different 
humanitarian relief organisations, all of whom are involved in the provision of immediate 
response to disasters (see Fig 2.9, Kovács and Spens 2008, 2007) participated in the final 
research (see Table 3.2).  In keeping with the classic case study process (Yin, 2013; 
Simons, 2009; Stake, 1995) each organisation was considered in isolation (Chapters 4 
through 7) with final conclusions and contributions being established through a cross-case 
analysis (Chapter 8).  Whilst fulfilling the final research objectives, this overall approach 
also addressed the thoughts offered by Kovács and Spens (2011), as developed in Chapter 
2 (see section 2.11.2) who highlight the need for good and applicable research within the 
field with empirical data being gathered through the use of appropriate qualitative method.   
 
 
1.6 Summary of Research Findings and Overall Contribution to Knowledge 
 
It is a recognised and frequently criticised characteristic of qualitative research that simple 
descriptions of the emergent findings are difficult to articulate (Bryman and Bell, 2012; 
Saunders et al, 2012; Silverman, 2011a).  For example, in the body of this thesis the findings 
and overall contribution to knowledge emerge over many pages of data extracts, analysis 
and explanatory text that span five chapters.  Hence, in addressing the research question, 
the associated cross-case analysis of the data gathered provided an overall contribution to 
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knowledge that will be presented in Chapter 8.  The contribution was applicable to both the 
humanitarian and commercial supply chains and implications for methodology were also 
identified.  By way of introduction a short summary of the key areas of the contribution are 
discussed here.  
 
1.6.1 The Humanitarian Relief Sector 
 
The findings identify specific barriers to collaborative working within the humanitarian relief 
sector; in particular, key emic issues and themes are identified and subsequent 
contributions made in four key areas, namely: 
 
1. Management and Control. 
2. Understanding and Training. 
3. Relationships. 
4. Military Involvement. 
 
Moreover, the study concludes with the development of a development of a conceptual 
generic model of the humanitarian supply chain that includes a number of significant issues 
which, if addressed will improve collaboration and thereby benefit overall efficiency and 
effectiveness to the general betterment of future relief provision.   
 
1.6.2 The Commercial Sector 
 
Commercial supply chain managers are increasingly faced with challenges that no longer 
obey the traditional rules of forecast driven certainty and are therefore, forced to adopt the 
more event driven approaches utilised by their humanitarian sector counterparts (Kovács, 
2012; Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011).  Large scale disruptions with very 
short lead times are emerging as one of the most pressing issues for commercial supply 
chains, consequently business sector supply chain managers can learn from their 
humanitarian sector counterparts who are expected to respond to disasters with very short 
lead times (Decker et al, 2013, p238).  Hence whilst the main focus of this research was the 
development of findings and an overall contribution within the specialised context 
associated with the humanitarian relief sector, a constant consideration throughout was the 
potential for generalisation of the findings to the wider body of knowledge and in particular 
to that associated within the management of commercial sector supply chains.  
Consequently, the implications of some of the findings of this research and elements of the 
final contribution are also considered in the following areas of the commercial business 
supply chain: 
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1. Barriers to Collaborative Working. 
2. Combating Supply Chain Complexity. 
3. Joint Training Initiatives. 
4. Suppression of Market Forces. 
5. Defining Value in the Value Chain. 
6. Network Structures and Power. 
 
1.6.3 Limitations of the Study and Implications for Methodology 
 
In common with all research this study suffered from a number of limitations.  Whilst these 
limitations did not detract from the overall significance of the findings, it was right to 
comment on them at some stage in the final reporting process (Section 8.9).  Moreover, 
whilst the final Research Strategy (Fig 3.4) proved on the whole to be successful, it was not 
without its difficulties and challenges; hence, comment is also made by way of lessons 
learned and some implications for methodology are identified in 3 key areas, namely: 
 
1. Research Boundaries. 
2. Multiple ‘Domains’. 
3. Interviews, Focus Groups and Observation. 
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
 
 
To introduce and develop the arguments summarised here in detail, the thesis comprises 
eight chapters, including this introduction, that cover the literature in the field, 
methodological considerations, individual domain analysis with theoretical comments, and 
final conclusions and contribution to knowledge.  These chapters are constituted as follows. 
 
Chapter 1.  Introduction.  The first chapter serves to set the scene for the reader 
and details the rationale and context of the research itself.  The final research 
objective, question and aim of the investigation are explained and a summary of 
the final research findings and overall contribution to knowledge offered. 
 
 
Chapter 2.  Perspectives on Humanitarian Supply Chain Management and 
Collaboration.  The literary review begins by setting the scene with a discussion on 
the scale of the challenge that the humanitarian relief community faces.  The 
disciplines associated with, and the definitions of supply chain and logistics 
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management are considered, and a comparison of the key issues associated with 
the business and humanitarian supply chains leads into a contextual discussion on 
the humanitarian supply chain itself.  The actors within the humanitarian supply 
chain are established before consideration of the arguments for a network approach 
to the supply chain, and also of the academic discourse on the formation of hastily 
formed networks in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster is made.  The 
pressures on the humanitarian supply chain and on those employed within it, are 
analysed as themes and issues are identified which will help to inform the first stage 
of the final research design.  Thoughts then turn to the distinct phases of disaster 
relief operations (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) and to the identification of an 
appropriate phase of focus for this research.  The case is made for the review and 
overall research to take as its focus the immediate response phase to disaster relief 
and an appropriate supply chain for the immediate response phase is discussed.  
Arguments are then considered for optimisation and collaboration within the 
humanitarian supply chain before a discussion on achieving collaboration through 
clusters leads into an analysis of the aims and structure of the United Nations Cluster 
Approach.  This discussion suggests that the United Nations has a significant role 
to play in the management of relationships amongst collaborating actors within the 
humanitarian supply chain, hence the review moves on to consider the associated 
academic discourse on relationship management and power within this context.  The 
penultimate section of the review highlights a clear research opportunity; moreover, 
a significant number of research gaps are identified which form the basis of, and 
underpin the final research question and aim of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 3.  Research Methodology.  The range of issues that bear, both directly 
and more peripherally, on the research approach adopted are discussed within this 
chapter.  In explaining how the final methodology was arrived at both the external 
and internal influences on the methodological decisions made are acknowledged, 
and sources revealed surrounding the connections between the purpose of the 
research, the philosophical and theoretical perspectives taken and the research 
question previously arrived at in Chapter 2.  In order to clearly explain and justify the 
thought processes involved in arriving at the final methodology the research onion 
(Saunders et al, 2009) is systematically peeled, with discussion of each exposed 
layer being offered to explain the thinking behind the final chosen approach.  The 
resulting research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of 
data and the choice of design reflects decisions made about the priority given to a 
range of dimensions within the research process (Bryman and Bell, 2007); hence, 
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set against this background the research design methods employed to collect and 
analyse data are also discussed. 
 
Chapter 4.  The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs – Individual Domain Analysis.  The data gathered from The UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the participants within the UN 
Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) is presented and discussed concurrently 
with appropriate academic discourse within the field of research that was first 
introduced within Chapter 2.  A short background and history of the OCHA, its 
formation and role is included together with a discussion on the organisation’s 
growing influence and focus on the coordination of the overall humanitarian relief 
effort.  The tasking and structure of the CMCS is explained before the use of the 
organisation as a research domain for the study is justified.  The discussion then 
turns to an analysis of the key etic and emic issues and themes identified.  Final 
conclusions and overall domain themes and issues are then established through 
triangulation of the data gathered and the academic discourse.   
 
Chapter 5.  The UK Ministry of Defence Joint Forces Command – Individual 
Domain Analysis. The data gathered from the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) Joint 
Forces Command (JFC) is presented and discussed concurrently with appropriate 
academic discourse within the field of research that was first introduced within 
Chapter 2.  A short background and history of the UK military contribution to 
humanitarian disaster relief is included.  A discussion on the strategy behind the 
Joint Forces Logistic Component then follows, together with narrative on the 
organisation’s role within the planning and coordination of the UK military 
contribution to humanitarian disaster relief.  The UK MOD’s definitions of disaster 
relief operations are then explained and clarified before the future strategy for the 
JFC (post 2012) is considered together with a consideration of the on-going and 
escalating MOD involvement within disaster relief.  The discussion then turns to an 
analysis of the key etic and emic issues and themes identified.  Final conclusions 
and overall domain themes and issues are then established through triangulation of 
the data gathered and the academic discourse.    
 
Chapter 6.  Oxfam International – Individual Domain Analysis.  The data 
gathered from the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (Oxfam) is presented and 
discussed concurrently with appropriate academic discourse within the field of 
research that was first introduced within Chapter 2.  A short background and history 
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of Oxfam International is included together with a discussion on the organisation’s 
current (as at 2012) portfolio of humanitarian programmes and structures.  The 
discussion then turns to an analysis of the key etic and emic issues and themes 
identified.  Final conclusions and overall domain themes and issues are then 
established through triangulation of the data gathered and the academic discourse.   
 
Chapter 7.  Tearfund – Individual Domain Analysis.  The data gathered from 
participants within The Evangelical Alliance Relief (TEAR) Fund is presented and 
discussed concurrently with appropriate academic discourse within the field of 
research that was first introduced within Chapter 2.  A short background and history 
of Tearfund is included together with a look at its current (as at 2012) portfolio of 
humanitarian programmes and structures.  The discussion then turns to an analysis 
of the key etic and emic issues and themes identified.  Final conclusions and overall 
domain themes and issues are then established through triangulation of the data 
gathered and the academic discourse.   
 
Chapter 8.  Thesis Conclusions and Overall Contribution to Knowledge.  In 
keeping with the classic case study process (Yin, 2013 Simons, 2009; Stake, 1995) 
the discussion within Chapters 4 through 7 considers each of the research domains 
in isolation.  Hence, in seeking to establish the final conclusions and academic 
contribution the debate within this Chapter considers the results of a cross-domain 
analysis and uses as its basis the 4 significant emic themes and issues that emerged 
during the individual domain analyses; namely, management and control, 
understanding and training, relationships and military involvement.  Each emic 
theme is discussed separately, with the latter part of the Chapter drawing out the 
significance of the overall cross-domain analysis and with it the final contribution to 
knowledge.  The implications of this research and the associated findings are then 
considered within the context of the business supply chain.  In common with all 
research this study suffered from a number of limitations; hence, whilst these 
limitations did not detract from the overall significance of the findings, they are 
discussed within this Chapter.  Similarly, whilst the final Research Strategy (Fig 3.4) 
proved, on the whole to be successful, it was not without its difficulties and 
challenges; therefore, by way of lessons learned comment is also included on the 
implications for methodology.  Finally, the findings of this research reveal a number 
of opportunities for further research that would both enhance the contributions 
identified within this thesis and also generate new contributions to the body of 
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knowledge.  Thus, in closing the Chapter, a number of suggestions for further 
research are highlighted. 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has laid the foundations for the thesis.  The extent of the research problem 
and its background were introduced.  The rationale and context of the study were set out 
and the final research objective, question and aim established.   A short introduction to the 
final methodology adopted was included together with a summary of the research findings 
and overall contribution to knowledge.  Finally, a short explanation of the overall structure 
of the thesis was set out.  What emerges is a timely and pertinent investigation into what is 
a burgeoning field of academic interest, and one in which more qualitative empirical 
research is called for (Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 2011).  Public awareness 
when a disaster strikes demands immediate action that is aimed at reducing humanitarian 
suffering as well as speeding up overall response and recovery times.  It is clear that 
humanitarian logistics both as a practice and a research topic is now very much in the 
spotlight and that this research has a valid contribution to make to the developing body of 
knowledge in the field. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PERSPECTIVES ON HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT AND 
COLLABORATION 
 
“The line between order and disorder lies in logistics”  
(Sun-Tzu, translated by Ames, 1993) 
 
2.1 Integrating Existing Literature within the Research Process  
 
A competent review of the literature is at least in part a means of affirming your credibility 
as someone who is knowledgeable in your chosen area (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
However, this is not simply a matter of reproducing the theoretical opinions that previous 
scholars have variously expressed, but must also include a demonstration of the ability to 
interpret what has been written whilst possibly using the ideas of others to support a 
particular view-point or argument.  Two main reasons exist for reviewing the literature 
(Sharp et al, 2002 cited in Saunders et al, 2009); the first, the preliminary review helps to 
generate and refine ideas in order to arrive at a final research idea that meets the 
requirements of both the examining and sponsoring organisations.  The second often 
referred to as the critical review or critical literature review (Saunders et al, 2009), is a part 
of the research project proper.  Here the student will demonstrate an awareness of the 
current state of knowledge within the chosen subject field, note its limitations and identify 
in the wider context the anticipated area of contribution to be achieved through further 
enquiry.  Jankowicz (2005) best summarises the fundamental intentions of the literature 
review: 
 
“There is little point in reinventing the wheel…..the work that you do is not done in 
a vacuum, but builds on the ideas of other people who have studied the field 
before you.  This requires you describe what has been published, and to marshal 
the information in a relevant and critical way” (p.161) 
 
The review of previous related research should also help to identify key concepts and 
variables relevant to the chosen research area which may well have been defined by 
researchers in different ways and thus inconsistently reported (Gill and Johnson, 2010).  
Indeed these inconsistencies may need appropriate recognition and resolution within the 
review itself.  A key part of this close review of the topic should be an attempt to narrow the 
focus of discussion in order to position the research substantively and methodologically in 
relation to existing literature.  In doing so there should also be ample opportunity to highlight 
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those issues within the research which will provide additional or alternative insights; thereby 
justifying the project through elaboration of the predicted contribution. 
 
The precise approach to the literature will depend upon the methodological approach 
(deductive or inductive) that the researcher is intending to use (Gill and Johnson, 2010; 
Saunders et al, 2009).  With a deductive approach the role of the literature review is to 
critically review existing knowledge and to enable an exploration between differing variables 
or constructs of interest.  The primary aim is to identify theories and ideas which will be 
used to test hypotheses which have been developed through the review process; these 
hypotheses are then testable through the collection of appropriate data.  However, with 
inductive research the purposes of the literature review are altogether different (Gill and 
Johnson, 2010; Saunders et al, 2009).  Whilst the issues of contextualization and 
justification in relation to the existing body of knowledge are equally important within the 
literature review, and the research will still have a clearly defined purpose with associated 
research question(s) and objectives, there are no predetermined theories or conceptual 
frameworks at the outset.  Inductive approaches are concerned with developing a pre-
understanding of the substantive area of interest that provides a starting point for the 
research in terms of what Blumer (1954, cited by Gill and Johnson (2010) and Saunders et 
al, 2009) described as sensitizing concepts.  Blumer argued that the literature review should 
not be used as a vehicle to impose previously conceptualized ideas through the process of 
operationalisation used by deductive researchers; moreover the view is that there should 
be no “preconceived theory that dictates, prior to research, relevancies in concepts and 
hypotheses” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p.215).  
    
As already noted in Chapter 1 and developed in more detail in Chapter 3, a qualitative, 
inductive, approach was adopted for this thesis (Garfinkel, 1967 and Sacks et al, 1974 both 
cited by Bryman and Bell, 2007).  Carefully selected data gathering techniques were utilised 
to produce the rich data needed to establish similarities and, perhaps more importantly 
differences between key actors and/or organisations (Gill and Johnson, 2010, Saunders et 
al, 2009, Bryman and Bell, 2007).  Noting that generalisability and justification of a purely 
qualitative approach would be key concerns, distinct barriers (Gieryn, 1983) were put 
around the research at an early stage (see Section 2.6).  Whilst acknowledging the 
importance of all phases of humanitarian relief provision (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) 
(see Fig 2.9 and Section 2.6.1), the expected outcomes of a piece of doctrinally focussed 
research, volume of information and the need for focussed research effort, resulted in the 
decision to concentrate on the Immediate Response phase of humanitarian relief provision 
(Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007).  
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2.1.1 Structure of the Literary Review 
 
This literary review has been written to give the reader a logical flow to, and justification of 
the final research question and aim.  By way of a road map, the structure of the review is 
depicted in Fig 2.1. 
 
 
  Setting the Scene and a Discussion on the Scale of the Overall Challenge 
Generic Definitions of Supply Chain Management & Logistics and a 
discussion within the context of Humanitarian Relief 
Pressures on the Humanitarian Supply Chain, its actors and 
donors 
The Phases of Disaster Relief and a Focus on the 
Immediate Response Phase 
The Case for Optimisation and Collaboration 
and a discussion on differing strategies and 
approaches  
The United Nations Cluster 
Approach 
The Case for Further 
Study and Identified    
Research Gaps 
Research 
Question 
&         
Aim 
Fig 2.1  Structure of the Literary Review 
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The literary review will begin by setting the scene with a discussion on the scale of the 
challenge that the humanitarian relief community is faced with.  The disciplines associated 
with, and the definitions of supply chain and logistics management will then be considered, 
commencing with a generic view before a comparison of the key issues associated with the 
business and humanitarian supply chains will lead into a contextual discussion on the 
humanitarian supply chain itself.  The actors within the humanitarian supply chain will be 
established before consideration of the arguments for a network approach to the supply 
chain, and also of the academic discourse on the formation of hastily formed networks in 
the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster is made.   The pressures on the humanitarian 
supply chain and on those employed within it, will be analysed as themes and issues are 
identified which will help to inform the first stage of the final research design (as discussed 
and developed in Chapter 3).  Thoughts will turn to the distinct phases of disaster relief 
operations (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) and to the identification of an appropriate 
phase of focus for this research.  The importance of all phases of humanitarian relief 
provision is acknowledged and the case is made for the review and overall research to take 
as its focus the immediate response phase to disaster relief.  An appropriate supply chain 
for the immediate response phase will be discussed before the arguments for and concept 
of optimisation and collaboration within the humanitarian supply chain are considered.  A 
discussion on achieving collaboration through clusters will lead into an analysis of the aims 
and structure of the United Nations Cluster Approach, and a discussion on the overall 
effectiveness of this approach as an aid to collaboration.  This discussion suggests that the 
United Nations has a significant role to play in the management of relationships amongst 
collaborating actors within the humanitarian supply chain, hence the review will move on to 
consider the associated academic discourse on relationship management and power within 
this context.  The penultimate section of this review will draw on previous discussion within 
this Chapter to highlight a clear research opportunity within what is a burgeoning field of 
academic knowledge.  Moreover, a significant number of research gaps will be identified 
which will form the basis of this research and the final doctoral study.  Finally, the research 
question and aim of the thesis will be stated. 
 
What emerges within this review is a growing body of knowledge in a field that has come a 
long way since the original outcries about the poor management of the 2004 Asian tsunami 
relief effort (Kovács, 2011, p250).  Whilst commentary (Blansjaar, 2011; van Wassenhove, 
2006) debates the actual scale of resource that is dedicated to logistics provision in 
response to disasters, (somewhere between 50 and 80% of the total budget) what is clear 
is that humanitarian logistics both as a practice and a research topic is now very much in 
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the spotlight; so much so that opinion is now being offered that no longer is there simply a 
case for humanitarian logisticians to look at their commercial counterparts for best practice 
but that there is also a growing case for adoption of the reciprocal view (Christopher and 
Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011).   
 
The scene will now be set with a discussion on the scale of the challenge that the 
humanitarian supply chain community face. 
 
2.2 Setting the Scene - the Scale of the Challenge 
“As in previous years, there has been an increase in demand for humanitarian 
assistance while the operating environment for delivering such assistance 
becomes more complex.  Humanitarian responders are more numerous and 
diverse…..It will be essential over the coming years for the international system to 
find ways to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by this new 
environment and to respond more effectively to its challenges and demands”. 
(Un, 2013, p.2) 
 
“Effective [Humanitarian] logistics is the essence of famine relief because the 
greatest task in providing aid is getting food to the people who are starving” (Long 
and Wood, 1995, p213).   
 
“The speed of humanitarian aid after a disaster depends on the ability of 
logisticians to procure, transport and receive supplies at the site of a humanitarian 
relief effort” (Thomas, 2003, p4) 
 
 
The unprecedented world-wide response to the 2004 Asian Tsunami resulted in 
approximately $5 billion being raised by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (Thomas and Fritz, 2006); but many global companies wanted to do 
more – to give goods in kind and to lend logistics staff or managers.  Despite cautions 
against sending out unsolicited items, aid agencies were confronted with a stream of gifts 
sent out by well-meaning donors.  Within two weeks of the Tsunami, Colombo airport (Sri 
Lanka) reported that 288 freighter flights had arrived without airway bills to deliver 
humanitarian cargo (Thomas and Fritz, 2006); whilst some carried much-needed supplies 
that had been cleared by recognised humanitarian organisations a significant number 
brought unsolicited and inappropriate items (such as cuddly toys for children).   What results 
is described as a “Crowded Stage” (Heaslip, 2011, p.150) with the sheer number of 
disparate actors involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance complicating efforts to 
improve coordination. 
 
Disaster and disaster relief are not particularly new concepts.  Fritz (1961) described 
disaster as “Uncontrollable events that are coordinated in time or space, in which a society 
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undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses that the social structure is disrupted and 
the fulfilment of all of the essential functions is prevented” (p.655); Sjoberg (cited by Baker 
and Chapman,1962) saw disaster as “a severe, relatively sudden and frequently 
unexpected disruption of a social system resulting from some precipitating event that is not 
subject to social control” (p.357); a view clearly supported by Guhu-Sapir, et al (2011) 
whose reference to “a situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a 
request to a national or international level for external assistance; an unforeseen and often 
sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering”(p7) is that 
preferred by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED).  Perhaps 
a more telling and forthright assessment is that offered by Smith (cited by Rodriguez et al, 
2006) who simply see disasters as: 
 
“Events that produce death and destruction and cause considerable social, 
political and economic disruption” (p.301).   
 
Van Wassenhove (2006) provides a simple grid to help differentiate between sudden 
disasters and those which develop more slowly over a more protracted period, see Fig 2.2. 
 
 
 Natural Man-Made 
 
 
Sudden-onset 
 
Earthquake 
Hurricane 
Tornadoes 
 
 
Terrorist Attack 
Coup d’état 
Chemical Leak 
 
 
Slow on-set 
 
Famine 
Drought 
Poverty 
 
Political Crisis 
Refugee Crisis 
 
 
Fig 2.2  Explaining Disasters. (Van Wassenhove, 2006, p476) 
 
As will be discussed later and developed in greater depth within Chapter 3, appropriate 
boundary setting based on associated research boundary work (Gieryn 1983) was a key 
issue at the outset of this study.  This meant that, whilst acknowledging the importance of 
all types of disasters, this review and the overall emphasis of the study took as their focus 
the sudden onset - natural (Van Wassenhove, 2006) type of disasters. 
According to figures offered by CRED, in 2010 alone a total of 385 separate natural 
disasters killed over 297 000 people worldwide, affecting more than 217.0 million others 
and causing US$ 123.9 billion of economic damages (Guhu-Sapir et al, 2011).  It is 
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unsurprising therefore that an extensive humanitarian community has built up progressively 
during the last 50 years (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006).  Moreover, disaster relief is and will 
continue to be a growth market with both natural and man-made disasters expected to 
increase another five-fold over the next 50 years (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005).  
Consideration of the natural disasters reported between 1900 and 2010, Fig 2.3 
(International Disaster Data Base, EM-DAT, 2012) would seem to support these somewhat 
pessimistic forecasts.   
 
Year 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Number of 
Disasters 
5 5 8 10 15 30 45 65 120 250 450 400 
 
 
Fig 2.3 Natural Disasters Reported 1900-2010 (International Disaster Database, EM–DAT, 
2011). 
 
 
Trunick (2005) notes that supply chain management and logistics have always been an 
important factor in humanitarian aid operations, to the extent that logistics efforts account 
for 80 percent of disaster relief.  Agreeing with this, van Wassenhove (2006) argues that 
the majority of NGOs are in practice logistics organisations as he also estimates that some 
80 percent of NGO expenditure is related in some way to logistics.  One of the notable 
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aspects of the relief effort following the 2004 Asian Tsunami was the public 
acknowledgement of the role of logistics in effective relief.  In the immediate aftermath of 
the Tsunami, relief goods flooded airports and warehouses in the affected regions leaving 
aid agencies struggling to sort through, store and distribute the piles of supplies.  In Sri 
Lanka cargo-laden humanitarian flights overwhelmed the goods capacity of the airport and 
downstream relief agencies struggled to locate warehouses to store excess inventory.  
Indian transportation pipelines were bottlenecked and in Indonesia damaged infrastructure 
created what Thomas and Kopczak (2005) described as a “logistical nightmare” (p1).  A 
spokesman for Doctors Without Borders at the time acknowledged the importance of 
coordinated logistics and supply chain management: 
 
“What is needed are supply managers: people who sort goods, identify priorities, 
track deliveries and direct the traffic of a relief effort in full gear” (Economist, 2005).   
 
However, the logistical obstacles to delivering humanitarian aid make managing a 
commercial supply chain look easy by comparison and many organisations continue to 
underestimate the importance of logistics in disaster relief operations and still focus on 
fundraising activities only (Murray, 2005).  Whilst the perspective of the logistician is seen 
as a strategic and central component to the planning of effective relief effort (Thomas, 
2003), research (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005) has shown that only a handful of aid 
agencies have prioritized the creation of high-performance logistics and supply chain 
operations and that consequently, relief operations are not as efficient and effective as they 
could be; as a result relief to beneficiaries is delayed or reduced.   
 
Having set the scene discussion must now turn to the background to and definitions of, 
SCM and logistics both in the generic sense and to those more pertinent to the humanitarian 
sector. 
 
2.3 Supply Chain Management and Logistics 
 
Supply Chain Management (SCM) and Logistics are not new ideas (Christopher, 2011).  
From the building of the pyramids to the relief of hunger in Africa, the principles underpinning 
the effective flow of materials and information to meet the requirements of customers have 
altered little.  Academic opinion (Mangan et al, 2012; Slack et al, 2010; Greasley 2009; 
Bozarth and Handfield, 2008; Harrison and van Hoek, 2008 to name but a few) support the 
traditional Transformational Process view of an organisation, placing the emphasis on the 
activities that the particular organisation must perform when managing its own operations.  
However, opinion is also quick to acknowledge that it is not enough for an organisation to 
simply focus on operations within its own boundaries anymore, and that managers must 
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also appreciate how the organisation is linked within the operations of its suppliers, 
distributors and most importantly, customers; in essence it is vital for organisations to 
appreciate their position in what is termed the Supply Chain and the role that logistics has 
to play within it (Sweeney, 2005).  SCM’s economic and social construction are not just 
noteworthy but remarkable (Fawcett and Waller, 2013, p.183) as it provides the opportunity 
to optimise logistical performance at the inter-organisational level (Mangan et al, 2012; 
Harrison and van Hoek, 2011; Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Monczka et al, 2010; Lysons and 
Farrington, 2006).  It seeks to achieve linkage and co-ordination between the processes of 
other entities (suppliers and customers) in the pipeline and the organisation itself.  For SCM 
to be successful it involves a significant change from the traditional arm’s-length, even 
adversarial, customer/supplier relationships of the past with a focus on co-operation and 
trust and the recognition that, if properly managed “the whole can be greater than the sum 
of the parts” (Christopher, 2011, p.3).  It appears that SCM is “Logistics taken across inter-
organisational boundaries” (Cooper et al, 1997, p.1) but what is also clear is that for SCM 
to succeed managers must appreciate how their organisational processes are linked in with 
those of their suppliers, distributors and customers (Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Bozarth and 
Handfield, 2008).  The discussion will now consider the generic background to, and 
definitions of SCM and logistics.   
 
2.3.1 Generic Background and Definitions 
 
There has been significant debate surrounding what distinguishes logistics and SCM.  It 
appears that SCM is “Logistics taken across inter-organisational boundaries” (Cooper et al, 
1997, p.1) but what is also clear is that for SCM to succeed managers must appreciate how 
their organisational processes are linked in with those of their suppliers, distributors and 
customers (Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Bozarth and Handfield, 2008).  Larson and 
Halldórsson (2004) offer 4 conceptual perspectives (see fig 2.4) 
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The traditionalist view places SCM within logistics, and suggests that SCM is just one small 
part of the logistics function. The re-labeling perspective contends that SCM is simply a 
renaming of what was once understood to be logistics and is now known as SCM.  The 
unionist perspective regards logistics as a fundamental part of SCM in that SCM completely 
subsumes the logistics function.  Finally, the intersectionist perspective is described by 
Larson and Halldórsson (2004) as: 
 
“The intersection concept suggests SCM is not the union of logistics, marketing, 
operations management, purchasing and other functional areas. Rather, it includes 
strategic, integrative elements from all of these disciplines. For instance, in the 
purchasing area, negotiating a long-term arrangement is a strategic element and 
transmitting a purchase order is tactical. The supply chain manager would be 
involved in the negotiations, but not the purchase order transmission. Similarly, in 
the logistics area, hiring a third-party logistics (3PL) provider is a strategic decision, 
while picking and packing in the warehouse are tactical. At the intersection, SCM 
co-ordinates cross functional efforts across multiple firms. SCM is strategic, not 
tactical. (p.21) 
 
Logistics 
Logistics 
Logistics 
Logistics 
SCM 
SCM SCM 
SCM 
X 
Traditionalist 
Unionist Intersectionist 
Re-Labelling 
Fig 2.4     Perspectives on Logistics versus Supply Chain Management (Larson and 
Halldórsson, 2004, p19)  
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The Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP, 2014) acknowledge 
that supply chain management (SCM) as a profession has continued to change and 
evolve to fit the needs of the growing global supply chain.  They also note that the fact that 
the supply chain is expected to cover a broad range of disciplines, means that it can be 
difficult to clearly define what a supply chain actually is.  Indeed the CSCMP argue that at 
times SCM can be confused with the term logistics management; accordingly, they  
propose the following definitions: 
 
“Supply chain management encompasses the planning and management of all 
activities involved in sourcing and procurement, conversion, and all logistics 
management activities. Importantly, it also includes coordination and collaboration 
with channel partners, which can be suppliers, intermediaries, third party service 
providers, and customers. In essence, supply chain management integrates supply 
and demand management within and across companies” (CSCMP, 2014). 
 
“Logistics management is that part of supply chain management that plans, 
implements, and controls the efficient, effective forward and reverses flow and 
storage of goods, services and related information between the point of origin and 
the point of consumption in order to meet customers' requirements” (CSCMP, 2014). 
 
If we are to be in a position to move the discussion on to consider the specific context of 
the humanitarian supply chain, given that these generic definitions are set against the 
business sector it is appropriate at this point to consider a comparison of the humanitarian 
supply chain with that for the business sector.  
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2.3.2 Humanitarian and Business Supply Chains – a Comparison 
Table 2.1 offers a comparison of the key issues associated with Business and Humanitarian 
Supply Chains.   
 
 Supply Chain 
Issue Business Humanitarian 
Logistical Demands Predetermined  
Predictable - Efficient 
Stable - Uncomplicated 
Unique 
Unpredictable – Reactive - Inefficient 
Unstable - Complex 
Logistical Drivers/ 
Motivators 
Profit 
Costs 
Quality 
Efficiency 
Effectiveness 
Preservation and Improvement of Life 
Speed of Response – acute timeframe 
Flexibility 
Agility 
Effectiveness 
Improvement and 
Learning 
Encouraged 
Achievable 
Waking up 
Little time to review, rapid response 
leads to a fire fighting approach 
Actor/Stakeholder 
Involvement 
Manageable Numbers 
Similar Interests 
Numerous 
Differing Interests – political, ideological 
Risk of Mismatch Increasing - globalisation = longer 
paths and shorter response times 
Decreasing margins for error 
High 
 
Very small margins for error  
Approaches to  
Collaboration 
Common reasons to collaborate –
win-win long-term non-adversarial 
relationships encouraged 
 
Business Culture and successes 
reinforce cooperation. 
 
High levels of buyer dominance over 
suppliers.  Ability to reconfigure 
supplier relationships selectively and 
dissolve partnerships that have 
outlived usefulness. 
 
Supplier Associations – forums to 
enable suppliers to understand 
customer plans 
 
Businesses can see humanitarians 
as idealistic and inefficient. 
Little Reason to Collaborate - large 
numbers of disparate donors, 
governments and military actors with 
differing interests  
 
Little evidence of agreement on 
relationships 
 
Overall lack of coordination – some 
evidence of improving cooperation with 
organisations becoming more adept at 
working with corporate partners  
 
Logistics Cluster - cross functional team 
to coordinate NGOs and allocated 
process  
 
Increasing power of donors who can 
detrimentally affect balance of supply 
and demand   
 
Humanitarians sceptical of the business 
world.   
 
Table 2.1 Comparison of Business and Humanitarian Supply Chains 
 
Emergencies generated by natural disasters are unique (Chandes and Paché, 2010, p322); 
lives are at stake and in contrast to the business sector the issue is not to bring quality 
logistical service to consumers at the lowest cost.  Unlike in business, where traditionally 
logistical demands have usually been predetermined, the humanitarian supply chain is 
faced with a series of unknowns (Cassidy, 2003).  In business profit maximisation and cost 
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minimisation are ordinarily key drivers/motivators as is the desire to sustain long-term 
market demand and the limitation of uncertainty within the supply chain; however, the 
provision of humanitarian aid has a differing set of characteristics which inevitably 
complicate the associated management task (Decker et al, 2013; Kumar and Havey, 2013; 
Dash et al, 2013; Mays et al, 2012; Heaslip, 2011; McLachlin and Larson, 2011; Kovács 
and Spens, 2007).  Humanitarians aim to prioritise a shared moral code which overrides 
economic outcomes; moreover they operate in environments which will feature high 
uncertainty and constantly changing contexts (Mays et al, 2012).  Humanitarian 
organisations may also be expected to leave one disaster zone and deploy straight into 
another offering little time to invest in the process of improvement and learning.  
Commentators argue that humanitarian organisations are somewhere between 15 and 20 
years behind their private sector counterparts in respect of the application of supply chain 
management tools, and in the realisation of the levels of efficiency and effectiveness 
associated with the recognition of logistics as a managerial discipline (Spring, 2006; Van 
Wassenhove, 2006).   
 
Humanitarian disasters often involve and test the abilities of numerous organisations, actors 
and contending stakeholders including governments, non-governmental (NGOs) or private 
voluntary organisations, multi-governmental organisations, and local and national military 
organisations (Kovács and Spens, 2008; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009a).  Within 
two weeks of the 2004 Asian Tsunami, Colombo airport (Sri Lanka) 288 freighter flights had 
arrived without airway bills to deliver humanitarian cargo (Thomas and Fritz, 2006); 
moreover approximately 400 NGOs were working on the ground in Indonesia alone (Völz, 
2005).  As is the case in the private sector, the risk of mismatch and the disruption afforded 
by globalisation, together with the associated smaller margins for error (Kleindorfer and Van 
Wassenhove, 2004) will inevitably put even more strain on humanitarian supply chains.  
Indeed, it is argued (Perry, 2007, Van Wassenhove, 2006; Kleindorfer and Van 
Wassenhove, 2004) that the private sector could have lessons to learn from the challenges 
faced by humanitarian supply chains, which show the extremes of a trend towards the 
greater levels of risk and uncertainty that are becoming more and more apparent in modern 
global private sector supply chains (Christopher, 2011).    
 
This comparison and discussion leaves us in a position to consider appropriate definitions 
within the specific context of the humanitarian supply chain, and the associated logistics 
demands and requirements.   
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2.3.3 Humanitarian Supply Chain Management and Logistics 
 
Humanitarian SCM and logistics have emerged as a worldwide-noticeable theme as 
disasters, either man-made or natural, may occur at any time around the world with 
enormous consequences (Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; 
Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada et al, 2006).  Consequently, the provision of timely and 
appropriate humanitarian aid has developed into a global and multinational industry 
(Carroll and Neu, 2009) and more and more focus is being placed on the optimization of 
the logistics and supply chains that are charged with transforming public and private 
donations into tangible aid.  There now exists a fierce need to coordinate the logistics 
resources of the public and private sectors to avoid arbitrary resource allocation during 
disasters; however, ineffective coordination of efforts between relief suppliers, logistics 
servers and demanders is still a major concern (Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van 
Wassenhove, 2009).  It has been recognised that the humanitarian relief effort concerns 
itself with: 
 
“A process of planning, managing and controlling the efficient flows of relief, 
information, and services from the points of origin to the points of destination to meet 
the urgent needs of the affected people” (Ernst, 2003),  
and that in humanitarian relief operations: 
“Logistics planning and coordination need to be seen as essential rather than merely 
desirable” (Rickard, 2003).   
Whilst business logistics has already been clearly defined by numerous authors (see for 
example Mangan et al, 2012; Christopher, 2011; Harrison and van Hoek, 2011; Slack et al, 
2010; Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Monczka et al, 2010), definitions of humanitarian logistics 
are less prevalent.  The principles of the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport’s 
Humanitarian and Emergency Logistics (HELP) forum offer one definition: 
 
“Right people, equipment and material, in the right place, in the right sequence as 
soon as possible, to deliver maximum relief at the least cost – saved lives, reduced 
suffering and the best use of donated funds” (CILT, 2011). 
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However, the statement offered by Thomas and Kopczak (2005) seems to be the one that 
is currently adopted by the majority of authors within the field: 
 
“the process of planning, implementing and controlling the efficient, cost-effective 
flow and storage of goods and materials, as well as related information, from the 
point of origin to the point of consumption for the purpose of alleviating the suffering 
of vulnerable people.  The function encompasses a range of activities, including 
preparedness, planning, procurement, transport, warehousing, tracking and tracing, 
and customs clearance” (p.2) 
 
The similarity between this definition and that offered by the CSCMP (2014) and discussed 
earlier, in respect of the business sector is striking.  Hence, for the purposes of this research 
Thomas and Kopczak’s (2005) definition for the humanitarian SC is adopted.  Moreover, 
thinking back to the perspectives offered by Larson and Halldórsson (2004), some argue 
that within the humanitarian logistics community a re-labeling is taking place in that what 
was once logistics is now SCM (Heaslip, 2012b, p.38).  However, given the focus on 
collaboration within this thesis a unionist stance will be adopted whereby logistics is 
regarded as a fundamental part of SCM.  In keeping with the thoughts of Mangan et al 
(2012): 
 
“The SC is a much wider, intercompany, boundary-spanning concept, than is the 
case with logistics”. (p.13) 
 
Thomas and Kopczak (2005, p2) offer four supporting reasons why humanitarian logistics 
is central to disaster relief and crucial to the performance of both current and future 
operations: 
 
1. Logistics is crucial to the effectiveness and speed of response for major 
humanitarian programs. 
 
2. With procurement and transportation included in the function logistics can be one 
of the most expensive parts of a relief effort. 
 
3. The logistics department is often the repository of data that can be analysed to 
provide post-event learning, as it will handle the tracking of goods through the 
supply chain. 
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4. Logistics data reflects all aspects of execution from the effectiveness of suppliers 
and transportation providers, to the cost and timeliness of response, to the 
appropriateness of donated goods and the management of information.   
 
Having defined the humanitarian supply chain within the context of this research and 
acknowledged the significance of the chain itself and of the associated logistics processes, 
thoughts must now turn to defining the actors involved in the overall relief effort.  
 
2.3.4 The Actors within the Humanitarian Supply Chain 
 
The supply chains associated with business enterprise ordinarily concern themselves with 
the effective and efficient management of the flow of goods, information and finances to 
final customers (demand satisfaction); however in the case of humanitarian logistics, 
circumstance calls for the process to go beyond mere profitability (Ernst, 2003).  In 
humanitarian logistics demand is not actually created as the end customer has no true 
choice (Kovács and Spens, 2007); hence, the numerous actors involved in the 
Humanitarian Aid Supply Network are not linked or motivated by pure financial gain or by 
the simple need to satisfy demand.  Each actor within what will be a complex supply network 
will have their own motivation and distinct reasons for their participation (the idea of 
motivation and influences will be discussed in greater depth later, see Section 2.4).  Kovács 
and Spens first offered a model of actors within the supply network of humanitarian aid in 
2007, which included donors, aid agencies, governmental and non-governmental 
organisations (NGO), military, logistics service providers and suppliers.  The original model 
was presented in numerous arenas both academic and practical and following the 
associated feedback was modified to the revised version below (Fig 2.5)  
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Fig 2.5 Actors in the Supply Chain Network of Humanitarian Aid – a Revised Model 
(Kovács and Spens, 2008) 
 
 
The revised model depicts the actors within the supply network as donors, aid agencies, 
NGOs, governments, military and logistics providers.  Donors are considered as the 
important actors who, in recent years have provided the bulk of funding in support of the 
relief effort; typically these will include foundations, individual donors and the private sector, 
as well as country specific funding such as that from the United Kingdom.  Other actors 
include the military, the governments from host and neighbouring nations, and other NGOs 
and logistics providers.  The military is acknowledged as a significant actor on many 
occasions (Ozdammer et al, 2004) and their role will be discussed in greater detail in the 
next section of this review.  Many independent companies or individuals may elect to supply 
materials and services in disaster relief; however, these suppliers (Kovács and Spens, 
2008) may have vastly different reasons for participating in disaster relief (the idea of 
Corporate Social Responsibility will be discussed later).   
 
This model is still not without its critics and the failure to include beneficiaries as customers 
in respect of the aid effort has been noted (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006); however Kovács 
and Spens (2008) contend that they should not be included as they are not in a position to 
shape demand, the contention being that NGOs and aid agencies will effectively represent 
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the interests of beneficiaries by completing needs assessments in the aftermath of a 
disaster (Long and Wood, 1995).  Another criticism surrounds the inclusion of the media 
(Heaslip et al, 2007), and the assertion that they can influence the donor response to 
disasters.  Whilst acknowledging the role of the media Kovács and Spens (2008) are content 
that they should not feature as the final model stems from the use of an industrial network 
approach and, as such only includes active participants within the delivery of humanitarian 
aid.  It should also be noted at this stage that whilst the core responsibility of humanitarian 
organisations is towards beneficiaries of aid, actors also face pressure from other 
stakeholder groups, most prominently the donors that they are ultimately accountable to 
(Beamon and Balcik 2008).  (The associated pressures will be discussed in greater detail 
later in thesis).  Hence, the customers of this SC network are both the donors and 
beneficiaries and the suppliers can also be donors and/or paid suppliers (Charles et al, 
2010, Oloruntoba and Gray 2009).  As discussed earlier, the model offered here serves to 
illustrate the number of disparate actors and the resulting complexity of the humanitarian 
SC and hence the challenge associated with achieving overall coordination of effort when 
at times “everyone and no one may seem to be in charge” (Heaslip, 2011, p.151).   
 
2.3.4.1  The Military Contribution 
 
The involvement of military forces in the provision of humanitarian aid in cases of conflict or 
natural disasters is not a new concept (Heaslip and Barber, 2014).  Examples of associated 
intervention exist during World Wars I and II and up to the present day, including the Berlin 
Airlift, the Congo, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Sudan, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Mozambique (Heaslip et al, 2012, p.377; Doel, 1995, p.26).  Weeks (2007) notes the 
significant United States military involvement in the responses to recent natural disasters, 
such as the Asian Tsunami and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  Moreover, Weeks also 
highlights the wish of the then President (George W Bush) to see an even larger role for the 
military in the response to natural disasters.     Similarly, with the end of the Cold War, the 
UK government has become more involved in the provision of humanitarian aid, not only 
through the funding of UN Agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) but also 
with the tasking of its armed forces.  Such an outlook and focus is highlighted by the 
Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR, 2011) which, under the chairmanship 
of Lord Ashdown considered the way that the UK government responds to humanitarian 
emergencies.  The review identified that: 
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“It is because the impulse to relieve suffering is rooted in morality that our 
interventions to relieve suffering at times of disaster must always be driven by 
need and need alone. Nevertheless, the fact that Britain is prepared to play a full 
part (and often a leading part) as a member of the international community in order 
to relieve suffering at times of crisis makes for, not only a more compassionate 
world, but a safer one too – and that benefits all of us”.  (HERR, 2011, p3) 
 
There is a clear distinction between the military response to a complex emergency (such as 
that in Iraq or Afghanistan) and that associated with a natural disaster, and the contention 
amongst academic commentators is that the contributions of military actors are more readily 
accepted following a natural disaster (Cross, 2012; Balcik et al, 2010, Kovács and Taham, 
2009).  Moreover, in some cases the contributions of militaries who are regarded as middle 
powers such as those from Canada, Holland, Ireland or the Scandinavian countries is seen 
as more acceptable than that offered by those from larger powers, for example the United 
States or United Kingdom (Rutherford et al, 2003).  Military humanitarian actors have 
traditionally favoured short-term lifesaving interventions with a clearly defined exit strategy 
(Rigby, 2001, p.957), hence in keeping with the focus of this thesis the immediate response 
phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008) to a natural disaster is considered to be the element where 
there is likely to be a mix of military and non-military organisations working alongside one 
another (Pettit and Beresford, 2005).  This is due in no small part to the capacity boosting 
availability of military resources, and on the military’s ability to cope with the unpredictability 
of demand and associated flexibility of response required (Rietjens et al, 2007); moreover, 
the rapid response offered by the military together with its structured command and control 
systems is not found in the majority of NGOs or other actors within the humanitarian supply 
chain (Kovács and Tatham, 2010).   
 
As will be discussed later within this thesis (Section 4.4.1) the Oslo Guidelines (UN, 2006) 
were developed to ensure that foreign military and civil defence assets deployed in 
response to a natural disaster could support and complement relief operations whilst 
working together in collaboration.  The Guidelines clearly state that military resources must 
not be used “in a manner that would compromise the civilian nature and character of 
humanitarian assistance” (p.4).  However, noting that military assets are still frequently used 
in support of the relief effort, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Assistance (UN OCHA) and its humanitarian partners are frequently called upon to work 
with its member states to incorporate into contingency planning the possibility of military 
asset usage, and to engage military actors at an early stage in the response in order to 
guide military efforts and to protect the humanitarian space (Seigel, 2011; Tomasini and 
Van Wassenhove, 2009).  The United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination 
Section (CMCS) is the organisation within OCHA tasked with facilitating dialogue and 
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interaction between civilian and military actors within a given disaster zone (OCHA, 2012d).  
As a result of its role, as will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 the UN CMCS was chosen 
as an appropriate domain of study for this research.  Furthermore, following a humanitarian 
natural disaster the UK government may be requested to mount or lend support to the relief 
effort in the country or region affected (see discussion on the role of a humanitarian military, 
Fischer, 2011).  The UK contribution will usually be led by the Department for International 
Development (DFID) who may call on military assistance if civilian resources are insufficient 
or if this approach provides a comparative advantage.  The Joint Forces Logistic 
Component (JFLogC) is the organisation within the UK Ministry of Defence which is tasked 
with the planning and coordination of all military Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 
Relief Operations (HADRO) (MOD, 2008).  Hence, as will be discussed within Chapters 3 
and 5 the JFLogC was selected as an appropriate domain of study for this research. 
 
2.3.5 Supply Network Management and Hastily Formed Networks 
 
In an attempt to reflect the growing recognition that the logistics of a disaster response are 
a key cost driver (Christopher, 2011; Aitken et al, 2005), some argue that the term Supply 
Network Management (SNM) is actually a more accurate representation of the reality found 
in many commercial and humanitarian scenarios (Tatham and Pettit, 2010, p.610).  This 
argument is typified by Lambert et al (1998) who suggest that: 
“Strictly speaking, however, the supply chain is not just a chain of businesses with 
one-to-one business-to-business relationships, but a network of multiple business 
and relationships” (p.1)     
 
Given this, discussion will now turn to a network approach to the supply chain. The terms 
supply chain and supply network are both offered by way of descriptors of the linkages 
that enable organisations to serve the end customer (Harrison and van Hoek, 2011).  
Whilst the term chain describes a relatively simple, sequential set of links, network refers 
to a more complex structure which relies upon two-way exchanges between member 
organisations.   In essence the network can be described as a series of interdependent 
processes which, when working in harmony go together to serve the end customer 
(Sadler, 2007).  In offering arguments in support of collaboration in what he describes as a 
“synchronous supply chain” Christopher (2011, p141) discusses the problems associated 
with the inherent disconnection between stages within conventional supply chains.  
Moreover, Christopher goes on to contend that if the supply chain is regarded as a 
“confederation of partners linked together as a network” (p104) and not as a series of 
“separate islands” (p141), then true agility can be achieved.   
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Gadde et al (2010) bring strategic choice into the debate as they discuss three basic 
approaches to network strategy: 
 
1. Conservative Network Strategy:  Rely on low-involvement and minimal ‘thin’ 
relationships, looking instead to actively exploit perceived benefits within the market.    
 
2. Liberal Network Strategy:  Characterised by a variation between high- and low-
involvement relationships depending on circumstances.  Extensive collaboration will 
be used if benefit is perceived whilst other relationships may be governed by market 
mechanisms. 
 
3. Radical Network Strategy:  Relationships should be the norm as it is believed that 
collaboration will always provide opportunities for performance improvement.  
 
In discussing barriers and facilitators to the development of sustainable networks, Hingley 
and Lindgreen (2013) argue for a clearer understanding of the potential benefits of a 
network structure within a business context, whilst highlighting the possible impact of power 
relationships and the role of lead organisations within distribution networks.  Although the 
discussion focusses on the role of local and regional food businesses within networks the 
similarities with the field of humanitarian relief provision are striking.  Hence the concept of 
relationships and power will be discussed later in this review as the potential position of the 
United Nations within the humanitarian SC is considered.  The use of market mapping as 
an approach to describe the value chain, support services and business environment (Albu 
and Griffith, 2006) offers a participative vehicle to identify the blockers or gatekeepers 
(Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley et al, 2010) who ultimately prevent cooperation and 
cohesion within a given network.  The mapping process also promotes a better 
understanding of the competencies and relationships necessary for specific market systems 
to work by identifying 3 distinct components: 
 
1. Business Environment (the influencers): Infrastructure and policies, institutions 
and processes that shape the market system. 
 
2. Market Chain Actors and their Linkages (the players):  The chain of actors who 
own a product as it moves form primary producers to consumers. 
 
3. Service Providers (the supporters): The business and extension services that 
support the operation.      
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Taking this discussion into the field of this research, Yaziji and Doh (2009) recognise the 
importance of NGO networks, advising that given their limited resources, NGOs in particular 
can benefit from network involvement.  If an NGO is positioned correctly it can gain influence 
by identifying and filling structural holes within the network, and can find itself in the role of 
a power broker as it is called upon to mediate or moderate relationships between others 
within the overall synchronised configuration (Doh and Teegan, 2003).  Kumar and Havey 
(2013) support this view, arguing the case for a network authority to make best use of the 
diverse expertise inherent within a humanitarian supply chain; the associated structure 
being designed to make best use of the community relationships and trust that exists 
between NGOs throughout the world, resulting in a more effective overall response.  
However, the challenge in applying this theoretical approach to rapid onset disasters is that 
the networks are what Kumar and Havey (2013) describe as hastily formed (HFN), hence 
there is not the opportunity to build the trust that can be associated with longer term 
relationships.  The characteristics of HFN’s are listed as (Tatham and Kovács, 2010): 
 
1. Rapidly Established Network. 
 
2. Participants from Different Communities, Organisations and Cultures. 
 
3. Participants Forced to work in a shared, confined space. 
 
In a development of Hung et al’s, (2004) discussion on a peripheral route to trust Tatham 
and Kovács (2010, p38) suggest a model of swift trust that they feel is pertinent within 
humanitarian supply chains, see Figure 2.6.  
36 
 
   
 
 
Fig 2.6      The Route to Swift Trust (Tatham and Kovács, 2010, p38). 
 
Given the critical nature of humanitarian relief and the necessarily short delivery times 
required, the HFNs that are formed are normally between relatively small numbers of 
suppliers which may already have mature trusting relationships (Tatham and Kovács, 
2010).  However, the nature of the HFN becomes important when the other individuals and 
organisations that are also active in the same disaster response are considered as these 
relationships are not mature and the Route to Swift Trust may well be evident.  Furthermore, 
the complexity of the final network is multiplied still further due to the numerous additional 
internal and external pressures that act on the humanitarian supply chain, hence, the 
discussion will now turn to consider these as we endeavour to clarify the overall scale of the 
associated managerial challenge.  
 
2.4 Pressures on the Humanitarian Supply Chain  
The discussion thus far has identified the complexity that results when a humanitarian 
supply chain is developed and also highlighted the number and variety of different 
associated actors.  As will be discussed and developed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, a 3 stage 
research design was developed with the initial stage being based on the development of 
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the etic themes and issues that have an influence on the humanitarian SC and collaboration 
within it.  Hence, if these themes and issues are to be identified then consideration must be 
given at this stage to the inherent pressures both internal and external on the SC itself.     
 
2.4.1 Humanitarian Principles and the Humanitarian Space 
 
 
“The Humanitarian Space is an environment where humanitarians can work 
without hindrance and follow humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and 
humanity” (Spearin, 2001, p22). 
 
 
The principle of humanity means that humankind shall be treated humanely in all 
circumstances by saving lives and alleviating suffering, while ensuring respect for the 
individual.  This is a fundamental principle of humanitarian response (Picet, 1979).  The 
Code of conflict for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in 
Disaster Relief, introduces the concept of the humanitarian imperative which expands the 
principle of humanity to include the right to receive and to give humanitarian assistance.  It 
states the obligation of the international community “to provide humanitarian assistance 
wherever it is needed” (Slim, 2000). 
 
Humanity, neutrality and impartiality must be present to constitute a humanitarian operation 
(Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009).  Add to this the concept of independence and the 
4 humanitarian principles are defined (DFID, 2008): 
 
1. Humanity:  to bring assistance to people in distress without discrimination 
 
2. Impartiality:  Action is based solely on need 
 
3. Neutrality:  Humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict. 
 
4. Independence:  Humanitarian action must be kept separate from political, 
economic, military or other objectives. 
 
These principles were first developed by Henry Dunant after the battle of Solferino (1859), 
initially to protect the rights of soldiers.  They became part of the Geneva Convention in 
1864 and then formed the seeds of the Red Cross Movement in 1875 (British Red Cross, 
2010).  Dunanists have their beliefs firmly rooted in the principles advocated by Henry 
Dunant and work tirelessly to uphold the principles of impartiality and neutrality, advocating 
a non-interventionist strategy in conflict (Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 2011).  
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The Humanitarian Space (the framework within which organisations can properly conduct 
humanitarian work) is driven by the three principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality 
(Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009, p.25).  The Humanitarian Space exists in both a 
physical and virtual sense, and it is the goal of all humanitarian agencies to live and operate 
within it.  In the physical sense, security is the key as it represents the zone where all aid 
agencies are protected from violent intervention and can move and operate freely.  In the 
virtual sense, it represents the interaction between the different humanitarian actors and 
systems and how they can create a working environment where their mandates can be 
maintained and executed.  Given that all three principles included are of equal importance, 
Tomasini and Van Wassenhove (2009) contend that the visual representation of this idea 
(Fig 2.7) should be one of an equilateral triangle whose internal area equates to the 
humanitarian pace.  Maintaining its balance is what all agencies should strive for and any 
compromise on any one principle would affect the size and shape of the triangle and 
ultimately individual agencies’ ability to operate effectively.  Moreover, it should not be 
forgotten that the forth principle of Independence must also have an overriding influence on 
the overall strategy and shape of any relief operation (DFID, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weiss and Collins (2000) note that a dilemma may emerge when armed conflict rages and 
non-combatants are clearly being targeted by a warring party.  How should the humanitarian 
organisation maintain impartiality neutrality and independence, when this may involve 
Fig 2.7    Humanitarian Space and Principles (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009, p.27) 
 
Humanity 
Neutrality Impartiality 
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breaking these key principles by making public the violations and atrocities that they are 
witnessing?  Moreover, as well as courting question from voluntary financial contributors, 
this approach may also involve humanitarian actors taking the chance that the belligerents 
may withdraw their consent for a humanitarian presence.  Recent commentary (Charity and 
Security, 2010a) on the approaches of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
towards the provision of health services in Afghanistan illustrates this point and highlights 
the lengths that humanitarian actors must go to, and the criticism which they may face whilst 
endeavouring to uphold Dunanist principles.  The ICRC’s Mission Statement is to be: 
 
“An impartial, neutral and independent organisation whose exclusively 
humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict 
and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance”  (ICRC, 
2010).  
 
In keeping with this statement the ICRC has been providing first aid kits, training and other 
humanitarian aid to anyone in the conflict areas, including Afghan security forces and the 
Taliban.  This has triggered an angry response from some but others see it as “neutrality at 
its best” (Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 2010).  Indeed, a US military spokesman for the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan offered his support to the 
ICRC approach recognising “the need for the their [Red Cross’] work to be executed 
impartially” (Washington Times, 2010).  Moreover, arguments are growing (Charity and 
Security, 2010b) that impartiality is a fundamental principle of NGOs who provide 
humanitarian assistance and that it is time for the US to change laws that restrict aid groups 
in these efforts.  
 
Post the 9/11 atrocities in New York (2001), arguments began to emerge regarding the 
humanitarian communities’ ability to maintain its neutral position (Stoddard, 2003; Lobe, 
2003; USAID, 2003) in the face of messages from the White House (USAID, 2003) that 
neutral humanitarianism had no place within the framework of the Global War on Terror.  
More recently, Bear (2009) offered the view that it was time to accept that NGOs were no 
longer neutral and that they should stop ‘clinging to the myth’ that they are.  He cites 
statistical analysis (Humanitarian Policy Group, 2009) that demonstrates the increasing 
numbers of humanitarian aid workers killed, kidnapped or seriously injured in 2008 when 
compared to figures for the previous year (260 in 2008 against 206 in 2007).  Bear (2009) 
contends that although NGOs still believe that they are maintaining a neutral stance the 
harsh reality is that NGOs are no longer seen as neutral, at least not in places such as 
Afghanistan and Darfur.  Indeed the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) report (2009) 
explains that: 
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“The most recent evidence continues to show that even those agencies that make 
considerable efforts to dissociate themselves from political actors and project an 
image of neutrality have not been immune from attack….aid organisations are 
being attacked not just because they are perceived to be cooperating with Western 
political actors, but because they are perceived as wholly a part of the Western 
agenda” (p.6) 
 
The HPG (2009) go on to highlight the relative surge in attack rates seen, especially against 
NGO international (expatriate) staff and conclude that attacks on aid workers were 
increasingly politically motivated.  In the face of these pressures, historically NGOs have 
still refused to accept military assistance (Beauregard, 1998, p.3), believing that it 
undermines their independence or compromises the key principles of impartiality and 
neutrality.  Many NGOs oppose military assistance in the belief that being seen with any 
military organisation, including peace keepers, can increase the chances that the NGO will 
be attacked and/or denied permission to travel freely.  Some organisations refuse military 
assistance in almost any circumstance, one such being the ICRC:   
 
“Only on direct order from the ICRC headquarters will delegates even converse 
with any military force, let alone work with them operationally” (Natsios, 1995, 
p.73).   
 
Clearly given this discussion the role for the armed forces within humanitarian supply chains 
should be clarified.  A view echoed by Seipel (2011) who highlights the potential that 
combined working between humanitarian aid logisticians and military supply chain 
specialists could bring (p.228) and also by Boin et al (2010) who call for more research to 
help establish under what conditions and during which phases of the disaster the military 
can play a role, as they note that flawed disaster supply chains often evoke calls for the 
military to “take over” as they will bring “unified command” and “decisive leadership” (p.4). 
 
2.4.2 Political Influence and Motivation 
 
Doh and Teegan (2003) suggest that NGOs have been defined as “Those non-profit 
associations focused on social change via political influence” (p.xi) and as “Organisations 
of individuals and donors committed to the promotion of a particular set of issues through 
advocacy work” (p206).  In recent years numerous NGOs have been formed with the goal 
of influencing policy decisions and shaping global political perspectives on issues ranging 
from protecting humanitarian law to protecting the environment (Steinberg, 2003; Doh and 
Teegan, 2003).  By way of example, Amnesty International whose stated purpose is to: 
 
“Stand up for humanity and human rights…………..to protect individuals wherever 
justice, fairness, freedom and truth are denied” (Amnesty International, 2010)  
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has, through relentless campaigning, succeeded in gaining immense power in placing 
human rights issues high on governmental agendas (Steinberg, 2003).  Similarly, Oxfam 
International believe that they can “End poverty and injustice, as part of a global movement 
for change” (Oxfam International, 2010) whist Médecins Sans Frontiéres “Are committed to 
providing medical aid where it is most needed, regardless of race, religion, politics or 
gender” (Médecins Sans Frontiéres, 2010).  Using a wide range of tactics with different 
audiences, NGOs increasingly push their agendas through campaigns targeting specific 
corporations, governments or audiences (Yaziji and Doh, 2009).  In some instances NGOs 
target specific corporations pushing them to meet existing social expectations and legal 
requirements but also seeking to change broader expectations about corporate 
responsibility and governmental regulations (Doh and Teegan, 2003). 
 
Steinberg (2003) notes that one of the harshest fronts of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the 
information war, in which powerful NGOs with major influence on the international media 
consistently display a biased approach.  He highlights what he describes as the “hijacking” 
of the Durban anti-racism conference in 2001 by anti-Israel NGOs as an illustration of the 
dangers of politically motivated humanitarian groups that derive credibility simply on the 
basis of mission statements promoting what he describes as universal human right”.  
Moreover, Steinberg (2003) believes that NGOs’ non-political nature and adherence to 
these human rights principles has given them a halo effect against criticism and scrutiny, 
and that direct political influence has been felt through the misquotation of international law 
and the overuse of terms such as war crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing.  This 
unchecked authority has allowed several groups to blur the distinction between advancing 
human rights and promoting narrow ideological and political causes, and this coupled with 
perceived impartiality has granted NGOs immense moral authority.  Steinberg’s comments 
ultimately resulted in the establishment of NGO Monitor (2010) which was founded to 
“promote [NGO] accountability and to advance vigorous discussion on the reports and 
activities of NGOs claiming to promote moral agendas, such as human aid and human 
rights”. 
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2.4.3 The World Economy and International Response 
 
Humanitarian workers and organisations face the challenge of finding neutral ways to 
operationalise their mandate without compromising their principles or producing a negative 
impact (Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Weiss and Collins, 2000).  NGOs will 
typically try and assert economic pressure on countries and organisations to further their 
own stated goals or missions.  One year on from the Gleneagles G8 summit, Oxfam (2006) 
issued a briefing note reminding member states of their agreed commitment to debt 
cancellation, aid provision, peacekeeping and arms control, world trade deals and climate 
change.  This note, issued one week in advance of a follow up meeting of G8 finance 
ministers, explored the progress (or the lack thereof) since the G8 summit.  It contrasted 
the positive results of decisions such as the cancellation of Zambia’s $5 billion debt to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the removal of education fees in Burundi, with the 
fact that 500,000 women died in either pregnancy or childbirth and 11 million children died 
from poverty, conflict, and disease during the same period.  A similar note (Oxfam, 2009) 
highlighted the perceived negativity of a model of economic growth utilised by nations rich 
in minerals and hydrocarbons involved in extractive activities.  Arguments were offered that 
the model frequently had negative social, environmental, financial, and institutional impacts.  
Furthermore, Oxfam (2009) suggested that these issues were all consequences of 
exploitation contracts agreed between producing states and multinational corporations 
which were harmful to the common good.  The view was that in many cases, such a model 
had contributed to bad public policies and low levels or bad quality of public spending in 
producing countries. 
 
2.4.4 Fund Raising Strategies, Competition and Corporate Social Responsibility  
 
In terms of total resources in the mid-1990s, NGOs surpassed the resources of the United 
Nations (excluding the IMF and World Bank) in the disbursement of total official 
development (Weiss and Collins, 2000).  The largest NGOs had budgets of several million 
US dollars and were dependent upon funds from governments and international 
organisations as well as donations from private individuals and foundations.  The Lancet 
(2010) and Olson and Gregorian (2007) acknowledge the competition amongst NGOs for 
donor funding and the associated desire to demonstrate superior effectiveness and 
efficiency, sometimes at the expense of quantifiable end results.  Indeed, in a review of the 
immediate response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake the Lancet offer the view that NGOS 
were: 
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“Jostling for position, each claiming that they are doing the most for earthquake 
survivors” (p253) 
 
 
In the past funding for international disaster response came primarily from a small number 
of western governments (Katoch, 2006).  This allowed donor governments to insist that 
those agencies to which they gave their money participated in established coordination 
processes.  However, responses to the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004) and to Hurricane 
Katrina (2005) changed this situation as the public emerged as a major donor in its own 
right.  The United Nations (2005, p4) noted that the tsunami resulted in: 
 
“An unprecedented influx, at all levels of relief effort, of goods and services from 
the corporate business community”.   
 
 
An increasing number of companies were seeking visible means of demonstrating to their 
stakeholders, including employees, customers, vendors, and local communities, that they 
were actively subscribing to the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Tomasini 
and van Wassenhove, 2009; Katoch, 2006).   
 
In 2002 Porter and Kramer noted that many corporations appreciated that they could 
enhance their competitiveness by engaging in partnerships where social and economic 
values overlapped.  Consequently, private logistics companies (TNT, DHL, UPS, FedEx 
and the like) were increasingly seeking to participate in partnerships with NGO humanitarian 
organisations, not only with charitable and societal intent but also as an opportunity for 
learning and business development.  Accordingly, in an era of rapid globalisation of 
business, disasters such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004) have prompted companies 
to re-examine their roles and to consider humanitarian activities in terms of their overall 
CSR strategy (Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009).  The Tsunami triggered immense 
interest in disaster response amongst major corporations and added to the proliferation of 
corporate sector networks seeking their own distinct role in the relief effort.  However, 
motivation for this interest appears to be mixed; whilst the ethics of CSR undoubtedly plays 
a major part, so too does a desire for the associated positive publicity and perhaps 
increased market access that contributions may bring (Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 
2009; Katoch, 2006).  In short, by seeming to become better corporate citizens the view is 
that these organisations believe that they can benefit both their own business and society 
in general.  
 
Although some NGOs, in a bid to uphold their Dunanist principles vehemently refuse any 
governmental contributions or limit them to a small percentage of their overall budget 
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(Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009), Weiss and Collins (2000) argue that the majority 
are not so discriminating about contributions to their organisational well-being and that this 
dependency on corporate and governmental donations can produce another negative 
effect.  In a bid to maintain contribution levels, NGOs may feel that they must demonstrate 
to donors that their presence and inputs into a humanitarian mission are valuable.  Hence, 
the NGO may be pressured into ignoring local inputs and ideas as well as the comparative 
advantages of collaborating with other agencies in the field, and look instead to create and 
capture the humanitarian space (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009, p.27) that best 
suits their donors perceived needs.  Indeed, The Lancet (2010) observed during the relief 
effort following the Haiti earthquake, that many aid agencies sometimes acted according to 
their own best interests rather than in the interests of disaster victims and believed that aid 
organisations must be judged not just financially but also on how they physically operated 
within the field:   
 
“Large aid agencies and humanitarian organisations are often highly competitive 
with each other.  Polluted by the internal power politics and the unsavoury 
characteristics seen in many big corporations, large aid agencies can be obsessed 
with raising money through their own appeal efforts”. (p253) 
 
2.4.5 Societal Wealth, Interference and Influence 
 
High income societies can afford better measures to limit the effects of natural disasters 
(Strömberg, 2007).  Buildings can be constructed of stronger and more durable materials; 
housing can be built on raised platforms to withstand flooding and agricultural areas 
irrigated to reduce loss during droughts.  Warning systems can be introduced for certain 
natural disasters (Sheets and Williams, 2001 cited by Strömberg, 2007) and when disaster 
does strike, such as the recent floods in Australia or the earthquakes in Japan and New 
Zealand (BBC News, 2011, 2011a, 2011b) negative effects can be limited, as medical care 
and food can be quickly provided and mass evacuations facilitated when needed.  
Moreover, as the government typically handles many of these measures, disasters may be 
less severe in societies which have efficient and accountable governments, and within 
countries that are more democratic with civil liberties and a free press (Isham et al, 1997; 
Sen, 1990).  Indeed, in a comparison across states within India, Besley and Burgess (2002) 
found that emergency relief was more responsive in states where people read newspapers. 
 
In the aftermath of natural disasters there can be significant interference with society and 
therefore institutional change arising from both the initial impact effects and corresponding 
responses (Albala-Bertrand, 2000).  Moreover, such effects and responses may be intense, 
long-term and, in the main deliberate.  The associated preventative activities may have 
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societal implications as they aim to modify people’s behaviour and institutions, so that if the 
impact cannot be avoided at least its effects can be both reduced and effectively 
counteracted when and if they do occur.  Preventative activities may include, for example 
the establishment of land-use regulations and building codes, with the associated 
enforcement structures.  They may also deal with people’s involvement in the 
implementation of effective prediction or warning measures and self-help systems, and also 
in government’s rapid and effective reaction to potential and actual impact effects 
(Strömberg, 2007, Albala-Bertrand, 2000).  Furthermore, preventative measures may 
include insurance, mortgage and taxation systems that encourage safer types of behaviour 
and a better distribution of risk so that disaster effects can be reduced (Albala-Bertrand, 
2000).  Finally, in a bid to gauge response effectiveness and to minimize antisocial and 
speculative behaviour, markets, migrations and human reactions may be monitored. 
 
Having considered the pressures that are inherent within the humanitarian supply chain 
thoughts must now turn to the distinct phases of the relief effort (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 
2007) and to the identification of an appropriate phase of focus for this research.  
 
2.5 The Phases of Disaster Relief 
 
Disaster Relief is often described as a multi-stage process (Tomansi and van Wassenhove, 
2009; Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007; Petit and Beresford, 2005; Nisha de Silva, 2001; 
Long,1997).  Lee and Zbinden (2003) discuss three phases of disaster relief operations, 
preparedness, during operations and post operations.  This idea is taken a stage further 
(Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) with different operations or phases within disaster relief 
being identified as preparation, immediate response and reconstruction, see Fig 2.8.     
  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.8  Phases of Disaster Relief Operations (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) 
 
 
Preparation: Although natural disasters are difficult to predict, some regions are 
prone to prepare for particular risks.  Tokyo, San Francisco and Reykjavik are 
Preparation Reconstruction 
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offered as examples of cities that need to make careful preparations for the 
possibility of major earthquakes (Kovács and Spens, 2007, p.102) and other cities 
and regions are too close to active volcanoes or lie in hurricane prone regions to 
simply ignore appropriate preparation and planning (Nisha de Silva, 2001).  
However, Murray (2005) notes that as donors often insist that money is seen to go 
directly to help beneficiaries by way of direct aid, the financing of preparatory 
measures are often neglected; hence regional actors such as regional governments, 
businesses and NGOs should finance and lead preparatory initiatives.  From a 
research perspective, Kovács and Spens (2008) discuss the focus within the 
literature on the preparation phase to the detriment of the immediate response and 
reconstruction phases.  They note the abundance of simulation and modelling 
articles on the preparation phase (p.220) and the reliance on the ability to offer 
predictions of requirements, such as inventory (see for example Chang et al, 2007; 
Beamon and Kotelba, 2006) in support of natural disasters.  In short, the contention 
is that few papers deal with the physical dynamics of an emergency and with tem 
the immediate response phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008). 
 
Immediate Response:  Once a natural disaster strikes, the emergency plans of 
regional actors are instigated (Kovács and Spens, 2007).  However, although actors 
may be prepared for the disaster, they will still be forced to operate in an 
environment with a significantly destabilised structure (Murray, 2005; Cassidy, 
2003).  Moreover, the challenge can be compounded if the disaster strikes in a less 
developed region, which from the outset may have inadequate infrastructures (Long 
and Wood, 1995).  As a result, actors are forced to make assumptions regarding the 
requirements of the aid effort on limited information.  The main problem areas within 
the immediate response phase lie in coordinating supply requirements against 
unpredictable demand (Long and Wood, 1995) and with what is termed the last mile 
problem (Gaboury, 2005; Ozdamar et al, 2004; Beamon, 2004; Long 1997; Long 
and Wood, 1995) of transporting the correct items to beneficiaries.  Consequently, 
unsolicited supplies are seen to create blockages within the humanitarian SC at 
airports and within warehouses (Murray, 2005; Cassidy, 2003).  The few articles that 
have focussed on the immediate response phase consider the problems of 
coordinating supply and also consider the challenges of unpredictability and of 
meeting the last mile challenge (Kovács and Spens, 2008, p.221).  However, many 
of these articles are located within quantitative method and suggest new modelling 
and simulation developments (see for example Tzeng et al, 2007; Yi and Kumar, 
2007; Tovia, 2006).  In short, the call is for more qualitative research which has as 
its focus the immediate response phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008). 
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Reconstruction:  Gustavsson (2003) notes that for many disaster struck regions 
funding is often focussed on short-term relief and that the long-term reconstruction 
phase is neglected.  However, the reconstruction phase is argued to be of equal 
importance as disasters can have long term effects on a region (Kovács and Spens, 
2007).  Hence, regional actors should also have as their focus the reconstruction 
phase, which will require some form of continuity planning; moreover, a key element 
of this process should include consideration and appropriate revision of preparatory 
plans to encompass lessons learned from the outcomes of the response to the 
current disaster (Thomas, 2003), thereby completing the loop back to the 
preparation phase.   Kovács and Spens (2008) contend that the reconstruction 
phase has largely been neglected both in the literature and in humanitarian aid as a 
whole (p.222).  Gustavsson (2003) believes that this is indicative of the lack of long-
term funding and the associated concentration on the immediate response phase.  
Perhaps understandably, articles that do focus on reconstruction are focussed on 
regional perspectives rather than on the overall relief effort (see for example Salam, 
2007, which focusses on the outcomes of the Asian Tsunami).      
 
Whilst acknowledging the importance of all phases of humanitarian relief provision, the calls 
for more qualitative research within the immediate response phase (Kovács and Spens, 
2008) and the expected outcomes of a piece of doctrinally focussed research, volume of 
information and the need for focussed research effort, meant that the decision was taken to 
concentrate on the Immediate Response phase of humanitarian relief provision.; hence, this 
review will now take as its focus the immediate response phase and the discussion will turn 
to an appropriate supply chain to address the associated demands. 
 
2.5.1 Immediate Response Phase – The Right Supply Chain  
 
“The onset of a disaster will demand an immediate response with the emphasis on 
getting the right goods, at the right time, to the right place, and distributed to the 
right people” (Tomansi and van Wassenhove, 2009, p.48) 
 
During the early stages of the disaster relief effort supply chains need to be designed and 
deployed at once even though the knowledge of the situation may be very limited (Beamon, 
2004; Tomansi and van Wassenhove, 2004; Long and Wood, 1995).  Whilst it is essential 
to design and instigate a supply chain that addresses the immediate needs of the affected 
population (food, water, shelter, medicines), information may be very limited on the specific 
impact of the particular disaster.   
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“The smooth coordination and avoidance of duplication of effort relies on 
information sharing and knowing who will be involved in the disaster response and 
in what capacity” (Tomansi and van Wassenhove, 2009, p.49).   
The urgency and pressures involved may mean that humanitarian agencies are happy to 
accept a premium to get the right goods to the right place at the right time; for example, 
goods may be flown in from abroad as quickly as possible as at this stage expense is 
secondary.  Research into sources of supply chain delay within warehousing or customs 
processes (Handfield and Nichols, 1999) suggests that as much as 95% of associated time 
and resources are wasted on waiting for goods and services to arrive in the required place.  
Clearly any saving in this area within a humanitarian supply chain could be turned into 
preserved lives on the ground.  Whilst speed and urgency are key, not every type of good 
is needed in every disaster zone and unsolicited donations may actually become a burden 
on the supply chain; hence, it is imperative that appropriate monitoring and communication 
are evident to promote efficiency; what Christopher (2011) describes as supply chain 
responsiveness.  Moreover, supply chain collaboration is argued to be important as sub-
optimisation occurs when each organisation within a supply chain attempts to optimise its 
own results rather than integrating its goals and activities with other organisations for the 
benefit of the whole chain (Christopher, 2011; Senge, 2010; Cooper et al, 1997), hence it 
is appropriate that we consider these concepts next.   
 
2.6 Humanitarian Supply Chains - The Case for Optimisation and Collaboration 
 
“Problems of inter-agency coordination are often most evident in the initial frantic 
stages of response to a humanitarian emergency when aid agencies often fail to 
make the effort, or simply find it too difficult to collaborate” (Fenton, 2003, p23) 
 
“The myriad of humanitarian organisations must co-ordinate their efforts in every 
disaster if they are to provide real relief at the point of need’”  
(Kovács and Spens, 2009, p506) 
 
“Logistic co-ordination is required both within humanitarian supply chains and 
between humanitarian organisations to achieve efficient relief”  
(Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006, p115) 
 
Supply Chain Collaboration (SCC) is not a new concept.  Writing in 1990 Bowersox 
concluded that what he termed logistics alliances “were making US industry more efficient 
and thus more competitive” (p.45).  In citing one executive who said “for us, the reason for 
this venture [logistics alliance] is market impact….  cost reduction is important but 
secondary” (p.45), Bowersox further noted that, in keeping with Porter’s (1990) value chain 
analogy, the main rationale for orchestrating an alliance was to increase competitive 
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advantage.  SCC is focused on relationships and may be of significant benefit to all supply 
chain partners (Monczka et al, 2010; Lysons and Farrington, 2006).  SCC simply refers to 
a chain where two or more independent organisations work jointly (collaborate) to plan and 
execute supply chain operations with greater success than when acting in isolation 
(Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002).  Successfully formulating the appropriate strategy in a 
particular customer/supplier situation implies that all entities within the supply chain must 
work together (Kampstra and Ashayeri, 2006).  Collaboration has been promoted as a silver 
bullet in many areas of SCM and it is argued that overall supply chain value is increased 
when organisations within the chain seek to integrate their goals and activities together with 
other organisations for the benefit of the whole chain (Christopher, 2011; Cooper et al, 1997; 
Porter, 1990) rather than focussing on their own individual results.  A global survey of supply 
chain progress conducted in 2004 (Supply Chain Management Review and Computer 
Sciences Corporation) observed that collaboration was cited as the single most pressing 
issue.  The survey showed that 44 percent of the sample organisations had initiatives 
specifically associated with collaboration; however, only 35 percent of these initiatives 
turned out to be even moderately successful.  Kampstra and Ashayeri (2006) contend that 
this offers a typical example of a situation where not all participants in every supply chain 
had embedded collaborative values and that you cannot ultimately collaborate with a party 
that lacks a genuine desire to collaborate.  
 
Dash et al (2013) discuss the positive impact that collaboration and coordination can have 
on overall supply chain performance.  With emerging competition for funding amongst major 
relief organisations, Thomas and Kopczak (2005) note that although many humanitarian 
heads of logistics faced the same challenges, there is still a tendency for each to fight their 
own battles with little collaboration; indeed the lack of logistical integration means that 
humanitarian organisations run the risk of entering into direct competition with other 
organisations (Chandes and Paché, 2010); competition that limits the ability to achieve 
some level of common intent (Olson and Gregorian, 2007).  Fenton (2003) comments on 
the sad reality of this behaviour, noting that all too often emergencies trigger a huge 
scramble amongst aid organisations for donor money to support their own relief incentives, 
which is often to the detriment of valuable coordination (p24).  Following their review of core 
logistics challenges post the 2004 Asian Tsunami, Thomas and Kopczak (2005) found that 
several humanitarian relief organisations were, in a bid to speed up future response times, 
independently seeking to procure regional warehousing and that three such organisations 
were actually talking to the same warehouse providers in the same city.  Similarly two 
organisations had commissioned costly analyses to select a fleet management system and 
three were, again, independently wrestling with the idea of a training program for field 
logisticians.  None of these managers knew that their counterparts had the same objectives 
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hence, there was little collaboration or resource sharing.  Moving this idea on to the 
immediate response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, The Lancet (2010, p253) comment on 
the “jostling for position” amongst NGOs and on the fact that some agencies claimed to be 
“spearheading” the relief effort, whilst in reality the situation in Haiti was “chaotic, 
devastating and anything but coordinated”. 
 
A theoretical discussion (Carroll and Neu, 2009) seeking a developmental framework for a 
comprehensive set of universal techniques and a commonality in humanitarian logistics and 
supply chain management, discusses the importance of taking a tri-axial view based around 
the complementing characteristics and common values associated with the business, 
military and humanitarian logistics sectors.  Through better collaboration the humanitarian 
relief sector could take best practice from business and military logistics and supply chain 
management systems, as they seek to improve the overall performance of humanitarian 
logistics missions.  A similar review in the aftermath of the Asian tsunami (Oloruntoba, 2005) 
suggests that whilst the extent of effective collaboration between national authorities, local 
actors and international actors appeared to be adequate, longer term coordination and 
partnership between actors would be required for a successful relief effort and that there 
should be clarification of organisational roles in disaster management.  In Haiti, the United 
Nations, commenting on the relief efforts following the 2010 earthquake noted the lack of: 
 
“Capacity [on the ground] required to coordinate efficiently the large number of 
partners (in excess of 900 official NGOs were operating in Haiti according to the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)) involved in the 
operation” (Lynch, 2010).     
 
In addition, Heaslip (2010) observes that: 
 
“In fragile settings such as Haiti, the mandates, timeframes, guiding principles and 
methodologies for working of civilian aid agencies and military forces are radically 
different and often clash, despite good intentions and a sincere common desire to 
“help the people” held by international military and civilian aid personnel involved 
in disaster relief operations”. 
 
Moreover, extensive academic commentary (Russell, 2005 and Davidson, 2006 both cited 
by Carroll and Neu, 2009; DEFRA 2007; Townsend, 2006) on a wide variety of humanitarian 
relief operations, ranging from the Asian Tsunami in 2004, the South Asian earthquake and 
US Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the UK floods in Hull in 2007, all point to catastrophic 
logistics and supply chain management failures.  All of these examples display similar 
identifiable failures stemming from the neglect of close proactive collaboration within the 
whole network of disaster and emergency relief actor agencies.  Whilst each organisation 
had its own operating methods and goals, it is only through the coordination of plans and 
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the sharing of resources that “effective humanitarian logistics” would be truly achieved 
(Long and Wood, 1995, p216).  Additional work written in the days immediately following 
the Asian Tsunami (Oloruntoba, 2005) also acknowledged the plethora of domestic and 
international agencies and organisations working to address the regions’ humanitarian relief 
requirements, whilst it also offered additional support for the establishment of a 
standardised, coordinated logistics management system within the region.  Earlier work 
(Gustavsson, 2003) focussing on lessons learned following humanitarian relief efforts within 
Kosovo and Iraq (post military intervention), acknowledged that no one agency could meet 
the logistical challenges presented within the associated supply chains on its own, and that 
what was required was a much higher degree of collaboration across all agencies.  It was 
important that the whole humanitarian relief sector drew on the proven expertise and 
successes borne out of cooperation and collaboration across the commercial sector.  In a 
similar vein, Kovács and Tatham (2009) in a paper investigating ways of improving SC 
responsiveness pointed to the necessity of greater interoperability between the numerous 
actors, whilst Akhtar et al (2012) noted that successful coordination in Humanitarian Supply 
Chains could contribute towards: 
 
“acceptance of proposals, amount of donations received, delivering supplies and 
completing projects on time, quality, reduction of costs, a quick response time, 
flexibility, fair distribution of supplies, donors and beneficiary satisfaction” (p.22) 
 
A selective review of literature within the field (Carroll and Neu, 2009) noted that proposed 
solutions to alleviate operational failures along humanitarian logistics and supply chains 
centred upon adaptations of traditional conceptual approaches to SCM.  The underlying 
theme was for a common approach requiring collaboration throughout and between supply 
chain tiers and actors at all levels and positions of responsibility.  
  
“Where end to end supply chain collaboration was not developed sufficiently to offer 
a robust and responsive logistics system, product or service delivery failure was 
inevitable” (Carroll and Neu, 2009, p1029)    
 
Supply Chain Optimisation concentrates on controlling the various elements of the supply 
chain and removing the non-value-added steps that are evident within it.  In keeping with 
many academic commentators, (Mangan et al, 2012; Seipel, 2011; Harrison and van Hoek, 
2011; Heaslip, 2011; Christopher, 2010; Skjoett-Larsen et al, 2003), Lysons and Farrington 
(2006) argue that optimisation of the supply chain is most likely to be achieved by 
collaboration between cross-functional teams within the organisation and customers and 
suppliers external to it, but can this be achieved within the pressurised environments 
inherent after a disaster within environments which are typically characterised by the need 
for acute urgency and a high level of intensity (number of tasks vs time and available 
52 
 
resources).  Moreover, actions within these environments will be carried out by a series of 
different actors with different levels of commitment to the task and each other, and with 
differing motives and agendas (Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 
2007; Yamada et al, 2006; Lyles, 2005).  In essence, the profit-making incentive associated 
with Lysons and Farrington’s (2006) arguments for supply chain collaboration is effectively 
replaced by the need for a speedy and lifesaving response.  Furthermore, Davis (1993) 
suggested that reduction of uncertainty within such a supply chain would lead to 
optimisation and pointed out that failure to fulfil promises was a distinct source of such 
uncertainty. 
 
2.6.1 Collaboration through Clusters 
 
In offering his economic cluster theory, Porter (1998) suggested that clusters are: 
 
“Geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and institutions in a 
particular field…. they often extend downstream to channels and customers and 
laterally to manufacturers of complementary products and to companies in 
industries related by skills, technologies, or common inputs” (p.78). 
   
 
Moreover, being part of a cluster allows companies to “Operate more productively whilst 
coordinating with related companies; and measuring and motivating improvement” (p.81).  
Patti (2006) develops this concept into the Supply Chain context, contending that clusters 
should “include upstream suppliers and downstream customers and may of ten extend 
horizontally to include the makers of similar and complementary products that require the 
same basic skills, raw materials, and specialized equipment” (p.266).  Cluster members 
benefit from both competition and cooperation.  Productivity increases for members as they 
are afforded better access to employees and suppliers and to specialised information and 
public institutions, increased availability of complementary products and services, and 
better motivation and incentivisation.  Competition amongst members forces them to 
improve their efficiencies, to control costs, and to actively seek ways to enhance their 
capabilities and overall contribution; without this competition and motivation amongst 
members a cluster will fail.  Much of the cooperation will occur vertically within the supply 
chain. However, horizontal cooperation will occur whenever there is no direct competition 
and whenever there is an outside threat to the overall existence of the cluster (Patti, p.267). 
 
Whilst recognising what they describe as the “veritable flood of interest” (p.1) of the cluster 
concept in regional analysis and policy, by way of contrast, and in critique of Porter’s (1998) 
original work Asheim et al (2009) contend that clusters have been “oversold” (p.23) and 
suggest that there has long been a need for an objective assessment of their feasibility and 
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overall success.  Simmie (2009) also criticises Porter’s (1998) contribution to the debate on 
clusters as he comments that many industrial regions and areas of the business sector 
cannot be fully analysed and driven using a clustered approach.   Similarly, Martin and 
Sunley (2003, p.5) question the success of a clustered approach and argue that “the mere 
popularity of a construct is by no means a guarantee of its profundity”; indeed, they go on 
to debate the influential nature of the clustered approach and the fact that “its overall 
seductiveness has resulted in a rush to apply the concept in some business arenas, in 
advance of theoretical and empirical assessments of the strategy” (p.35).  Turning to the 
practical application of the concept and in particular the application of the clustered 
approach to the humanitarian sector, as will be discussed later in this Chapter (section 2.10) 
Jensen (2012) argues that whilst clusters are fine in principle, in practice they are ineffective 
and cumbersome as they slow things down in the field; in essence little had actually 
changed since clusters were first introduced into the humanitarian supply chain. 
 
2.6.2 Horizontal and Vertical Collaboration 
 
When considering the variety of forms of potential supply chain collaboration, Barratt (2004) 
argues the case for two main categories, vertical and horizontal collaboration, see Fig 2.9.  
Horizontal collaboration improves coordination between organisations that are “experts in 
the same functional area” (Jahre and Jensen, 2010, p.666) and occurs when 2 or more 
competing or unrelated organisations cooperate to share private information or resources 
such as a warehouse space or manufacturing capacity (Prakash and Desmukh, 2010; 
Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002).  It is defined as “concerted practices between companies 
operating at the same level(s) in the market” (Cruijssen et al, 2007) and may involve 
collaboration with both competitors and non-competitors (Barratt, 2004; Simatupang and 
Sridharan, 2002).   Vertical collaboration aims to “synchronise different levels of a supply 
chain for overall efficiency…..making all participants focus on the final customers’ needs” 
(Jahre and Jensen, 2010, p.667).  It takes place across different tiers within the supply chain 
and occurs when “two or more organisations such as the manufacturer, the distributor, the 
carrier, and the retailer share their responsibilities, resources, and performance information 
to serve relatively similar end customers” (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002, p.19).  
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Fig 2.9  The Scope of Collaboration: Generally (Barratt, 2004) 
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In summarising selected theoretical ideas on collaboration and categorisation, Jahre and 
Jensen (2010, p.666) offer the following views on what to coordinate and why: 
 
Dimension/ Type of 
Coordination 
Horizontal Vertical 
 
 
 
 
 
What to Coordinate 
 
Actors, activities, resources 
at strategic, tactical and 
operational levels in 
information, money and 
material flows for companies 
at the same stage in the 
supply chain. 
Focus on the companies and 
their specific tasks. 
 
 
Actors, activities, resources at 
strategic, tactical and 
operational levels in information, 
money and material flows for 
companies at different stages in 
the supply chain. 
Focus on the customer and 
synchronisation. 
 
 
 
Why Coordinate 
 
To achieve economies of 
scale and to reduce costs for 
the individual company. 
To have access to more 
physical resources, 
information and competence. 
 
 
To reduce overall supply chain 
costs for some actors. 
To improve customer service 
through smoother flows. 
 
Table 2.2 Coordination Aspects in Selected Literature (Jahre and Jensen, 2010, p666)  
 
Collaboration through the adoption of clusters has been suggested as a possible solution 
to address the lack of optimisation and coordination inherent within the humanitarian supply 
chain, and the United Nations Cluster Approach has been identified as a step in the right 
direction in this respect (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010; Patti, 2006), 
hence the review will now turn to a consideration of the UN Cluster Approach.   
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2.7 The United Nations Cluster Approach – A Step in the Right Direction? 
 
 
 
Fig 2.10  How the Cluster System Works (UN OCHA, 2011) 
 
The United Nations (UN) Cluster Approach was developed following the Humanitarian 
Response Review (HRR) of the global humanitarian relief system commissioned by the 
then United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs, which was tasked with carrying out “an independent assessment of 
the humanitarian system in which the experts identify reasons why the aid community 
sometimes falls short of its goals” (p.1).  The HRR (OCHA, 2005) concluded that: 
 
“A common element in the problems encountered is reliance of many NGOs on 
individual initiatives as opposed to group action….however, there is a sense that the 
time has arrived for the humanitarian community to work collectively towards an 
inclusive system-wide coordination mechanism to which all stakeholders can feel a 
sense of belonging.” (p.47) 
 
 
2.7.1  Aims and Structure 
 
The UN Cluster Approach organises humanitarian relief into a number of specialist clusters 
with a predefined leadership.  The aim of the approach is to strengthen overall response 
capacity as well as to improve the overall effectiveness of the response in five key ways 
(United Nations OCHA, 2005):  
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1. Ensure sufficient global capacity is built up and maintained in all the main 
sectors/areas of response, with a view to ensuring timely and effective responses in 
new crises.  
 
2. Provide predictable leadership in all the main sectors/areas of response.  
 
3. Develop/ design approaches around the concept of partnerships (i.e. clusters) 
between UN agencies, international organisations and NGOs.  
 
4. Strengthen accountability by making cluster leads answerable at the global level for 
building up a more predictable and effective response capacity and at the field level, 
for fulfilling agreed roles and responsibilities. 
 
5. Improve strategic field-level coordination and prioritization in specific sectors/areas 
of response by placing responsibility for leadership and coordination of these issues 
with the competent operational agency. 
 
The cluster concept is designed to apply to all humanitarian UN bodies, as well as national 
and international NGOs involved in the provision of disaster relief.  In essence any 
humanitarian organisation which has the capacity can lead a cluster and organisations 
working in the field may find themselves contributing to a number of clusters.  The Inter-
Agency Standing Committee (IASC) which is designated as the primary mechanism for 
inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance (IASC, 2011) has defined global 
clusters in eleven functional areas of humanitarian activity, with associated lead 
organisations, see Table 2.3.  However, whilst the responsibilities for cluster leads have 
been clearly defined, commentators (Jensen, 2012) argue that the ways in which those 
responsibilities should be handled are “less obvious” (p.148).  In essence how is the cluster 
leader expected to fulfil its lead responsibilities in an environment where many independent 
organisations “often object to being directed” (p.148). 
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Global Cluster Cluster Lead Organisation(s) 
Camp Coordination and Camp 
Management 
UN Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
Early Recovery UN Development Programme (UNDP) 
Education UN Children’s’ Fund (UNICEF) 
Save the children (SC) 
Emergency Shelter UNHCR 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC) 
Emergency Telecommunications World Food Programme (WFP) 
Food Security Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)  
WFP 
Health World Health Organisation (WHO) 
Logistics WFP 
Nutrition UNICEF 
Protection UNHCR 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) 
UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) 
UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
International Development Law Organisation (IDLO) 
UNDP 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) 
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene UNICEF 
Registered Engineers for Disaster Relief (RedR) 
 
Table 2.3 Global Clusters and Cluster Leads (Humanitarian Reform, 2011) 
 
Having introduced the cluster concept and described it in general terms, given the framing 
of this research and overall research question it is appropriate that this research takes as 
its focus the logistics cluster.   
 
2.7.2  The Logistics Cluster 
 
The Logistics Cluster is responsible for preparedness and emergency response in respect 
of the overall logistics response and is expected to (Altay and Labonte, 2011, p.92; Jahre 
and Jensen, 2010): 
 
1. Fill logistics gaps and alleviate bottlenecks 
2. Prioritize logistics interventions and investments 
3. Collect/ share information and assets 
4. Coordinate port and corridor movements to reduce congestion 
5. Provide details of transporters and rough indication of market rates 
6. Provide guidance on customs issues 
7. Provide information on equipment and/or relief supply items 
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In the first year of implementation of the UN Cluster Approach (2006) the Logistics Cluster 
accounted for by far the largest portion of the allocated resource (almost one quarter of the 
US $40 million total budget, (OCHA, 2006, p.3).  Altay and Labonte (2011, p.93) suggest 
was that this substantial contribution could serve as an indicator of the importance of 
logistics in humanitarian operations or alternatively could demonstrate the amount of 
neglect afforded logistics as a discipline within the field up to that point in time.  
Encouragingly, or perhaps worryingly as at 2011, the only one of the eleven functional 
clusters to meet the IASC Working Group baseline capacity and preparedness standard (to 
be able to respond to 3 major disasters per annum, affecting up to 500,000 with two 
disasters occurring simultaneously) was the Logistics Cluster (Altay and Labonte, 2011, 
p.93).   
 
2.7.3  An Aid to Collaboration? 
 
Research into and evaluations of the cluster approach and of interventions since its first 
field use in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006 (Jahre and Jensen, 2010; ActionAid, 
2007; Stoddard et al 2007; Cosgrave et al, 2007; Street, 2007) note initial high levels of 
confusion regarding individual agency roles; there was a general lack of understanding 
amongst field workers in respect of the role of each cluster and the associated cluster leads 
(Stoddard et al, 2007; Street, 2007; OCHA, 2006).  However, there were many positive 
aspects to the Concept including increased opportunities for collaboration and dialogue, 
improved coordination and greater predictability (Street, 2007; OCHA, 2006); the approach 
continues to develop and in 2011 it was viewed as a means of facilitating more effective 
and efficient levels of humanitarian response in the medium to long-term (Altay and 
Labonte, 2011).  However, there are still concerns relating to inter-cluster coordination.  It 
has been noted that: 
 
“The general feeling amongst NGOs was that clusters were overly 
compartmentalised and that there were too many” (ActionAid, 2007, p.5).   
There was also a  
“Fundamental barrier to addressing cross-cutting issues stemming from weak inter-
cluster coordination, including inadequate information management and analysis” 
(Stoddard et al, 2007, p.40).   
 
When reflecting on the humanitarian efforts in respect of the 2007 Mozambique floods, 
concerns were raised that whilst the clustered approach might encourage a closer focus on 
the designated functional areas (see Table 2.3), this could be to the detriment of cross-
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cluster themes (Cosgrave et al, 2007, p.3).  Furthermore, research on the application of the 
approach in Pakistan post the 2005 earthquake, observed that some participants: 
 
“Found the increased demands due to the need for inter-cluster coordination to be 
a burden rather than a help in ensuring adequate and timely responses, in managing 
information and avoiding both gaps and duplication”  (Street, 2007, p.3).    
 
2.7.4  Horizontal or Vertical Collaboration? 
 
Considering the relative merits offered by the application of both horizontal and vertical 
collaboration it has been argued (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010) that 
the focus of the cluster system thus far has been on Horizontal Collaboration, that is 
“improving coordination between organisations that are considered to be experts in the 
same functional area of disaster response” (Jahre and Jensen, 2010, p.666).  Cluster 
collaboration takes place, on the whole between providers of services at the same stage of 
the supply chain, for example between providers of water and sanitation solutions.  
However, Kovács (2011) does question the role of cluster leaders, describing the current 
system as a “stove-pipe approach” whilst noting that:  
 
“Everybody wants coordination [collaboration] but nobody wants to be to be 
coordinated” (p251) 
One clear advantage of horizontal collaboration is the achievement of economies of scale 
for actors and this is perhaps a key driver for the adoption of this approach in what are 
globally frugal times.  However, this approach can also be the source of a significant overall 
disadvantage as became evident when considering the response to the Pakistan 
earthquake (Street, 2007), where individual clusters were seen to function with internal 
efficiency, whilst failing to operate in harmony with one another.  An issue summarised by 
Jahre and Jensen (2010): 
 
“Coordination [collaboration] within clusters may impede coordination [collaboration] 
across clusters, leading to excessive functional focus and reduced focus on total 
beneficiary needs” (p.667) 
 
Whilst accepting that the application of horizontal collaboration is still far from perfect,  
academic opinion (Kovács, 2011; Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010; Street, 
2007) suggests that the real challenge for the cluster approach lies in the adoption of 
vertical, cross-cluster collaboration, which occurs when “2 or more organisations such as 
the manufacturer, the distributor, the carrier, and the retailer share their responsibilities, 
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resources, and performance information to serve relatively similar end customers” 
(Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002, p.19).  Research (Jahre and Jensen, 2010) suggests 
that it is inherently difficult to make humanitarian supply chains customer driven, and that a 
more strategic approach considering the upstream level could serve to enhance on going 
and future humanitarian operations (p677).  Significant problems are generated as 
responsibility for global resource allocation is defined by the permanent cluster lead whilst 
facilitation of the appropriate response in the field rests with the designated local cluster 
leader.  Evidence suggests that cross-cluster collaboration, and a means to bridge the 
supply chain from the global to the local level has still to be addressed (Stoddard et al, 
2007).  Summarising (Jahre and Jensen, 2010): 
 
“Effective vertical collaboration depends on successfully merging the pipelines of 
many of the organisations in an operation, and on creating a strategic level for 
carrying out coordination between disasters; that is preparing for a coordinated 
approach in operations” (p668) 
 
Building on these ideas it has been suggested that the next dimension for collaboration 
within humanitarian disaster relief should be to seek a more strategic view as the field looks 
to move on from a Humanitarian Logistics Management (Horizontal) approach to adopt 
Humanitarian Supply Chain Management (Vertical) concepts (Kovács, 2011, p253).  A view 
echoed by the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR), an independent review 
chaired by Lord (Paddy) Ashdown tasked to look at how Great Britain responds to 
humanitarian disasters, who amongst their findings concluded that clusters needed to be 
more strategic, and be grouped around need and the ability to work on several levels 
(HERR, 2011, p31). 
 
This discussion on the United Nations Cluster Approach would suggest that the United 
Nations has a significant role to play in the management of relationships amongst 
collaborating actors within the humanitarian supply chain, hence it is appropriate that the 
discussion moves on to consider the associated academic discourse within this context.   
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2.7.5 Relationship Management, Power and Supply Chain Collaboration  
 
Handfield and Nichols (1999) argue that the three critical components to a supply chain 
strategy are information flow, product flow and relationship management.  Moreover, they 
describe relationship management as the most fragile and tenuous of the three.  
Traditionally business exchange has been based on transactional relations focusing on a 
single product transaction with little if any information sharing (Jagdev and Thoben, 2001).  
Transactions in the 1970s and 80s were characterized by tough price negotiations with 
seller and buyer looking at their customers and suppliers as adversaries that provided the 
best way to increase the individual company’s profit margin (Skjoett-Larsen et al, 2003).  
These arm’s length relations were often characterised by distrust and competition.  At the 
end of the 1980s a significant change in trading relations took place with previous arm’s 
length relations being replaced by durable arm’s length relationships and strategic 
partnerships (Kalafatis, 2000; Dyer et al, 1998), characterised by a high degree of 
information exchange.  It has been suggested (Christopher, 2011) that the practice of 
partnership sourcing is now widespread and that the benefits of such an approach can 
include improved quality, innovation sharing, reduced costs and integrated scheduling of 
production and delivery.  At the route of this argument are the concepts of Relationship 
Marketing (RM) and Partnering.  RM emphasises the importance of establishing and 
maintaining relationships between customers and buyers (Iglesias et al, 2011, p631).  Initial 
definitions of RM (for example Berry, 1983 cited by Iglesias et al, 2011) centred their focus 
on relationships with external customers; however, other, more recent commentators 
developed the concept of RM to include other actors and relationships, out with those 
established between a company and its end customers (Christopher et al, 1991).  This idea 
of the expanded view leads to the concept of Partnering which Upadhye and Battacharya 
(cited by Sadler, 2007) define as: 
 
“Business relationship based on mutual trust, openness, shared risk and shared 
rewards that yield a competitive advantage, resulting in greater business 
performance than companies could achieve individually” (p169) 
 
The idea proffered is that customer/supplier relationships should be based on partnership 
and that successful supply chains will be those based on mutuality and trust where there is 
a constant search for win-win solutions (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and 
Farrington, 2006).   
 
Power as a construct in business to business relationships has received irregular and 
contrasting treatment from analysts (Hingley, 2005a, p.848).  Contrasting views surround 
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the idea that on the one hand power can have a negative effect on the workings of a 
successful supply chain, in that it negates co-operation and is not helpful in building 
relationships (Naudé and Buttle, 2000; Doney and Cannon, 1997); however, there are some 
commentators (Kalafatis, 2000; Earp et al, 1999; Blois, 1998; Campbell, 1997) who support 
the view that power can have a positive influence and that diversity within relationships is a 
good thing.  Campbell (1997) notes that there is no clear correlation between a customer’s 
trust in a supplier or vice versa and that the basis of relationships is founded on other factors 
such as business opportunism or a salesman’s charisma.  Similarly, Palmer (2002, 2000) 
contends that individuals and organisations are not motivated by the need or desire to 
cooperate but by self-interest and in the longer term self-preservation; a view supported by 
Cox (2004, 2001) who argues that business relationships are entered into for reasons of 
self or organisational gain, usually associated with monetary gain.  The acceptance of 
power imbalance is a first step towards successful relationship building and although 
collaborative chain activity is commended suppliers must still be prepared to operate within 
conditions of imbalanced power and reward (Hingley, 2005a, p.63).  Whilst modern day 
literature more often than not trumpets SCM and SCC as strategies that benefit all 
collaborators and ultimately the end customer, we should not lose sight of the fact that it is 
possible for some contributors to try and take advantage of the situation by forming 
opportunistic trade deals at the expense of other members (Simtupang and Sridharan, 
2002).  These actions may generate inertia and supply chain conflict, resulting in 
unnecessary cost and a degraded customer service.  Consequently, a key factor in the 
construction of a successful collaborative supply chain must be the elimination of 
managerial inertia in favour of a chain that develops joint initiatives to ensure that each 
member has a stake in success by delivering value to the end customer.  A collaborative 
supply chain should develop appropriate and common performance measures, integrated 
policies, information sharing, and incentive alignment.  Despite the clear and slightly historic 
message on the benefits that SCC can bring, Senge (2010) seems to suggest that little has 
changed.  Whilst initially agreeing that in order to effect change across a supply chain you 
must first “Focus on the nature of relationships” (p.71); sadly, Senge goes on to add: 
 
“In most supply chains, 90 percent of them [relationships] are transactional 
…..there is very little trust and very little ability to innovate together” (p.71).    
 
Having discussed power as a construct in business to business relationships and the 
contrasting views on the influence that power can have on the workings of a successful 
supply chain (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley, 2005a; Naudé and Buttle, 2000; 
Kalafatis, 2000; Earp et al, 1999; Blois,1998; Doney and Cannon, 1997; Campbell, 1997) 
the debate must now turn to the question of who is the true power broker along the 
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humanitarian supply chain?  In introducing the Structural Holes Theory Burt (2005) 
contends that an individual or organisation within a network, can strengthen its position by 
acting as a broker.  In this context the broker would seek to identify structural holes within 
the humanitarian supply chain and to creating bridges across these holes, hence relocating 
the organisation in a stronger and more powerful position.  The United Nations Cluster 
Approach suggests that the UN is the accepted power broker in a system that is realising 
opportunities for dialogue and improved coordination and that is now facilitating more 
effective and efficient levels of humanitarian response in the medium to long-term (Altay 
and Labonte, 2011; Street, 2007; OCHA, 2006).  However, is this really the case with actors 
and organisations readily accepting that power imbalance is a first step towards successful 
relationship building and in certain circumstance being content to operate within conditions 
of imbalanced power and reward (Hingley, 2005a, p.63). 
 
2.8 An Empirical Opportunity - The Case for Further Study and the Identified 
Research Gaps 
 
The foregoing discussion and analysis have served to highlight a clear empirical opportunity 
within what is a developing body of academic knowledge.  Moreover, a significant number 
of research gaps have been identified which will form the basis of this research and the final 
doctoral study.  These gaps will now be analysed and considered by way of justification of 
the final research question and aim.  
  
2.8.1  A Burgeoning Field 
 
Whilst acknowledging the attention that the field of humanitarian SCM has gained as a 
research area, and the fact that researchers have begun to lay the foundations for a core 
body of knowledge, numerous academic commentators (Leiras et al, 2014; Fawcett and 
Waller, 2013; Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Mangan et al, 2012; Overstreet et al, 2011; Kovács 
and Spens, 2011, 2008 and 2007; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 
2009; Thomas and Fritz, 2006; Beamon, 2004; Yamada et al, 2006; Lyles, 2005; Murray, 
2005; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005; Rickard, 2003) suggest that the research field of 
humanitarian SCM is relatively new and is still in its infancy.   
 
 “Literature on humanitarian logistics is scant” (Kovács and Spens, 2007, p100) 
 
Fawcett and Waller (2013) contend that SCM is the newest business discipline and that, 
as such it is going through what they describe as “growing pains” (p.183) as it seeks to 
chart its future course and define a meaningful destiny for itself.  Indeed, whilst the use of 
SCM techniques is becoming more prevalent in the humanitarian sector (Leiras et al, 
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2014; Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009), with the intent to encompass cross-
functional and inter-agency approaches becoming more popular, it is acknowledged that 
there is no single form of humanitarian supply chain and, therefore no single definition of 
Humanitarian Supply Chain Management (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006, p.115).   
 
Modern Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) supply chains enable a faster 
and more effective response than ever before (Day et al, 2012).  Although the number of 
beneficiaries of humanitarian aid has grown year-on-year (Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács 
and Spens, 2011; Tatham 2011), until the inception of The Journal of Humanitarian 
Logistics and Supply Chain Management (JHLSCM) in June 2011 no dedicated journal 
existed within the field nor was there any journal or other outlet focusing on this topic alone.  
Academic interest has been growing in this area, yet publications still remain fragmented 
and generalised; however, acknowledgment is now made of the increasing number of 
special issues of scientific journals that have been dedicated to the humanitarian logistics 
field since 2005  (Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 2011).  Hence, whilst lessons 
have been learned from past aid operations, operational failures still occur at the point of 
contact for humanitarian missions.  Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) comment on the growing 
body of practice-based literature on Humanitarian SCM and Logistics, but note that this 
work seldom refers to well-established concepts within academic supply chain literature; 
they go on to postulate that if attempts were made to apply such concepts from the business 
model to the humanitarian aid supply chain, we may identify many important parallels, but 
also many equally important differences (p.115).  Similarly, Beamon (2004) observes that 
the majority of existing supply chain research is focused on managing and/or optimizing the 
commercial supply of goods and services, and that whilst the humanitarian relief process is 
an important domain for SCM it has received little attention.   
 
In their study of the 2007 Pisco Earthquake in Peru, Chandes and Paché (2010) discuss 
the absence of collaboration between humanitarian actors and highlight that this resulted in 
lost time, wasted resources and ultimately a deeply disorganised supply chain (p337).  
Observation of the logistical response to the Pisco earthquake demonstrated that business 
logistics, mixing a service and a manufacturing perspective, could furnish valuable 
information to the field of humanitarian logistics not only on the conditions of success within 
collaborative logistics, but also on the obstacles that must be overcome (opposition of 
individual and collective interests, conflict over the division of tasks to be performed….).  In 
concluding, Chandes and Paché (2010) demand a greater depth of exploratory reflection 
within humanitarian logistics and a more rigorous maintenance of the debate surrounding 
SCM, opening a research agenda of the highest priority on the critical need for a more 
collaborative strategy (p337).  Moving this debate forward Dash et al (2013) suggest that 
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“disaster response supply chain management is an emerging field and there is great 
potential for research in emergency logistics and disaster response initiatives” (p.60) and 
Kumar and Havey (2013) highlight the need for more research on disaster relief supply 
chain management in light of frustrations with the delays in receiving aid following the Haiti 
earthquake (2010).  Finally, by way of a summary of current thinking in the field, Fawcett 
and Waller (2013) suggest that: 
 
“Recent research indicates that the top barrier to more effective HADR is inadequate 
logistics, followed by weak governance and insufficient collaboration” (p.187) 
 
2.8.2  Standardisation and Collaboration 
 
In the aftermath of the Asian Tsunami, there was a noticeable increase in interest from 
academia as well as from logistics practitioners in the development of theory and practice 
within the field of Humanitarian SCM; indeed some 40 separate articles and conference 
papers were published in the area between late 2005 and 2007 (Grant and Auton, 2008; 
Kovács and Spens, 2008). Humanitarian logistics had established itself as a field of high 
research interest however, whilst many papers within the field used the concept of supply 
chain management as a starting point, very few of them had a supply chain focus in the 
empirical research, for the field to develop such an approach was called for (Kovács and 
Spens, 2008).  There is an urgent requirement for standardisation of logistics for 
humanitarian emergencies, a shortage of humanitarian logistics experts, inadequate 
assessment and planning and limited collaboration and coordination across the 
humanitarian supply chain as a whole, which creates duplication of effort and wastage 
(Kovács and Spens, 2007, p103).  This lack of collaboration could, at worst mean that relief 
efforts in the field are restricted; hence, networks within affected countries which are best 
placed to implement immediate aid might be severely limited, leading to an increased loss 
of life and suffering (The Lancet, 2010).  Although the discipline of humanitarian logistics is 
“maturing” (Kovács, 2011, p260), for the field to truly evolve, further research is needed in 
support of the planning and execution of the important operations of disaster relief.  
Sophisticated collaboration mechanisms, such as those seen in commercial supply chains 
that are not currently observed in the disaster relief chain, require further inquiry to develop 
new and innovative ways to define relationships and contracts in ways that support the 
provision of humanitarian relief (Akhtar et al, 2012; Balcik et al, 2010, p33; Vincent and 
Bagshaw, 2005).  However, as already discussed the extent of the challenge implicit in 
achieving a coordinated response between NGOs must also reflect, at least in part, the 
desire of many such organisations to maintain a degree of independence from their 
colleagues (Tatham, 2011).   
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Thomas and Fritz (2006) note that academic comparability between humanitarian and 
business operations processes has been limited and Carroll and Neu (2009), whilst 
supporting the concept of end-to-end supply chain collaboration within humanitarian 
logistics, offer what they describe as a pioneering attempt to promote best practice analysis 
from military, business and humanitarian sectors (p1029).   
 
“Perhaps the supply chain academic community has a role to play in disseminating 
the concepts of its discipline in a way that convinces humanitarian donors of the 
importance and value of providing resources for appropriate information systems 
and supply chain processes [Supply Chain Collaboration] as much as for tangible 
relief supplies”.  (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006, p118)    
 
Discussing aspects of humanitarian supply chain management that are in need of further 
research, Larson (2011) highlighted the importance of further investigation into the role of 
intra- and inter-organisational relationships offering the hypothesis that: 
 
“Greater coordination – within NGOs, among NGOs and between NGOs and other 
actors can reduce disaster risk and improve humanitarian effectiveness” (p29)  
 
whilst Boin et al (2010) offer the compelling view that:   
 
“Coordination is the Holy Grail of disaster response” (p4) 
 
In a similar vein, outlining potential areas of research within the field Kovács and Spens 
(2011) suggest that the combination of inter-agency collaboration with supply chain 
collaboration should be a key research area (Table 1, p8); humanitarian logistics requires 
good and applicable research with empirical data being gathered through the use of case 
studies or other qualitative methodologies.  Indeed, a poll of Editorial Advisory and Review 
Board members carried out to establish the scope of the first publication of the JHLSCM 
(Kovács and Spens, 2011) led to specific criticism of the seeming reliance on the use of 
quantitative methodologies, which led to research outcomes that “often propose elegant 
solutions to problems, with little or no attention paid to how solutions might be implemented” 
(p10).  Kunz and Reiner (2012) offer the view that “empirical methodologies such as cross-
organisational case studies should be used more in order to increase knowledge in the field” 
(p.133) as they note that most research methodologies utilised within humanitarian logistics 
research use simulation and modelling.  Supporting these views, Balcik et al (2010) point 
out that : 
 
“The literature lacks studies that broadly and systematically address relief chain 
coordination” (p22) 
 
68 
 
This drive and need for more research in this area is perhaps best summarised by Tatham 
(2011): 
 
“Given its pivotal role in the preparation for, and response to, a disaster, logistics 
and the members of the logistic profession across all of the responding agencies 
and organisations have a highly influential role to play.  Improved cooperation would 
not only pay significant dividends through the development and sharing of best 
practice and the appropriate integration of people, processes and technology, it 
would also help to break down the wider barriers of mutual suspicion that, 
unquestionably, exist” (p14) 
 
 
2.8.3  A More Strategic View - Learning From and Informing Business  
 
What of the discipline and practice of supply chain management as a whole?  Larson (2011) 
offers the view that humanitarian logisticians have much to learn from their business 
counterparts; there has been limited knowledge transfer between business and 
humanitarian logistics practitioners and as a result aid agencies are many years behind 
business organisations in the adoption of modern supply chain practices (p15); indeed it 
has been suggested that humanitarian aid agencies may be 15 or even 20 years behind 
adopting today’s fundamental tools of logistics and supply chain management (van 
Wassenhove, 2006; Spring, 2006).  However, it should also be noted, that there is 
increasing opinion that the traditional view of a predictable and stable commercial supply 
chain should no longer be the accepted norm.  Dash et al (2013) proffer the idea that some 
aspects of commercial logistics and SCM in support of normal every day activity are similar 
to those within disaster response supply chains; hence, managers of both disciplines could 
learn from each other and supplement best practice within both fields (p.58).  Commercial 
supply chain managers are increasingly faced with challenges that no longer obey the 
traditional rules of forecast driven certainty and are therefore, forced to adopt the more 
event driven approaches utilised by their humanitarian counterparts (Decker et al, 2013; 
Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011).  Indeed, the prospective outreach of 
humanitarian logistics research through managerial relevance and access to research 
results, and the overall usefulness of such work to logistics practitioners in all fields is now 
being noted (Dash et al, 2013; Decker et al, 2013; Kovács, 2012).  In short, perhaps the 
commercial sector has something to learn from its humanitarian counterparts and vice 
versa? 
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2.8.4  Identified Gaps in the Research  
By way of a final summary of this discussion and in support of the final research question, 
aim and adopted methodology and method, Table 2.4 is now included which sets out and 
describes the background to the identified research gaps.
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Identified Research Gap Description Academic Underpinning Sources 
Research in the field of 
humanitarian SCM is 
relatively new and is still 
in its infancy. 
Humanitarian SCM is starting to receive attention as a field of research and scholars have 
begun to lay the foundations for a core body of knowledge; however the field still needs 
significantly more academic research and associated publications.  
Leiras et al, (2014) 
Fawcett and Waller (2013)  
Kunz and Reiner (2012)  
Mangan et al (2012)  
Overstreet et al (2011)  
Kovács and Spens (2011, 2008, 2007)  
Carroll and Neu (2009)  
Tomasini and van Wassenhove (2009) 
Grant and Auton, 2008 
Thomas and Fritz (2006)  
Yamada et al (2006) 
Lyles (2005) 
Murray (2005) 
Thomas and Kopczak (2005) 
The humanitarian field 
must encompass more 
cross-functional and 
inter-agency 
approaches 
SCM is the newest business discipline and is still seeking to chart its future course and 
define a meaningful destiny for itself.   
Leiras et al, (2014) 
Fawcett and Waller (2013)  
Tatahm and Paettit (2010) 
Ballou (2007) 
Tomansini and van Wassenhove (2009)  
Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) 
Research within 
humanitarian SCM 
seldom refers to the 
application of well-
established concepts 
within academic supply 
chain literature such as 
those associated with 
SC collaboration.   
If attempts were made to apply well-established academic concepts from the business 
sector to the humanitarian SC, then important parallels, and equally important differences 
may be identified to the benefit of the overall relief effort. 
Akhtar et al (2012) 
Kunz and Reiner (2012)  
Balcik et al (2010) 
Carroll and Neu (2009)  
Oloruntoba and Gray (2006)  
Vincent and Bagshaw (2005) 
Beamon (2004) 
A research agenda is 
required on the critical 
need for stronger 
governance and a more 
collaborative strategy 
within the humanitarian 
SC.  
There is an absence of collaboration within the humanitarian SC, hence a greater depth of 
exploratory reflection is required, and a more rigorous debate surrounding humanitarian 
SC collaboration is needed. 
Leiras et al, (2014) 
Fawcett and Waller (2013)  
Kumar and Havey (2013)  
Kovács (2011) 
Tatham (2011) 
Balcik et al (2010) 
Chandes and Paché (2010) 
The Lancet, 2010 
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Identified Research Gap Description Academic Underpinning Sources 
Lessons can be learned 
from the humanitarian 
sector by business 
sector SC managers to 
the benefit of the 
discipline of SCM as a 
whole. 
There is limited knowledge transfer between business and humanitarian logistics 
practitioners and as a result aid agencies are many years behind business organisations 
in the adoption of modern supply chain practices. The traditional view of a predictable and 
stable commercial supply chain should no longer be the accepted norm within the 
business sector and SC managers face similar challenges to their humanitarian 
counterparts.     
Dash et al (2013)  
Decker et al (2013) 
Kovács (2012) 
Christopher and Tatham (2011) 
Boin et al (2010) 
Carroll and Neu (2009) 
Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) 
Thomas and Fritz (2006) 
Further research is 
needed into the role of 
intra- and inter-
organisational 
relationships within the 
humanitarian SC. 
 
 
The contention is that greater coordination within NGOs, among NGOs and between 
NGOs and other actors within the humanitarian SC can reduce disaster risk and improve 
humanitarian effectiveness.  The belief being that coordination is the Holy Grail of disaster 
response. 
Leiras et al, (2014) 
Kovács and Spens (2011)  
Larson (2011)  
Boin et al (2010) 
More research is 
required within the field 
with empirical data 
being gathered through 
case studies or other 
qualitative 
methodologies. 
Current research within the field is predominantly focussed on quantitative methodologies 
which utilise simulation and modelling.   
Kunz and Reiner (2012) 
Kovács and Spens (2011) 
Tatham (2011) 
More research is 
required into the 
success of UN Cluster 
Concept 
Analysis of the United Nation Cluster Approach suggests that the concept has, in part 
answered the call for a collaboration within the humanitarian SC.  Is this true in reality? 
Altay and Labonte (2011) 
HERR (2011) 
Kovács (2011)  
Barratt, 2004 
 
 
Table 2.4 Identified Gaps in the Research
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2.9 The Final Research Question and Aim of the Thesis 
 
Given the foregoing discussion, this study will seek to fill the identified gaps in the research 
(Table 2.4) surrounding the effective planning and coordination of the provision of 
emergency logistics and to evaluate how effective collaboration might be achieved along 
the humanitarian supply chain as a result.  The foregoing narrative and analysis therefore 
gives rise to the single research question: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim of the thesis is to make a theoretical contribution to contingency theoretic 
perspectives and a functional contribution to existing business and humanitarian supply 
chain practice, by revealing what factors restrict effective collaboration between actors 
within humanitarian relief environments and suggesting how these issues might be 
addressed in the future. 
  
When considering the Immediate Response to Natural Disasters what are the key 
drivers within the Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain that will help to improve 
future collaborative working? 
 73 
 
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
“People undertake research in order to find things out in a systematic way, thereby 
increasing their knowledge” 
(Jankowicz, 2005)  
3.1 Introduction 
Once a topic has been identified and a research question refined, thoughts must then turn 
to the sort of data required to answer the question and to how this data might be gathered 
(Cameron and Price, 2009).  A research methodology is simply a technique for collecting 
data (Creswell, 2013; Bryman and Bell, 2007) and choosing an appropriate methodology 
depends on a clear understanding of what each method has to offer, what it can do and, 
perhaps more importantly what it cannot do and what type of research findings will be 
produced.  The research philosophy adopted contains important assumptions about the 
way in which the researcher views the world and these assumptions will underpin the overall 
research strategy and chosen methods (Saunders et al, 2010).  Accordingly, the range of 
issues that bear, both directly and more peripherally, on the research approach adopted will 
be addressed.  In explaining how the final methodology was arrived at both the external and 
internal influences on the methodological decisions made will be acknowledged, and 
sources revealed surrounding the connections between the purpose of the research, the 
philosophical and theoretical perspectives taken and the research question previously 
arrived at in Chapter 2.  A research design provides a framework for the collection and 
analysis of data and the choice of design reflects decisions made about the priority given to 
a range of dimensions within the research process (Bryman and Bell, 2007); hence, set 
against this background the research design methods employed to collect and analyse data 
will also be discussed. 
 
3.2 Methodological Choice, Research Philosophy and the Personal Perspective 
Methodology should represent the theory of how actual research is undertaken (Blaikie, 
2007).  In achieving this, methodology seeks to guide the development of rigorous, 
comprehensive and integrated approaches based on critical assessment of a range of 
influences and options.  Blaikie (2007) goes on to suggest that these should include, 
amongst other things, the topic of research, underlying philosophical inclinations about how 
theory should be generated and/or tested, what criteria should be satisfied and what 
resources are available.  In essence the research methodology adopted must contain 
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important assumptions about the researcher’s ontological and epistemological views on the 
world (Saunders et al, 2009).  Business and management researchers must have an 
awareness of the philosophical commitments that they make through their choice of 
research strategy as this has a significant impact not only on what they do but on their 
understanding of what it is that they are actually investigating.  In part the philosophy 
adopted will be influenced by practical considerations, however the main influence is likely 
to be the particular researcher’s view of the relationship between knowledge and how it is 
developed.  The important issue is not whether the researcher is philosophically informed 
but how well is the researcher able to reflect upon the philosophical choices made and 
defend them in relation to the alternatives available (Johnson and Clark, 2006 cited by 
Saunders et al, 2009, p108).   
 
Individual assumptions about human knowledge and about the nature of reality will have an 
inevitable impact on how we shape and understand research questions, the methods that 
we use and how findings are interpreted (Crotty, 1998).  The contention being that the main 
influence on the philosophy that an individual adopts is likely to be their particular view of 
what is acceptable knowledge and the process by which this is developed (Saunders et al, 
2012, p.128).  As discussed earlier within this thesis (section 1.2), prior to taking up a role 
within academia, the researcher served for almost 26 years in the RAF, in what is arguably 
a classic objectivist reality.  The structures and social entities certainly exist in a reality that 
is external to, and independent of the social actors within it (Bryman and Bell, 2012; Blakie, 
2007).  In essence military personnel change roles on a regular basis, but duties are 
described by terms of reference and operating procedures which must be adhered to.  A 
strict hierarchy is necessarily maintained and there is little, if any room for the subjectivist 
view.  Furthermore, when considering the epistemological position and what is accepted as 
knowledge (Bryman and Bell, 2012; Saunders et al, 2012; Cameron and Price, 2009; 
Blaikie, 2007) the law like generalisations associated with the military environment would 
seem to reflect the positivist philosophy and the position associated with that of the natural 
scientist (Saunders et al, 2012, p.134).  Add to this the fact that this researcher served as 
an aviation engineer and the suggested links to an objectivist, positivist stance would seem 
obvious.  However, whilst still serving, this researcher began to consider management as 
an academic discipline and was stuck by the fact that despite this objectivist structure, 
individual approaches to management and the interactions between the associated social 
actors within the military arena, still had a significant part to play in the overall nature of 
reality.  In effect, for this researcher the opinion was formed in favour of the subjectivist 
aspect of ontology.  Moreover, the view was also developed that the social world of 
management was simply too complex to support this ‘law-like’ scientific generalisation and 
that for meaningful commentary, an understanding of the differences between social actors 
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must be considered.  Hence, against this argument and realisation the subjectivist, 
interpretivist views are favoured by this researcher and, as will be described in this Chapter 
will form the basis for the remainder of this thesis. 
 
3.3 Formulating the Research Question – Identifying Relevant Literature 
 
Exploring and engaging with the literature relevant to the particular focus of the research 
must be a thread that runs through the entire research process (Creswell, 2013; Cameron 
and Price, 2009; Blaikie, 2007).  Moreover, in order to establish what work has been 
previously published within the subject field, it is important that the literature search is 
carefully planned to ensure that the relevant and up-to-date literature is located (Saunders 
et al, 2009).  In order to avoid what they describe as information overload Saunders et al 
(2009, p.75) suggest that key words and search items should be established at an early 
stage; accordingly, the table included at Appendix A sets out the key words used throughout 
this research process.  These key words were revisited on a 4 monthly cycle to ensure that 
an up-to-date literary review was maintained; in addition reference lists associated with 
articles found during the initial keyword search were also investigated.  Consequently, the 
stock of literature gradually expanded to well in excess of 250 items.  Hence, it was useful 
to keep a data base of articles with a short précis of each article being maintained to aid 
with the management of the literature.  In addition to journal searches through established 
library search engines, such as Emerald and Ebsco, the research was also informed 
through registration with Google Scholar, which proved to be a very useful and much used 
facility throughout the project. 
 
3.4 Arriving at a Methodology 
 
Arriving at a methodology is a complex process.  The range of methodological literature that 
explains the different approaches to research that have developed, in both the natural and 
social sciences, bears witness to how diverse the options are, how problematic the choices 
may be and how these are intimately connected to different philosophical and theoretical 
perspectives (see for example: Creswell, 2013; Gill and Johnson, 2010; Cameron and Price, 
2009; Saunders et al, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Blaikie, 2007). Numerous academic 
models are offered which seek to assist researchers in navigating these diverse options 
and the inherent complexities and perhaps conflicts involved in selecting an appropriate 
methodology (see for example: Gill and Johnson, 2010; Saunders et al, 2009; Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997).  As with any model it would be unwise to consider any one in particular as 
necessarily right, but by the same token it would also be folly to consider any model as 
wrong, at least because they all offer an attempt to distil ideas and options down to a 
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workable and tangible level.  In short, as a guide for how an issue might be resolved, they 
are essential and extremely helpful.  Indeed, Partington (2000) suggests that the level of 
consideration should lie somewhere between simply applying an established, normative 
approach with little further comment and reconstructing the entire philosophy of science to 
arrive at a unique methodological strategy.  His advice, however, is to find and explain an 
approach that is appropriate to the requirements of the research and its context rather than 
to favour either extreme.  This advice echoes that of Emmett (1972), to adopt a style that is 
essentially a matter of convenience, employing an approach that is relevant and helpful to 
the subject matter and the method of enquiry, rather than given as an absolute.  Accordingly, 
the thinking that was used to arrive at the chosen approach will now be explained. 
 
3.4.1 The Research Process - An Appropriate Methodological Model 
 
As discussed previously there are numerous models which attempt to represent the field.  
The models aim to integrate contributions from a range of academic texts in an attempt to 
encapsulate the options available for the researcher.  More or less prescriptive as to the 
approaches to research, they usefully indicate how philosophical, theoretical and 
methodological perspectives might be aligned.  One such model, that offered by Saunders 
et al (2009), (Fig 3.1) depicts what they refer to as the research onion.  This nested hierarchy 
seeks to avoid the strict polarity apparent within some models (see for example: Hussey 
and Hussey, 1997), while retaining the conceptual identity of the different layers and still 
indicating potential associations between those layers.   
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Fig 3.1     The Research Onion (Saunders et al, 2009, p.108) 
In keeping with other such representations, Saunders et al (2009) offer a model that allows 
the researcher to identify the key issues that require attention if the final research 
methodology adopted is to be both justifiable and credible.  Fundamental to its use is a 
process that leads from initial considerations of underlying philosophical perspectives 
through a series of layers before finally arriving at appropriate methods of data collection 
and analysis.  The researcher also considered this model to be similar to the depiction of a 
hill on an Ordnance Survey map.  If one considers the onion in a 3 dimensional way, then 
the overall data collection method becomes the top of the hill with all of the supporting 
elements that go towards the overall philosophy and approach underpinning the peak.  With 
this in mind, in order to clearly explain and justify the thought processes involved in arriving 
at the final methodology the onion will now be systematically peeled, (or indeed the hill 
climbed), with discussion of each exposed layer being offered to explain the thinking behind 
the final chosen approach. 
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3.5 Philosophical Positioning 
 
As discussed earlier, the research philosophy adopted must contain important assumptions 
about the researcher’s ontological and epistemological views of the world (Saunders et al, 
2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007).  In part the philosophy adopted will be influenced by practical 
considerations (access to data and/or participants, time constraints etc..) but it is these 
assumptions about initial researcher positioning that will underpin the overall research 
strategy and the associated research methods.  Considering the outer layer of the research 
onion at Fig. 3.1 Saunders et al (2009) offer a comparative view of the 4 alternative research 
philosophies.  
 
 Positivism Realism Interpretivism Pragmatism 
Ontology – 
the nature of 
reality 
 
External, 
objective, 
independent of 
social actors 
 
Objective. Exists 
independent of 
human thoughts 
and beliefs or 
knowledge 
 
Socially 
constructed, 
subjective, may 
change 
 
External 
multiple, view 
chosen to best 
enable 
answering of 
research 
question 
Epistemology 
–what 
constitutes 
knowledge 
 
Only 
observable 
phenomena 
can provide 
credible data 
 
Observable 
phenomena 
provide credible 
facts. Insufficient 
data means 
inaccuracies 
 
Subjective 
meanings and 
social 
phenomena. 
Focus upon the 
details of a 
situation and 
reality behind 
the details 
 
Depends on 
the research 
question. 
Either or both 
observable 
phenomena 
and subjective 
meanings can 
provide 
acceptable 
knowledge 
 
 
Table 3.1 Comparison of 4 Research Philosophies in Management Research 
(Saunders et al, 2009, p.19) 
3.5.1 Ontology and Epistemology 
The idea that ontological and epistemological standing can be effectively polarised onto a 
position on a sliding scale is somewhat simplistic although it is fair to acknowledge that this 
representation does help to portray the options that are available to the researcher.   As this 
research was primarily concerned with the relationships that exist amongst actors within 
Humanitarian Relief Supply Chains, and the influence of those relationships on the 
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collaborative process, the focus had to be from the perspective of the actors involved.  
Furthermore, given the objectives it was of limited interest to simply describe particular 
behaviours in particular circumstances.  Von Wright (1971, cited by Bryman and Bell, 2007) 
depicts the epistemological clash between positivism and interpretivism when considering 
the social sciences and discusses the issues surrounding appropriate approaches when 
trying to interpret human action.  In essence the clash reflects a division between gaining 
an explanation of human behaviour that is inherent within the positivist approach and the 
understanding of human behaviour that is the goal of interpretivism.   The aim within this 
research project was, through appropriate analysis and some warranted speculation to 
identify the processes and mechanism that produced inherent behaviours, the influences 
on those behaviours and to speculate on how they might be modified and ultimately 
improved for the greater benefit of all involved in the provision of humanitarian relief (see 
discussion on Porter’s Value Chain (1990) within Section 2.2).  The goal was not to simply 
explain inherent behaviour, but to develop an approach that would reveal participants’ 
understandings of behaviours that held reality for them; hence the epistemological locations 
would have to reveal humanitarian actor's interpretations and understandings of their reality 
coupled with an ontology that would link participant experiences with dissimilar levels of 
reality. 
 
Hence in keeping with the thoughts of Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998, cited by Saunders et 
al, 2009, p.109) whilst the pragmatic approach was intuitively appealing, the idea of a 
constantly moving ontology did not seem appropriate.  The subjective, socially constructed 
ontological view coupled with the epistemological focus on the details of a situation and the 
reality behind those details meant that the overall standpoint within this thesis was an 
interpretivist one. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6 The Appropriate Research Approach – Deductive or Inductive? 
 
3.6.1 Distinctions 
The distinction between deductive and inductive approaches is at first glance a simple one 
(Creswell, 2013; Saunders et al, 2010; Cameron and Price, 2009).  Deductive research has 
its origins in research in the natural sciences.  It starts with theory and proceeds by testing 
Final Philosophical Positioning 
Interpretivism 
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hypotheses derived from that theory.  On the other hand, inductive research does quite the 
opposite in that it starts with observations and derives theory from those observations.  
Bryman and Bell (2007) offer the opinion that the deductive approach represents the 
commonest view of the nature of the relationship between theory and research as the 
researcher develops hypotheses based on what is known about the domain under scrutiny 
and of the associated theoretical ideas; however, they also argue that the last step when 
utilising deduction actually involves some induction, as the researcher infers the 
implications of his or her findings for the theory that prompted the whole exercise.  Whilst 
noting that deductive research is what most people understand as scientific research 
Cameron and Price (2009) believe that logically speaking inductive research must come 
first and that induction is the “chicken that lays the theory egg” (p.75).  But just as the 
processes associated with a deductive approach will entail an element of induction so the 
inductive approach is likely to include some deduction.  Once the phase of theoretical 
reflection on a set of data has taken place, the researcher may wish to collect additional 
data in order to identify the conditions in which a suggested theory will or will not hold true, 
in short the application of a deductive approach utilising the newly induced theoretical ideas 
(Saunders et al, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007).   
 
3.6.2 A Collective Wariness – the Case for the Inductive Approach  
 
The emergence of the social sciences in the 20th century led to a wariness of deduction 
amongst associated researchers.  Social sciences researchers were critical of the idea that 
a cause-effect link could be made between particular variables without allowance being 
made for an understanding of the way in which humans interpret and interact with their 
social world.  Followers of induction also criticise the ridgid methodologies associated with 
deduction that make no allowance for alternative explanations of what is actually happening 
(Saunders et al, 2009).  The call for more inductive, theory-building studies which are useful, 
relevant and up-to-date has been growing for some time (see for example Daft and Lewin, 
1990 who question the usefulness and relevance of much organizational theory).  
Underlying these practical concerns are the more fundamental methodological issues 
surrounding the dominance of the quantitative, deductive, theory-testing research 
paradigms in management research which is challenged on scientific grounds (Partington, 
2000, p.92).  Numerous commentators now offer the view that the evolving status of 
research into organisations has made it appropriate for researchers to adopt methodologies 
that aim to build new theories from empirical data (see for example Eisenhardt, 1989).  As 
discussed earlier this research sought to identify and understand relationships within the 
field of humanitarian supply chains and the influences that social interaction could have, 
hence the interpretive view working with what Saunders et al (2009, p.116) describe as the 
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social actors within the field was adopted.  Moreover, as highlighted within Chapter 2 (see 
section 2.11), although the discipline of humanitarian logistics is “maturing” ( Kovács, 2011, 
p260); for the field to truly evolve, further research is needed in support of the planning and 
execution of the important operations of disaster relief.   Sophisticated collaboration 
mechanisms, such as those seen in commercial supply chains that are not currently 
observed in the relief chain, require further inquiry to develop new and innovative ways to 
define relationships and contracts in ways that support the provision of relief (Balcik et al, 
2010, p.33).  Hence, the case for an inductive approach lies in this desire to induce 
hypotheses from the field research.   Given that the purpose of the research was to develop 
an understanding and explanation of the nature of relationship forming, analysing data as 
defined by the subject matter rather than on pre-constructed hypotheses which had been 
developed in advance of the fieldwork, the inductive approach was considered to be the 
most appropriate.   
 
 
 
 
 
3.7 The Final Research Strategy 
 
3.7.1 Grounded Theory 
 
“The purpose of grounded theory is theory construction rather than description or 
application of existing theories” (Charmaz and Bryant, 2011, p.292) 
 
Grounded theory is thought to be the best example of the inductive approach as it is firmly 
rooted in the assumption that research should not begin with a prior hypothesis but that 
hypotheses should be developed from close data analysis (Silverman 2011a, Saunders et 
al, 2009, Bryman and Bell, 2007).  Based on the seminal work of Glaser and Strauss (1967) 
it is a strategy which should be adopted where a more behaviouristic review is required 
(Sunday, 1979 cited by Gill and Johnson, 2010).   But grounded theory was and still remains 
more than simply a process of theory development that is grounded in data collection.  It is 
implicit in the joint and several works of Glaser, Strauss, Corbin and others that the term 
grounded theory refers to a process.  However, although much cited in the organisational 
literature, Bryman and Bell (2007) note that the associated methods and techniques remain 
Final Research Approach 
Inductive 
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contentious, not least between its original authors who developed the approach along 
different paths following the publication of the initial text (Glaser and Strauss, 1967); 
moreover, there is considerable controversy about what grounded theory actually is and 
entails (Charmaz, 2000 cited by Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.585).  Whereas Glaser (1992) 
has sought continuously to promote a highly flexible approach dependent as much on the 
creativity and ingenuity of the research as on any procedure guidance, Strauss (1987) and 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) have developed an ever more systematised approach where 
data collection, analysis and eventual theory stand in close relationship to one another.  
Reassuringly, one part of the process of development is the clear shift that Glaser and 
Strauss have both made from their initial 1967 view that grounded theory was uniquely the 
domain of professionally trained sociologists to one accepting that the approach was 
adaptable to a variety of fields and disciplines (Glaser, 1992; Strauss and Corbin, 1990), 
although perhaps more especially in the social sciences. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) offer the view that the grounded approach can be used to 
enable the researcher to “identify and explain patterns and processes, commonalities and 
differences” (p.9).  However, Suddaby, (2006, cited by Saunders et al, 2009) lists six 
common misconceptions about a grounded approach: 
1. It should not be an excuse to ignore the literature.  
2. It is not a presentation of raw data. 
3. It is not theory testing. 
4. It is an interpretative, highly creative process and not a logico-deductive one. 
5. It is not perfect and can by its very nature be ‘messy’; hence the researcher must 
develop a tacit feel for their data. 
6. It is not easy and is the product of experience, hard work and creativity. 
Partington (2000) offers a similar view, in that researchers attracted by the guiding principles 
associated with grounded theory cannot escape the undiminished need for “sensitivity, 
creativity, patience, perseverance, courage and luck” (p.91).  Against these warnings is the 
view that where the researcher wishes to facilitate reflection upon events and/or identify 
organisational structure then inductive grounding may make this process easier (Locke, 
2001); moreover, this approach can also offer a “strong handle on what real life is like” 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.10) and is conducted by “people who apply a broad set of 
skills and experiences in a variety of settings rather than exclusively by functionally 
constrained academics “ (Partington, 2000, p.91). 
In this research, therefore, the decision was taken to use the highly flexible approach 
espoused by Glaser (1992).  The attraction of the Glaserian approach was that it does not 
simply support the ‘classic’ grounded approach, but allows the researcher the licence to 
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build upon existing theory and the freedom to speculate on developing elements of that 
theory rather than simply producing a range of procedurally linked concepts as espoused 
by Strauss and Corbin (1990).  Glaser (1992) explicitly allows for considerable freedom in 
speculating beyond the raw data to draw generalisations, rather than to depend on strict 
adherence to procedural rules and the constraints of conditional process.  However, in spite 
of his somewhat free-form approach Glaser’s ultimate and explicit interest remains in the 
development of strong sociological constructs (Glaser, 1992).  Although the researcher is 
not a trained sociologist, this work was based on an interest in the processes of 
organisational life and on the wish to generate a theoretical explanation for poorly 
researched phenomena in a discrete context.  The view was taken that, even for a relatively 
novice researcher, this kind of investigation held the potential to produce interesting 
contributions to both theory and practice, and perhaps have relevance beyond the limited 
context of the research.   Hence, the overall strategy was best placed within the grounded 
theory-building approach. 
 
3.7.2 Case Studies 
 
“A strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a 
particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple 
sources of evidence” (Robson, 2002, p.178) 
 
Yin (2009) describes a case study as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context” (p.14).  Simons (2009) argues that in-depth case 
study research is more effective in addressing what is currently happening within an industry 
and why it is happening when compared to more traditional analysis, which often describes 
what has happened in the past.  Case studies should be of particular interest if the overall 
aim of the research is to gain a rich understanding of the process being studied (Creswell, 
2013; Morris and Wood, 1991 cited by Saunders et al, 2009).  Saunders et al go on to 
suggest that case study research is more often than not used in explanatory and exploratory 
research which is aimed at addressing the question why? Yin (2013) distinguishes between 
case studies and histories, but the only difference that he identifies between the two is that 
a case study uses direct observation and systematic interviewing.  Yin also offers the view 
that a case study is an empirical inquiry that enables: 
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1. In depth investigation of a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. 
 
2. The study of a situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than 
data points. 
 
3. The utilisation of multiple sources of evidence. 
 
Traditionally theory has been developed by combining observations from previous literature, 
common sense and experience, but the tie to actual data may often be a somewhat tenuous 
one (Eisenhardt, 1989).  However, back in 1967, Glaser and Strauss were arguing that it is 
the intimate connection with the empirical reality that permits the development of a testable, 
relevant and valid theory.  Qualitative research studies social phenomena from the 
perspective of the informants (Creswell, 2013; Banister et al, 1994).  Within this general 
tradition, case studies have an important function in theory building, especially when 
investigating emergent organisational behaviour that is informal or unusual, when current 
theory is weak or under-developed and there are potentially many variables whose 
connections are not immediately obvious (Hartley, 1994).   Hartley goes on to suggest more 
specifically that case studies allow us to explore social processes as they unfold, in their 
natural organisational and environmental context, often revealing uniqueness rather than 
typicality.  Similarly, by engaging closely with the informant’s domain the researcher can 
capture the concepts and categories used by subjects to organise their world and therefore 
aid the emergence of new insights (Jones, cited by Mangham, 1987).  Yin (2013) notes that 
case studies are also useful when the boundaries between context and phenomena are not 
clearly evidenced and context is deliberately part of the design.   
 
When researching in a field for which little or no formal theory exists or, as here, when new 
insights are sought, the value of the qualitative theory building approach to case study 
becomes evident (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  Yin (2009) points out that bias on the part of 
the researcher and a lack of rigour has undermined the legitimacy of case studies in some 
fields and that conclusions drawn from single case studies are open to accusations that 
they produce insufficient data for effective conclusions to be drawn.  However, what is clear 
is that the case study continues to be an important part of research in the fields of 
management and social science.  Indeed numerous supply chain management text books 
are populated with case studies, both long and short, for instructional purposes (see for 
example Mangan et al, 2012; Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Lysons and Farrington, 2006, 
Mentzer, 2004; and Lysons and Gillingham 2003).  Moreover, it is argued that the in-depth 
case study approach allows for greater insight into the field of study within a real life context 
and that the method is especially useful for analysing various stages of a supply chain 
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(Soosay et al, 2008).    The exploratory aspects of a multiple case study approach proves 
especially useful for investigating supply chains and developing an in-depth insight into 
individual key stages within the chain itself.  Case studies can be used to offer a multi-
dimensional and flexible assessment of supply chains through deeper exploration and 
identification of relatively complex key areas and events within the chain.  This allows for 
the collation of a wide spectrum of information for the enhancement of academic research 
and the development of theories which may benefit various key personnel at various stages 
of the supply chain (Soosay et al, 2008).  In a similar vein, outlining potential areas of 
research within the humanitarian field Kovács and Spens (2011) suggest that the 
combination of inter-agency collaboration with supply chain collaboration should be a key 
research area: 
 
“Humanitarian logistics requires good and applicable research with empirical data 
being gathered through the use of case studies or other qualitative methodologies” 
(Table 1, p8).   
 
As discussed earlier (section 3.6), a strong argument in favour of the inductive approach is 
that it offers the potential to answer not only the research question but also questions not 
originally asked (Partington 2000); the contention being that when research is conducted 
from the perspective of the informant, and the researcher remains open to surprise rather 
than seeking to confirm expectations, ever more interesting insights can emerge from field 
work.  Qualitative case studies allow for the adoption of an integrated method approach, not 
only to improve rigour, but also to explore and understand a specific topic while allowing the 
researcher to develop the best possible methodology for their given area of research 
(Cameron and Price, 2009; Saunders et al, 2009; Yin, 2009).  
 
The kind of focus, depth and detail proposed by these scholars represents an almost self-
evident description of, and argument for the use of case study within the context of this 
research.  While the criteria evinced above have discrete characteristics it is clear by 
inspection that they also emerge from a common underlying theme.  To paraphrase, this 
can be stated as follows.  When new insights are sought and when it is deemed important 
to reveal and to understand the unique perspectives of informants within the natural 
organisational contexts and environments then the argument for adopting a qualitative, 
inductive case based approach is strong.   In light of the study objectives, a qualitative 
multiple case study approach using an integrated research methodology was 
acknowledged as an appropriate and valuable means of developing this research.  Within 
the context of this study, the case study approach allowed the researcher to investigate and 
examine the studied phenomena within a real life context and explore why and what was 
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happening in a current situation (Yin, 2009).  Case studies also provide the opportunity for 
a holistic view of what is happening within a business, enabling the researcher to see the 
whole picture.  Finally, this method was chosen as it is considered to be one of the most 
effective means of obtaining a broad range of rich data (Saunders et al, 2009). 
 
3.7.3   Single vs Multiple-Case Design 
 
Each of the notions advanced in the previous paragraphs resonate with the needs and 
intentions of this investigation and so the use of a case based, qualitative and inductive 
approach held clear attractions for the overall research strategy.  However, should the 
approach be that of a single case or would a multiple-case design be the better option?  Yin 
(2009) argues that the use of multiple-cases provides more compelling evidence and is 
therefore regarded as being more robust.  In addition, a qualitative multiple-case study not 
only allows for comparison between individual companies or cases, but the collection of 
increased, in-depth, exploratory data favours the identification of a greater number of 
unknown conditions and events (Soosay et al, 2008).  Yin (2009) also suggests that the use 
of multiple-case designs has increased in frequency over recent years and offers the view 
that in some fields multiple-case studies have been regarded as a different methodology 
from the single-case approach.  Multiple-case designs arguably have distinct advantages 
when compared to the single-case approach (Herriott and Firestone, 1983 cited by Yin, 
2009) in that the evidence produced is often considered to be more compelling, hence 
overall findings are viewed as more robust.  Furthermore, they are used more often than 
not where the intention of the research is to compare and contrast findings and to look for 
similarities and differences across a number of organisations (Cameron and Price, 2009; 
Simons, 2009).  As this thesis was concerned with identifying reasons why participant actors 
within the Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain were struggling to collaborate, it was felt that 
the associated field work was well suited to the use of multiple-case studies based on 
different actors within the Supply Chain itself.   Yin (2009) also suggests that whilst 
supplementing the findings associated with a single-case, the data gathered from additional 
cases might also fill a gap left by the first case (p.62), thereby making the findings all the 
more compelling.  Moreover, the selection of a multiple-case approach also benefits the 
justification of the final findings and serves to address the arguments surrounding 
triangulation of the final qualitative data and associated findings (see section 3.11.7).   
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3.7.4 Cross-Case Research and Analysis 
 
An illustration of the cross study method is included in Fig 3.2.   
 
Fig 3.2  Case Study Research (Yin, 2009, p.57) 
 
Following the development of theory the figure illustrates the importance of the case 
selection and data collection process.  It also shows that each case should be treated as 
an individual study before cross-case analysis is used to identify trends, commonality and 
differences (Yin, 2009) which will lead to the final findings and the overall contribution.  The 
adoption of this approach is amplified within Fig 3.4 and the associated discussion (see 
section 3.10).    
 
A True Case Study? 
 
Having considered the overall methodology to be adopted within this research thoughts 
turned to the actual definition of the word case and the merits of its use given the overall 
context of this study.  Definitions of classic cases (Simons, 2009, Yin, 2009, Stake, 1995) 
suggest that the selected organisations should be considered from all angles and all 
aspects and clearly this was not to be the approach here, where a much more focussed 
view of the participant organisation’s particular approaches to disaster relief and the 
immediate response phase (see Fig 2.9, Kovács and Spens 2008, 2007) in particular would 
be the key.  Accordingly, in order to locate the cases within the general context the decision 
was taken to use the term domain instead of case, whereby a domain is understood to be 
more descriptively rich than a case expressed as an area of human practice valued by 
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society and mastered through a recognised period of study and learning (Gardner,1997).  
Hence, hereafter, throughout the thesis the classification of domain is used in preference to 
the term case. 
 
The Final Research Domains – A Justifiable Choice 
 
As will be discussed later, within the general context, the aim was to identify a sufficient 
number of domains to achieve data triangulation and with it generalisability of the final 
findings and contribution (See section 3.11.7).  Following Stage I of the research design 
(See Fig 4) responses were received from 11 of the 18 organisations that were contacted 
(see Appendix B).  However, a decision had to be taken on the number of domains that 
would feature in the final research, offset against the necessary limitations associated with 
the required word count for the final thesis together with the requirement for rich qualitative 
data, identified as key to the successful fulfilment of the study itself.  Hence, against these 
restrictions and stipulations four actor organisations, all of whom are involved in the 
provision of immediate response (see Fig 2.9, Kovács and Spens 2008, 2007) to disasters 
were identified as domains for the study.  In-depth introductions to these organisations are 
included within the separate domain analysis chapters (4 through 7); but by way of summary 
and justification, the following organisations were selected: 
 
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance: 
Following initial contact during Stage I of the research process (see Fig 3.4 and 
section 3.11.1), and a discussion on the overall research topic, the researcher was 
advised by the United Nations to contact their Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Assistance (UN OCHA) as it is deemed to be responsible for bringing 
together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent and coordinated response to 
emergencies and disaster relief.  A key pillar of the OCHA mandate is to “coordinate 
effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and 
international actors” (OCHA, 2012a).  OCHA's overall role is to ensure effective 
coordination, including strengthening the cluster approach (see section 2.10), data 
and information management, and reporting.  The organisation believe that by 
ensuring that the right structures, partnerships and leaders are supported, they and 
their humanitarian partners can better coordinate humanitarian situations.  
Moreover, OCHA also aims to promote efficient interaction between civilian and 
military actors in humanitarian operations.  Given that the overall emphasis of this 
research was based around an investigation of the use of collaborative techniques 
within the humanitarian relief supply chain, inclusion of OCHA was considered to be 
essential. 
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The UK Ministry of Defence Joint Forces Command:  Weiss and Campbell 
(1991) note that it seems that when disasters occur, governments often turn to the 
military for help as the military have certain resources immediately to hand as well 
as the transport and human assets with which to distribute them.  Following a 
humanitarian disaster the UK government may be requested to mount or lend 
support to the relief effort in the country or region affected (see discussion on the 
role of a humanitarian military, Fischer, 2011).  The UK contribution will usually be 
led by the Department for International Development (DFID) who may call on military 
assistance if civilian resources are insufficient, or if this approach provides a 
comparative advantage.  The Joint Forces Logistic Component (JFLogC) within the 
Ministry of Defence’s Joint Forces Command is the organisation tasked with the 
planning and coordination of all military Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
Operations (MOD, 2008).  The researcher’s personal origins of interest, and 
previous military background have already been highlighted (section 1.2); moreover, 
access to participants within JFLogC could be facilitated through previous military 
colleagues and contacts.  Hence having identified, the key role that the military has 
to play within the humanitarian relief supply chain and the responsibilities placed on 
the JFLogC in particular, the organisation was identified as a key contributor towards 
achievement of the overall research aims. 
 
Oxfam International:  is a confederation of 17 organisations networked together in 
more than 90 countries (Oxfam International, 2011).  One of the 14 members of the 
Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC, 2012) Oxfam International is registered as 
a Foundation in The Hague and as a foreign company limited by guarantee in the 
UK (Oxfam International, 2011).  The 2010/11 Annual Report (Oxfam International, 
2012) records total expenditure as €911 million (£730 million as at November 2012), 
with €660 million (£530 million) being spent on regional programmes.  Figures such 
as these show the organisation listed in the top 10 humanitarian NGO’s and 
agencies (see Table 1 in Tatham and Petit, 2010, p.611) together with some of the 
other positive respondents contacted during Stage I of the research (see Fig 3.4 and 
section 3.11.1), and listed at Appendix B, namely the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), CARE International and UNICEF.  
Moreover, a close comparison of the mission statements, overall aims and structure 
of similar sized NGOs operating within the field, confirms that Oxfam International 
can be considered to be one that represents a typical large organisation.  Hence, 
Oxfam International was selected as a domain that could represent the views of the 
NGOs listed in the top ten of those operating within the humanitarian relief supply 
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chain, and as a domain that could offer a significant contribution to the overall 
outcomes and final contribution.     
 
Tearfund:  Tearfund is a Christian international aid agency working globally to end 
poverty and injustice (DEC, 2012).  One of the 14 members of the Disasters 
Emergency Committee (DEC) the organisation is a signatory to the Red Cross Code 
of Conduct (IFRC, 2012) and a member of the Humanitarian Accountability 
Partnership (HAP, 2012).  Tearfund follows a biblical path in believing that helping 
communities in need is central to the purpose of local churches, wherever they may 
be (Tearfund, 2011).  The 2011/12 Director’s Report and Accounts (Tearfund 2012) 
records total Tearfund income as £70 million and expenditure on charitable activities 
as £59 million.  In keeping with similar size religious NGOs, Tearfund is committed 
to ensuring that as much as possible of the money donated is turned into aid on the 
ground.  Hence, for the purposes of this research it was considered to be 
representative of those smaller organisations who responded positively during 
Stage I of the research process (see Fig 3.4 and section 3.11.1), namely Comic 
Relief and Concern Worldwide.  Moreover, whilst it does not have a lead role in the 
collaborative effort within the humanitarian SC, Tearfund is considered to be a 
representative of those smaller organisations who are a key element of the overall 
SC and are therefore, in a position to offer key contributions and comment in support 
of the overall research approach.  Moreover, a close comparison of the mission 
statements, overall aims and structure of similar sized NGOs operating within the 
field, confirms that Tearfund can be considered to be one that is typical of those 
smaller organisations.  Hence, Tearfund was selected as an organisation that could 
represent the views of the smaller sized NGOs operating within the humanitarian 
relief supply chain, and as a domain that could add to the overall findings and 
associated final contribution.   
 
By way of final summary the organisations to be considered as cases within this study are 
also shown in Table 3.2.   
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Organisation Mission Statement Justification 
 
 
United 
Nations Office 
for the 
Coordination 
of 
Humanitarian 
Affairs   
(UN OCHA) 
 
“Mobilize and coordinate 
effective and principled 
humanitarian action in 
partnership with national 
and international actors in 
order to alleviate human 
suffering in disasters and 
emergencies”  
(OCHA, 2012) 
 
 
OCHA is the part of the United Nations 
Secretariat responsible for bringing 
together humanitarian actors to ensure a 
coherent response to emergencies. 
OCHA also ensures there is a framework 
within which each actor can contribute to 
the overall response effort. 
 
 
 
 
 
UK MOD –
Joint Force 
Logistics 
Command  
 
“A Disaster Relief 
operation is a primary 
Military Task and 
contribution to a disaster 
relief response.  It 
provides specific 
assistance to an afflicted 
overseas population” 
  (JDP 3-52, 2008) 
 
 
Following a humanitarian disaster 
overseas, the UK may be requested to 
mount or lend support to a relief effort in 
the country or region affected.  The UK 
military contribution will be coordinated by 
the Joint Force Logistics Command within 
the UK MOD.  
 
 
 
 
 
Oxfam 
International 
 
“We believe we can end 
poverty and injustice, as 
part of a global movement 
for change” 
(Oxfam, 2011) 
 
Considered to be representative of the 10 
largest NGOs within the sector.  An 
international confederation of 17 
organizations networked together in 92 
countries, as part of a global movement 
for change, to build a future free from the 
injustice of poverty.  
 
 
 
 
 
Tearfund 
 
“Our vision is to see 50 
million people released 
from spiritual and material 
poverty through a 
worldwide network of 
100,000 local churches” 
 
(Tearfund, 2011) 
 
Considered to be representative of a 
relatively small NGO within the sector 
formed and based around core Christian 
values.  Tearfund takes a comprehensive 
and integrated approach to disasters and 
disaster vulnerability, undertaking 
disaster risk reduction, disaster response 
and advocacy work. 
  
  
 
Table 3.2 Organisations Selected as Cases within this Study 
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Whilst discussing her approach to case study research, and the linkage of it to the grounded 
theory approach, Simons (2009) draws on the work of Charmaz (2006) and explains that 
whilst engaged in case study she: 
 
“Always works from an intention to reflect and accurately represent participants’ 
meanings in the policy and practice contexts in which they work, that is for these to 
be grounded in participants’ perspectives”  (p.125) 
 
Simons goes on to clarify that throughout the research process she is concerned with 
theorising and using a range of different processes before arriving at an interpretative theory 
associated with her selected case or cases.  Given the similarity of the approach and 
research design explained and adopted here, and the support for the linkage between 
grounded theory and case study the final research strategy will be a multiple-domain 
grounded one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.8 Qualitative or Quantitative Method? 
Most texts seem to find it useful to distinguish between qualitative and quantitative research 
although it is argued that the distinction can be an ambiguous one as it is regarded by some 
as a fundamental contrast but by others as no longer useful or even “false” (Layder, 1993 
cited by Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.28).  Use of the distinction does however still seem to be 
a useful one, as it represents a means of classifying the different methods that are available 
to the researcher and provides a helpful vehicle when considering the options open for data 
collection and analysis.  Although, on the face of it the clear distinction between quantitative 
and qualitative research would seem to be the presence or lack of measurable, quantifiable 
data, some writers suggest that the differences run far deeper (Barbour, 2009; Cameron 
and Price, 2009; Flick, 2009; Saunders et al, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007).  In short, choice 
of approach will differ in relation to the researcher’s philosophical preference in respect of 
the epistemological and ontological foundations associated with the overall research 
strategy adopted (see Table 3.3).   
  
Final Research Strategy 
Multiple-Domain and 
Grounded  
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Quantitative 
 
 
Qualitative 
Principal orientation to the role of 
theory in relation to research 
Deductive Inductive 
 
Epistemological orientation 
 
Positivism Interpretivism 
 
Ontological orientation 
 
Objectivism Constructionism 
 
Table 3.3 Fundamental Differences between Qualitative and Quantitative Research 
Strategies (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.28) 
Moreover, once chosen the associated mechanisms and processes to be utilised by the 
researcher will differ markedly (see Table 3.4).  These will be discussed in greater depth 
later, particularly in respect of the criticisms that are proffered as a result. 
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Quantitative Qualitative 
Numbers Words 
Point of view of researcher Points of view of participants 
Researcher distant Researcher close 
Theory Testing Theory emergent 
Static Process 
Structured Unstructured 
Generalization Contextual understanding 
Hard, reliable data Rich, deep data 
Macro Micro 
Behaviour Meaning 
Artificial settings Natural Settings 
 
Table 3.4 Some Common Contrasts between Quantitative and Qualitative Research 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.426) 
3.8.1. Quantitative Research 
Quantitative research can be constructed as a strategy that emphasises quantification 
through the collection of data that entails a deductive approach with the accent on testing 
theories.  Data gathering will incorporate the practices associated with the natural scientific 
model and of positivism in particular, embodying a view of social reality as an external, 
objective reality (Cameron and Price, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007).  Data collection and 
analysis are much less labour intensive than that for qualitative work and conclusions can 
be drawn across a much wider sample set.  This is important to a positivist as 
 95 
 
generalisability will normally be of concern and justification that findings can be taken 
beyond the confines of the particular context in which the research was originally conducted; 
hence findings may also encompass statistical analysis and estimations of probability 
across a representative sample.  Moreover, results seem to be more scientific feel and are, 
therefore more appealing to most managers (Cameron and Price, 2007, p.213). 
 
Several criticisms have been offered against the quantitative approach and the associated 
epistemological and ontological foundations on which it is based.  As one would expect, 
these have been voiced most loudly from exponents and supporters of the qualitative 
method.  Social scientists employing a deductive, positivist, quantitative approach are 
effectively turning a blind eye to the inherent differences between the social and natural 
worlds and to the key factors which distinguish people and social institutions from the world 
of nature.   
 
“The thought objects constructed by the social scientist ……. have to be founded 
upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men living 
their daily life within the social world” (Schultz, 1962, cited by Bryman and Bell, 2007, 
p.19). 
Other commentators (Silverman, 2011b; Brabour, 2009) offer the view that the 
measurement processes utilised by quantitative researchers present an artificial and 
spurious sense of precision and accuracy.  For example are respondents to questionnaires 
all interpreting questions similarly and can true validity of responses be justified as a result?  
Finally, the reliance on instruments and procedure to gather and analyse data leaves the 
researcher and associated outcomes isolated from reality.  Overall outcomes are left 
detached from reality with findings representing a ‘snap shot in time’ rather than the on-
going and developing reality of the social world (Mordue, 2011).    
 
3.8.2  Qualitative Research 
 
Against a background of historical academic scepticism qualitative research has over the 
past 15 years or so established itself as an acceptable approach within a broad range of 
disciplines (Silverman, 2011b; Barbour, 2009; Flick, 2009).  It is usually constructed as a 
research strategy that emphasises words rather than quantification in the collection and 
analysis of data.  This approach will most likely appeal to a pragmatist or a constructionist, 
interested in how meaning is constructed.  Data will be richer and less shaped by the 
researcher’s own preconceptions than that associated with the quantitative approach.  It 
can generate deeper insights and understanding and form the basis for theoretical 
development where none exists.  Data gathered will predominantly support an inductive 
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approach surrounding the rejection of the natural scientific model in favour of the generation 
of theory and a review of the way in which individuals interpret their social world; social 
reality will be viewed as a constantly shifting emergent property of the individual’s creation 
(Cameron and Price, 2009; Flick, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
 
However, data collection can be time-consuming and data analysis may require 
sophisticated and even more time-consuming analysis if conclusions are to be robust rather 
than simply reflections on the researcher’s own thinking (Silverman, 2011a, 2010; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  The associated time demands will normally mean that the data set will 
be gathered from a relatively small sample (when compared to that for a quantitative 
approach) meaning that generalisability of findings will always be an issue.  Indeed it is 
interesting to note that the majority of academic publications based around the outcomes 
of qualitative research strategy seem to dedicate significantly more narrative in support of 
the research strategy than that afforded to research strategy within papers dedicated to 
their quantitative counterparts, perhaps reflecting the scepticism and concerns discussed 
here (Mordue, 2011). 
 
In keeping with the critical views afforded by the qualitative community on their quantitative 
counterparts, the quantitative community have some equally strong views on the pitfalls of 
a qualitative research strategy.  The approach is considered to be too subjective, relying 
too much on the researcher’s unsystematic views on what is significant and important and 
also on the close relationships that the researcher invariably builds up with his subject 
audience.  The basic premise of the strategy means that replication of studies is another 
area of concern, in that the unstructured nature of the research leaves it all but impossible 
to reproduce the original conditions and circumstances of the findings.  Moreover, as 
outcomes are bound to be dependent upon the individual characteristics of the researcher 
(personality, background, age, gender….) replication is unachievable.  Similarly, 
generalisation is of concern with the scope of the findings being severely restricted.  In 
essence, how can just one or two cases be presented as truly representative of all cases? 
(Cresswell, 2013; Saunders et al, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
 
3.8.3 An Appropriate Method?  
 
The focus of this research was to gain an in-depth insight into the humanitarian relief supply 
chain and with it a thorough understanding of existing practices as perceived by the study 
participants.  This type of research lends itself to exploratory qualitative techniques, 
including case studies and in-depth interviews, which have been shown to be an effective 
means of gathering a large amount of data rich information about a particular subject area 
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while being closely involved with the subject participants (Silverman, 2011a; 2011b; 2010; 
Brabour, 2009; Miles and Huberman, 1994).  Outlining potential areas of research within 
the field Kovács and Spens (2011) suggest that humanitarian logistics requires good and 
applicable research with empirical data being gathered through the use of case studies or 
other qualitative methods.  A poll of Editorial Advisory and Review Board members carried 
out to establish the scope of the first publication of the Journal of Humanitarian Logistics 
and Supply Chain Management (Kovács and Spens, 2011) resulted in specific criticism of 
the seeming reliance on the use of quantitative research methods within the field.  Sandwell 
(2011) performed a study into the operational issues encountered in humanitarian logistics 
which considered the wider issues affecting humanitarian organisations, whilst McLauchlin 
and Larson (2011) sought to advance thought and practice on supply chain relationship 
building by considering lessons to be learned from leading humanitarian logistics 
practitioners.  Such studies are examples of those within the field of humanitarian logistics 
that have implemented the use of qualitative methodological techniques including 
exploratory in-depth interviews, case studies and focus groups to fulfil their objectives.  
However, Kunz and Reiner (2012) discuss the paucity of such research, offering the view 
that “empirical methodologies such as cross-organisational case studies should be used 
more in order to increase knowledge in the field” (p.133) as they note that most research 
methodologies currently utilised within humanitarian logistics rely solely on the use of 
quantitative simulation and modelling.   
 
Whilst there is clearly a balance to be struck between the use of qualitative and quantitative 
method, given the foregoing discussion a qualitative method (Saunders et al, 2009) was 
determined to be the most appropriate within this study, with the inflexible nature of the 
positivist quantitative methods regarded as unsuitable for addressing the research problem 
in this instance.  As will be discussed later (see section 3.11) the strategy associated within 
this research was effectively broken down onto 3 distinct stages based on the application 
of differing qualitative methods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Final Research Method 
Qualitative  
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3.9 Time Horizons – a Cross-sectional Study 
 
The researcher must decide whether the final findings are to offer a snapshot taken at a 
particular point in time or results that are more in keeping with a diary over a given period.  
Saunders et al (2009, p.155) contrast Cross-sectional studies with Longitudinal studies; the 
former being typical of research projects undertaken for academic courses which are 
necessarily time constrained and describe an incidence or phenomenon at a given point in 
time, the latter offering the capacity to study change and development.  As discussed earlier 
this study utilised a retrospective review (a snapshot) of the humanitarian relief supply chain 
at a given point in time; moreover, whilst recommendations would be made for future 
improvements there was no realistic opportunity to change process or actual events during 
the study; hence, this study clearly fulfilled the criteria associated with a Cross-sectional 
study. 
  
Time Horizon 
Cross-Sectional 
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3.10 The Final Methodology 
Table 3.5 is now included, by way of a summary of the discussion thus far and as a means 
to clarify and justify the final methodological approach: 
 
  
Final 
Approach 
 
Reasoning 
 
 
Philosophical 
Positioning 
 
Interpretivism 
 
An approach that would reveal participants’ understandings 
of behaviours that held reality for them.  To reveal 
humanitarian actor’s interpretations and understanding of 
their reality coupled with an ontology that would link 
participant experiences with dissimilar levels of reality. 
 
 
Approach 
 
Inductive 
 
 
To develop an understanding and explanation of the nature 
of relationship forming, analysing data as defined by the 
subject matter. 
 
 
 
Methodological 
Choice 
 
Grounded 
(‘Theory 
Building’) 
 
Not classic but the Glaserian (1992) approach which explicitly 
allows for considerable freedom in speculating beyond the 
raw data to draw generalisations, rather than to depend on 
strict adherence to procedural rules and the constraints of 
conditional process.   The potential to produce interesting 
contributions to both theory and practice and perhaps have 
relevance beyond the limited context of the research. 
 
 
Multiple-
Domain Study 
 
As this thesis is concerned with identifying reasons why 
participant actors within the Humanitarian Relief Supply 
Chain are struggling to collaborate, the associated field work 
was well suited to the use of multiple-case studies based on 
different actors within the Chain itself.  The focus and context 
of the study meant that the term domain was substituted for 
the term case.  
 
 
Strategy 
 
 
Qualitative 
 
This study considers the opinions and approaches utilised by 
a number of different organisational actors within the 
Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain.  A qualitative approach 
would address the need for good and applicable research 
within the field with data being gathered on the emic issues 
through the use of appropriate qualitative methodologies 
(Kovács and Spens 2011). 
 
 
Time Horizon 
 
Cross-
sectional 
 
A retrospective review (snapshot in time) of the humanitarian 
supply chain fulfilling the cross-sectional criteria. 
 
 
Table 3.5 A Summary of the Final Methodological Approach  
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In keeping with the strategy discussed in section 3.3.1, it is only right that the research onion 
model (Saunders et al, 2009) is also returned to at this stage. 
 
 
Fig 3.3   The Research Onion ‘Peeled’ (adapted Saunders et al, 2009, p.108) 
Note: Dotted line around grounded theory to indicate a ‘theory building’ rather than a 
classic grounded approach. 
 
3.11 Etic and Emic Knowledge and Data 
The terms etic and emic were first suggested by linguist Kenneth Pike in 1990 (Headland 
et al, 1990).  Referring to the insider versus outsider, subjective versus objective view of the 
world, they offer a method of signposting for anthropologists and other researchers working 
within social and behavioural sciences to refer to 2 kinds of data concerning human 
behaviour (Kottack, 2012).  According to Pike (1967 cited by Xia, 2011), the use of these 
terms “proves convenient…to describe behaviour from two different standpoints, which lead 
to results which shade into one another (p.77).  The proposition offered by Headland et al 
(1990) is that researchers use the term etic to refer to objective or outsider accounts and 
emic to refer to subjective or insider accounts.  They offer the following by way of definition: 
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Etic Knowledge: refers to generalisations about human behaviour and describes 
observations of behaviour from the perspective of the outsider.  The etic approach 
acknowledges that members of a culture may be too involved in day to day activity 
to offer an impartial view.  Hence, when using the etic approach the researcher 
develops what he or she considers to be important (Kottack, 2012) and issues and 
themes are identified by the researcher in advance of field work through 
consideration of secondary sources. Etic data represent the researcher’s 
interpretation as an outsider (Xia, 2011, p.80). 
 
Emic Knowledge: and interpretations are those existing within a culture that are 
determined by local custom, meaning and belief and are described by a native of 
the culture associated with the research.  The emic approach investigates how 
people think and how they perceive and categorise their world (Kottack, 2012), 
hence, emic issues and themes will be identified and developed by the researcher 
engaged in field work.  In their simplest form, emic data come primarily from 
interviews among subjects. It is the subject who describes to the researcher his/her 
own behaviours and thoughts of the phenomena under investigation (Xia, 2011, 
p.80).  
 
The etic and emic approaches are at times regarded as in conflict with one another, and 
the suggestion is that one should be preferred to the exclusion of the other.  However, Xia 
(2013) argues in favour of the complimentary nature of the two approaches, particularly for 
researchers involved in identifying the form and function of human social systems.  Given 
this discussion and the context of the research question, the associated research design 
and the data gathering methods adopted, the terms etic and emic were considered as 
appropriate signposts (Headland et al, 1990) to describe and label the key issues and 
themes as they were developed.     
 
3.12 The Overall Research Design - Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Having established an overall methodology for the study the next stage must be to address 
the issue of data collection and analysis and ultimately the final research design.  A number 
of methods exist which will facilitate the collection of the rich data required in order to fulfil 
the requirements of this study and they will be discussed in greater detail now.   By way of 
illustration the final research design for this study is outlined in Figure 3.4. 
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Research Aims and Objectives 
Stage I  
(section 3.11.1) 
Initial contact with 
NGOs through 
questionnaire to 
identify willing 
participants and key 
etic issues  
Stage II 
(section 3.11.2) 
Confirm etic issues and 
develop emic issues 
through semi-
structured interviews 
with willing participants 
 Develop semi-structured interview guide based on 
key etic issues 
 Pilot with one NGO 
 Approach other selected NGOs and MOD/ UN OCHA 
 Coding and analysis of responses (qualitative data – 
confirm key etic issues/themes and emergent emic 
issues/themes) 
 Check findings/understanding with participants 
Three Stage Research Design 
 Develop an introductory questionnaire based on etic 
issues  
 Pilot with one NGO 
 Send out to other NGOs 
 Coding and analysis of responses (identify key etic 
issues/themes) 
 
 
Research Idea 
 
Fig 3.4     The Final Research Design 
Informed by prior interest 
and personal experiences  
 Develop focus group topic guide based on key emic 
issues 
 Pilot with one NGO 
 Approach other selected NGOs and MOD/ UN OCHA 
 Coding and analysis of responses (qualitative data – 
confirm key emic issues/themes) 
 Check findings/understanding with participants 
 
Literature Review leads 
to initial etic 
Issues/Themes (see 
Appendix E) 
Stage III  
(section 3.11.3) 
Confirm emic issues 
and investigate through 
focus groups with 
willing participants 
Final Contribution to Knowledge 
Respondent 
Validation -
Feedback 
Cross-Domain Analysis 
Respondent 
Validation -
Feedback  
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By way of summary, the final design was split into 3 distinct stages; the aim of the first stage 
was to establish contact with prospective participants whilst also confirming the relevance 
of the etic issues developed during the literary review process.  A covering letter/e mail 
(Appendix C) and self-completion questionnaire (Appendix D) was sent out to prospective 
NGO participants.  The aim of this was 2 fold; firstly the questionnaire and accompanying 
letter would serve as a means of introduction to prospective participants and secondly, the 
completed questionnaires would provide some initial primary data on the respondent NGOs 
and allow the researcher to select appropriate participants for Stages II and III of the study.  
Stages II and III were designed to gather the rich data that would be needed to address the 
overall aims and research question of the study, hence, all 3 stages lent themselves to a 
qualitative approach using multiple methods of data collection.  Once analysis was complete 
the related findings and interpretations were confirmed with participants through a checking 
and feedback process (as illustrated in Fig 3.4). 
 
This overall research process also addressed the thoughts offered by Kovács and Spens 
(2011), discussed in Chapter 2 (see section 2.11) who highlight the need for good and 
applicable research within the humanitarian logistics field with data being gathered through 
the use of appropriate qualitative method.  Indeed Kovács and Spens (2011) go on to 
discuss the specific criticism levelled at research within this particular field whereby there is 
a seeming reliance on the use of quantitative methodology.   The use of case studies and 
in particular the merits afforded by a multiple-case approach (Yin, 2009) has been 
discussed earlier (see section 3.7.3) but given the perspectives sought here, a multi-site 
cross comparison also served to increase confidence in the overall findings whilst 
addressing the concerns levelled at the qualitative researcher’s door regarding reliability of 
data and generalisability of findings.  For completeness, each stage of the final research 
design will now be discussed in greater detail. 
 
3.12.1     Stage I – Identification of Participants and Confirmation of Key Etic Issues 
 
Stage I of the research process was designed to identify prospective participants and also 
to confirm the relevance and currency within the humanitarian relief community of those etic 
issues identified during the literary review (see Appendix E).  Analysis of the data gathered 
would also aid with the production of the interview schedule to be used during the semi-
structured interviews within Stage II of the process (see Appendix F).  A survey strategy is 
a common and popular approach within business and management research and is best 
used for exploratory and descriptive research (Saunders et al, 2009).  Moreover, data can 
be collected which can be used to suggest possible reasons for particular relationships 
between participants.  Brown (1998) believes that the information gathered through 
 104 
 
questionnaires can be used to make meaningful comparisons between departments within 
an organisation or between organisations themselves.  Keohane (1971) supports this view 
as she argues that the data offered by questionnaires emerges more clearly than that for 
interviews and that the resulting recommendations can be made with greater confidence.  
There are a number of advantages and disadvantages associated with the use of 
questionnaires as a means of gathering data are encapsulated by Oppenheim (1996), see 
Table 3.6 
 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Low cost data collection Low response rates 
Low cost processing Cannot correct misunderstandings/ probe 
or explain. 
No Interviewer – respondents more willing 
to answer awkward/ embarrassing 
questions 
No control 
Quickly reach widely dispersed 
respondents 
No observation of respondents 
 
Table 3.6      An Adaptation of Oppenheim’s (1996) Advantages and Disadvantages of 
Questionnaires 
3.12.1.1     An Initial Questionnaire 
 
Given this discussion an initial questionnaire was produced (see Appendix D).  This was 
sent out to a total of 16 NGOs which were selected as being typical (Stake, 1995) of those 
operating within the Humanitarian SC as well as to the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the MOD Joint Forces Command 
(JFLogC) (see Appendix B); also included was a letter/e mail of introduction (see Appendix 
C).  Prior to this the questionnaire was piloted with one NGO in order to establish clarity of 
the questions asked and also the time taken to complete the questionnaire.  The questions 
used were based around the etic issues that had been highlighted during the literary review 
(see Appendix E).  To increase response speed, questions were made deliberately straight 
forward with closed or multiple choice answers being sought.  Moreover, noting the 
warnings offered against the use of sensitive questions (Collins and Hussey, 2003), in that 
they may result in questionnaires being discarded or ignored these were also avoided.  The 
final responses assisted with the selection process of appropriate organisations for Stages 
II and III of the study and also with the development of the interview schedule to be used 
within Stage II (see Appendix F).  Responses were received from OCHA, the JFLogC and 
9 NGOs (see Appendix B); moreover 7 of the NGO respondents also offered to participate 
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in the study, representing 43% of the non-governmental organisations contacted.  Of these 
respondents the OCHA, JFLogC and 2 NGOs were finally selected as participants in the 
research and justification of these final selection is included in Section 3.7.6 and Table 3.2. 
 
3.12.2     Stage II – Discussion of Etic Issues and Development of Emic Issues 
 
Having established links to, and selected the participant organisations which would be 
considered as the domains throughout the study, Stage II was designed to gather rich 
qualitative data on the associated etic issues; furthermore, the emic issues which would be 
used to formulate the final contribution to knowledge would also be identified. 
 
Interview data is often considered to be the major source of information obtainable for 
qualitative research and the use of in-depth interviews is often the foremost form of data 
collection within a case-based study (Yin 2009).  Barbour (2009) describes interviews as 
“the gold standard of qualitative research which involve a somewhat rarified, in-depth 
exchange between researcher and researched” (p.133).  Simons (2009) describes this 
technique as a means of getting inside someone’s head and discovering their perspective 
and finding out feelings, memories and interpretations that would otherwise be left 
undiscovered using any other means; in essence Simons believes that interviews allow 
insight into a participant’s memories and as such provide explanations of how things have 
come to be.  In the business research interview the aim is for the interviewer to elicit all 
manner of information such as interviewee behaviour, attitudes, norms, beliefs and values 
(Saunders et al, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007); moreover an interview can help the 
researcher to gather valid and reliable data that is relevant to the established question and 
aims.  Indeed, where research questions and aims have yet to be established an interview 
or interviews may help the researcher to establish these.  Interviews can give you a degree 
of flexibility and adaptability that it is difficult to replicate using other methods (Cameron and 
Price, 2009).  An experienced interviewer can re-word questions, drawing out discussions 
to make the whole process more akin to having a conversation.  This conversational 
ambience makes the subject more willing to disclose things that they may be reluctant to 
put in writing on a questionnaire.  Meaning can also be explored as the researcher can ask 
the respondent to elaborate, expand upon or clarify a point. 
 
Interviews may be highly formalised and structured, using standardised questions for each 
interviewee or may be informal and unstructured conversations, or indeed they may fall 
somewhere in between these two extremes.  Various typologies are used to illustrate this 
level of formality (see for example Healey, 1991 and Robson, 2002 both cited by Saunders 
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et al 2009).  Fig 3.5 offers a summary of the wide variety of interview formats that are 
available. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3.5     Summary of Interview Forms (Saunders et al, 2009, p.321) 
Standardised interviews (often referred to as interviewer-administered questionnaires) are 
based on a predetermined set of questions which are read out with the response being 
recorded and coded against a standard schedule.  They are invariably used to collect 
quantifiable data as part of a survey and whilst there is some social interaction between 
researcher and participant they do not offer the flexibility and adaptability afforded by their 
non-standardised counterparts.  Non-standardised interviews, on the other hand are used 
to facilitate the gathering of data which will afford itself to qualitative analysis , thereby 
helping the researcher to reveal and understand not only what and how but also to explore 
the why (Saunders et al, 2009, Bryman and Bell, 2007).   
 
One particular advantage of selecting interviews as a means of data collection is that they 
provide an opportunity for the researcher to receive feedback when face-to-face with the 
respondent, which would otherwise be unobtainable (Cameron and Price, 2009).  This was 
particularly relevant within the context of this research, as the researcher felt it was 
important to be able to gauge the interviewee’s body language and expressive non-verbal 
responses (see section 3.11.5 on Observation).  The scope of in-depth interviews can vary 
greatly from being highly structured to completely unstructured, depending on the design 
and requirements of a particular study (Saunders et al, 2009).  Unstructured interviews do 
not normally require a pre-determined interview schedule and allow for completely open 
Interviews 
Standardised 
One to One 
Face to Face Telephone Electronic 
One to Many 
Electronic Group 
Focus Groups Focus Groups 
Non-Standardised 
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dialogue and discussion between the researcher and the participant.   However, if a 
completely unstructured approach is adopted then concerns can be raised as to whether all 
of the relevant information pertinent to the research question will be  
gathered.  By contrast, a highly structured approach is one that will follow a strict interview 
schedule solely relying on a set of pre-prepared interview questions.  In this study both of 
these extremes were deemed to be unsuitable as it was felt that adopting a highly structured 
approach would not allow any opportunity for discussion to take place, or for the 
development of any answers or obvious discussion points; however, some structure was 
still required if the interviews were to lead to relevant rich data.  In essence, the exploratory 
nature of this research required a method that facilitated open discussion, whilst ensuring 
that relevant and in-depth data was collected; hence, a semi-structured interview approach 
which effectively fell somewhere between the two extremes discussed here, was adopted. 
 
Within the framework of a semi-structured interview, whilst questions will not be asked in 
an inflexible manner or even in a pre-determined order the researcher will set out to ask the 
interviewee about a set of predetermined topics or subject areas. In order to achieve this, 
and to ensure that all of the themes and separate issues under investigation are addressed 
in sufficient depth, the researcher will often use an interview guide or schedule (Bryman 
and Bell 2007).  Whilst the exploratory nature of the technique is intended to gain a greater 
depth and broader range of knowledge, allowing for adaptations and deviations to be made, 
the interview schedule will serve to keep the researcher within the parameters of the overall 
research question.  Within the realms of the in-depth interview, the researcher has an 
opportunity to use their initiative and follow up on an interviewee’s response to develop 
areas of interest that may not have been previously anticipated (Cameron and Price, 2009).  
This provides an opportunity for other, relevant topics to be discussed that may arise during 
the course of the interview and which appear to be promising for providing rich data or 
additional insights (Saunders et al, 2009); in effect the process allows for the identification 
of the emic issues which may formulate the final contribution to knowledge.  Ghauri and 
Gronhaug (2005), argue that one of the main advantages of in-depth interviews is that the 
researcher gains a more accurate and clear picture of a participant’s position and attitude 
and behaviour.  This is possible because of the open ended question structure often in place 
that allows the interviewee to answer freely according to their own thinking and their 
answers are not constrained by only a few alternatives. 
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3.12.2.1     Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
One of the greatest disadvantages of in-depth interviewing is that it requires a certain level 
of skill by the researcher (Saunders et al, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Ghauri and 
Gronhaug, 2005).  However, in this case the researcher was an experienced and trained 
interviewer who had carried out upwards of 1000 semi-structured interviews with applicants 
for places as Royal Air Force officers and aircrew.  Given this, the original research 
question, associated aims, and the call for a more qualitative approach to data gathering 
within the field (Kovács and Spens, 2011) the non-standardised approach was seen as the 
ideal vehicle to gather the rich, in-depth data that would be needed to address the final aims 
and research question.  Accordingly a semi-structured interview schedule was produced for 
this stage (Appendix F).  This strategy also ensured the consistent, yet isolated approach 
necessary within each individual participant and organisational domain given the adoption 
of a multiple-case approach (Yin, 2009 and Fig 3.2). 
 
3.12.3     Stage III – Clarification of Emic Issues and the Final Contribution 
 
Having established the emic issues associated with the research question through analysis 
of the data gathered during Stage II of the process, the overall aim of Stage III was to clarify 
these issues with a view to formulating the final contribution to knowledge.  Given the 
approach in Stage II, due consideration had to be given to the thoughts of Silverman (2011b) 
on how one-to-one interview data is being used in research, and on the increasing tendency 
for qualitative research to rely exclusively on interview data alone.  This is a view supported 
by Atkinson and Silverman (1997) who suggest that one-to-one interviews are more often 
than not being held up as a means of reflecting the character of the wider society, laying 
bare people’s feelings in order to elicit the inside story.  In short any assumption that 
interviews are the default method to establish qualitative data must be challenged.  Hence, 
the decision was taken that another research method was required to address these 
comments and to increase overall credibility of findings and contribution.  Moreover, the 
researcher was also attracted by the clear opportunity to practice and hone an additional 
method.  The use of focus groups proved to be an attractive means of addressing some of 
these comments and to also assist still further in expanding the ideas raised within the one-
to-one process utilised during Stage II, thereby justifying and underpinning the final 
contribution to knowledge. 
 
Focus groups have become a popular method for researchers examining the ways in which 
people interact with one another, allowing for collective exploration of themes and issues 
(Liamputtong, 2011; Cameron and Price, 2009; Krueger and Casey, 2008; Bryman and Bell, 
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2007).  The approach assists the researcher to develop an understanding of why people 
react in the way that they do.  The researcher acts as a facilitator, prompting the group to 
discuss and explore the area of research interest in a bid to discover what is important to 
the group whilst exposing differences in opinion and perspective, areas of tension and 
conflict as well as areas of agreement and consensus.  Focus groups also give the 
researcher an opportunity to observe participant behaviour and dynamics allowing the 
researcher to perceive the political and social interactions that take place (Laimputtong, 
2011; Krueger and Casey, 2008).  As discussed earlier this research utilised multiple 
domain studies to ascertain differing humanitarian actors’ views on collaboration within 
associated relief supply chains.  Hence, the use of focus groups was considered to be a 
key, final factor in gathering appropriate qualitative data.     
 
3.12.3.1     Participant Focus Groups and Additional Stimuli 
 
Given this discussion, the decision was taken to utilise a series of focus groups during the 
third stage of the research, with participants being those respondents who had already been 
interviewed during Stage II of the process.  One focus group was carried out within each of 
the four participant organisations, with the researcher facilitating the process and recording 
key themes on a white board as participants discussed the key emic themes.  In order to 
ensure consistency across all focus groups cross-domain analysis of the emic issues 
identified during Stage II led to the production of a single topic guide (Barbour, 2009) (see 
Appendix G).  Whilst focus groups were identified and utilised in gathering appropriate 
qualitative data, consideration also had to be given to ensure that group focus was 
maintained on what was effectively a retrospective review of participant experiences.  
Hence, drawing upon the work of Ericsson and Simon (see Hayes, 1986) within the field of 
psychological protocol analysis and verbal reporting (the idea that subjects should be 
encouraged to think aloud using triggers to stimulate recall and discussion), and further 
discussion by Barbour (2009) on the use of stimulus materials to enrich the qualitative data 
gathered within focus groups, participants were also encouraged to recount experiences 
utilising their own materials such as maps, photographs and video clips.   Thus, with the 
researcher acting as the facilitator, the basis of the focus groups was initially set around the 
topic guide; however the individual stimuli quickly served to expand discussion and to help 
group members to develop the issues at hand and to put them into context.  Moreover, the 
stimuli used also provided another strand of invaluable data for desk top study and analysis, 
and an additional lens to add depth and density (richness) to the overall data set gathered 
as suggested by Denzin and Lincoln (2005). 
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3.12.4      Observation 
 
Whilst the main purpose of the interview is to gather in-depth information relating to the 
subject area, it is recommended (Flick, 2009; Yin, 2009, Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Miles 
and Huberman, 1994), that the researcher seeks to utilise additional techniques in 
conjunction with this strategy to establish further data rich information in order to address 
issues surrounding corroboration and generalisability (see section 3.11.7 on triangulation).  
One such method is observation (Barbour, 2009).  Observation essentially involves “the 
systematic observation, recording, description, analysis and interpretation of people’s 
behaviour” (Saunders et al, 2009 p.288). Barbour (2009) describes observational fieldwork 
as “a method that was initially very popular with anthropologists engaged in the study of 
other cultures” (p.17); she also acknowledges that it is now a popular method with in 
sociology which has allowed researchers to study how work or social practices are enacted 
on a daily basis.  Observation affords the researcher the opportunity to effectively act as a 
fly on the wall, the minimal involvement on the part of the researcher being used to uncover 
inconsistencies between how people perceive and present their involvement, to how they 
actually act in practice.  Saunders et al, (2009) differentiate between participant observation 
and structured observation offering the view that whilst the former enables the researcher 
to gather data on the meanings that people attach to their actions, the latter is a technique 
that is more concerned with the frequency of those actions.  Participant observation will 
enable the researcher to discover the delicate nuances of meaning and as Delbridge and 
Kirkpatrick (1994, p.39) put it: 
 
“In the social sciences we cannot hope to adequately explain the behaviour of social 
actors unless we at least try to understand their meaning” (p.39). 
 
Given the research question and aims under investigation here, observation was identified 
as a useful method to gain appropriate data on the interaction between actors along the 
humanitarian relief supply chain.  However, amongst others Delbridge and Kirkpatrick 
(1994) note that classic participant observation involves the researcher “immersing himself 
in the research setting, with the objective of sharing peoples’ lives while attempting to learn 
their symbolic world” (p.37) (see for example the study by Boje (1991) on story performance 
in an office supply firm).  Given the subject matter within this thesis, a classic participant 
approach was deemed impractical as, clearly the researcher would not be able to follow 
humanitarian relief specialists into an active disaster area or relief zone.  However, 
conscious of a desire to avoid the temptation to just focus on narrative and in particular what 
was said, the decision was taken to utilise observation in order to highlight many other 
issues surrounding the research.  Hence, turning to the thoughts of Cameron and Price 
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(2009) who suggest that non-participant observation is an approach where “the researcher 
is concentrating simply on the act of observing” (p.255) a mix of the two approaches was 
identified as a suitable compromise which would allow observation to form a constituent 
part of the data gathering strategy.  As a former military officer the researcher had previous 
experience of employment within such areas and effectively understood the associated 
working practices and language, arguably associated with a participant observer.  
Moreover, in his previous role as an RAF interviewing and selection officer (see section 
3.11.2), the researcher had extensive experience and training within the field of interviewee 
observation and in identifying the messages associated with participant behaviour during 
interview, arguably acting as a non-participant observer. 
 
3.12.4.1     Observation within Interviews and Focus Groups 
 
Consequently, whilst the verbal content of interviews and focus groups gathered during 
Stages II and III was digitally recorded and transcribed into narrative representation, field 
notes were also maintained which produced a description of what was seen; this included 
issues such as how things were said, focus group interaction, what issues were avoided 
and which areas drew the more emotional responses and reactions.  Whilst some field notes 
were made during the interviews and focus groups it proved invaluable to also take time out 
immediately after the sessions to revisit and embellish the field notes whilst observations 
were still relatively fresh in the mind. 
 
3.12.5  Respondent Validation – Feedback 
 
Silverman (2011a) discusses the merits of taking research findings back to those who have 
been studied in a bid to validate research findings.  This argument builds on the ideas 
proffered by Reason and Rowan (1981) and Bloor (1978 cited by Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007) who offer the idea that good researchers will go back to participants with 
tentative results in order to refine them in the light of subjects’ reactions.  Hammersley and 
Atkinson (2007) also suggest that a crucial test for any final results is whether the actors 
whose beliefs and behaviour have been analysed and described, actually recognise the 
final findings.  Moreover, they highlight that further detail and evidence may be forthcoming 
from participants as they are invited to review initial findings and that this new data may 
alter the plausibility and interpretation of existing data and with it the final overall contribution 
to knowledge. Consequently, the findings of the research were presented to the participants 
at each stage of the research process for comment and feedback on the final analysis, 
understanding and findings. (see Fig 3.4). 
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3.12.6  Triangulation of Qualitative Data and Generalisability 
 
The integration of a number of different methodological techniques has been shown to 
strengthen qualitative research.  This is known as triangulation or methodological 
triangulation whereby the combination of research techniques can strengthen and add 
weight to the validity of the research findings (Gill and Johnson, 2010; Cameron and Price, 
2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007).  The term triangulation has its roots in the engineering 
profession where it was used to ensure increased accuracy of results produced.  By taking 
three measurements rather than two, engineers were more able to produce findings that 
would be considered to be both accurate and valid (Hassard and Cox, 1995 cited by 
Cameron and Price, 2009).  Whilst this motive of accuracy may seem somewhat at odds 
with the ontology and epistemology that underpin the general approaches and methodology 
associated with qualitative research, thinking back to the discussion earlier on the criticism 
and scepticism surrounding the generalisability of associated findings (see section 3.8.2), it 
would seem that a means of triangulating findings is key to the success and ultimate 
credibility of a thesis of this type.  Denzin and Lincoln (2005) offer the view that in the context 
of qualitative research, triangulation should be looked upon as an “alternative to validation” 
(p.4) in that it should allow the researcher, through the use of a number of different lenses 
to “add depth and density to the data”.  Saunders et al (2009) echo this sentiment referring 
to triangulation as “the use of different data collection techniques within one study to ensure 
that the data are telling you what you think they are telling you” (p.146).  Similarly, Cameron 
and Price, (2009) discuss the value of gathering data from a range of different sources as 
they describe and discuss the merits of what they term “Data Triangulation” (p.257). 
 
This study used multiple sources of “data source triangulation” (Yin, 2009, p.116) which are 
aimed at “corroborating the same facts or phenomenon”. Convergence of Evidence was 
achieved as data was gathered through the form of interviews and focus groups with diverse 
organisations (actors within the humanitarian relief supply chain) and with different types of 
interviewees (at all strategic and operational levels).  Moreover, additional data was 
gathered through observation and analysis of protocol data (Hayes, 1986); hence, it can be 
argued that the use of multiple settings and multiple method to gather data enhanced the 
overall generalisability of the research.  Finally, checks were also made as to whether the 
findings were plausible and agreeable through the use of participant feedback (Miles and 
Huberman 1994).   
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3.13 Data Analysis 
 
Once the process of data collection commences, the real challenge for any researcher is 
the collation and control of that data.  The process of data collection during the 3 stages 
described earlier and an appreciation of the sheer volume of information generated, 
illustrates what is an acknowledged problem within qualitative research, in that the research 
is done chiefly with words and not numbers (as in quantitative research) and that words, 
unlike numbers can have multiple meanings and by their very nature are harder to 
manipulate (Silverman, 2011a; 2011b; 2010; Barbour, 2009; Miles and Huberman, 1994)  
Hence, the need for a structured strategy to collate and analyse the data gathered to cope 
with what has been described as data pile up or data overload (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 
p.56). 
 
3.13.1      Data Management and Research Ethics 
 
In keeping with the final research design the following chain of evidence was created:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig 3.6  The Chain of Evidence 
 
As a result of this process a substantial amount of qualitative data was gathered, 
necessitating the need for the digital storage and achieving of research data.  Whilst digital 
folders were created for each case study and the associated individual interviews and focus 
groups, all data gathered was destroyed following final approval and submission of the 
thesis.  Moreover, as the data collection, analysis and field work associated with this study 
involved gaining access to a variety of organisations and their employees, research ethics 
and the appropriateness of the researcher’s behaviour in relation to the rights of those who 
become the subject of their work or are affected by it (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p183) had to 
be a key consideration; hence, all Ethical Principles for Research with Humans within the 
University of Lincoln Ethics Procedures (UofL, 2009) were adhered to during the design and 
subsequent implementation of the final research strategy, in that the dignity and autonomy 
of individuals was considered at all times.  All participants gave informed consent and 
anonymity was assured at all times.   
Stage I  
(section 3.11.1) 
Initial contact with 
NGOs through 
questionnaire to 
identify willing 
participants and key 
etic issues  
Stage II 
(section 3.11.2) 
Confirm etic issues and 
develop emic issues 
through semi-
structured interviews 
with willing participants 
Stage III 
(section 3.11.3) 
Confirm emic issues 
and investigate through 
focus groups with 
willing participants 
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3.13.2      Codification and Codes 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994) differentiate between coding and codes.  Coding is a process 
of analysis where field notes are transcribed or synthesized to give them meaning.   This 
part of analysis involves how the researcher differentiates and combines the data gathered 
and the reflections that are made about the information.  “Coding is an attempt to fix 
meaning, constructing a particular vision of the world that excludes other viewpoints” (Seale, 
1999, p.154).  Codes are the tags or labels that are used to assign meaning to the 
description and inferential information complied during the research (Miles and Huberman, 
1994).  They are more often than not a word or a short phrase that “symbolically assigns a 
summative, salient, essence-capturing and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-
based or visual data” (Saldana, 2013, p.3).  They will usually be attached to chunks of data, 
words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs connected to a specific setting, a grouping 
which Dey (1993) describes as distinguishable or definable themes which can be used as 
a basis for comparison.  They can take the form of a straightforward category label or a 
more complex one such as a metaphor (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  In interpretive 
research these codes are often already known as they are based on the general topics that 
have been previously set out within the thesis.   These predetermined themes or etic issues 
(those brought to the research from the outside) were guided by the literature and concepts 
of the research problem, its aims and objectives and are prevalent within the interview guide 
developed for Stage II (see Appendix F).  Hence for the initial analysis stages of this study, 
a manual coding system was developed in order to organise the data in line with those 
whose etic topics previously discussed and developed within Chapter 2 (as included in 
Appendix E).  
 
By way of illustration of the process used, included below is a short data extract from one 
of the Stage II interviews with coding for etic topics. This extract comes from the second 
domain of study (UK MOD – Joint Force Logistic Command) and an interview with the 
Commandant: 
 
You have small and medium NGOs some of which are better at delivering than 
others with scale bringing its own complexity of organisation but also strengths 
[PWRPOS].  The airport was tiny, with a very small area of aircraft and equipment.  
Very early on the NGOs had flooded in and there was limited military involvement 
and it took some time to get my team onto the ground.  There was only one real 
hard standing and the NGOs had occupied this with flags flying [SUSFR], however 
I struggled to see why a number of these were there apart from having their flag 
flying [SUSSTRAT].  It was pretty chaotic as NGOs do not like to be told what to do 
and do not like to be coordinated [RMOPP, PWRNEG].  The scale thing does matter 
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as it is clear that there are some small organisations that rely on the larger ones for 
logistic support [PWRPOS, RMT, COLALL, COLHOR, COLVER] but there are also 
others who will jealously guard their independence [HUMSIND] and do not like to be 
seen as working with any other organisations [PWRNEG].  As a general rule the 
NGOs are far happier to operate alone than to be seen as being part of an alliance 
[COLALL].  These organisations almost trade on their independence [HUMSIND] 
and impartiality [HUMSIMP] and their main aim seems to be to wave a flag and to 
get publicity and be noticed [SUSFR, SUSSTRAT].  They effectively claimed the 
ground because they got there first [PWRNEG, SUSSTRAT].  Most of the aid that 
was delivered was not actually needed and effectively clogged up the airhead some 
form of coordination was clearly needed [COLCLU].    
 
This example which is from an early interview illustrates the density of coding that was 
typical at the beginning of the process when what was important in respect of the study was 
not entirely clear and so consequently, many comments were coded.  Also many of the 
same codes are repeatedly used throughout, this is both natural and deliberate as there are 
mostly repetitive patterns of action and consistencies within human affairs and the ultimate 
aim of the coding process is to identify repetitive patterns and themes (Saldana, 2013; Miles 
and Huberman, 1994).  As the process unfolded, this density reduced markedly as the 
significant categories were identified and subsumed earlier categories.  Indeed in keeping 
with the thoughts of Dey (1993) who regards the creation and identification of codes as an 
on-going aspect of any research project, where coding categories can be extended, 
modified or even discarded, the researcher was conscious of the need to identify emerging 
codes as and when they appeared.  Miles and Hubmeran (1994) commend the revision of 
codes throughout any research project in order to address the emic issues (those that 
emerge throughout the study which may be nested within the original etic issues) and to 
also take account of the researcher’s growing field experience, as they put it: 
 
“There is more going on out there than our initial frames have dreamed of, and few 
field researchers are foolish enough to avoid looking for these things” (p.61) 
 
Furthermore, some codes will simply not work, others may decay away and some may 
flourish to an extent that they may have to be broken down into more manageable sub-
codes.   
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3.13.3         Thoughts on Computer-assisted Qualitative Data Analysis – Nvivo 10 
 
Drawing on the thoughts of Bryman and Bell (2012) who believe that one of the most 
significant developments in qualitative research since the middle of the 1980s is the 
emergence of computer software that can assist in the use of qualitative data analysis 
(p593), time was taken during the analysis phase to experiment with the use of NVivo (QSR 
International, 2012) as an a computer based aid to data analysis.  Unfortunately, the 
software was found to be cumbersome and far from intuitive leaving the researcher to take 
the decision quite early on in the process to stick with manual coding and the use of coloured 
highlighter pens to facilitate analysis. 
 
3.14  Writing Up the Research and Final Contribution 
 
3.14.1  The Write Up – Presenting Qualitative Research 
 
As this thesis was based predominantly on a qualitative approach and the gathering of rich 
and in-depth data, questions were raised on how to present this data within the final 
manuscript.  Pratt (2009) and Silverman (2011b) discuss the challenges associated with 
writing up qualitative research and agree that unlike quantitative findings, which will 
invariably have a significance level or a magic number associated with them, qualitative 
findings present quite different issues for the researcher if an appropriate message is to be 
conveyed to the reader.  Pratt (2009) talks of 2 perilous paths which should be avoided 
when qualitative research is discussed: 
 
1. A lack of balance between theory and data. 
2. Turning a qualitative narrative into a quantitative one. 
 
Golden-Biddle and Locke (2007 cited by Pratt, 2009) talk of “telling and not showing” 
(p.857), where the author offers no clear evidence of the transition from their data to their 
interpretation of that data.  The advice offered is to place some data within the body of the 
thesis and to avoid the inclusion of elaborate tables of data which rely on the reader 
constantly transiting to and from the table whilst also hoping that the reader has the 
understanding of the data that the author had originally intended.  Consequently the domain 
analysis Chapters (4 through 7) and the final Concluding Chapter (8) include quotations 
extracted from the data gathered which offer a summary of overall opinion or typify 
responses within a particular area of discussion or focus.  This approach will also hopefully 
make the document more interesting and logical for the reader.   
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Qualitative researchers will often try and make their research more palatable to the 
quantitative community by using deductive shorthand which effectively mimics quantitative 
techniques (Pratt, 2009, p.857; also discussed in Mordue, 2011).  Given the inductive nature 
of this study, clearly this was to be avoided.  In a similar vein, the triangulation of the data 
analysed is key for credibility and generalisability, hence the use of 4 research domains and 
an associated array of data gathering techniques (see section 3.11.7).  Finally, in keeping 
with the advice on presenting such work (Yin, 2013) the final report consists of separate 
chapters (4 through 7) for each domain of study together with a final chapter (8) covering 
the cross-domain analysis, results and overall contribution. 
 
3.14.2  The Theoretical Contribution? 
 
The ultimate aim of any study such as this is to spell out the final significant contribution to 
knowledge (Phillips and Pugh, 2005; Rugg and Petre, 2004).  Most organisational scholars 
do not generate theory from scratch but generally work on the improvement of what already 
exists (Whetten, 1989, p492) and this is certainly the case here.  As discussed earlier whilst 
the principles of grounded theory were utilised a theory building rather than a classic 
grounded approach was adopted (see section 3.7.1) with a view to presenting findings that 
would improve upon processes that already exist.  However, this does create a problem in 
that it is difficult to then judge what constitutes a sufficient contribution to warrant the final 
award.   
 
A theory must contain the following elements (Dubin, 1978 cited by Whetten, 1989, p.490): 
 
What factors logically should be considered as part of the explanation of the social 
phenomena of interest?  When authors begin to map out the conceptual landscape 
of a topic, they should remember that it is easier to delete unnecessary or invalid 
elements and recognise that their ideas will be refined over time; hence they should 
err on the side of including too many factors as they look to justify their arguments. 
 
How are the factors that are included related?  Visual representation may help to 
clarify the author’s thinking whilst also increasing reader comprehension, not 
forgetting that the researcher must also justify why the findings and related factors 
should be given credence in the context of the particular representation or 
phenomena under discussion? 
 
Why should colleagues give credence to this particular representation of the 
phenomena?   The answer lies in the logic of the underlying model.  The soundness 
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of fundamental views of human nature, organisational requisites or societal 
processes provide the reasonableness of the proposed conceptualization.   
 
Whilst it is possible to make a theoretical contribution by simply adding or subtracting factors 
to the existing processes (the whats) a better way to demonstrate the value is to identify 
how these changes affect current relationships between variables (the hows).  These 
relationships, Whetten (1989) argues are where the true theory lies as he cites Poincare 
(1983): 
 
“Science is facts, just as houses are made of stone….But a pile of stones is not a 
house and a collection of facts is not necessarily science” (p.493) 
 
But what are the factors that conceptual arguments are judged upon as these must inform 
what is a ‘significant contribution’ and with it the final award.  Tables 3.7 summarises these 
key factors by way of 7 questions: 
 
Question Notes: 
Whats new? Reviewers are not necessarily looking for new theories but 
modifications or extensions to current theories should alter scholarly 
opinion in some way. 
So what? Will the theory change existing practice and process? 
Why so? Is there compelling evidence to support the proposed theory? 
Well done? Is there evidence of reasoned thinking and a broad understanding of 
the associated subject area? 
Done well? Is the argument well written and presented and is it an enjoyable read? 
Why now? Is the topic of contemporary interest? 
Who cares? What is the likely scale of academic interest in the subject area and 
overall contribution? 
 
Table 3.7 Factors Considered in Judging the Theoretical Contribution (adapted from 
Whetten, 1989, p.494) 
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3.15 Conclusion 
In this chapter a detailed account of the philosophy, strategy, methodology and analytical 
processes of the research study has been presented.  As explained and justified, in order 
to address the research question and achieve the associated aims  the study adopted 
qualitative methods utilising a multiple-case study approach (Yin, 2009).  A 3 stage process 
involving self-completion questionnaires, semi-structured interviews and focus groups is 
described and illustrated (Fig 3.4), with observation and protocol data being incorporated in 
the final approach in order to address criticisms levelled at the validity and generalisability 
of purely qualitative data gathering strategies.  Similarly, the use of case studies and in 
particular the merits afforded by a multiple-case approach (Yin, 2013; Simons, 2009; Stake, 
1995), are exploited and arguments offered that given the perspectives sought here, the 
use of a multi-site cross comparison serves to increase confidence in the overall findings; 
in essence adding credibility to the overall contribution to knowledge.  Definitions of classic 
cases (Yin, 2009, Simons, 2009, Stake, 1995) suggest that the selected organisations 
should be considered from all angles and all aspects; however this is not the approach here, 
where a much more focussed view of the participant organisation’s particular approaches 
was deemed to be a key to success.  Hence, in order to locate the cases within the general 
context of the research, arguments are offered to justify the use of the term domain instead 
of case throughout the analysis; whereby a domain is understood to be more descriptively 
rich than a case (Gardner,1997).   
 
By systematically peeling the research onion (Saunders et al, 2009) the discussion of each 
exposed layer affords the opportunity to understand and appreciate the thinking behind the 
final chosen approach.  The resulting research design provides a framework for the 
collection and analysis of data, and the choice of design reflects decisions made about the 
priority given to a range of dimensions within the research process.  Hence, set against this 
background the research design, methodology and associated methods employed to collect 
and analyse data are also described and clarified.  Whilst enabling the fulfilment of the final 
research aims, the approach described also addresses the calls offered by Kovács and 
Spens (2011), who highlight the need for good and applicable research within the 
humanitarian logistics field, with empirical data being gathered through the use of 
appropriate qualitative method; and also those of Kunz and Reiner (2012) who believe that 
“empirical methodologies such as cross-organisational case studies should be used more 
in order to increase knowledge in the [humanitarian logistics] field” (p.133).   
  
 120 
 
CHAPTER 4 
THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN 
AFFAIRS – INDIVIDUAL DOMAIN ANALYSIS 
 
 
“OCHA is responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent 
response to emergencies. The aim is to assist people when they most need relief or 
protection. A key pillar of the OCHA mandate is to coordinate effective and principled 
humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors.” 
(OCHA, 2012a) 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This is the first of four chapters that present an analysis of the data gathered from the 
individual domains considered during this research.  This approach is in keeping with classic 
multiple-case design (Simons, 2009; Yin, 2009; Hartley, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989) where the 
researcher is advised to consider each case in isolation prior to final cross-case analysis.  
Consequently, it should be noted at this stage that in order to ensure this isolated yet 
consistent consideration of the research domains, the approach described within this 
chapter will be mirrored within chapters 5,6 and 7.    
 
The data gathered from The United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the participants within the UN Civil-Military Coordination 
Section (CMCS) is presented and discussed concurrently with appropriate academic 
discourse within the field of research that was first introduced within Chapter 2.  A 
continuation of the adopted research methods established within Chapter 3 will be utilised 
as data gathered at each of the 3 stages of the final research strategy will be discussed and 
analysed.  Following guidance on the application of the case study method (Yin, 2009) the 
narrative and analysis presented here will be completed in isolation from the other cases 
(see Chapters 5, 6 and 7) with a cross-comparison of the data gathered from all four 
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domains being included in Chapter 8 where a review of trends, commonality and differences 
will result in the final contribution to knowledge.   
 
By way of introduction a short background and history of the OCHA, its formation and role 
is included together with a discussion on the organisation’s growing influence and focus on 
the coordination of the overall humanitarian relief effort.  The tasking and structure of the 
CMCS is explained before the use of the organisation as a research domain for the study 
is justified.  Following the inclusion of a listing of respondents and their backgrounds the 
discussion turns to an analysis of the key etic and emic issues and themes identified.  The 
chapter is structured in 3 parts at this point which follow Stages I to III of the final research 
approach as developed and discussed within Chapter 3 of this thesis.  Final conclusions 
and overall domain themes and issues are then established through triangulation of the 
data gathered and the academic discourse.  Thus, the approach will enable an exploration 
of the trends that describe the barriers to collaboration within humanitarian relief supply 
chains and the identification of measures that might help to address these barriers, thereby 
potentially improving collaboration along humanitarian relief supply chains in the future.   
 
 4.2 Background – Coordinating the Overall Humanitarian Effort  
 
The Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC) is 
responsible for the oversight of all emergencies requiring United Nations humanitarian 
assistance.  The ERC also acts as the central focal point for governmental, inter-
governmental and non-governmental relief activities.  This responsibility is managed 
through OCHA which is the organisation within the UN Secretariat tasked with the overall 
coordination of humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies (OCHA, 
2012a).  OCHA also ensures that there is a framework within which each actor can 
contribute to the overall response effort.  The ERC leads the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC), an inter-agency forum for coordination, policy development and 
decision-making involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners.  In a country 
affected by a disaster or conflict, the ERC may appoint a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) 
who will be tasked with ensuring that response efforts are organised.  The HC works through 
an established OCHA office with government, international organisations, non-
governmental organisations and affected communities.  OCHA's stated overall mission is 
to (OCHA, 2012a): 
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1. Mobilise and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership 
with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in 
disasters and emergencies. 
 
2. Advocate the rights of people in need. 
 
3. Promote preparedness and prevention. 
 
4. Facilitate sustainable solutions. 
 
OCHA's Strategic Framework is built on three pillars (OCHA, 2012a): 
 
1. Partnerships:  Partnership has always been integral to OCHA's efforts.  Sustained 
relations, built on trust and mutual respect, are considered to be vital when preparing 
for and responding to humanitarian emergencies.  OCHA is positioned within the 
international humanitarian system to convene and influence agendas.  They try and 
achieve this strategically, with the aim of creating a more enabling environment for 
humanitarian action. 
 
2. Service Provision:  OCHA try to ensure that their services and support to partners 
evolve and meet clients’ needs.  They achieve this by focusing on helping partners 
through humanitarian coordination, leadership, strengthening coordination 
mechanisms, and improving the evidence base for humanitarian decision-making, 
planning and resource allocation. 
 
3. Reliability and Professionalism:  In 2010, OCHA introduced rapid reaction 
solutions to ensure that the right people are on the ground immediately after a new 
disaster.  This effort is coordinated by longer-term staff to ensure continuity of the 
overall OCHA presence. 
 
OCHA has over 30 offices around the world, split across 4 continents with upwards of 1,900 
staff.  OCHA’s coordination work is funded from the UN’s regular budget, member states’ 
voluntary contributions and private donations.  Since 2002, OCHA’s budgetary 
requirements have almost quadrupled as it has expanded its overall role and influence; 
however, its regular budget allocation from the UN has remained almost static (OCHA, 
2012a).  This trend means that OCHA now places great reliance on extra-budgetary 
resources and that its current income is predominantly by way of voluntary contributions 
from individual member states and the European Commission (see OCHA, 2012b for a 
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breakdown of donors as at February 2011).  By way of example, for 2010-11 only 0.6 per 
cent of the United Nations Regular Budget was allocated to OCHA which amounted to some 
US $14 million (£9 million) however its reported programme and administrative budget was 
close US $242 million (£151 million) (OCHA, 2012c).   
 
Donors to OCHA are grouped in an informal OCHA Donor Support Group (ODSG) with 
members committing to annual funding of a minimum threshold (currently US $0.5 million, 
£0.3 million).  They provide financial, political and technical support towards fulfilling 
OCHA’s mandated coordination activities.  The ODSG’s goal is to support OCHA in fulfilling 
its mandate by acting as a sounding board and a source of advice on policy, management, 
budgetary and financial questions.  The Group also acts as a mechanism for feedback, 
donor consultation and the exchange of views on OCHA’s strategic priorities, new project 
initiatives, evaluations and reviews.  The Group also discusses measures that members 
may take individually or collectively to assist OCHA in better fulfilling its mission and goals 
on the basis of the humanitarian principles (DFID, 2008).  
 
It should also be noted at this stage that the UN and OCHA have no influence on 
governments that have bi-lateral arrangements with countries requesting military assistance 
in the aftermath of a natural disaster (Cottey and Forster, 2005; Macrae, 2002).  By way of 
example, during the response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013) Australia and 
Canada were embedded with OCHA in delivering the humanitarian response, whilst other 
countries who lacked bilateral agreements with the Philippine government, such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom found themselves on the periphery of the 
humanitarian effort.  
 
 
4.3     A Brief History – United Nations’ Commitment since 1991 
 
In December 1991, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 46/182 (UN, 2012), which 
was designed to strengthen the UN response to complex emergencies and natural 
disasters, whilst improving the overall effectiveness of humanitarian operations in the field.  
The resolution also created the position of ERC; a role which combined into a single UN 
focal point the functions carried out by the Secretary-General's representatives for major 
and complex emergencies, as well as the UN's natural disaster functions carried out by the 
UN Disaster Relief Organisation.  Soon after the resolution was adopted, the Secretary-
General established the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA).  He also assigned the 
ERC the status of Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, with offices in New 
York and Geneva to provide institutional support.  Resolution 46/182 (UN, 2012) also 
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created the IASC, the Consolidated Appeals Process and the Central Emergency Revolving 
Fund as key coordination mechanisms and tools of the ERC.  In 1998, as part of the 
Secretary-General's programme of reform, DHA was reorganised into the OCHA that exists 
today, with an expanded mandate to include the coordination of humanitarian response, 
policy development and humanitarian advocacy.  This means that OCHA carries out its 
coordination function primarily through the IASC, which is chaired by the ERC.  Participants 
include all humanitarian partners, from UN agencies, funds and programmes, to the Red 
Cross movement and NGOs.  The IASC is expected to ensure inter-agency decision-
making in response to complex emergencies and these responses include needs 
assessments, consolidated appeals, field coordination arrangements and the development 
of humanitarian policies. 
 
 
4.4 A Growing Influence - Current Focus and Coordination Activity 
 
OCHA lists as its main areas of focus, policy, advocacy, information management, 
humanitarian financing and coordination (OCHA, 2012a); however, given the topic of 
research within this thesis the discussion will now deal solely with the final OCHA area of 
focus, that of coordination.   
 
OCHA is responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent and 
coordinated response to emergencies and disaster relief.  The aim is to assist people when 
they most need relief or protection.  A key pillar of the OCHA mandate is to “coordinate 
effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international 
actors” (OCHA, 2012a).  OCHA is committed to leading the international community's efforts 
to develop a better architecture for the humanitarian system, a strategy which includes; the 
introduction of HCs within disaster areas; the development of representative and inclusive 
Humanitarian Country Teams; the management of an effective and well-coordinated 
framework within which all humanitarian organisations can contribute systematically; and 
predictable funding tools.  OCHA currently plays a key role in operational coordination in 
crisis situations, including assessing situations and needs; agreeing common priorities; 
developing common strategies to address issues such as negotiating access, mobilizing 
funding and other resources; clarifying consistent public messaging; and monitoring 
progress.  OCHA's overall role is to support the leadership of the HCs and to ensure 
effective coordination, including strengthening the cluster approach, data and information 
management, and reporting.  They believe that by ensuring that the right structures, 
partnerships and leaders are supported, they and their humanitarian partners can better 
prepare for and more effectively coordinate humanitarian situations.  OCHA serves as the 
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secretariat for inter-agency coordination mechanisms such as the IASC and for rapid-
response tools, such as the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination system, 
and the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group.  OCHA also aims to promote 
efficient interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian operations, to bridge 
gaps in environmental emergency management, and to map global emergency relief 
stockpiles on behalf of the whole humanitarian community.   
 
4.4.1 United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Section 
 
The Oslo Guidelines (UN, 2006) which sought to ensure that foreign military and civil 
defence assets deployed in response to a natural disaster could support and complement 
relief operations were developed through an inter-governmental, inter-agency process.  The 
Guidelines clearly state that military assets must not be used “in a manner that would 
compromise the civilian nature and character of humanitarian assistance” (p.4).  However, 
military assets are frequently used in support of relief efforts, hence OCHA and its 
humanitarian partners are frequently called upon to work with its member states to 
incorporate into contingency planning the possibility of military asset usage, and to engage 
military actors at an early stage in the response in order to guide military efforts and to 
protect the humanitarian space (Seigel, 2011; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009, p.27).  
The United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) is the 
organisation within OCHA tasked with facilitating dialogue and interaction between civilian 
and military actors within a given disaster zone (OCHA, 2012d).   
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4.5 Data Collection, Respondents and Results 
 
The UN CMCS was first contacted in July 2012 through a series of introductory letters and 
questionnaires, as per Stage I in the research methodology.  Key respondents are shown 
in Table 4.1: 
 
 
Respondent Time with 
OCHA 
(years) 
Relevant Practical 
Experience 
Role Code 
Officer In 
Charge 
15 
Pakistan Floods, 
Haiti, Africa, Balkans, 
Asian Tsunami, 
Sudan; Somalia 
Leadership and overall 
command of the UN-
CMCoord.   
 
OIC 
Officer In 
Charge Policy 
and Plans 
10 
Pakistan Floods, 
Haiti, Africa, 
Afghanistan,  
Coordination and 
development of strategic 
policy and planning. 
 
PP 
Officer In 
Charge 
Operational 
and Field 
Support Unit 
12 
Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Pakistan Floods, 
Haiti, Asian Tsunami, 
To manage resources  
engaged in the delivery 
of individual relief 
projects 
 
 
OFS 
Officer In 
Charge 
Training and 
Partnership 
Unit  
11 
Pakistan Floods, 
Haiti, Afghanistan, 
Iraq,  
 
To develop, coordinate 
and deliver training 
within the UN- CMCoord TPU 
Humanitarian 
Coordinator  
10 
Pakistan Floods, 
Haiti, Africa, 
Afghanistan, 
To ensure that the 
response effort during a 
given relief operation is 
organised and 
coordinated on the 
ground. 
HC1 
8 
Haiti, Asian Tsunami 
(Banda Aceh), HC2 
  
 
Table 4.1 UN CMCS – Key Respondents 
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4.6 Data Analysis – Stage I – Key Etic Themes and Issues 
 
Analysis of the data gathered through the introductory questionnaires will now be discussed.  
In achieving this due consideration will be given to the practical relevance of the initial etic 
issues and themes identified within the Literature Review as set out and codified at 
Appendix E.  Note that etic data analysis codes included within Appendix E and respondent 
codes within Table 4.1 will be used at this stage. 
 
4.6.1 Humanitarian Space 
 
The senior respondent (OIC) made it clear that an essential responsibility of the UN CMCS 
was to protect and promote all four of the humanitarian principles.  He was keen to stress 
that whilst military action supports political purposes (POLINF), humanitarian assistance 
should be based on recipient need and should be provided neutrally (HUMSNEU).  The 
remaining respondents had a variety of opinions as to the relative importance of the 
humanitarian principles however, it was clear that they all agreed on the significance of the 
Oslo Guidelines (UN, 2006a) when working with the military to ensure that the key areas of 
impartiality (HUMIMP), operational independence (HUMIND) and neutrality (HUMNEU) are 
not compromised and that the overall civilian character of the humanitarian assistance 
offered is not affected (SUSCSR).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6.2 Organisational Sustainment, Power and Relationships 
 
The UN CMCS is regarded by the respondents as the key arbiter in the avoidance of 
competition (SUSSTRAT) between NGOs and local governments.  Moreover, the 
respondents with operational, on the ground experience (OIC, OFS, HC1,2) highlighted that 
the organisation is tasked with minimising any inconsistency in approach (RMT) and also 
regards itself as a driver in helping to facilitate and establish common goals amongst 
contributors (PWRPOS, RMT).   
 
 
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
Humanitarian Principles/ Military Role/ 
Maintenance of Oslo Guidelines/ Corporate 
Social Responsibility 
 128 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6.3 Collaborative Working and the Military 
 
The operational involvement in the relief effort was highlighted by the junior respondents 
(PP, OFS, TPU, HC1,2) who emphasised the importance of the UN CMCS in its role as the 
enabler of collaborative working between donors operating in the same humanitarian relief 
space (COLCLU, COLALL).  This is particularly true when local and international 
humanitarian organisations are involved and are expected to work alongside the military 
(HUMSIND).  The belief is that effective and consistent humanitarian civil-military 
coordination (COLCLU, COLLALL, COLRES) is a shared responsibility that is crucial to 
safeguarding humanitarian principles and the humanitarian space (PWRPOS, RMT).  All 
respondents expressed the opinion that the OCHA is expected to manage the level of 
coordination and the associated differing relationships that develop (RMT, RMOPP, 
COLCU).  The senior and operationally experienced respondents (OIC, OPS, HC1,2) were 
keen to comment on the military contribution to the disaster relief effort and believed that, 
given their ability to rapidly mobilise and deploy unique assets and expertise, the military 
could offer a valuable contribution to any humanitarian operation (COLHOR, COLVER, 
COLLALL).  The senior respondent (OIC) also noted that the acceptance of military 
assistance is vital in some circumstances and that the UN cluster concept could ensure 
differing levels of collaboration between humanitarian organisations and the military;  
collaboration which could effectively range from what he termed cooperation through to 
coexistence (PWRPOS, RMT, COLCLU).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
Management of Competition/ Power and 
Relationship Management 
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
UN Cluster Concept/ Lead Status/ Power 
and Relationships/ Military Assistance 
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4.6.4 Summary – UN-CMCS Key Etic Themes and Issues 
In completing Stage I of the research strategy with the UN CMCS the following key etic 
themes and issues were identified to inform Stage II of the research strategy. 
 
Theme  
 
Issue Description Notes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Humanitarian Space  
 
Humanitarian 
Principles 
Neutrality and Impartiality How maintained/ managed 
Military Role Should not compromise 
humanitarian principles 
How to ensure civilian 
character is established and 
maintained 
Maintenance of 
Oslo Guidelines 
Success of guidelines How enforced 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Humanitarian principles are 
not compromised and the 
overall civilian character of 
the humanitarian assistance 
offered is not affected. 
How achieved? 
Clarify meaning/ understanding 
 
 
 
 
Organisational 
Sustainment, Power 
and Relationships 
 
Management of 
Competition 
Key arbiter in avoidance of 
competition 
How? 
Power  Facilitate and establish 
common goals amongst 
contributors 
How?  How is this approach 
received by participants? 
Examples? 
Relationship 
Management 
Power broker role? How are relationships 
managed? Problems? 
Examples? 
 
 
 
 
 
Collaborative Working 
and the Military 
 
UN Cluster Concept Success of the approach Successes?  Examples?  
How established/ managed/ 
maintained 
Lead Status Manager of collaboration 
and alliances 
How received/ managed/ 
maintained 
Examples? 
Power Broker between military, 
governments and NGOs 
How received? 
Successes? 
Examples? 
Relationship 
Management 
Military Assistance 
 
Table 4.2 UN CMCS – Stage I Key Etic Themes and Issues 
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4.7 Data Analysis – Stage II – Developing Emic Themes and Issues 
 
Analysis of the data gathered during the semi structured interviews with members of the UN 
CMCS listed in Table 4.1 will now be discussed.  In keeping with Stage II of the final 
research strategy interviews were based around the schedule (Appendix F) which was 
developed following cross-domain analysis of Stage I findings and the key etic themes and 
issues that had been identified as a result (see Appendix E).  Note that respondent codes 
listed within Table 4.1 will still be used throughout this discussion. 
 
4.7.1 General Processes, Coordination and Collaboration 
 
“The increasing number of actors within humanitarian relief areas means that whilst 
coordination of effort is essential it is [at the same time] extremely challenging” 
(OFS) 
 
“We regard OCHA as a critical contributor….we have seen examples in the past 
where the genuine drive to help has led to aid agencies working on their own without 
proper coordination…this leads to duplication of effort and ineffectiveness”.  (OIC) 
 
The thoughts cited above illustrate agreement with the views offered in the literature 
(Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) on the growing number of actors within humanitarian relief 
zones and reflect the common perception amongst those interviewed within the UN CMCS 
on the need for coordination within humanitarian relief provision, and the overall 
requirement for their office and the UN OCHA.  Effective collaboration will be a contributing 
factor in any supply chain activity (Seigel, 2011; Carroll and Neu, 2009) and it is reassuring 
to note that OCHA’s role as a facilitator of closer working was regarded as “crucial” (OIC, 
PP) amongst participants and effectively made life “easier within relief zones, as providers 
and recipients of aid know who to approach to get quick answers and quick responses” 
(OFS).  Hinting at the importance of supply chain resilience (Christopher, 2011) and the 
ability of that chain to withstand turbulence, OFS offered the view that the presence of 
OCHA and its representatives made victims of disasters feel “safer and reassured”, a view 
shared by OIC and PP who asserted a strong belief that “OCHA make a clear difference to 
those who are suffering on the ground”.  TPU was keen to discuss the impact of previous 
disasters and highlighted the fact that a new strategic framework had been adopted by the 
OCHA following a review of the lessons learned post the responses to the Haiti Earthquake 
and Pakistan Floods of 2010.  This is also echoed in the OCHA Plan and Budget statement 
(UN OCHA, 2013) where a new strategic plan is explained based on the UN Under-
Secretary General’s emphasis on “strengthening OCHA’s field effectiveness” (p.5).   
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OIC emphasised that this strategic framework is at the heart of all OCHA activity and that 
he saw his organisation’s role as one that should look to: 
 
“Broaden partnerships and become more accountable for the way that resources 
are managed whilst also trying to improve coordination of humanitarian provision 
and making the provision of humanitarian relief more effective and efficient” 
 
Agreeing with academic support for the use of clusters as a vehicle to achieve collaboration 
within supply chains (Patti, 2006, Porter, 1998) the respondents were supportive of the UN 
Cluster Concept and believed that it has a clear role to play in the overall effectiveness of 
humanitarian relief provision.   
 
“The Cluster Concept is a leap forward from its predecessor where basically every 
organisation did its own thing…it was an obvious requirement and has been, on the 
whole a success since its introduction” (PP).   
 
OIC believed that the cluster approach strengthened the relationship between the UN and 
international NGOs, but felt that there is a need to develop mechanisms for assessing the 
performance of clusters.  OIC was unaware of any such mechanisms but agreed that they 
would be useful at all levels and stages of the relief effort.  Agreeing with OIC, PP felt that 
accountability was a real weak point of the cluster approach and that there were very low 
levels of accountability of cluster leads to the HC in the field.  He offered the view that this 
is as a direct result of what he termed the “very loose” link between the cluster approach 
and the overall OCHA coordination system.  Referring to his experiences in Haiti, OFS felt 
that the cluster approach had been driven from the top down and that there had been little 
inclusion of the local providers and population, hence he felt that this had effectively 
undermined local ownership and with it local responsibility for relief action.  This experience 
would seem to echo the academic view that in order to be effective, clusters should include 
both “upstream suppliers and downstream customers” (Patti, p.266). 
 
OFS also felt that there is no clear criteria for the implementation of clusters in the context 
of situations where reoccurring natural disasters exist, which serves to undermine 
participation and promote what he termed “emergency thinking outside emergencies”.  In a 
similar vein, OIC commented that the cluster approach is too exclusive and does not include 
important providers such as national NGOs, governments and local donors.  Agreeing with 
Porter’s initial economic cluster theory (1998), OIC felt that this lack of involvement could: 
 
“Weaken local ownership and create tension with local government which could lead 
to unsustainable solutions and clear issues in the overall success of the long term 
recovery strategy”.   
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Demonstrating agreement with the academic view that cluster leads could learn valuable 
lessons from consideration of 4PL strategies (Jensen, 2012) the data gathered offers 
empirical evidence that there is a requirement to improve and promote inter‐agency 
contingency planning and that joint exercises at a country level might help to achieve this.  
Moreover, there is also a requirement for clear guidance on inter-cluster coordination and 
an explanation of the role of OCHA in making this happen within humanitarian emergency 
areas.  The view is that clusters need to be rationalised to avoid duplication and to ensure 
the most efficient use of time and resources (PP).  There is a common view that there is a 
lack of guidance on how to effectively invoke an ‘exit strategy’ (OFS) to help countries to 
move on from the cluster approach, and that there is a requirement to establish appropriate 
links between humanitarian aid organisations and local developmental actors within 
affected countries.  Further comment on this issue related back to the model on the Phases 
of Disaster Relief Operations (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) and on the clear need to 
establish closer linkages between the different stages of the disaster relief operation 
(OFS,HC1,HC2).  TPU noted that there is a requirement to provide training for country 
representatives on the cluster approach, its roles and responsibilities and that this should 
include all countries involved and all agencies be they governmental or non-governmental.   
 
Maintaining the training theme and suggesting agreement with the thoughts offered by 
Moore and Taylor (2011) and Thomas and Mizushima (2005) on the importance of 
humanitarian logistics professionalisation, TPU discussed the idea of long term investment 
in cluster coordination as a professional career path within provider organisations, and that 
whenever possible trained cluster coordinators and teams should be in the field for longer 
periods, putting them in a position to effectively train national and local personnel prior to 
final withdrawal.   
 
The data gathered illustrates that OCHA regards itself as effectively a 4PL provider 
(Harrison and van Hoek, 2011; Chopra and Meindl, 2010) which acts as a facilitator of 
resource sharing:  
 
“We do not have our own resources as such but regard our role as one that brings 
together providers and encourages the effective and efficient sharing of facilities and 
resources” (OIC). 
   
All respondents agree with the view that effective information sharing is a key element in a 
successful supply chain (Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Bozarth and Handfield, 2008); however, 
the consensus is that there is a significant amount of misunderstanding amongst 
humanitarian organisations and providers on OCHA’s role and capacity in relation to 
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information sharing and management at both the global and country level.  That said, all 
respondents agree that the cluster approach has improved information sharing, however 
information management is weak with significant amounts of information being lost or not 
shared when it was most needed (HC1, commenting on his experiences of the Pakistan 
floods, 2010). 
 
Returning to a discussion on supply chain resilience (Christopher, 2011) OIC believed that 
the UN CMCS contribution is essential in complex emergencies, particularly where there is 
associated risk to individual contributors, and that the military has a vital role to play in 
facilitating humanitarian access, protecting civilians, and providing security for humanitarian 
aid workers.  All respondents acknowledged the import role that the military has to play in 
the overall relief effort agreeing with commentary on the inevitability of such a contribution 
(Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 2011).  PP felt that there was an inevitability in that:  
 
“National governments see the deployment of their military resources as a quick and 
visible sign of involvement at an early stage of the disaster response”.   
 
OFS echoed this thought: 
 
“When an emergency or disaster occurs which leads to a humanitarian need, lots of 
countries will deploy their military’s or paramilitary organizations in direct response” 
 
However, OFS also seemed to reflect the ideas discussed by Tomasini and Van 
Wassenhove (2009) in respect of the role that the Humanitarian Principles have to play in 
what they argue constitutes a humanitarian operation, as he noted the problems that military 
intervention can create when local and international humanitarian organisations are 
involved.  In short, OFS clearly believes that it is vital that all organisations operating in the 
same area do not affect the overall neutrality and impartiality of the response. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Field Effectiveness/ Strategic Framework/ 
Cluster Concept/ Cluster Training/ 
Professionalisation/ Local Organisational 
Training/ Joint Training   
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4.7.2 Power and Relationships 
 
The data confirm the view that the relationship that exists between humanitarian actors will 
change depending on the type of emergency and the roles and responsibilities that are 
agreed and established with, and for the associated military contributors (OFS, HU1, HU2).  
There was acknowledgement that UN CMCS is seen by some humanitarian relief 
organisations as the power broker (Burt, 2005) in the supply chain and that the organisation 
is regarded by some humanitarian organisations as the focal point in the UN system for 
humanitarian civil-military coordination.  However the respondents do not regard 
themselves as necessarily a lead organisation, but more as one that plays the role of a 
facilitator.   
 
OFS agreed that the CMCS is happy to offer advice on matters relating to the involvement 
of foreign military resources to disaster relief and humanitarian relief operations, but was 
quick to stress that this is always complimented by the publication of operational guidance.  
The data gathered shows that the UN CMCS regards its role as one of providing support 
for humanitarian and military actors through the provision of training and advice on the 
guidelines that govern the use of foreign military and civil defence assets and humanitarian 
civil-military interaction.  TPU explained that the training programmes that UN CMCS offer 
are designed to develop the skills and knowledge necessary amongst humanitarian and 
military actors to facilitate communication and, where required successful coordination and 
interaction (for details of courses see discussion in OCHA 2013b).  OIC related his 
experiences at Banda Aceh in support of the Asian Tsunami (2004) in the following vignette, 
where he discusses power and relationships in respect of the need, as he saw it for OCHA 
to take the lead in the overall coordination of the humanitarian relief community: 
 
“We developed a Humanitarian Information Centre and encouraged all NGOs to 
register with us and also to give an indication of what contribution they were 
intending to make.  This helped us to produce maps of sectors showing who was 
working where and doing what and also to produce a list of contact information for 
all contributors.  I suppose it was accepted that in this sense we held the power in 
the region at that time.  We also chaired bi-weekly meetings and circulated minutes 
of decisions and outcomes…….  We were conscious that attendance [at the 
meetings] was voluntary and that there were other meetings being held amongst 
some of those who elected not to attend ours”.  
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OIC went on to discuss the role that the local government had to play in this process and 
was quick to emphasise that meetings were also brokered with local representatives, with 
an emphasis on giving them the lead role at an early stage in the relief effort.  OIC was 
quick to stress that he did not feel that there is any competition for the lead role in the 
recovery effort and that the role of OCHA and of the UN CMCS is to facilitate rather than 
dominate; moreover the overall aim is to return control to local government and agencies at 
the earliest opportunity.  Arguing against the academic view that market competition does 
not really influence organisations within the humanitarian relief supply chain (Dash et al, 
2013; Mays et al, 2102) OIC agreed with the assertions offered by Olson and Gregorian 
(2007) in that there is clear competition between donor organisations when it comes to what 
OIC termed as the “more high profile” elements of the disaster relief process; an opinion 
shared by other UN CMCS respondents (OFS, HC1, HC2) who felt that there is a drive to 
be noticed amongst NGOs and that this could be “unhealthy at times” (OFS). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7.3 The Humanitarian Space 
 
In keeping with arguments offered regarding what constitutes a humanitarian operation 
(Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008) all participants were happy to 
acknowledge the importance of the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, 
impartiality and independence.  There is a common view that it is essential to protect and 
promote the humanitarian principles.  PP explained that the administration of the principles 
within UN CMCS and OCHA lies with the IASC, which is designated as the primary 
mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance (IASC, 2011).  OIC 
referred to his experiences in South Sudan: 
 
“Successful coordination in humanitarian relief operations is based on logical and 
consistent UN engagement and on the establishment of stable peace arrangements, 
particularly in those countries that are recovering from a conflict.  Maintaining the 
humanitarian principles means that in classic political peacekeeping missions there 
should be close coordination between all organisations that are on the ground, be 
they local, military, governmental or NGO”. 
 
OFS felt that the humanitarian principles can be used to help facilitate collaboration between 
military and non-military organisations operating within disaster relief areas as they are 
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Power Broker and Facilitator/ Local 
Governmental Involvement/ Inter-Agency 
Competition 
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understood by everyone, and the common need to maintain them can be used to break 
down all types of barriers, be they political and/or religious or those that result from armed 
conflict.   
 
Weiss and Collins (2000) noted the dilemma that may emerge when humanitarian 
organisations are asked to provide aid in regions where armed conflict means that non-
combatants are being targeted by a warring party, and the data gathered (OFS, HC1, HC2) 
also confirms the need for military assistance in such disaster relief areas.  Afghanistan, 
Sudan and Somalia were all offered as a typical examples of insecure countries where 
security of aid workers is a real issue.  However, there also seemed to be agreement with 
the Humanitarian Policy Group Report (2009) on the view that violence against aid workers 
in other humanitarian areas has reduced in recent times and that this is probably due to 
what OFS described as: 
 
“The overall improvements to organisations’ management and assessment of 
security risk over the past 5 years”.   
 
As a result, there is a common view that humanitarian relief organisations, and in particular 
those sponsored by the UN, struggle to maintain a meaningful presence and safe access 
to affected people in areas where there is inherent conflict, which “ironically is normally 
where those most in need of aid find themselves” (HC2).  Despite these issues it was clear 
that the UN CMCS strategy is to avoid a military response as such, with a clear reluctance 
to resort to armed escorts be they from the military or private security organisations.  
Moreover, there is no support to the idea of centralisation or to a regime of restricted 
movement.  Reflecting the views highlighted by Heaslip (2011) and Beauregard (1998) on 
the acceptance of military assistance, HC1 pointed to his experiences in Haiti following the 
earthquake (2010), contending that the fact that the security rules which were in place called 
for armed escorts as standard actually restricted the aid effort as some NGOs simply 
refused to accept military assistance. 
 
OFS did point out however, that in keeping with the humanitarian principles organisations 
within the sector will always find ways to carry on delivering aid to affected populations.  He 
also believed that he had seen a shift in approach which was due to a change in the overall 
UN security management strategy.  Many humanitarian organisations now appreciate the 
importance of remaining in the secure environment that is established with the local 
community over time, and this acceptance helps to facilitate wider reaching and more 
effective access to those in greatest need.   
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Reflecting the academic discussion on political perception (Reindrop and Wiles, 2001) OFS 
commented on the view that some NGOs still exhibit in respect of the UN and OCHA: 
 
“Whilst the UN are meant to be neutral, politics and perception often prevent us from 
carrying out and coordinating humanitarian relief effort.  We are still regarded by 
some [NGOs] as an organisation that represents Western governments and this 
creates problems for us in some disaster relief operations”  
 
The data gathered support a common belief that the UN CMCS was created to facilitate 
discussions and working relationships between all contributors.  This is particularly true 
when it comes to the issue of military assistance and cooperation, where the view is that 
the organisation’s role is to promote communication and interaction between all actors 
within the disaster relief zone be they civilian or military.  Those relationships and 
agreements that developed as a result, are between the donors and should be based solely 
on their requirements and overall beliefs.  The UN CMCS provide a framework that is 
designed to promote a broader understanding of humanitarian relief provision, which does 
include guidelines for political and military actors on how best to work together in 
humanitarian relief areas (UN OCHA, 2012d).  PP explained that the framework had been 
designed to: 
 
“Help all of those involved [in the relief effort] to develop specific policy within 
internationally agreed guidelines based on the working environments that they find 
themselves in …..it [the framework] should help organisations to come to 
agreements based on appropriate civil-military coordination structures”  
 
There is also a view that OCHA is trying to establish a predictable approach to the 
involvement of military resources by encouraging their use in not just the disaster relief 
stage but also in the build-up and recovery; clearly linking to Kovács and Spens (2008, 
2007) discussions on the different phases of disaster relief operations and in particular to 
their call for an increase in the military contribution to the preparation and reconstruction 
phases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Maintain Secure Environment/ Maintain 
Humanitarian Principles/ Political Perception 
of OCHA/ Longer Term Military Involvement 
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4.7.4 Organisational Sustainment 
 
“We now understand our role a lot better and are more effective and efficient as a 
result…….I think that more importantly the donor community are starting to 
understand our role too” (PP) 
 
The above statement echoes the views within the data gathered, which suggests agreement 
that UN OCHA and the UN CMCS in particular have a growing role to play in the disaster 
relief effort.  OIC and PP pointed to the fact that the organisation and its role has grown 
significantly since its inception in 1991, a view shared by the USG/ERC in her opening 
statement in OCHA’s latest Annual Plan and Budget (UN OCHA, 2013): 
 
“Power is shifting and evolving; from traditional Government structures to a 
multiplicity of civic and private actors living increasingly interconnected lives.  This 
has profound implications for the way that we do our work” (p1) 
 
TPU offered the view that a broadening of role and emphasis for OCHA has yet to be 
transmitted to the humanitarian community and agreed that this should be included in all 
new training strategies both within and out with his organisation.  Participants pointed to the 
challenges associated with achieving sustainment against the growing demand for instant 
information (HC1), and to the fact that there is far greater expectation from donors and 
customers (OIC).  Much like in the business sector the risk of mismatch and the disruption 
caused by globalisation and the associated smaller margins for error, will inevitably put 
more strain on humanitarian relief supply chains (Perry 2007, Kleindorf and van 
Wassenhove, 2004); however, HC1 was quick to stress that advances in technology and 
the ability to quickly gather more accurate and timely information were realising significant 
improvements in the ability to deliver better and more effective aid.  PP agreed that new 
technology could play an active role in the facilitation of information sharing, but was also 
keen to stress that the gathering of such information rested with the organisations involved 
in the disaster response itself and not necessarily with members of OCHA and the UN 
CMCS.    Reflecting the overall strategic plan for OCHA (2013, p5) respondents discussed 
the need to demonstrate overall economic value for money to donors and agreed that they 
were being driven to achieve greater effectiveness within relief zones (HC1) and a more 
visible presence and lasting contribution (TPU).   
 
 
   
N 
 
  
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Strategic Framework/ Overall Role of 
OCHA/ Economically Accountable/ 
Information Facilitator/ Flexibility 
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4.7.5 Summary – UN-CMCS Key Emic Themes and Issues 
 
Theme 
 
Issue Description Notes 
Management 
and Control 
 
Field Effectiveness 
Visibility of Presence and  Overall 
Contribution 
Increasing pressure 
to demonstrate 
economic value 
Economically Accountable 
Information Facilitator Utilise modern technology 
Emphasis on 
facilitation of data 
access and not on 
data gathering 
Flexibility 
How to achieve against economic 
pressures 
Increasing pressure 
to demonstrate value 
for money Strategic Framework 
Increase efficiency and 
effectiveness 
Cluster Concept 
Performance Measurement 
How to make Cluster 
Leads Accountable 
Exclusivity 
Local Government 
must be Involved at 
all times  
Overall linkage to OCHA  
Very loose = 
confusion. 
Implementation Guidelines 
Need to be produced 
to prevent confusion 
 
Relationships 
 
Local Governmental 
Involvement 
Promote local ownership and 
responsibility at an early stage. 
Prevent undermining 
of local authorities 
Power Broker and 
Facilitator 
Not leader. 
Promote 
understanding 
Inter-Agency Competition Evident in the field. How to manage 
Political Perception of 
OCHA 
Guidelines Local confusion  
 
Understanding 
and Training 
 
Overall Role of OCHA Promote Wider Understanding Facilitator not actor. 
Joint Training 
Interagency exercises in  planning 
and coordination 
Who does what 
when 
Professionalisation  
Career path for Cluster and 
HUMLOG Leaders/Managers 
Improve efficiency/ 
effectiveness 
Local Organisational 
Training 
Part of exit strategy for HUMLOG 
organisations  
Pass responsibility 
for recovery to locals 
Cluster Training 
Promote understanding and 
management 
Roles and 
responsibilities.  
 
Military 
Involvement 
 
Maintain Secure 
Environment 
Provide security for HUMLOG 
workers 
Last resort 
Longer term  
Not just immediate response but 
preparation and reconstruction 
Maintain presence 
after immediate 
response  
Maintain Humanitarian 
Principles 
Help to Facilitate collaboration 
and break down political barriers 
Use in insecure 
countries  
 
Table 4.3 UN CMCS Stage II Key Emic Themes and Issues 
 
 
 
 140 
 
4.8 Data Analysis – Stage III – Confirming Emic Themes and Issues 
 
Analysis of the data gathered during the Focus Group carried out with members of the UN 
CMCS will now be discussed.  Three of the participants listed in Table 4.1 (OFS, HC1, HC2) 
were unable to take part in the Focus Group, hence membership was restricted to the 
remaining three UN CMCS participants listed in Table 4.1.  In keeping with Stage III of the 
final research strategy discussion during the Focus Group was based around the Focus 
Group Topic Guide (Appendix G) which had been developed following analysis of the Stage 
II findings and the key emic themes and issues that had been identified as a result.  Note 
that respondent codes listed within Table 4.1 will still be used throughout this discussion. 
 
4.8.1 Management and Control 
 
“We believe that OCHA and the CMCS play vital roles in the disaster relief effort, 
particularly in those areas where there are security issues as we [CMCS] are tasked 
with providing security for the civilian population and for the humanitarian aid 
workers” (OIC) 
 
From the outset of the UN-CMCS Focus Group there was clear agreement on the 
importance of effective coordination and a common belief that an ad hoc approach was not 
effective within humanitarian relief areas.  There was clear consensus on the role and 
responsibility of OCHA and the CMCS, however, it is acknowledged that achieving effective 
coordination is not an easy task and that the UN organisations do not always get it right.   
  
“We provide guidelines to help participating organisations and governments to 
provide humanitarian aid but we do to a certain extent rely on those organisations 
involved to adhere to the guidance offered” (OIC) 
 
The Group felt that their coordination challenge is being exacerbated as those involved in 
humanitarian relief have two new issues to face.  Firstly, the increasing scale and number 
of crises which often occur simultaneously, and secondly new types of emergencies which 
are more often than not caused and made worse by long-term problems such as extreme 
poverty, population growth and climate change; the view is that both of these issues call for 
much closer links between humanitarian actors themselves, as well as between those 
involved in third world developmental projects.  Local involvement is also recognised as a 
key to success:  
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“The pressure to effectively coordinate is all the more prevalent as is a clear 
recognition of the importance of establishing national ownership at an early stage. 
The UN must look to lead effective and principled humanitarian action, which is also 
aimed at long term recovery and addressing the root causes of disasters”. (TPU) 
 
Turning to the Cluster Concept.  The Group are in agreement with the overall aims of the 
Concept itself and also agree that it should seek to make global cluster leads accountable 
to the ERC for ensuring more effective inter-agency working, and with it a more effective 
response to humanitarian disasters.  All participants also agreed that whilst the Cluster 
Leads are issued with objectives, there is little evidence of an effective monitoring system 
to report cluster performance against.  The consensus was that clusters should look to 
involve local communities and authorities wherever possible as omission of local 
governments in the decision making process can lead to unnecessary tensions and 
confusion.  PP reiterated the view expressed during Stage II of the research (see 4.8.1) in 
that the linkage between the clusters and OCHA is unclear to some and that this does effect 
the overall efficiency of the humanitarian relief system.  This is a view shared by TPU who 
felt that: 
 
“Clearer guidelines on the cluster approach, similar to those that we [CMCS] issue 
on Civil-Military Coordination in relief areas would help everyone not involved with 
the UN.  I have witnessed local and national confusion as well as a duplication of 
effort on occasion which could have been addressed though clearer direction at the 
start”    
 
4.8.2 Understanding and Training 
 
“The demands and expectations on OCHA and its Humanitarian Coordinators is 
growing as is the pressure that is placed upon them.  The situation calls for 
experienced and professional leadership and this is not always easy to find”. (TPU) 
 
In agreement with the assertions offered in the literature (Tatham and Altay, 2013; Bolshe 
et al, 2013; Moore and Taylor, 2011; Thomas and Mizushima, 2005), the Group 
acknowledged the importance of training and professionalisation within humanitarian 
logistics.  As Goffnet et al (2013) and Heaslip (2011) discuss, the participants also 
appreciated the merits of joint training exercises; however they did recognise that such 
initiatives may be difficult to arrange in practice.  Some group members had taken part in 
such events in the past, but they commented that although valuable, attendance had been 
sporadic; moreover, given the current financial climate and increasing number of 
humanitarian relief operations, the view was that it may be difficult to justify such a strategy 
in the future. 
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The Group discussed the UN CMCoord Officer Deployment Plan, which offers a number of 
options and is used to provide predictable and sustainable humanitarian civil-military 
coordination in the event of humanitarian emergencies (OCHA, 2013a).  The Plan utilises 
the phased deployment of CMCS staff members and additional OCHA personnel, together 
with outsourced consultants to effect a staged approach to the build-up following a 
humanitarian disaster.  TPU was quick to emphasise that all of these staff will be 
appropriately experienced and trained through the CMCS Training Partnership Programme 
which offers a range of courses at a wide variety of venues across the globe.  The following 
courses were on offer in 2013 (OCHA, 2013b): 
 
1. United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Course. 
 
2. United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Field 
Course. 
 
3. United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Training of 
Trainers (ToT) Course . 
 
4. Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Familiarisation Course. 
 
Answering Heaslip’s (2011) call for more cross-fertilisation between the military, UN 
agencies and NGOs within training (p.164) the UN-CMCoord Courses are aimed at military 
and civilian organisations with experience in emergency response.  The strategy is that UN 
representatives as well as those from governments, NGOs and the military are able to share 
ideas and discuss operational strategies in a learning environment (OCHA, 2013b).  TPU 
did concede that attendance at these courses was difficult for some and that participation 
from smaller organisations was very low.  He also agreed that whilst the cluster concept 
was discussed on these courses it may be a prudent idea to establish a course aimed at 
cluster leaders which could clarify roles, structures and responsibilities.    
 
4.8.3 Relationships 
 
There was clear support for the belief that coordination has come a long way since the 
OCHA was created and that the organisation was striving to form stronger relationships 
between donors, NGOs, and UN agencies; but also acknowledgement that this is not 
always an easy task.  During a discussion on the merits of local engagement and building 
relationships with local authorities PP spoke of his experiences during the initial response 
to the Haiti earthquake (2010): 
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“The majority of Haitians lived in poverty prior to the earthquake, and depended on 
a dysfunctional urban economy which effectively collapsed within seconds. There 
was no identifiable authority or government to speak of, hence establishing 
relationships with the locals was extremely difficult.  Prior to the disaster there wasn’t 
a functioning economic system but there was political instability and weak national 
institutions. This made it very difficult to obtain local decisions on critical issues, such 
as land ownership for the relocation of the hundreds of thousands of displaced 
Haitians or on simple things such as waste disposal”. 
 
This vignette serves to demonstrate the overall Group opinion on the challenges associated 
with building relationships with local organisations, and also illustrates that those challenges 
are much the same as those reported within the business sector (Iglesias et al, 2011; 
Upadhye and Battacharya cited by Sadler, 2007).  Whilst there is a clear consensus that 
relationship building with local authorities was a good strategy, as it helped communities to 
take ownership of the recovery and also relief agencies to develop exit strategies at an early 
stage, in reality identification of the local authorities was not always an easy task.  TPU 
returned to the discussion on the Training and Partnership Unit (see 4.9.2) and reminded 
the Group that this is aimed at establishing partnerships with a wide variety of global 
humanitarian relief organisations, and that the strategy not only trains OCHA staff but also 
aims to promote inter-organisational relationships by offering training to members of other 
relief organisations. 
 
The Group agreed with the view that the private sector is an increasingly influential 
contributor to all stages of humanitarian relief (Christopher and Tatham, 2011, p.1) and also 
noted the contribution that smaller contributors have to make. 
 
“We shouldn’t forget the private sector’s role in this as well as other emerging smaller 
contributors, such as religious organisations……there is a need for OCHA and the 
international humanitarian community to establish standards and certification 
systems, and this should include ensuring that existing coordination and partnership 
strategies are inclusive and effective at bringing all of these different groups 
together” (OIC) 
 
As discussed in the literature (Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011) there is also 
recognition that humanitarian relief workers have some significant lessons to learn from the 
private sector in a number of areas including risk management and logistics, and that there 
is a need to create relationships with the private sector which may help the humanitarian 
community to increase capacity and fill any gaps that exist within the humanitarian 
response.  Whilst the increasing number of partnerships within the sector were 
acknowledged, it was argued that this is not being reflected by a “growing spirit of 
community” (PP).  The overall feeling is that inter-organisational relationships are running 
on a project timeline and that this is leading to a culture of “working in siloes with duplication 
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of effort” (PP).  Ultimately, the Group conceded that the sector is predominantly governed 
by transactional relationships, based on authority and bureaucratic structure rather than 
transformational partnerships, with an emphasis on a joint vision and a feeling of loyalty and 
trust (Mullins, 2013, p.385). 
 
4.8.4 Military Involvement 
 
“Whilst the Oslo Guidelines call for the use of military involvement in humanitarian 
relief as a last resort there are clear areas where the military can offer expertise and 
resources” (PP) 
 
The Group discussed the availability of military transport and logistics and other resources 
as well as the expertise in the provision of flexible and responsive supply chains 
(Christopher, 2011; Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011).  These assets, termed Military and Civil 
Defence Assets (MCDA) are provided on a non-profit basis and are made available under 
the control and coordination of OCHA and the CMCS (OCHA, 2012d).  Resources will be 
requested by CMCS through a 24-hour contact point system which is established with UN 
Member States, but only as a last resort when all other resources have proved to be 
insufficient, exhausted, or unavailable.  Despite these controls there was clear concern 
within the Group regarding the idea of “militarising” (PP) the overall relief effort, and the 
adverse effect that the presence of foreign military forces can have on the local population 
and also on the ability of civilian humanitarian organisations to operate freely within certain 
countries.  
 
“When a humanitarian disaster happens many international governments will use 
their military forces as a means of providing a quick and visible response. This can 
create a problem when local and international humanitarian organisations are also 
involved but obviously it is essential that everyone can operate in the same areas 
without effecting the overall civilian perception of the humanitarian relief process” 
(OIC). 
 
The Group acknowledged the efforts of some countries and governments to increase the 
overall military contribution to the humanitarian relief effort as discussed by Heaslip (2011), 
Seipel (2011) and Tatham (2011) as well as the increasing number of disasters that see 
international and local military forces working alongside civilian relief organisations.  The 
view is that the CMCS task of ensuring and administering collaboration and cooperation 
between civilian and military actors is more and more important; however, there was also 
acknowledgement that the organisation and its staff have to be aware of and promote the 
humanitarian principles, and aim to help all organisations to pursue common goals to the 
benefit of those in need.  
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There is also a consensus that the CMCS has to be aware of the political influence that is 
often placed on the military participants.  OIC spoke of the Civil-Military Coordination 
Guidelines that are produced by OCHA and offered by way of example the document 
produced for operations in Haiti (OCHA, 2011).  Hinting at the discussion offered by Heaslip 
(2011, p.163) on the need to establish “clear blue water” between military and civilian actors, 
OIC explained that the document was written to address any potential “blurring of lines 
between military actors on one side, and humanitarian actors on the other” and thereby 
“ensure adequate arrangements for civil military-engagement and to safeguard 
humanitarian principles and action” (OCHA, 2011, p.3). 
 
4.9 Conclusions and Overall Domain Themes and Issues  
 
As the first of four chapters presenting an analysis of the research findings, this chapter has 
drawn upon data gathered from the UN OCHA and in particular the respondents within the 
Organisation’s CMCS.  Having firstly established the key etic issues and themes through 
analysis of questionnaire responses, emic issues were developed and then investigated 
through a series of semi-structured interviews with OCHA participants.  Finally, additional 
analysis and application of relevant literature within the field informed the areas of 
discussion within a participant focus group.  Hence, in keeping with the final research 
strategy through triangulation of data gathered and findings from questionnaires, interviews 
and a focus group with key informants, the chapter has explored trends that describe the 
barriers to collaboration within humanitarian relief supply chains and also looked to identify 
how these barriers might be addressed to improve collaboration in the future.  Following the 
classic case study process (Yin, 2009) the findings and trends discussed within this section 
will be used during a final cross-domain analysis within Chapter 8 which will inform the final 
conclusions and academic contribution.  The section will now be broken down into the key 
emic themes and issues identified within the UN OCHA arrived at through application of 
Stages I and II of the final research strategy and confirmed and expanded upon during 
Stage III.    
 
4.9.1  Management and Control 
 
Initial discussion and analysis surrounding the secondary data available on the UN OCHA, 
confirms the organisation’s growing influence within the coordination of effective 
humanitarian relief.  OCHA’s overall approach to its role to “bring together humanitarian 
actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies” (OCHA, 2012a) is established, as is 
the contribution that the UN CMCS has to make in the facilitation of the interaction between 
civilian and military actors within disaster relief zones (OCHA, 2012d).  Whilst there is 
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agreement with the academic view that effective coordination has a significant role to play 
in any supply chain activity (Carroll and Neu, 2009), the data gathered concurs with 
arguments on the challenges that OCHA faces in achieving effective coordination against 
the growing number of actors within humanitarian relief zones (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 
2007).  Moreover, the increasing scale and number of crises and the worry that such events 
now occur simultaneously adds to the issues that OCHA faces, as does the fact that 
emergencies are now made worse by long term problems such as extreme poverty, 
population growth and climate change.  
 
The positive impact of OCHA’s strategic framework is highlighted and there is general 
agreement with the view (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) that the use of clusters in general, and 
the UN Cluster Concept in particular has a clear role to play in future successes.  There is 
a suggestion within the literature (Patti, 2006) that clusters have to include both upstream 
and downstream customers in order to be effective and in confirming this opinion, 
participants added that clusters should not be formed or driven from the top down.  
Concerns are raised surrounding effective cluster implementation, and agreement 
demonstrated with Porter’s economic cluster theory (1998), in that whenever possible 
clusters should strive to include local authorities at an early stage.  In keeping with the 
thoughts of Jensen (2012), OCHA’s function is likened to that of a 4PL, and consequently, 
cluster leads can learn valuable lessons by considering the adoption of 4PL strategies 
(Harrison and van Hoek, 2011).  Information sharing (Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Bozarth 
and Handfield, 2008) is a key to success in disaster relief operations, but the role of OCHA 
in the provision of information is misunderstood in that the organisation is established to 
facilitate information sharing and not, as some believe to carry out information gathering.   
 
4.9.2  Understanding and Training 
 
Thomas and Mizushima (2005) argue the case for logistics training being a necessity and 
not a luxury within the humanitarian sector, and their views, and those of more recent 
commentators (Tatham and Altay, 2013; Bolshe et al, 2013; Moore and Taylor, 2011) are 
echoed as training and professionalisation were a key theme of discussion amongst OCHA 
participants.  There is a clear requirement for experienced and professional humanitarian 
logisticians, but such skills are not easy to find.  Educational and training strategies should 
include local representation and all of those agencies involved in the relief effort, as this will 
help to develop and facilitate successful exit strategies post the disaster and the 
reconstruction phase.  As discussed in the literature (Christopher and Tatham, 2011; 
Larson, 2011), there is recognition that humanitarian relief workers have some significant 
lessons to learn from the private sector in a number of areas, including risk management 
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and logistics; moreover, there is a need to create relationships with the private sector which 
may help the humanitarian community to increase capacity and to fill any gaps that exist 
within the current humanitarian response.  Consequently, the availability of OCHA training 
courses, which are aimed at establishing partnerships with a wide variety of global 
humanitarian relief organisations should be highlighted (OCHA, 2013b); however, 
attendance at these courses is difficult for some organisations and very limited from other, 
smaller organisations.  Furthermore, whilst the cluster concept is discussed on these 
courses it might be prudent to establish a course specifically for cluster leaders.       
 
4.9.3  Relationships 
 
Coordination within humanitarian relief zones has improved markedly since the formation 
of OCHA, but there is still an ongoing requirement for more improvement, and a need for 
the establishment of stronger relationships between all actors within the sector.  The 
relationship that exists between humanitarian actors will change depending on the type of 
emergency, and on the initial roles and responsibilities that are agreed for the associated 
military contributors.  The UN CMCS is seen by some humanitarian relief organisations as 
the power broker (Burt, 2005) within the supply chain, although the organisation’s role is as 
a centre for advice and support, rather than one that necessarily provides leadership.  The 
challenges associated with building relationships with local organisations within the 
humanitarian sector, reflect the views on the similar issues faced by those within the 
business sector (Iglesias et al, 2011; Upadhye and Battacharya cited by Sadler, 2007).  
There is clear correlation with literary opinion on the importance of early local engagement 
(Vincent and Bagshaw, 2005) and on effective coordination with local authorities.  OCHA’s 
role is to facilitate such initiatives whilst at the same time aiming to return control to local 
government at the earliest opportunity.  Such strategies help communities to take ownership 
of the recovery and also assist aid relief agencies in the development of exit strategies at 
an early stage; however, in reality identification of appropriate local authorities is not always 
an easy task. 
 
There is an increasing contribution from the business sector, and an associated growth in 
the number of partnerships between business and humanitarian organisations; however, 
this is not reflected by a corresponding growth in a spirit of community.  These views concur 
with the thoughts on the challenges surrounding Hastily Formed Networks (Kumar and 
Havey, 2013) and with those of Senge (2010) on the lack of trust and propensity for 
transactional relationships within modern day Supply Chains.  Inter-organisational 
relationships are organised and agreed against project timelines, and this results in a culture 
of working within siloes which lead to unnecessary duplication of effort.  Ultimately, the 
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humanitarian sector is predominantly governed by transactional relationships, based on 
authority and bureaucratic structure rather than transformational partnerships, with an 
emphasis on a joint vision and a feeling of loyalty and trust (Mullins, 2013, p.385).  
Disagreeing with the view that market competition does not really influence organisations 
within the humanitarian relief supply chain (Dash et al, 2013; Mays et al, 2102) the opinion 
amongst OCHA participants echoes academic commentary (Olson and Gregorian, 2007) in 
that there is evidence of competition between donor organisations, which has a negative 
effect on the overall relief effort.  In essence, there is a propensity amongst donor 
organisations to try and be noticed through involvement in the higher profile elements of the 
disaster relief process, such as those that may appear on the worldwide media.    
 
4.9.4  Military Involvement 
 
OCHA is trying to establish a more predictable approach to the involvement of military 
resources within humanitarian relief zones by encouraging their use in not just the disaster 
relief stage, but also in the build-up and recovery phases, clearly linking to Kovács and 
Spens (2008, 2007) discussions on the different phases of disaster relief operations and, in 
particular to their call for an increase in the military contribution within the preparation and 
reconstruction phases.  The inevitability of military involvement within disaster relief 
operations is accepted and regarded as a means of maintaining supply chain resilience 
(Christopher, 2011; Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011), particularly where there is a perceived 
risk to the well-being of humanitarian actors.  However, a question still remains as although 
military intervention is seen by some international governments as a means of 
demonstrating a timely response, the conflict between a military presence and the 
maintenance of humanitarian principles (Tomansi and Van Wassenhove, 2009) presents a 
clear challenge for future disaster response operations.  Weiss and Collins (2000) note the 
dilemma that may emerge when humanitarian organisations are asked to provide aid in 
regions where armed conflict means that non-combatants are being targeted by a warring 
party, and the data gathered acknowledges the need for military assistance in such disaster 
relief areas.  However, there is also agreement with the Humanitarian Policy Group Report 
(2009) in that violence against aid workers in other humanitarian areas has reduced over 
the last 5 years, and that this is probably due to overall improvements within the 
management and assessment of security risk. 
 
Humanitarian relief organisations, and in particular those sponsored by the UN, do struggle 
to maintain a meaningful presence and safe access to affected victims who are located in 
areas of inherent conflict.  Despite these issues, reflecting the academic discourse on the 
reluctance of some aid organisations to accept military assistance (Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 
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2011; Beauregard, 1998), it is also evident that the UN CMCS strategy is to avoid a military 
response whenever possible, and to refrain from the use of armed escorts and centralisation 
or restricted movement.  Despite these challenges, reassuringly, the data also offers 
empirical support to the assertion that relief organisations will always find a way to deliver 
aid to affected populations (Heaslip, 2011).  Moreover, in light of changes in the overall UN 
security management strategy, there has been a shift in approach amongst some 
organisations, who now appreciate the importance of remaining in the secure environment 
that military contributors provide. 
 
As discussed in the literature (Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 2011), some countries 
and governments are seeking to increase the overall military contribution to the 
humanitarian relief effort and there is a corresponding increase in the number of disasters 
that see international and local military forces working alongside civilian relief organisations; 
however, the UN CMCS is also conscious that it has to be aware of the political influence 
that is often placed on those military participants.  Consequently, the Civil-Military 
Coordination Guidelines that are produced by OCHA for disaster relief operations, are 
written to effectively address any potential blurring of lines between military actors on the 
one side and humanitarian actors on the other (Heaslip, 2011); thereby, safeguarding the 
humanitarian principles (Tomansi and Van Wassenhove, 2009). 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE JOINT FORCES COMMAND – INDIVIDUAL 
DOMAIN ANALYSIS 
 
 
"Some enabling military capabilities are best delivered jointly. To provide a more effective 
vehicle for organising, commanding and championing some of these capabilities, we 
propose setting up a Joint Forces Command (JFC)."   
(MOD, 2011)  
5.1 Introduction 
The data gathered from the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) Joint Forces Command (JFC) is 
presented and discussed concurrently with appropriate academic discourse within the field 
of research that was first introduced within Chapter 2.  By way of introduction a short 
background and history of the UK military contribution to humanitarian disaster relief is 
included.  A discussion on the strategy behind the Joint Forces Logistic Component 
(JFLogC) then follows, together with narrative on the organisation’s role within the planning 
and coordination of the UK military contribution to humanitarian disaster relief.  The UK 
MOD’s definitions of disaster relief operations are then explained and clarified before the 
future strategy for the JFC (post 2012) is considered, together with a consideration of the 
on-going and escalating MOD involvement within disaster relief.  A listing of respondents 
and their backgrounds (Table 5.1) is included before the discussion turns to an analysis of 
the key etic and emic issues and themes identified.  Final conclusions and overall domain 
themes and issues are then established through triangulation of the data gathered and the 
academic discourse.   
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5.2 Background – UK Military Contribution to Humanitarian Disaster Relief 
Following a humanitarian disaster the UK government may be requested to mount or lend 
support to the relief effort in the country or region affected (see discussion on the role of a 
humanitarian military, Fischer, 2011).  The UK contribution will usually be led by the 
Department for International Development (DFID) who may call on military assistance if 
civilian resources are insufficient or if this approach provides a comparative advantage.  A 
Service Level Agreement exists between DFID and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) should 
this military contribution be required.  Weiss and Campbell (1991) note that it seems that 
when disasters, either natural or man-made occur, governments often turn to the military 
for help as the military have certain resources immediately to hand, such as food, medicine 
and fuel as well as transport and human assets with which to distribute them.  However, it 
should be noted at this stage that under United Nations agreements, the use of military 
foreign humanitarian aid must always be as a “last resort” (UN, 2006, p4). 
 
Logistics is regarded as fundamental to every military activity in all environments (MOD, 
2003).  Forces involved on operations, wherever they may be, require the right level of 
support at the right time, in the right place.  The challenge lies in the identification of right 
and its most effective, economical and efficient delivery.  Historically, each UK military 
service has been responsible for delivering its own support and whilst this arrangement 
provided commanders with sound guarantees it came at a price; heavy resource costs, 
duplication of effort and an unwieldy and complex logistics tail (MOD, 2003, p1-1).  In a bid 
to make best use of limited resources, whilst also being cognisant of the critical need for 
rapid and flexible response, the JFLogC was formed by the UK MOD in 2003.  The JFLogC 
was formed in the light of the need to be prepared to operate logistically within multiservice, 
multinational environments, in which it may be necessary to provide both support to, and 
draw from other nations and organisations.  For the purposes of the JFLogC logistics is 
defined as “the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of 
forces” (MOD, 2003, p1-2) whilst joint logistics is “the co-ordinated mutual logistic support 
of two or more [military] Services” (MOD, 2003, p1-3). 
The JFLogC is tasked with the planning and coordination of all military Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (HADRO) (MOD, 2008).  JFLogC policy and 
doctrine (MOD, 2003) identifies the possible requirement for the MOD to initiate 
humanitarian and related operations and acknowledges that these will involve personnel 
and formations adapting quickly to a ‘non-war fighting stance’ (p9-2).  As a consequence, 
the type of commodity or functional service required will alter subtly from warlike stores to 
those for humanitarian needs.  This change will require rapid adjustment to the logistic 
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demands within the supply chain; for example where once ammunition handling was 
required there may be a need for the bulk movement of food, water, tents and the like.  
Military doctrine (MOD, 2003) dictates that where operations are associated with the 
provision of humanitarian relief then those personnel involved will be expected to take 
account of the remaining national infrastructure, establish environmental conditions, provide 
liaison with the local civilian authorities and, most importantly the reporting media.  Indeed, 
note is taken of the negative effect that a lack of attention or application to the media 
response to the military logistics contribution can ultimately have at a political level (p9-3).  
Military doctrine does stress that the delivery of humanitarian assistance must be perceived 
to be impartial, and that any aid or support that is provided should enhance the perceived 
legitimacy of the deployed forces amongst the recipient population and other humanitarian 
actors within the affected region (MOD, 2008, p4-3). 
5.3 MOD Definitions 
The MOD (2008) utilise 2 distinct definitions of disaster assistance to help them to define 
and plan the associated level of response.  A Disaster Relief Operation (DRO) is defined 
as a “primary military task and contribution to a disaster relief response” (p1-2).  Such a 
task should be designed to provide specific assistance to an afflicted overseas population.  
Humanitarian Assistance is designated as a secondary military task, which is defined as 
“the provision of relief aid by military forces conducting operations other than DROs” (p1-
2).  By way of example, consideration of the UK MOD contribution to the response to 2 
earthquakes in Central Asia, illustrates the distinction between a DRO and Humanitarian 
Assistance: 
 
Earthquake in Northern Pakistan, October 2005:   UK Chinook helicopters were 
involved in the relief effort as part of an Operation specifically mounted in response 
to a request from the Pakistani government for assistance in respect of this disaster, 
hence this example represents a DRO. 
 
Earthquake in Northern Afghanistan, March 2002: UK Chinook helicopters were 
once again involved in the relief effort but were already deployed within Afghanistan 
in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).  They undertook 
relief flights as a secondary task within the wider ISAF mission, hence this 
represents Humanitarian Assistance. 
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5.4 Future Strategy – The Joint Forces Command  
 
Established to ensure that a range of vital military capabilities, functions and organisations, 
such as logistics, medical services, training education and intelligence were organised and 
managed effectively and efficiently to support success on military operations, the JFC 
achieved Initial Operating Capability in April 2012.  The launch of the JFC was regarded as 
a major milestone in the MOD's Transforming Defence programme (MOD, 2012) as it 
brought together a number of joint Defence organisations including the JFLogC.  The JFC 
was to ensure that investment in joint capabilities is appropriate and coherent, and to seek 
to strengthen the link between experience in operational theatres and top-level decision-
making.  The creation of the JFC was recommended by the Defence Reform review (MOD, 
2011), led by Lord Levene, as part of what has been regarded as the most significant 
programme of change across the MOD in a generation (see discussion within the Strategic 
Defence and Security Review, direct.gov, 2010).  The total number of military and civilian 
personnel in the JFC will be in the region of 30,000, a figure which includes those forces 
deployed on operations.  These personnel are at sites across the UK, overseas in the 
Permanent Joint Operating Bases, and on operations in military theatres around the world, 
most notably Afghanistan (MOD, 2012).  
 
5.5 On-going and Escalating MOD Contribution to Disaster Relief  
 
With the end of the Cold War, the UK government has become more involved in the 
provision of humanitarian aid, not only through the funding of UN Agencies and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) but also with the tasking of its armed forces.  The 
1998 Strategic Defence Review (MOD, 1998) signalled greater emphasis on, and 
acknowledgement of the provision of ‘Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations’ (p22) 
and such a focus focus has continued in more recent governmental publications resulting 
in the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR, 2011) which, under the 
chairmanship of Lord Ashdown considered the way that the UK government responds to 
humanitarian emergencies.  The review identified that: 
 
“It is because the impulse to relieve suffering is rooted in morality that our 
interventions to relieve suffering at times of disaster must always be driven by 
need and need alone. Nevertheless, the fact that Britain is prepared to play a full 
part (and often a leading part) as a member of the international community in order 
to relieve suffering at times of crisis makes for, not only a more compassionate 
world, but a safer one too – and that benefits all of us”.  (HERR, 2011, p3) 
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As a consequence of this continued and developing governmental focus, the UK MOD are 
involved in a wide variety of on-going relief efforts across the globe.  For example, each 
year Royal Navy (RN) personnel who are employed on the Atlantic Patrol Task (North) pre-
position a warship and supporting royal fleet auxiliary ships in the Caribbean for the 
hurricane season.  In 2007 such RN resources followed some 150 miles behind Hurricane 
Dean and after its destructive landfall in Belize, joined British Army personnel who were 
training in the region at the time to assist in relief efforts.  Later in the same season a RN 
Lynx Helicopter was tasked to deliver aid following Tropical Storm Noel’s devastating 
landfall in the Dominican Republic.  More recently the deployment of RN (The Telegraph, 
2013) and Royal Air Force (RAF) resources (BBC News, 2013c) in support of Typhoon 
Haiyan in the Philippines serves to further illustrate the escalating MOD contribution to the 
aid effort.  
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5.6 Data Collection, Respondents and Results 
JFLogC were first contacted in February 2012 through a series of introductory letters and 
questionnaires, as per Stage I in the research methodology.  Key respondents are shown 
in Table 5.1: 
 
Respondent Military 
Rank 
Time 
with 
MOD 
(years) 
Relevant Practical 
Experience 
Role Code 
Commandant 
JFLogC 
Air 
Commodore 
25 Afghanistan, Pakistan 
Earthquake, Haiti, Asian 
Tsunami (Banda Aceh), 
Africa, Balkans 
Leadership and overall 
command of the JFLogC.   
CDT 
Component 
Commander 
JFLogC 
Colonel 20 Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Bosnia, Pakistan, Asian 
Tsunami (Banda Aceh) 
Control and management 
of force-level logistic 
support and resources 
engaged in a response 
operation. 
COM 
SO1 HADRO Lieutenant 
Colonel 
22 Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti  Development of overall 
response strategy given a 
particular operation and 
management of that 
strategy from within the 
UK Headquarters. 
SO1 
SO2 HADRO Major 15 Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Bosnia 
 
Support to the overall 
strategy development.  
Reconnaissance of 
disaster areas and 
assessment of on-site 
needs. 
SO21 
SO2 HADRO 
Lieutenant 
Commander  
RN 
18 Caribbean Hurricane 
Relief (x3)  SO22 
SO3 HADRO 
Flight 
Lieutenant 
10 Afghanistan Direct liaison between 
JFLogC and site facilities. 
SO3 
 
Table 5.1 JFLogC – Key Respondents 
 
5.6.1 Natural Disasters and Complex Emergencies  
Prior to a discussion on, and analysis of the data gathered from the JFLogC participants it 
should be noted that whilst the focus of this research was on the immediate response to 
natural disasters, it quickly became apparent that respondents did not make the same 
distinction between natural disasters and complex emergencies that can be seen in the 
academic discourse, which does acknowledge the inherent differences between the 
required responses (Cross, 2012; Balcik et al, 2010, Kovács and Taham, 2009).  
Consequently, JFLogC respondents regard their experiences to be of equal importance 
irrespective of the type of disaster (Van Wassenhove, 2006).  Hence, at times the data and 
associated analysis of JFLogC data will refer to participant experiences within complex 
emergencies, as these are viewed to be of equal importance in helping to address the final 
research question and aim of this thesis.  
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5.7 Data Analysis – Stage I – Key Etic Themes and Issues 
Analysis of the data gathered from JFLogC via the introductory questionnaires (Appendix 
D), will now be discussed.  In achieving this due consideration will be given to the practical 
relevance of the initial etic issues and themes identified within the Literature Review as set 
out and codified at Appendix E.  Note that respondent codes within Table 5.1 will be used 
at this stage.  
 
5.7.1 Humanitarian Principles and Space 
 
The four humanitarian principles were acknowledged by all participants and given equal 
priority by the senior respondents (CDT, COM, SO1); however, whilst all of the junior 
respondents (SO21,22, SO3) ranked humanity (HUMSHUM) and impartiality (HUMSIMP) 
as the most important principles they did not offer a view on the significance of neutrality 
(HUMNEU) and independence (HUMSIND).  Perhaps this is understandable given the clear 
conflict between these principles and their chosen military careers (POLINF, POLMOT).  
The senior respondent (CDT) also commented on the importance of the Oslo Guidelines 
(UN, 2006a) in the maintenance of the humanitarian principles when his staff were called 
upon to work alongside civilian organisations and local governments on disaster relief 
operations (SUSCSR).     
     
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
5.7.2 Collaboration, Organisation and Power 
 
All respondents believed that they were in a position to establish and facilitate an effective 
supply chain (COLRES) that was specifically designed for the delivery of humanitarian aid.  
Moreover, whilst all respondents acknowledged and recognised that they operate within the 
UN Cluster concept, the junior respondents saw this as a bottleneck to success and 
questioned its ability to offer practical coordination in an operational context (COLCLU).  
The senior respondents (CDT, COM, SO1) were happy to take the lead in future operations 
(PWRPOS, RMT) and all respondents recorded that they were content to work with other 
organisations and to share facilities and resources (COLRES, COLALL, COLHOR, 
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
Humanitarian Principles/ Military Role/ 
Politics/ Maintenance of Oslo Guidelines 
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COLVER).  Validity of contribution was important to the senior respondent (CDT) and all 
respondents ranked the demonstration of Corporate Social Responsibility (SUSCSR) above 
the demonstration of competitive behaviour towards other contributors (SUSSTRAT).  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.7.3 Summary – JFLogC Key Etic Themes and Issues 
 
Theme  
 
Issue Description Notes 
 
 
 
Humanitarian 
Principles and 
Space 
 
Humanitarian 
Principles 
Neutrality and 
Impartiality 
Conflict with military 
values 
Military Role Conflict with 
humanitarian 
principles 
How addressed 
Politics Political influence on 
decisions  
Affect? 
Maintenance of 
Oslo Guidelines 
Importance of 
Guidelines 
How achieved/ 
maintained/ enforced 
Clarify meaning/ 
understanding 
 
 
 
Collaboration, 
Organisation and 
Power 
 
UN Cluster 
Concept 
Success of the 
approach 
Successes?  
Examples?  
How established/ 
managed/ 
maintained 
Power Between military, local 
and national 
governments and 
NGOs 
How received? 
Successes? 
Examples? 
Relationship 
Management 
Collaboration 
Corporate 
Social 
Responsibility 
Demonstration of CSR How? 
Examples? 
 
Table 5.2 JFLOGC – Stage I Key Etic Themes and Issues 
 
 
  
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
UN Cluster Concept/ Power and 
Relationship Management/ Collaboration/ 
Corporate Social Responsibility  
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5.8 Data Analysis – Stage II – Developing Emic Themes and Issues 
 
Analysis of the data gathered during the semi structured interviews with members of 
JFLogC listed in Table 5.1 will now be discussed.  In keeping with Stage II of the final 
research strategy interviews were based around the schedule (Appendix F) which had been 
developed following cross-domain analysis of Stage I findings and the key etic themes and 
issues that had been identified as a result.  Note that respondent codes listed within Table 
5.1 will still be used throughout this discussion. 
 
5.8.1 General Processes, Coordination and Collaboration 
 
 
“By the time we got there, there were already a lot of organisations on the ground.  
All of the NGOs had flooded in and pitched their tents with their flags flying.  What 
was evident to me was that there were a number of organisations on the ground that 
had to demonstrate that they were there, but how effective they were being and what 
their reason for being there other than that was not really clear to me.  It was pretty 
chaotic because NGOs don’t like to be told what to do, they don’t like to be 
coordinated and commanded or controlled”. (CDT) 
 
The thoughts above illustrate how the data reveals a common perception amongst the 
respondents within the JFLogC in respect of NGO presence within disaster relief zones.  In 
keeping with the thoughts of Heaslip (2011 and 2010) on the military’s suspicion of aid 
workers and the inherent lack of understanding between military contributors and NGOs, 
questioning of the actual contribution of some non-military participants is a common theme 
as is a clear need amongst JFLogC participants to understand the reasons behind why 
some NGOs are in the disaster region at all.  There is obvious frustration at the fact that 
these organisations are taking up valuable space on the ground (SO1) whilst, in the eyes 
of JFLogC participants, they make no visible contribution to the overall aid effort.  Comments 
regarding chaos and a lack of coordination are perhaps understandable, as military ethos 
and training are traditionally and necessarily based around identifiable structure, command 
and control and reporting procedures (see for example Joint Defence Publication 3-52, 
MOD, 2008).  The data gathered supports the view (Heaslip, 2010) that whilst military 
personnel are happy to be led and controlled in a top-down manner, members of the NGO 
community, in the eyes of the military appear to be somewhat disorganised, but at the same 
time significantly more operationally flexible.  Observations that are supported by Thompson 
(2010) who notes that “even though military forces have a huge potential to make a 
difference in the [disaster relief] logistics arena sensitivities remain” (p.2) and Heaslip (2010) 
who believes that these “radically different” methodologies and guiding principles can result 
in clashes.  COM was keen to describe his frustration and annoyance at what he described 
as “the ridiculous reticence of some NGOs to remain deliberately uncoordinated for no good 
reason”. 
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The following demonstrates a commonly held view amongst JFLogC contributors in respect 
of the UN Cluster Concept: 
 
“The UN Cluster Concept works in the final area of delivery.  The UN believes that 
it works upstream but it doesn’t work like that.  In my experience it at least provides 
a way of having a nightly meeting to try and facilitate some order of coordination 
amongst those who are there.  To be fair it sort of works a bit but the name ‘Cluster’ 
is a really apt name for it!” (COM) 
 
In clear disagreement with the academic support for a clustered approach (Altay and 
Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010; Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) it is evident amongst the 
more junior respondents in particular (SO21, SO22 and SO3), that the concept is held in 
some contempt and that, in keeping with Jensen’s (2012) thoughts, in practice is regarded 
as a hindrance to successful provision of disaster relief.  Participants clearly disagree with 
the assertion that clusters allow participants to operate more productively (Patti, 2006), and 
feel that the UN Cluster Concept actually “stove pipes” the relief effort, meaning that 
contributors just focus on their own perceived area of expertise; moreover clusters are 
regarded as something that NGOs can hide behind whilst working in isolation (SO3).  The 
data confirms that there is a common understanding of the concept of Supply Chain 
Collaboration and it is reassuring to note that the definitions offered by JFLogC respondents 
are in agreement with the academic views already discussed within this thesis.  However, 
this common understanding seems to exacerbate the situation for JFLogC as it serves to 
highlight what CDT regarded as “visible flaws in the UN Cluster Concept idea”.  In essence, 
respondents can see the need for the Cluster Concept, but are frustrated by its inability to 
achieve its aims in reality.  Agreeing with Jensen’s (2012) thoughts on the challenges for 
cluster leaders to take responsibility in an environment where many independent 
organisations “often object to being directed” (p.148), the comment that serves to sum up 
the JFLogC feelings on the UN Cluster Concept comes from SO1: 
 
“What they really need is a good Sergeant Major to coordinate the effort on the 
ground!” 
 
The data gathered within JFLogC does not make happy reading for the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which COM regarded as the “biggest 
misnomer around as OCHA doesn’t do coordination”.  The consensus of opinion amongst 
respondents is that OCHA may work in what CDT described as “peace time”, meaning 
during periods of quiet, but that it is “unable to produce the goods on the ground when it 
really has to”, referring to times following events where immediate disaster response is 
called for.  A clear theme within the data is that OCHA do not really coordinate disaster 
relief events and hence do little to address the issue of “stove piping” discussed earlier in 
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this section.  This belief would seem to misalign itself with the stated overall aims of OCHA 
itself (OCHA, 2012a) and of the UN Cluster Approach (UN, OCHA, 2005) in particular.  
Rickard (2003) is clear in the view that within humanitarian relief zones “Logistics planning 
and coordination need to be seen as essential rather than merely desirable”; however, the 
senior respondents (CDT, COM) agree that they have seen little evidence of any 
improvement in this area since OHCA’s introduction.  CDT refers to the “Crowded Stage” 
(Heaslip, 2011, p150) as he cites an example where aid was being received in a disaster 
relief zone that was “clogging up the area”, and was clearly frustrated as he believed that 
“most of the aid that arrived was not needed” or had “arrived at the wrong time”:   
 
“If the UN OCHA cannot resolve these sort of issues then who should…”. (CDT)   
 
Furthermore, CDT believed that this lack of coordination meant that there was: 
 
“no real organisation of NGOs as they arrive in the disaster relief zone……it [the 
relief effort] grows organically as NGOs pitch tents wherever they can as they arrive 
and stake a claim to their ground……”. 
 
These observations seem to echo academic discourse on the importance of coordination 
and information flow (Ernst, 2003; Rickard, 2003) and the overall assertion on the 
requirement for a comprehensive needs analysis prior to the commencement of any 
disaster relief effort:   
 
“What is clear is that contributors [NGOs] are flying in due to the urgency to be seen 
to be doing something on the ground.  I believe that this should not happen straight 
away and that there is a requirement to stand back, assess what is the real need in 
the context of the particular operation and then to act, something else that OCHA 
claim to do but from my experiences do not achieve in reality” (COM) 
 
Sadly, the data also demonstrates that things have not really moved on since the 
observations made by Reindorp and Wiles in 2001, who whilst observing humanitarian 
coordination within the field, conclude that humanitarian responses are often based on 
insufficient analysis of the context of the disaster and that contributing agencies often 
struggle to make a telling impact due to a lack of local knowledge (Reindorp and Wiles, 
2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Supply Chain Control/ OCHA Role/ UN 
Cluster Concept/ Coordination/ Local 
Control 
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5.8.2 Power and Relationships 
 
“There is a power base in that scale does matter.  Some smaller organisations who 
might be delivering in the same field do rely on some of the bigger ones for logistical 
support.  Others jealously guard their independence as they do not want to be seen 
to be tarnished by others.  As a general rule they [NGOs] are happier operating on 
their own rather than in alliance with others”. (CDT) 
 
Clearly contesting the concept of a value chain (Porter, 1990), a common view amongst the 
JFLogC respondents concurs with that offered by CDT.  Whilst Porter argued for efficiency 
and effectiveness through the formation of supply chain networks the inherent theme within 
the data reflects the views of Chandes and Paché (2010) and Olson and Gregorian (2007) 
in that in order to be successful NGOs rely on competition for resources, ground and other 
assets.  Consequently, the view is that there is a reticence amongst some donor 
organisations to be seen to act alone rather than in partnership with others.  In essence the 
military view is that: 
 
“NGOs are not happy to be led and are much happier when working alone” (COM).   
 
Burt (2005) contends that an organisation can become a power broker by creating bridges 
to cross what he terms the structural holes within a supply chain; hence, in light of this 
discussion, and the foregoing on the military requirement for an identifiable management 
structure, it is unsurprising that JFLogC respondents are quick to offer the view that they 
would happily assume the role of the power broker (Kumar and Havey, 2013; Don and 
Teegan, 2003) and adopt lead status within a humanitarian relief zone if the opportunity 
arose.  However, CDT made some interesting and candid points about what he described 
as the arrogant attitude that is sometimes evident amongst him and his colleagues: 
 
“The trouble with the military is that we think that we always know best, however in 
this context [disaster and humanitarian relief] that is clearly not the case”  
 
Echoing the views of Heaslip (2011, 2010) on the level of understanding between military 
humanitarian contributors and their civilian counterparts, CDT went on to explain that the 
military do not understand what he describes as “the humanitarian landscape” nor do they 
have an appreciation of “NGOs and what they can do”.  CDT acknowledges that NGOs are 
the “experts in their field” and that the military could clearly learn a lot from them.  However, 
reflecting Seipel’s (2011) assertions regarding the “over-inflated view of their own 
capabilities” (p.227) that is inherent amongst some military contributors, CDT is also quick 
to argue that the reciprocal of this is also true in that “NGOs could learn a lot from the military 
in respect of command and control and other niche skills that military logisticians possess”.  
SO1 also has strong views on what he described as “niche areas” and these will be 
discussed within the following section. 
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Data on the issue of trust supported the view proffered by Heaslip (2011) as it revealed a 
common perception that respondents feel that they are not trusted by NGOs and other 
donor organisations, and that this is in part due to a “clear misunderstanding of the military 
role within humanitarian relief” (SO22): 
 
“NGOs should be made aware of what the military can do for them and also why we 
are there…education is the key…..”  (SO22) 
 
This idea is expanded upon in the next section where measures to “educate NGOs” will be 
discussed. 
 
Tatham and Kovács (2010) develop Hung et al’s (2004) discussion on a peripheral route to 
trust and suggested a model for the establishment of swift trust within the Hastily Formed 
Networks (Kumar and Havey, 2013) which are inherent within humanitarian relief zones.  
The data gathered suggests broad agreement that relationships and relationship 
management is “what the military are trained to facilitate” (SO1).  More than one respondent 
was quick to highlight the extensive experience that they had of rapidly establishing teams 
and nurturing the relationships that are associated with success.   
 
“I have witnessed good and bad relationships but talking to people is what we are 
about” (SO21).   
 
Referring again to the issue of trust (Heaslip, 2011; Tatham and Kovács, 2010), and on the 
need for mutual trust and openness within successful partnerships (Upadhye and 
Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 2007), SO1 acknowledged that the public perception of the 
UK military has been tarnished by recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that this 
might have an adverse effect on relationships with other organisations; he also suggested 
that working relationships could be built by putting forward the idea that JFLogC should be 
regarded as the “acceptable face of military”: 
 
“JFLogC is about the provision of logistics support and that is what is needed in 
disaster relief zones.  High readiness and rapid response is what disaster relief calls 
for and we can provide that.  We should remind other donor organisations that the 
JFLogC are not a war fighting command and that we are there to help” 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Relationships/ Humanitarian Landscape/ 
Expertise/ Acceptable face of the military 
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5.8.3 The Humanitarian Space 
 
“Some organisations do trade on their Independence and are obsessive in trying to 
demonstrate independence and impartiality.  They are renowned for it, believing that 
they do what they do and do it very well”. (SO1)   
 
Despite the academic view that the humanitarian principles must be present to constitute a 
humanitarian operation (Seipel, 2011; Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009) SO1’s 
statement typifies the data gathered within the JFLogC on the subject of the Humanitarian 
Space and Principles (DFID, 2008).  There is obvious frustration at the influence that the 
humanitarian principles have on the overall disaster relief effort but also an evident 
scepticism amongst respondents in the fact that these principles could prove to be 
“malleable when required” (CDT).  By way of support to this assertion, CDT offered the 
following vignette in respect of his experiences during the disaster relief effort to the 
Pakistani Earthquake (2005): 
 
“We were asked to provide helicopter support to an NGO who had a very strong 
reputation for its impartiality and independence and was well known for its refusal to 
accept military assistance or to work alongside the military in any capacity.  I 
discussed the requirements with the NGO representative on the ground and he 
presented me with an ultimatum on behalf of his head office.  We were to put red 
crosses on the sides of the aircraft involved, our aircrew were not to fly in their 
military flying clothing and no weapons were to be carried.  For sound military 
reasons I refused on all 3 counts whereupon the representative agreed that he was 
happy to work with us anyway.  He later told me that had he passed my response 
back to his head office the chances were that they would have refused him 
permission to use our aircraft.  An example of a pragmatic decision on the ground 
that led to the successful delivery of life saving aid”. 
 
The clear message that comes out of this vignette and the one that is supported by similar 
responses from other JFLogC respondents is that NGO representatives employed in 
disaster relief areas are relatively happy to work with the military under the right 
circumstances, but that further up the NGO managerial chain there is a different attitude in 
respect of the maintenance of the humanitarian principles; thereby underpinning the view 
that during humanitarian relief operations, “strongly motivated people from the military and 
NGO organisations usually find ways to surmount barriers that they encounter” (Heaslip, 
2011, p.163).   
 
Analysing the associated JFLogC data highlights the fact that in keeping with the 
Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR, 2011) discussed earlier, the military 
are very keen to do significantly more in respect of the disaster relief effort; however, the 
respondents see the humanitarian principles and associated NGO attitudes to them as a 
real barrier to effective progress in this area: 
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“We want to up the profile of the military within humanitarian relief and my 
organisation has been established to do just that, but the humanitarian principles 
seem to be a real hindrance in achieving this aim” (COM).   
 
To that end, and in keeping with the discourse on integrating learning (Goffnet et al, 2013; 
Heaslip 2011) and learning mechanisms for humanitarian logistics (Lu et al, 2013) members 
of the HADRO team are keen to establish links within NGOs and to deliver presentations 
on what the military can offer by way of contribution.  SO1 believes that NGOs are “naïve 
to think that the military can just provide security and heavy lift helicopters and they should 
tap in to a lot more relevant capability”.  Citing the UK military publications on Logistics for 
Joint Operations (MOD, 2003) and on Doctrine for Disaster Relief Operations (MOD, 2008), 
SO1 went on to discuss the following “niche areas” where he believed that his organisation 
can make a meaningful contribution: 
 
1. Initial reconnaissance and identification of need. 
2. Provision of effective data links and information gathering. 
3. Logistics planning and coordination both immediate and longer term. 
4. Establishment of central operations centres and the associated command and 
control. 
5. Engineering and building projects to re-establish infrastructure and logistics links. 
 
Ultimately SO1 felt that military personnel can offer the same “can do” attitude that he had 
witnessed amongst members of NGOs engaged in the provision of disaster relief “on the 
ground”; however, when pressed he did agree that his niche areas do look remarkably 
similar to the overall aims of the UN Cluster Concept and the associated OCHA 
responsibilities (OCHA, 2005); moreover they would also seem to reflect the economic 
cluster theory proffered by Porter (1998)  and developed by Patti (2006). 
 
Turning to the political dimension CDT supported the academic view on the linkage between 
governments and their military (Yaziji, 2009; Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003; 
Weiss and Collins, 2000).  CDT believes that in a lot of disaster affected areas “the local 
military are the government” and that: 
 
“NGOs should realise that by working with the local military they are effectively 
working with the local government”.   
 
CDT went on to develop the idea that in lots of countries where disaster happens, 
boundaries between the military and government are unclear and asserts that NGOs should 
be ready to adapt to this: 
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“Whilst NGOs don’t like dealing with military, they need to understand that the local 
military is the government and therefore they should be happy to work alongside 
them in appropriate circumstances”.   
 
On a similar theme COM felt that in his experience host nations are all too happy to “hand 
over their sovereignty to the NGOs”, and that local governments should look to “be strong 
and maintain overall control of the disaster relief effort”.  He offers the following vignette 
regarding his experiences of the events following the Asian Tsunami (2004):  
 
“One of the great strengths in Banda Ache was the Indonesian military ground forces 
as they were effectively the government’s representatives on the ground.  When we 
arrived they had a clear plan that mapped out where the relief effort would be within 
3 weeks and when contributors including ourselves would be expected to leave the 
area.  It was evident that despite being fully aware of the need for outside assistance, 
they were not happy to hand over control of the situation to any other organisation 
and as a result they maintained control over the NGOs and other contributors in the 
area.  This framework gave the Indonesian military and government clear control.” 
 
COM believes that other nations should consider this approach and that forward planning 
would enable them to control the “flood of contributors” into their country as well as the 
“influx of foreign aid and NGOs”.  He feels that governments have certain levers to use to 
facilitate this control, for example visa allocation, but did acknowledge that what are 
invariably desperate nations have to remain “forceful enough to make such strategies 
happen”.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Political Pressure/ Local 
Governments/Perception 
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5.8.4 Organisational Sustainment 
 
“In Haiti there must have been over 300 NGOs and other organisations on the 
ground when we arrived.  They were all there taking up precious hard standing in 
an area where, ironically ground space was at a premium, but I did struggle to see 
what they were all doing there………..the vast array of different coloured tents, 
banners and logos on show did serve to brighten up the place” (SO1) 
 
“When we arrived all of the NGOs were in tents on the hard standing with flags flying, 
it quickly became apparent that their main aim seemed to be get the publicity as its 
good for fund raising”.  (COM) 
 
“I have seen the UN Cluster Concept used to allocate areas to each organisation 
and this seemed important for each NGO to have their own area where they can 
demonstrate that they are doing stuff to their donors”. (CDT) 
 
The thoughts offered above reflect those of all of the JFLogC respondents as there is a 
clear perception that the demonstration of “presence on ground” (COM) is a key issue for 
NGOs within humanitarian relief zones.  Moreover, some respondents regard this as the 
main reason why so many organisations quickly arrive in a disaster relief zone and then 
seem to “add little if anything to the actual relief effort” (SO22). 
 
“What was evident to me was that there were a number of organisations on the 
ground that had to demonstrate that they were there, but how effective they were 
being and what their reason for being there other than that was not really clear to 
me”. (CDT)   
 
CDT’s frustration triggered the discussion which has already been related in the last section 
regarding strong local control over NGOs and the levers that nations have to control the 
“flood of contributors” (COM).  CDT believes that a “fear of a loss of funding” may actually 
drive NGOs to “utilise their resources in an inefficient yet publically acceptable way”; an 
opinion that would seem to echo those of Olson and Gregorian (2007) who highlight the 
negative impact that funding relationships and competition can have on the coordination 
process and those of Kent (1987) who discusses the adverse influence on NGO’s of a “fear 
of donor withdrawal”.   
 
 
 
 
  
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Understanding of NGOs role/ Control of 
NGOs  
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5.8.5 Summary – JFLogC Key Emic Themes and Issues 
 
 
Theme 
 
Issue Description Notes 
Management and 
Control 
 
Supply Chain Who has overall control? 
Issues brought by 
complexity 
UN Cluster Concept 
Ineffective;  
Stove pipes effort 
Frustration at lack 
of overall impact 
Coordination 
NGOs Who coordinates  
Ineffective? Doesn’t work 
Local control Who maintains this? 
Strength of local 
governments 
 
Understanding 
and Training 
 
OCHA Misnomer  What is its Role? 
NGOs 
Roles 
 
Overall 
Contribution 
Why so many? 
Why are some 
there? 
Humanitarian 
landscape 
Lack of knowledge How to educate 
 
Relationships  
 
Community 
Military vs Civilian How to develop 
Avoided by some NGOs Why? 
Acceptable face of the 
military 
What is it? 
How to 
demonstrate to 
other 
participants? 
NGOs 
Reticence to work alone How to change 
perception and 
opinion 
Don’t trust the military 
Expertise 
Trained to nurture a sense of 
community 
How to exploit 
 
Military 
Involvement 
 
Pressure to do more 
Demonstrate more 
humanitarian involvement 
Exploit niche 
areas 
Local Governments 
Work with local authorities 
and do not take over 
sovereignty 
How to ensure  
Help to maintain overall 
control 
Strength of local 
governments 
Perception 
JFLOGC is not a War fighting 
Command 
How to change 
perceptions 
 
 
Table 5.3 JFLogC – Stage II Key Emic Themes and Issues 
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5.9 Data Analysis – Stage III – Confirming Emic Themes and Issues 
 
Analysis of the data gathered during the Focus Group carried out with members of JFLogC 
will now be discussed.  Two of the participants (COM and SO22) listed in Table 5.1 were 
unable to take part in the Focus Group, hence membership was restricted to the remaining 
four JFLogC participants listed in Table 5.1.  In keeping with Stage III of the final research 
strategy discussion during the Focus Group was based around the Focus Group Topic 
Guide (Appendix G) which had been developed following analysis of the Stage II findings 
and the key emic themes and issues that had been identified as a result.  Note that 
respondent codes listed within Table 5.1 will still be used throughout this discussion. 
 
 
5.9.1     Management and Control 
 
 
Initial discussions within the JFLogC Focus Group reflects the literary views on the positive 
impact that collaboration and coordination can have on supply chain performance (Dash et 
al, 2013; Carroll and Neu, 2009).  All participants agree that the facilitation role should rest 
with OCHA, “after all the C is meant to stand for coordination” (CDT), however there is also 
clear frustration amongst the Group with OCHA’s inability to achieve this aim and with what 
SO1 termed the “ineffectiveness” of the organisation.  By way of illustration, CDT offered 
the following experience: 
 
“In Pakistan OCHA watched on as NGOs pitched their tents on the hard standing 
whilst we were left to operate helicopters from a muddy field.  They [OCHA] did not 
seem to appreciate the ridiculous situation that they were supposedly 
coordinating…..” 
 
The Group do not agree with the idea that an ad hoc approach to humanitarian relief has 
any merit although they do echo the view (Akhtar et al, 2012; Kovács and Tatham, 2009; 
Oloruntoba, 2005; Gustavsson, 2003) that this is what regularly happens in reality.   
 
“In my experience, planning and coordination will always make an operation more 
effective and a lack of it must result in inefficiency and overall wasted effort” (SO1) 
 
This response is perhaps predictable given the military training and culture of the Group 
and CDT did become somewhat emotional as he discussed the contribution that the military 
had to make in respect of coordination as, once again he related his experiences in 
Pakistan: 
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“In Pakistan the young men had to stay high in the hills to keep control of their land.  
It was clear that there were no plans for the winter and so we agreed to take the 
planning task on.  We used our expeditionary logistics experience to model where 
depots could be placed to give helicopter and vehicle access and I believe made a 
significant contribution to the relief effort as a result.  To deny the overall effort this 
opportunity just because we are military would have been crass to be frank”     
 
 
The Group then mooted the idea of establishing a coordinating authority amongst UK based 
NGOs.  Referring back to Porter’s Value Chain SO3 suggests that this authority should be 
based on niche capabilities, and that it should not be forgotten that the military has some 
key skill sets and capability to contribute, particularly in the areas of rapid reaction and 
expeditionary logistics provision.  The idea of the military skill set in expeditionary logistics 
was a key theme of the focus group and there was strong agreement that the military has 
a lot more to offer, if permitted and accepted.  
 
There are equally strong opinions on the role and success of the UN Cluster Concept UN 
OCHA, 2011).  Questioning the overall effectiveness and aims of the Concept (OCHA, 
2005), SO3 offered further support to Jensen’s (2012) discussion on the cumbersome 
nature of clusters in practice.  SO3 believes that the Concept serves to “stove pipe” the 
relief effort, giving those involved an excuse to work in isolation from other donors.  The 
Group agreed that some form of performance measurement might help the situation, and 
that it would also help to hold the cluster leaders accountable for their actions.  Discussion 
surrounding the traffic lights performance management system of key performance 
indicators led to a suggestion that this approach might offer a possible solution, although 
there is agreement that such a strategy will call for very careful and political management.  
(Note: The traffic lights system is a military adaptation of the Balanced Scorecard System 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996), for an example of its application within the military see 
Australian Government, (DofD), 2005).  
 
Concurring with the academic views that in order to be effective clusters should include both 
“upstream suppliers and downstream customers” (Patti, p266), the Group agreed that local 
governments should be involved in all aspects of the relief effort and that this should include 
cluster management itself.  However, there is acknowledgement that this could be difficult 
in light of what the literature identifies as blockers (Burt, 2005) and gatekeepers (Hingley et 
al, 2010).  CDT recalled an experience in Haiti and also pointed to the Balkans where he 
found it “difficult to know who was actually in charge from day to day”.  Turning to the 
discussions in support of the use of partnerships within successful supply chains 
(Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006) there is also consensus 
that the linkage between OHCA and the clusters is confusing and unclear and at times “non-
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existent” (CDT), and that clearer guidelines on cluster implementation and overall usage 
will serve to help all those involved. 
 
5.9.2     Understanding and Training 
 
The theme and importance of training and overall professionalisation within humanitarian 
logistics is argued for by Thomas and Mizushima in 2005 and is also highlighted in more 
recent work (Tatham and Altay, 2013; Moore and Taylor, 2011).  Agreeing with the 
importance of such a strategy, the Group view was that integrated training exercises have 
a role to play in the overall promotion of partnered working and collaboration within 
humanitarian relief zones (Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011).  This is unsurprising given 
that this type of approach is a key feature of military training and development.  Echoing the 
economic cluster theory (Porter, 1998) CDT supported the involvement of local 
governments and organisations in such strategies and by way of example related his 
experiences of forward planning exercises in Malawi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone: 
 
“Working through contacts in Ghana we were able to speak to local governments 
and discuss how we could work with them on disaster relief projects.  Using the 
fictitious scenario of a broken dam and the associated floods we briefed government 
representatives on our military capability and were able to convince them to build 
military cooperation into their long term plans.  They realised how by working 
together and using our different skill sets and expertise we could help to address the 
relief effort in an efficient and effective manner.” 
  
The introduction of the idea of the humanitarian landscape (Tomansini and van 
Wassenhove, 2009; Seipel, 2011; Spearin, 2001), first discussed during Stage II of the 
research confirmed CDT’s view that there is a lack of appreciation of the skill sets 
possessed by NGOs and other donor organisations amongst JFLogC participants.  Whilst 
agreeing that successful relationships should be built on mutual trust and openness 
(Upadhye and Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 2007) all Focus Group members conceded that 
they do not fully appreciate the different roles and responsibilities of the organisations 
engaged in disaster relief, but also argued that the reciprocal is also true in that other 
humanitarian organisations fail to understand the military role, hence the consensus is that 
joint training would help; a discussion that offers clear empirical support to the assertions 
offered by Heaslip (2011). 
 
The Group agreed that the current military chain of command would never sanction 
humanitarian logistics as an individual profession per se, but could see clear benefit if such 
an approach is adopted by the civilian sector.  Echoing the ideas purported on integrated 
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service learning within the sector (Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011) SO1 believes that it 
would be beneficial if the military ‘experts’ are involved in advising on the content of any 
associated courses or training programmes, but was also happy to accept the opinions of 
other members of the Focus Group in that this will probably not happen in reality.  Indeed, 
the overall view is that realistically military involvement in any such training initiatives will 
not be politically acceptable.  SO1 went on to discuss the ongoing development work of an 
appropriate training course for members of the JFLogC who are tasked with the planning 
and coordination of all military HADRO.  Referring back to the earlier discussion on the 
Cluster Concept (5.10.1) there is strong agreement that any training initiatives should 
include appropriate elements on the Concept and the associated structures, roles and 
responsibilities, and that a course aimed specifically at cluster leads will also add great 
value.     
 
5.9.3     Relationships 
 
Participants feel that the inclusion of local governments and organisations, be they military 
or not is key to the overall effectiveness of the disaster relief effort.  The discussion did turn 
to the associated issues surrounding identification of the local authorities but SO1 best 
surmised the JFLogC Group opinion: 
 
“There is clear value in establishing working links with the local authorities.  After all 
the disaster is on their patch therefore they should best know the area and their 
peoples’ needs.  I see us [the military] as a resource provider and we should be 
guided by those who have the knowledge to make us most effective”.  
 
Handfield and Nichols (1999) contest that relationship management is the most fragile and 
tenuous component in any successful supply chain and the Group felt that given their 
experience of working with different nations under the NATO Chain of Command, they have 
a role to play in this area.  Agreeing with the literary discourse on partnership sourcing 
(Christopher, 2011, Iglesias et al, 2011, Lysons and Farrington, 2006) the Group believe 
that JFLogC staff already have relevant experience of establishing international 
relationships; however, there is acknowledgement that the circumstances and demands 
when comparing a NATO operation to that in respect of a response to a humanitarian 
disaster, are somewhat different.  That said, there is still a strong view that what is required 
is a NATO style organisation for disaster relief and that although OCHA claim to be that 
organisation, the command structures that they implement do not have the same effect.   
 
The Group echoed the lessons learned following the Hull floods in 2007 (DEFRA, 2007) in 
that relationships at the UK level should be addressed in the first instance and that the 
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working relationship between JFLogC and DFID can be improved.  The feeling is that there 
should be a lot more liaison between JFLogC and DFID and that the associated teams 
should get to know one another, and to try and understand their roles and contributions to 
the overall disaster relief effort.  The Group acknowledge that DFID has responsibility for 
leading and coordinating the UK Government’s humanitarian response (DFID, 2008; MOD, 
2008 and 2003) and suggest that, because of this they can have some influence on the UN 
if that is needed or deemed appropriate.  However there is a consensus that DFID are a 
difficult organisation to work with: 
 
“DFID want to command the military mission….What we [the military] want is to be 
given mission command and not to be micro managed”. (SO21) 
 
(Mission Command is a military doctrinal philosophy which represents a shift away from a 
leadership methodology based on iron discipline and control to one which is based on the 
commander being given the freedom of thought to achieve a given task.  Also see Watters, 
2002) 
 
Information flow is acknowledged as a critical component in the supply chain (Handfield and 
Nichols, 1999) and communication between organisations in the field was discussed by the 
Group as a real issue of concern.  CDT was quick to point out that Command and 
Communication was a real problem for him in Pakistan.  However, he suggested that these 
problems illustrate that the type of person who is drawn to work in the voluntary sector 
perhaps already has a prejudiced view of the military and that this does not help with 
relationship building:   
 
“Perhaps we could flag ship previous military successes within humanitarian relief 
and work together with OCHA to try and address these prejudiced views of the 
military contribution amongst those in the voluntary sector” 
 
Power is not viewed as an issue by the Group as all participants were happy to act in a 
subordinate role and to effectively accept the inherent power imbalances (Hingley, 2005a) 
within the overall supply chain structure.  Referring to the Joint Doctrine Publication on 
Disaster Relief Operations (MOD, 2008) all participants appreciate the coordinating 
responsibilities that the UN and its associated offices have to play in disaster relief areas 
and seem to concur with the idea that the UN are to act as the power broker (Burt, 2005) 
within humanitarian relief zones.  There is however, obvious frustration at the lack of control 
and coordination witnessed and clear disagreement with the idea that this is being improved 
within the field (Altay and Labonte, 2011) indeed, this became a key feature of the whole 
session.  In essence, consensus within the JFLogC Group is that the organisation is happy 
to carry out all tasks given, but that it should be effectively coordinated and controlled by 
those who are placed in a position of power in the relief zone, the gatekeepers in academic 
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terms (Hingley et al, 2010).  However, participants find it difficult to identify who has the lead 
role on the ground, or who has specific responsibility for elements of the relief effort: 
 
“….if we can’t identify who is in charge, then how can anyone else”. (CDT)  
 
5.9.4     Military Involvement 
 
The Group began this section by discussing the idea that in keeping with the Humanitarian 
Emergency Response Review (2011) the UK Government are keen that the military look to 
demonstrate more high profile involvement in humanitarian relief.  The Group agreed that 
this could prove difficult as, in keeping with Dunanist principles (Seigel, 2011; Tatham, 
2011) their experience is that most NGOs are not happy to work alongside a military man 
in uniform.  The view is that a military uniform would always be viewed by some as a symbol 
of an organisation that operates in contravention to humanitarian principles, and that 
attempts to reduce the impact of a uniform such as the UN blue beret are, on the whole 
ineffective; there are still clear challenges ahead: 
 
“We [the military] are still tarnished with Iraq backlash.  A serious repair job is needed 
at a national and international level.” (CDT) 
 
“In my experience, changing from an Army to a UN blue beret has little effect at the 
end of the day” (COM)2 
 
There is broad acceptance that any association with the military can be seen by some donor 
organisations as being against the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van 
Wassenhove, 2009) and in particular impartiality (DFID, 2008), but also a view that NGOs 
appear to be happy for military intervention when their staff feel under threat.  The 
consensus is that JFLogC and the military in general should do more to publicise military 
measures in respect of impartiality and to challenge the perceptions of NGOs.  The 
suggestion is that examples such as the prioritising of medical aid for injured Taliban forces 
in Afghanistan or the support for the International Red Cross stance to provide first aid kits, 
training and other humanitarian aid to anyone in the conflict area, including Afghan security 
forces and the Taliban (Washington Times, 2010) can help in this respect.   
 
 
  
                                                             
2 The researcher can also add operational support to this view given his personal experiences as discussed 
in section 1.2. 
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CDT offered the following regarding the local military: 
 
“In lots of places where disaster happens, the boundaries between military and 
government are unclear.  For example Pakistan has a civilian president but we all 
know that the military runs the country.  The same could be said for Haiti and some 
North African countries.  In Indonesia this was true to a certain extent hence whilst 
NGOs do not like working with the military they must appreciate that in these cases 
the local military is the government and therefore they should be prepared to work 
alongside them”.  (CDT) 
 
There was a debate on the role of the military in future disaster relief operations and a 
suggestion that whilst no one can stop NGOs arriving in the disaster area, the JFLogC could 
be utilised to control the arrival and distribution of military resources.  CDT suggested that 
JFLogC should look to simple niche markets as they seek to identify a greater role.  As an 
example, he offered his successes in Banda Aceh where his team had placed a large map 
of the area on an outside wall and populated it with relevant information, thereby becoming 
an information centre for all contributors.  
 
 
5.10 Conclusions and Overall Domain Themes and Issues 
 
This is the second of four chapters presenting an analysis of the research findings and the 
discussion has drawn upon the data gathered from participants within the UK MOD’s 
JFLogC.  Having firstly established the key etic issues and themes through analysis of 
questionnaire responses, emic issues were developed and then investigated through a 
series of semi-structured interviews with JFLogC participants.  Finally, additional analysis 
and application of relevant literature within the field informed the areas of discussion within 
a participant focus group.  Hence, in keeping with the final research strategy through 
triangulation of data gathered and findings from questionnaires, interviews and a focus 
group with key informants, the chapter has explored trends that describe the barriers to 
collaboration within humanitarian relief supply chains and also identified how these barriers 
might be addressed to improve collaboration in the future.  Following the classic case study 
process (Yin, 2009) the findings and trends discussed within this section will be used during 
a final cross-domain analysis within Chapter 8 which will inform the final conclusions and 
academic contribution.  The section will now be broken down into the key emic themes and 
issues identified within the JFLogC arrived at through application of Stages I and II of the 
final research strategy, and confirmed and expanded upon during Stage III.  
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5.10.1     Management and Control 
 
The JFLogC participants agree with academic opinion on the positive nature of, and clear 
requirement for collaboration and coordination along the humanitarian relief supply chain 
(Dash et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Rickard, 2003).  Participant 
experiences confirm that planning and coordination will always make the relief effort more 
effective and efficient, and will help to reduce overall waste (Slack et al, 2010).  Whilst the 
coordination role should rest with the UN OCHA the organisation struggles to meet its 
coordination task and is at times ineffective.  OCHA works well during periods of quiet, but 
is less effective in the face of events where an immediate response (Kovács and Spens, 
2008, 2007) is required.  An ad hoc approach to the management of the humanitarian relief 
supply chain is not appropriate, but participants do concur with literary observations which 
suggest that this is the case in some relief zones (Akhtar et al, 2012; Kovács and Tatham, 
2009; Oloruntoba, 2005; Gustavsson, 2003).  The idea of establishing a coordinating 
authority amongst UK based NGOs is suggested, and in agreement with Porter’s concept 
of a Value Chain (1990) the arguments presented are based around niche capabilities and 
the provision of supply chain agility (Christopher, 2011) through exploitation of the military’s 
key skill sets within the field of expeditionary and rapid reaction logistics.   
 
In disagreement with academic support for a clustered approach (Altay and Labonte, 2011; 
Jahre and Jensen, 2010; Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998), the overall effectiveness and aims of 
the UN Cluster Concept (UN OCHA, 2011) are questioned as in keeping with Jensen (2012) 
the concept can prove to be cumbersome and serve to stove pipe the relief effort, acting as 
a hindrance in some practical cases; moreover, clusters give those involved an excuse to 
work in isolation from other participants.  To improve success the Cluster Concept requires 
some form of performance measurement system, which serves to hold cluster leaders 
accountable for their actions.  Hence, there is support for the adoption of a traffic light 
system similar to that used by the MOD (Kaplan and Norton, 1996, Australian Government, 
(DofD), 2005).  Academic discourse on the need to include both “upstream suppliers and 
downstream customers” (Patti, p.266) is reflected in the view that local governments should 
be involved in all aspects of the relief effort and that this should include cluster management.  
However, this could be difficult due to blockers (Burt, 2005) and gatekeepers (Hingley et al, 
2010) within the supply chain, and due to inherent problems with the identification of 
appropriate local authorities within some humanitarian relief zones.  There is broad support 
for the use of partnerships within successful supply chains (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 
2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006), but also consensus that the linkage between OHCA 
and the clusters is confusing and unclear and at times non-existent, hence, clearer 
guidelines on cluster implementation and overall usage are required. 
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5.10.2     Understanding and Training 
 
JFLogC opinion reflects the academic view on the importance of training and overall 
professionalisation within humanitarian logistics (Tatham and Altay, 2013; Heaslip, 2011; 
Moore and Taylor, 2011; Thomas and Mizushima, 2005).  However, the overall consensus 
is that whilst the current military chain of command would never sanction humanitarian 
logistics as an individual profession within the military, participants can see clear benefit if 
such an approach was adopted by civilian humanitarian organisations.  Echoing the ideas 
purported by Goffnet et al (2013) and Heaslip (2011), and in keeping with military 
approaches to training, integrated training exercises have a role to play in the overall 
promotion of partnered working within humanitarian relief zones.  Whilst agreeing that 
successful relationships should be built on mutual trust and openness (Upadhye and 
Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 2007), JFLogC participants concede that they do not fully 
appreciate the different roles and responsibilities of the organisations engaged in disaster 
relief; however in keeping with Heaslip (2011) the belief is that the reciprocal is also true, in 
that other organisations do not understand the military role within humanitarian operations.  
Joint training strategies will help to address this lack of understanding and appreciation.  
Concurring with the economic cluster theory (Porter, 1998), the involvement of local 
governments and organisations in such educational strategies is regarded as an essential 
element in their overall success.  Supporting the ideas offered on integrated service learning 
within the sector (Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011) it will be beneficial if military ‘experts’ 
can be involved in advising on the content of any associated courses or training 
programmes; however, there is also a pragmatic acceptance that this will probably not 
happen in reality due to political pressures (Thompson, 2010) and the overall impact on 
some donor organisations to preserve the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van 
Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008).   
 
JFLogC is also engaged in the development of an internal training course for members of 
the organisation who are tasked with the planning and coordination of all military HADRO.  
To address issues surrounding the implementation, management and overall structure of 
the UN Cluster Concept (UN OCHA, 2011) such training initiatives will include appropriate 
elements on the concept itself.  Furthermore a training programme specifically aimed at 
cluster leaders will also be of great benefit.   
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5.10.3     Relationships 
 
Handfield and Nichols (1999) offer the view that relationship management is the most fragile 
and tenuous component in any successful supply chain.  Agreeing with the literary 
discourse on partnership sourcing (Christopher, 2011, Iglesias et al, 2011, Lysons and 
Farrington, 2006) the consensus is that JFLogC staff already have relevant experience of 
establishing international relationships.  Working with different nations under the NATO 
Chain of Command means that JFLogC staff are skilled in relationship management, and 
in generating  swift trust (Tatham and Kovács, 2010) within the inherent Hastily Formed 
Networks (Kumar and Havey, 2013).   
 
Whilst Porter (1990) argued for efficiency and effectiveness through the formation of supply 
chain networks, the inherent view echoes that of Chandes and Paché (2010), in that in order 
to be successful NGOs rely on competition for resources, ground and other assets.  
Consequently, there is a reticence amongst some donor organisations to be seen to act 
alone and to demonstrate overall presence on the ground, views which concur with the 
observations offered by Olson and Gregorian (2007) and Kent (1987) on NGO’s actions 
due to financial pressures and the fear of donor withdrawal.  The inclusion of local 
governments and organisations is considered to be a key to the overall effectiveness of the 
disaster relief effort, and the JFLogC regards itself as a resource provider which is happy 
to be guided by those who have the local knowledge to ensure the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the overall relief effort.  A NATO style organisation for humanitarian relief 
is required to help address the associated issues and although OCHA claim to be that 
organisation (OCHA, 2012a), the command structures that it implements within the field do 
not have the desired effect.  The lessons learned following the Hull floods in 2007 (DEFRA, 
2007) suggest that the UK based working relationship between the JFLogC and DFID 
should be addressed in the first instance.  Consequently, there should be significantly more 
liaison between the JFLogC and DFID, and the associated teams should take measures to 
gain a clearer understanding of their organisation’s roles and overall contribution to the relief 
effort.  In essence, JFLogC participants want to be given the freedom to make decisions 
using the military doctrinal philosophy of Mission Command (Watters, 2002). 
 
Information flow is a critical component in the supply chain (Handfield and Nichols, 1999; 
Ernst, 2003; Rickard, 2003) and JFLogC participants agree that communication between 
organisations within the field is a real area of concern.  Reflecting the discussion on mistrust 
(Heaslip, 2011), the challenge of relationship building is further exacerbated for the JFLogC 
due to some organisational and/or individual prejudiced views of the military amongst other 
humanitarian organisations.  The aim for the military should be to build upon past successes 
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within the humanitarian relief sector, and to try and use these to redress the preconceived 
views of their contribution. 
 
The JFLogC is happy to act in a subordinate role and to accept the inherent power 
imbalances (Hingley, 2005a) within the overall supply chain structure.  Military policy 
documents (MOD, 2008 and 2003) reflect the coordinating responsibilities that the UN and 
its associated offices have to play in humanitarian relief areas and concur with the idea that 
the UN are to act as the power broker (Burt, 2005) within such areas.  The JFLogC is content 
to carry out all tasks given to it, but its contribution should be effectively coordinated and 
controlled by the gatekeepers (Hingley et al, 2010) in the field, namely the OCHA.  However, 
a lack of clear control and coordination has been witnessed, clearly in disagreement with 
the view that this has improved in recent humanitarian responses (Altay and Labonte, 
2011).  In sum, it is difficult at times to identify who has responsibility for elements of the 
relief effort on the ground.  Whilst military personnel are happy to be led and controlled, the 
view is that members of the NGO community are not; an opinion supported by Thompson 
(2010) who notes that whilst military forces have the potential to make a difference with 
disaster relief arenas, what he describes as “sensitivities” still remain (p.2) and by Heaslip 
(2010) who believes that these radically different methodologies and guiding principles can 
result in what he terms clashes between the military and civilian humanitarian organisations.   
 
5.10.4     Military Involvement 
 
In keeping with the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (2011) the UK Government 
is keen that the military look to demonstrate more high profile involvement in humanitarian 
relief.  However, this could prove difficult as, in keeping with Dunanist principles (Seipel, 
2011; Tatham, 2011) most NGOs are not happy to work alongside the military.  A military 
uniform will always be viewed by some as a symbol of an organisation that operates in 
contravention to humanitarian principles, and attempts to reduce the impact of a uniform, 
such as the UN blue beret are on the whole ineffective.  Referring to the issue of trust 
(Heaslip, 2011; Tatham and Kovács, 2010) and to the need for mutual trust and openness 
within successful partnerships (Upadhye and Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 2007), JFLogC 
participants acknowledge that the public perception of the UK military had been tarnished 
by recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this may have an adverse effect on 
relationships with other organisations.  Hence, the JFLogC should strive to be regarded as 
the acceptable face of military.  In a similar vein, there is also broad acceptance that any 
association with the military can be seen by some donor organisations as being against the 
humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009) and in particular against 
impartiality (DFID, 2008), but also a belief that NGOs appear to be happy for military 
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intervention under the right circumstances, and particularly in situations where humanitarian 
actors feel under threat.  Consequently, the JFLogC and the military in general, should do 
more to publicise current and past military measures and successes in respect of 
impartiality.  Moreover, NGOs who refuse to work alongside the military should be reminded 
that in some cases the local military is the government and that if the drive is to include local 
authorities in the overall relief effort, then they will be forced to work alongside them.  To 
that end, and in keeping with the discourse on integrating learning (Goffnet et al, 2013; 
Heaslip, 2011) and that on learning mechanisms for humanitarian logistics (Lu et al, 2013), 
members of the HADRO team are keen to establish links within NGOs and to deliver 
presentations on what the military can offer by way of a lasting contribution.  As the UK 
military and the JFLogC in particular look to expand its role in future humanitarian relief 
operations by exploiting niche areas of expertise, the suggestion is that they could assist 
with the control of the arrival and distribution of international military resources within the 
relief zone. 
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CHAPTER 6 
OXFAM INTERNATIONAL – INDIVIDUAL DOMAIN ANALYSIS 
 
“Working with thousands of local partner organizations, we work with people living in 
poverty striving to exercise their human rights, assert their dignity as full citizens and take 
control of their lives.” 
(Oxfam International, 2011) 
6.1 Introduction 
The data gathered from the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (Oxfam) is presented and 
discussed concurrently with appropriate academic discourse within the field of research that 
was first introduced within Chapter 2.  By way of introduction a short background and history 
of Oxfam International is included together with a discussion on the organisation’s current 
(as at 2012) portfolio of humanitarian programmes and structures.  A justification on the use 
of Oxfam as a research domain for this study is then offered.   Following the inclusion of a 
listing of respondents and their backgrounds (Table 6.1) the discussion turns to an analysis 
of the key etic and emic issues and themes identified.  Final conclusions and overall domain 
themes and issues are then established through triangulation of the data gathered and the 
academic discourse.   
 
6.2 Background – Core Beliefs, Drivers and Scale    
 
Formed in 1995 by a group of independent non-governmental organizations whose aim was 
to work together for greater impact on the international stage, Oxfam International is an 
international confederation of 17 organisations networked together in more than 90 
countries, as part of a global movement for change to build a future free from the injustice 
of poverty (Oxfam International, 2011).  One of the 14 members of the Disasters Emergency 
Committee (DEC, 2012) they work directly with communities and seek to influence the 
powerful to ensure that poor people can improve their lives and livelihoods and have a say 
in decisions that affect them.   
 
 181 
 
Oxfam International believe that respect for human rights will help lift people out of poverty 
and injustice, allow them to assert their dignity and guarantee sustainable development.  
They argue that everyone should have the right to a livelihood and they work at many levels 
with partners and communities in support of their right to a decent living.  They strive for 
better working conditions and better protection of the natural resources on which poor 
communities depend.  They work with partners and communities to implement programs 
that lead to self-sustaining livelihoods, with a strong focus on women and campaign for 
fairer trade rules at the global level, and for better policies at the national level.  They 
maintain that being healthy and educated is an essential step along the route out of poverty, 
and point out that millions of people have no access to health services, schooling or safe 
water.  Moreover, Oxfam International remind the world that many communities are 
constantly at risk from illnesses that are easily prevented or treated, or are unable to read 
and write, which means exclusion from their society (Oxfam International, 2011).  They 
campaign for more and better aid, with a focus on basic services.   
 
Oxfam International is registered as a Foundation in The Hague and as a foreign company 
limited by guarantee in the UK (Oxfam International, 2011).  Each affiliate is a member of 
the Foundation and subscribes to the Foundation’s constitution through an affiliation 
agreement.  The constitution consists of three documents: the Constitution, the Code of 
Conduct, and the Rules of Procedure (Oxfam International, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c).  Affiliates 
must also sign a trade-mark licence, which enables them to use the Oxfam International 
brand.  The Foundation is governed by the Oxfam International Board which meets 
annually.  The 2010/11 Annual Report (Oxfam International, 2012) records total expenditure 
as €911 million (£730 million as at November 2012), with €660 million (£530 million) being 
spent on regional programmes.  47% of this expenditure was split across the top 20 
countries; the biggest beneficiary during the reporting year being Haiti to the tune of almost 
€60 million (£48 million).   
 
6.3 A Brief History – Committed to Human Rights since 1942 
 
The name “Oxfam” comes from the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, founded in Britain 
in 1942.  The group campaigned for food supplies to be sent through an allied naval 
blockade to starving women and children in enemy-occupied Greece during the Second 
World War (Oxfam International 2011).  As well as becoming a world leader in the delivery 
of emergency relief, Oxfam International implements long-term development programs in 
vulnerable communities.  They are also part of a wider global movement, campaigning with 
others, for example, to end unfair trade rules, demand better health and education services 
for all, and to combat climate change.  Today, there are 17 member organizations of the 
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Oxfam International confederation.  They are based in: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Ireland, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, The Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Quebec, Spain and the United States.  The Oxfam International Secretariat 
is based in Oxford, UK.  The Secretariat runs advocacy offices in Brussels, Geneva, New 
York, Washington DC and Brasilia. 
 
At the program level, Oxfam International provides health training and clean water supplies, 
as well as funding schools and teacher training.  They contend that in disasters, people are 
at greater risk of violence, disease and abuse and seek to contribute to saving lives in 
emergencies by providing shelter, clean water and sanitation, and by working with local 
partners, help communities to rebuild and to better prepare themselves for future disasters 
(Oxfam International, 2012).  Oxfam International supports partners and communities to 
understand their rights and to speak out about their needs and concerns and, with others, 
to get people in power to listen and act.   They also support the view that people who are 
marginalised, because they are women, disabled or members of a religious or ethnic 
minority are more likely to be poor and work to combat such discrimination, to ensure that 
such groups have the means to enjoy equal access to jobs, essential services and influence.
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6.4 Current Humanitarian Programmes and Structures 
 
The 2010/11 Annual Report (Oxfam International, 2012) states that Oxfam International 
was engaged in operations in 92 countries worldwide (see in green on Fig 6.1).  This work 
included long term development programs, responding to humanitarian crises, campaigning 
and advocacy and raising public awareness of the causes of poverty and injustice.  As at 
November 2012 they were involved in emergency relief efforts in the Sahel region of 
Tunisia, Eastern Africa, Pakistan (support to the floods), Sudan, DR Congo, Afghanistan, 
and Haiti.   
 
 
 
 
 Fig 6.1 Oxfam International – World Wide Commitments (Oxfam International, 2012) 
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6.5 Data Collection, Respondents and Results 
Oxfam International was first contacted in March 2012 through a series of introductory 
letters and questionnaires, as per Stage I in the research methodology.  Key respondents 
are shown in Table 6.1: 
 
Respondent Time with 
Oxfam 
(years) 
Practical 
Experience 
Role Code 
Head of 
International 
Logistics and 
Supply 
6 
(19 years 
with MSF) 
Involved in logistics 
support to every 
major humanitarian 
crisis since 1987 
To lead and manage the 
International Logistics and 
Supply team. 
 
HOL 
Deputy Head 
of 
International 
Logistics and 
Supply 
12 Most major crises 
since joining the 
organisation 
A member of the Logistics 
Management Team for a 
given relief programme. 
DHOL 
International 
Logistics 
Manager 
10 Haiti, Pakistan, South 
Sudan, Liberia,  
To manage resources  
engaged in the delivery of 
specific relief projects  
ILM 
International 
Area Manager 
8 Haiti, Pakistan Responsible for the 
management of specific 
logistics and supply chain 
functions involved in one 
particular relief project.  
Regular communication with 
other agencies and partner 
organisations. 
IAM 
 
Table 6.1 Oxfam International – Key Respondents 
 
6.6 Data Analysis – Stage I – Key Etic Themes and Issues 
Analysis of the data gathered from Oxfam International via the introductory questionnaires 
(Appendix D), will now be discussed.  In achieving this due consideration will be given to 
the practical relevance of the initial etic issues and themes identified within the Literature 
Review as set out and codified at Appendix E.  Note that respondent codes within Table 6.1 
will be used at this stage.  
 
 
 
 185 
 
6.6.1 General Processes and Coordination 
 
The senior respondents (HOL, DHOL) agreed that Oxfam International operate a supply 
chain that is specifically designed for its role (COLRES).  They confirmed that the 
organisation is affiliated to the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) and that they are 
familiar with the United Nations Cluster Concept (COLCLU).  All respondents agreed that 
the Cluster concept was used to help alleviate bottlenecks and to fill logistics gaps 
(COLALL, COLRES) and the senior respondent (HOL) confirmed that the concept also 
helped to prioritise logistics interventions and investments (COLHOR) and to collect and 
share information assets (COLVER), however this was not a view shared with the 
operational managers (ILM, IAM).  Similarly there was a difference of opinion on the use of 
the cluster concept when it came to coordinating port and corridor movements and to reduce 
congestion (COLALL, COLRES).  Whilst the senior respondents (HOL, DHOL) agreed that 
the concept helped with coordination of the logistics effort the juniors (ILM, ALM) with more 
recent operational experiences, believed that this was not the case.  Indeed all agreed that 
coordination of the logistics effort with UN agencies, other NGOs and the military (COLALL) 
within disaster relief operations was not achieved through the United Nations Cluster 
Concept.  Moreover, the provision of information on equipment and on specific relief supply 
items was not gained through the concept (HOL, DHOL). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.6.2 Organisational Sustainment, Power and the Military 
 
The senior respondent (HOL)  confirmed that Oxfam International took the lead in product 
specification and procurement (PWRPOS) and that they work with suppliers and program 
staff to create material kits that are used to support standard interventions within water and 
sanitation (COLHOR, COLVER, COLALL, COLRES).  He also confirmed that Oxfam 
purchase and preposition water and sanitation kits as part of the overall Water, Sanitation 
and Hygiene (WASH) cluster approach which, under the overall leadership of UNICEF aims 
to address gaps in response and enhance the overall quality of humanitarian assistance 
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
Use of and Success or otherwise of the UN 
Cluster Concept 
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(PWRPOS, RMT, COLALL, COLHOR).  Moreover, Oxfam International are happy to take 
the lead in future operations (PWRPOS, RMT) and do share facilities with other NGOs 
(COLALL).  Those with recent operational experience (ILM, ALM) confirmed that facilities 
are shared with numerous NGOs (COLHOR, COLVER).  Oxfam is prepared to accept 
military assistance from organisations that are working under a UN mandate, but 
acceptance of this did depend on the associated circumstances (RMT).  The senior 
respondents (HOL, DHOL) were in agreement that the demonstration to donors of an 
organisational presence and of the value of their contributions, was the priority within a relief 
zone (SUSFR) and that they did not regard competitive behaviour towards other 
contributors as important (SUSSTRAT).  It was notable that the demonstration of the 
concepts of CSR was a priority for the IAM and ILM (SUSCSR). 
 
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
Positive Aspects of Power/ WASH cluster 
approach/ Trust/ Relationship Management/ 
Military Assistance/ Organisational 
Presence/ Corporate Social Responsibility  
Demonstration of Value for money/ 
Presence 
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6.6.3 Summary - Key Etic Themes and Issues 
 
In completing Stage I of the research strategy with Oxfam the following key etic themes and 
issues were identified to inform Stage II of the research strategy. 
 
Theme  
 
Issue Description Notes 
General 
Processes  and 
Coordination 
 
UN Cluster 
Concept 
Alleviate bottlenecks 
and fill logistics gaps 
How? 
Which gaps? 
Examples? 
Successful? 
Prioritise logistics 
interventions and 
investments 
Collect and share 
information assets 
Coordination of the 
logistics effort with 
UN agencies, other 
NGOs and the 
military is not 
achieved 
Why not? 
Examples? 
How to improve 
 
Organisational 
Sustainment, 
Power and the 
Military 
 
Power Oxfam take the lead 
in product 
specification and 
procurement 
Examples? 
Successful strategy? 
WASH cluster 
approach 
Oxfam purchase and 
preposition water and 
sanitation kits as part 
of the overall 
approach 
Successful strategy? 
Issues? 
Trust Oxfam are happy to 
take the lead in 
future operations and 
do share facilities 
with other NGOs 
How is trust 
established/maintained? 
Relationship issues? 
Examples? 
Relationship 
Management 
Military 
Assistance 
Oxfam are prepared 
to accept military 
assistance but this 
depends on the 
associated 
circumstances.   
What circumstances? 
What type of/ how much 
assistance? 
Examples? 
Organisational 
Presence 
The demonstration to 
donors of an 
organisational 
presence and of the 
value of their 
contributions was a 
priority.   
How demonstrated? 
Examples? 
Corporate 
Social 
Responsibility 
Demonstration of 
CSR is a priority. 
How achieved? 
 
Table 6.2 Oxfam – Stage I Key Etic Themes and Issues 
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6.7 Data Analysis – Stage II – Developing Emic Themes and Issues 
 
Analysis of the data gathered during the semi structured interviews with members of Oxfam 
International listed in Table 6.1 will now be discussed.  In keeping with Stage II of the final 
research strategy interviews were based around the schedule (Appendix F) which had been 
developed following cross-domain analysis of Stage I findings and the key etic themes and 
issues that had been identified as a result.  Note that respondent codes listed within Table 
6.1 will still be used throughout this discussion. 
 
6.7.1 General Processes, Coordination and Collaboration 
 
In discussing resilience and the requirement for agility and flexibility Christopher (2011) 
highlights the issues surrounding the complexity that is inherent within modern supply 
chains, arguing that such supply chains will quickly descend into chaos unless they are 
connected through effective coordination and collaboration, shared information and 
knowledge.  The data gathered from Oxfam concurs with these ideas as participants agree 
that whilst the humanitarian relief supply chain is designed for its needs, it does struggle to 
work in reality and efforts to facilitate effective collaboration in the field are hampered by 
overall complexity.  In essence, the view is that in most cases, when faced with the need 
for an immediate response (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) there is little evidence of 
coordination on the ground as donor organisations according to IAM:    
 
“Jump in as there is nothing to prevent the influx of NGOs and other agencies”  
 
Participant opinion on collaboration and coordination is typified by HOL: 
 
“In my experience 5 or 6 big agencies deploy into a disaster zone and they take on 
national and local partners…..less well equipped organisations then arrive who have 
people but no access to materials or supply chains…”   
 
The thoughts above also serve to illustrate the agreement that is evident amongst Oxfam 
participants with academic discourse on the challenges presented within humanitarian relief 
zones by the growing number of donor agencies and the resulting supply chain complexity 
that they bring (Heaslip, 2012a and 2011; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van 
Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada et al, 2006)  
 
HOL agrees that some coordination is a good thing and cited the example of a unified coding 
system for humanitarian relief equipment that is now in place as one that is helping larger 
agencies and cluster leads to gain access to, and share common equipment and resources.  
He echoed the opinions of Altay and Labonte (2011) believing that coordination of 
technology is a step forward and that new IT systems and the associated information 
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sharing opportunities have significantly improved standardisation and interoperability 
across the sector.  However, HOL also offered a counter view on collaboration and 
suggested that what he described as an “ad hoc approach” might actually benefit the overall 
effectiveness of the humanitarian relief effort.  Arguing for the benefits of an element of 
chaos and uncertainty and agreeing with Mullins’ (2013) assertion that “without uncertainty 
there would be no decisions to make” (p.639), HOL’s belief was that there is far too much 
time spent in trying to apply formal structure to the supply chain.  Contesting academic 
opinion on the benefits of applying business sector supply chain strategy to the 
humanitarian sector (Chandes and Paché, 2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Beamon, 
2006), HOL argued that striving for structure and coordination within humanitarian relief 
zones is actually a “red herring” and felt that the inherent bureaucratic barriers actually 
served to slow the relief effort down.  HOL’s assertion was that what the sector really needs 
is a model built on an organisation’s ability to perform.   
 
In keeping with the arguments offered by Dash et al (2013) the data suggests that the use 
of classic market mechanisms will not guarantee a quality response in the provision of 
humanitarian relief and that what is really needed in the sector is a more rigid system that 
can judge agencies on their performance; moreover, such a system should have the 
legitimacy to exclude those that have a history of letting the overall effort down.  DHOL cited 
the example of large Christian organisations that have access to considerable funds through 
church donations, but that have in his experience turned this funding into bibles at a time 
when food, shelter and medical aid were a clear priority.  DHOL also highlighted the efforts 
of the Inter-Agency Procurement Group (IPAG) which is a “network of logistics professionals 
who work collectively on humanitarian supply chain activities” (IPAG, 2013) who are trying 
to establish an overall organisational certification standard across the sector as a first step 
in such a strategy.  He also acknowledged the Sphere Project (2011) as the common 
reference for the minimum standards of delivery within the field, but agreed with the view 
that whilst it does advocate integration of humanitarian organisations, it does not state 
specific performance evaluation measures (Heaslip, 2011, p.165). 
 
The data gathered highlights UN reforms where donors are encouraged to donate more 
money through UN agencies, but the inherent view is that such measures can be restrictive 
and that the policy is actually designed to reduce the number of agencies on the ground, or 
at the very least to bring more structure between the lead and other agencies.  ILM offered 
the view that in his experience: 
 
“UN agencies were reluctant to take on the level of control that is needed…..were 
not equipped to cope……and did not have the required skills to implement 
coordination on the ground”.   
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Porter (1998) suggests that “clusters allow companies to operate more productively whilst 
coordinating with related companies” (p.78), however IAM feels that clusters and cluster 
leaders are notoriously bad at communicating with local actors and local governmental 
organisations, clearly in disagreement with the advice offered by Patti (2006) on cluster 
membership within the supply chain context.  HOL cited the overall Water, Sanitation and 
Hygiene (WASH) cluster approach (UNICEF, 2013) within which Oxfam International 
purchase and preposition water and sanitation kits (see Section 6.7.2) as an example of the 
frustrations that he has experienced with the clustered approach.  Oxfam has worked in 
close collaboration with developmental and engineering organisations to help develop a 
common standard for the contents of these sanitation kits and on setting the overall quality 
requirements of the associated contents.  The WASH Cluster working group now aim to 
manage these prepositioned stocks and to allocate kits to agencies who have capacity but 
no supply lines.  However, this strategy calls for a standard specification of kit contents and 
overall quality, a specification that has been almost impossible to arrive at and sustain.  The 
data also contends with academic views on the advantages of pre-positioned equipment 
(Mangan et al, 2012; Gadde et al, 2010; Gourdin, 2006) as it demonstrates an overall belief 
that having pre-positioned equipment presents its own particular problems.  DHOL spoke 
of his experiences in the response to the Pakistan floods (2010)  
 
“All stocks were drawn upon at the outset….stock from stores were arriving on mass 
without any coordination….it reminded me of when we used to receive unsolicited 
truckloads of unwanted teddy bears in the past…” 
 
DHOL went on to confirm that the critical bottleneck is not the availability of supplies but of 
money and people.  He confirmed that Oxfam International is content to share the 
organisation’s equipment and materials with other NGOs and agencies and argued that the 
Oxfam International catalogue of humanitarian logistics equipment is regarded as the one 
that sets the standard within the sector for the provision of water and sanitation equipment. 
   
HOL suggests that a real concern that he has perceived across the sector is in respect of 
the ability of the humanitarian relief community to respond to multiple disasters and the 
likelihood of having to cope with more than one disaster at the same time.  He believes that 
it is not a case of if but when this will be a requirement and contested that whilst the 
response system was growing incrementally, the growth is at a slower rate than that 
required to cope with the complexity of the impending demand for multiple responses. 
 
There is broad agreement amongst Oxfam participants, with the view that the military does 
have a role to play within disaster relief zones (Heaslip, 2011; Thompson, 2010, 
Beauregard, 1998) but also some reservation in that the contribution has to be under the 
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right circumstances and on what ILM termed “An ad hoc basis where there may be a need 
for military resources such as trucks and planes or for military manpower to boost capacity”.  
HOL discussed the role that the local military can play in coordinating the efforts and 
contribution of external military organisations and cited his experiences of the Pakistani 
military in this respect.  However, he also referred to Haiti and to the aftermath of the 2010 
earthquake, where in keeping with the observations offered by Lynch (2010), HOL felt that 
the country was disorganised and did not have a strong enough political or military structure 
to help with the coordination of the US military contribution.      
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.7.2 Power and Relationships 
 
The data demonstrates overall agreement with the academic discourse on the advantages 
of a partnered approach (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006) 
and that Oxfam International is happy to take the lead or be led within humanitarian relief 
operations.  Acknowledging the challenges associated with the formation of what Kumar 
and Havey (2013) term Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) at the onset of an immediate 
response operation (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007), HOL offered Oxfam International’s 
contribution to the WASH Cluster (UNICEF, 2013) as an example of a possible route to 
swift trust (Tatham and Kovács, 2010) within the sector, and of the organisational 
relationships that can work within the provision of humanitarian relief.  Albeit a longer term 
relationship, the initiative is led by UNICEF under the IASC approach and acts as the global 
lead agency for water, sanitation and hygiene.  HOL explained that Oxfam International has 
successfully coordinated developmental programmes for water and sanitation equipment in 
partnership with various engineering companies and that such relationships can be used 
as building blocks to address the challenges associated with future HFNs: 
 
“The famous multi-functional Oxfam Bucket has not only ensured that fresh water 
can be transported quickly and safely but it has also enabled us to demonstrate our 
expertise in providing sanitation and water as a part of the overall disaster relief 
effort”  
 
(For more on the Oxfam Bucket see Oxfam, 2013). 
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Coordination/ Quality/ OCHA/ Ad hoc 
military contribution/ Equipment 
sharing/ Equipment development 
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The Lancet (2010) and Olson and Gregorian (2007) acknowledge the inherent competition 
amongst NGOs for donor funding, and the associated desire to demonstrate superior 
effectiveness and efficiency sometimes at the expense of quantifiable end results.  In a 
review of the immediate response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake the Lancet observed that 
NGOS were “Jostling for position, each claiming that they are doing the most for earthquake 
survivors” (p253).  The data concurs with this view and DHOL highlights that the 
humanitarian sector is like any other and that it should not be forgotten that: 
 
“Oxfam International is still a business….. it would not exist without 
donations…….because of this normal market forces and competition will inevitably 
be a factor within the sector”. 
 
Clearly in disagreement with academic opinion on the positive impact that collaboration and 
coordination can have on supply chain performance (Dash et al, 2013, Christopher, 2011, 
Patti, 2006; Porter 1998 and 1990), and on the concerns that humanitarian organisations 
run the risk of entering into competition with other organisations (Chandes and Paché, 2010; 
Olson and Gregorian, 2007), the data demonstrates that whilst the perception may be that 
the humanitarian sector is driven by a willingness to help, business opportunism still exists 
as do financial and political motives.  In keeping with this observation all respondents 
comment that the key limiting factors on the ability to provide aid will always be the 
availability of money and people, and that there is always more work than capacity.  ILM 
suggests that this lack of resources has, in his experience led to some issues in the past 
with other organisations who have accused Oxfam International of “not showing up” at 
certain disasters, and that this did present relationship management issues on occasion 
particularly with respect to the vital areas of “mutual trust and openness” (Upadhye and 
Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 2007, p.169).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.7.3 The Humanitarian Space 
 
The data gathered concurs with the academic views on the importance of the preservation 
of the humanitarian principles within the “humanitarian space” (Spearin, 2001, p.22).  All 
participants confirm that Impartiality and Neutrality (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; 
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Equipment sharing/ Equipment 
development/ Market forces/ 
Competition/ Finance 
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DFID, 2008) are key factors in the overall disaster relief effort and in the associated 
response.  DHOL believes that the UN has a key role to play in leading discussions on the 
“rules of engagement with the military contributors”.  He introduced the idea of what he 
termed 2 hats for the military and discussed the difficulties that this will inevitably bring: 
 
“At times [following natural disasters] the military want to wear 2 hats, one driven by 
the pressure to achieve political aims [in the aftermath of the disaster] and the other 
to support the humanitarian relief effort [at a later stage]……they cannot wear 
both….”. 
 
DHOL contests that trying to incorporate humanitarian relief within the larger political 
context is an impossible task as military and political objectives will always collide with 
humanitarian principles.  Whilst offering agreement with Heaslip’s (2011) assertion that 
“military and humanitarian organisations need to establish clear blue water between one 
another” (p.163), in DHOL’s terms the military has to clarify which hat they are wearing at 
the outset of the relief effort, and should consistently adopt that one role (or hat) throughout 
the relief operation.  HOL also agrees with the thoughts offered by Williamson (2011), in 
that the military idea of using humanitarian aid to win hearts and minds is a flawed one that 
does not constitute or assist humanitarian relief work.   
 
All participants agree that politics does not have a role to play in Oxfam International’s 
overall strategic approach.  However, in keeping with the academic view (Yaziji and Doh, 
2009; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003), HOL is happy 
to accept that political influence is an inevitable factor within the humanitarian sector as a 
whole. He discussed his experience of the role that the local interests of some donor 
countries has to play: 
 
“The European Community prepositioned [humanitarian relief] stocks in 
Dubai…..the local government were happy to accept this as the storage and 
subsequent transportation costs boosted their economy”   
 
“The Norwegian Government were keen to support Norwegian Church Aid’s 
contribution to the WASH cluster as local production costs of water and sanitation 
kits would bring money back into the Norwegian economy”  
 
 
 
 
  
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Rules of engagement/Conflict with 
warfare/ Political influence 
 194 
 
6.7.4 Organisational Sustainment 
 
In keeping with the view that an increasing number of organisations are seeking visible 
means to demonstrate their involvement in, and contribution to the humanitarian relief effort 
(Heaslip, 2011; Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Katoch, 2006; Porter and Kramer, 
2002) the data demonstrates that organisational sustainment is a significant consideration 
within Oxfam International.  Weiss and Collins (2000) acknowledge the inevitability of this 
and argue the negative impact that such pressures can have on charitable organisations 
such as Oxfam International, whose reliance on financial donations from the donor 
community may result in them looking to capture the humanitarian space that best suites 
perceived donor need.  Echoing this assertion, and in agreement with the arguments offered 
by Oloson and Gregorian (2007), DHOL believes that his organisation is not on its own in 
this respect, and that NGOs and aid agencies in general operate on a business model in 
competition with each other.  He also pointed to the fact that Oxfam International would not 
exist without donations and to the statement in its annual report: 
“Oxfam would not exist without the support of the millions of people across the world 
who donate, support the Oxfam shops, participate and organize events and buy gifts 
from Oxfam Unwrapped”. (Oxfam International, 2012) 
 
All respondents agree with this view and the belief amongst them is that relief organisations 
compete for resources in order to function, and that those organisation’s donors often want 
to see their donation being used to assist certain types of victims in particular ways.  This 
would seem to agree with the observations offered in the Lancet (2010) in that relief workers 
tend to adopt certain types of behaviour even when they know that their resources would 
be better used in other ways; moreover they also echo the thoughts of Olson and Gregorian 
(2007) and Kent (1987) who commented on the adverse influence that financial pressure 
and a corresponding fear of donor withdrawal can have on NGO behaviour within 
humanitarian relief zones.  By way of an illustrative summary, ILM offered the following: 
“If you are seen to be giving an appropriate response then you will be put on the list 
for the response to the next disaster………..it is important to be invited to the party 
to encourage donations and to maintain the organisation [Oxfam International] going 
forward”  
 
HOL also discussed the effectiveness of the UK Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC, 
2012) offering it as an example of an organisation that was able to provide a mechanism to 
unify fund raising and of one that encourages working together, joint advertising and 
collective working.  He did however, offer a cautionary note in that he felt that the UK DEC 
can undermine individual agency accountability and with it the incentivisation to achieve 
higher performance levels that market mechanisms will bring; moreover, HOL felt that the 
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Committee also lower the threshold for participation by agencies that are essentially 
unqualified to contribute to the overall relief effort.  
   
Confirming the argument that competition does exist within the sector (Olson and 
Gregorian, 2007; Weiss and Collins, 2000), DHOL confirmed that Oxfam International is 
now recognised by the European Commission as a Human Care Procurement Centre, 
meaning that they are able to sell water and sanitation equipment to other disaster relief 
agencies who will not have to go through the standard 3 quote procurement cycle.  This 
removal of levels of administration helps with quicker purchasing and therefore provision of 
rapid aid.  However, DHOL was also quick to highlight that this new status is helping Oxfam 
International to recover equipment developmental, production and operational costs, whilst 
also confirming what he argued is the organisation’s lead status within the sector and their 
overall competitive positioning in respect of other donor agencies.   
 
   
 
 
 
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Competition/ Market Forces/ Donor 
influence  
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6.7.5 Summary – Oxfam International Key Emic Themes and Issues 
 
Theme 
 
Issue Description Notes 
Management 
and Control 
 
Coordination 
Lacking on the ground Why? 
Information sharing is a good thing Promote 
Strict coordination slows down relief 
effort 
Ad hoc approach? 
Accept sector for 
what it is 
Clusters Bad at communicating locally Why? 
Quality Judge contributors an ability to perform 
IPAG – certification 
standard across 
sector 
Sphere – no power 
OCHA 
Unwilling to take on control function 
Incorrect skill sets 
Unable to cope 
 
Relationships  
Equipment 
sharing and  
development 
WASH Cluster 
Positive examples 
Engineering successes 
Market 
Forces 
Drive the sector like any other 
Accept within and 
out with the sector Competition NGOs compete for resources 
Finance NGOs must be ran as businesses 
Political 
Influence 
Governmental pressures to promote 
economy 
 
 
Military 
Involvement 
Rules of 
engagement 
UN to lead discussions Clear guidelines for 
all contributors 
Conflict with 
warfare  
Military cannot wear “2 Hats” Clarify which role 
Hearts and minds initiatives Not humanitarian 
relief 
Ad hoc basis When needed  
 
Table 6.3 Oxfam International – Stage II Key Emic Themes and Issues
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6.8 Data Analysis – Stage III – Confirm Emic Themes and Issues 
 
Analysis of the data gathered during the Focus Group carried out with members of Oxfam 
International will now be discussed.  All participants listed in Table 6.1 were able to take 
part in the Focus Group.  In keeping with Stage III of the final research strategy discussion 
during the Focus Group was based around the Focus Group Topic Guide (Appendix G) 
which had been developed following analysis of the Stage II findings and the key emic 
themes and issues that had been identified as a result.  Note that respondent codes listed 
within Table 6.1 will still be used throughout this discussion. 
 
6.8.1 Management and Control 
 
“OCHA are always on the ground and visible but I feel that some of their staff lack 
the experience to grasp the initiative and to really coordinate the overall response” 
(IAM) 
 
The consensus amongst the Oxfam International Focus Group was that the efforts of UN 
agencies do help to save lives and that the UN, and in particular OCHA should take the lead 
in ensuring that timely and adequate relief is provided.  However, there was also agreement 
with the precautionary views offered by Senge (2010) on the lack of success within supply 
chain collaboration and also with those offered by Kampstra and Ashayeri, (2006) in that 
“You cannot collaborate with a party that lacks a genuine desire to collaborate” (p.312).  The 
participant view is that OCHA has to try and achieve overall coordination against what ILM 
describes as “a tide of uncoordinated but willing donor organisations”.  The Group agree 
that OCHA has already made a significant contribution to the relief effort by supporting 
international and local governments in planning and co-ordinating humanitarian responses, 
but that more could and has to be done. 
 
Discussing his experiences of the Pakistan Floods (2010) ILM offered the view that the 
“painfully slow” overall UN response had resulted in an aid effort that was equally slow and 
often uncoordinated and that, as a consequence one that had struggled to deliver sufficient 
assistance to all of those who needed it.  HOL commented on the perception amongst some 
that the sector is dominated by the UN and a relatively small number of western based 
international donor organisations, and discussed moves to create collaborative 
organisations away from UN and Western influence.  The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN, 2013), an inter-state collaboration of 10 regional agencies was offered as 
an example of such an initiative with an “amalgamation of the willing” (ASEAN, 2013) being 
established which does not rely on UN or western money but instead centres itself on Japan 
as its main donor.  Whilst there was agreement that strategies such as this offer a means 
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of increasing overall global capacity for disaster response, the Group were also quick to 
agree that ASEAN has modelled itself on the UN structure and approaches, which could 
possibly lead to similar bureaucratic frustrations to those experienced as a result of UN 
involvement. 
 
Discussion on the Cluster Concept (UN OCHA, 2011) centred on Oxfam’s involvement in 
the Logistics Cluster and in keeping with academic discourse (Altay and Labonte, 2011; 
Jahre and Jensen, 2010) on the organisation’s aim to develop strategies from the bottom 
up.  The clear drive is to develop an approach which helps the victims of humanitarian 
disasters to help themselves; the suggestion was that this is being achieved by working 
closely with local communities and involving appropriate local authorities and organisations 
in the cluster at an early stage, thereby adhering to the suggested academic guidelines for 
successful cluster implementation and management (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998).  The Group 
agreed with the view that strong inter-cluster coordination is required (Stoddard et al, 2007; 
Street, 2007; OCHA, 2006) together with mechanisms to provide comprehensive 
recommendations and directions on how to better assess and analyse humanitarian 
disasters of the future.  The consensus is that such strategies will help to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of relief operations as a whole through the gathering of detailed 
information and illustrations showing overall need at an earlier stage.  DHOL explained that 
better knowledge of who is doing what and where will help to target those in greatest need 
in a timelier manner.  Opinion was that the cluster system is currently struggling due to a 
lack of experience amongst cluster coordinators of the skill sets necessary to cope with the 
initial phase of the response (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007).  The training implications of 
this will be discussed in the next section of this chapter, but this together with the fact that 
too many key UN staff are based centrally rather than in the field of operations, leads to 
what ILM contends are “gaps in provision, duplication of effort and frustrating delays in 
delivery of aid”.  This discussion on the negativity of centralisation clearly echoes the views 
offered by Handy (1993, cited by Mullins, 2013) on the concept, together with the thoughts 
of and arguments for, decentralisation and less hierarchical supervision within organisations 
(Bollinger and Hofstede, 1987, cited by Chanlat et al, 2013). 
 
The administrative procedures used to distribute funds to the relief organisations by some 
cluster leads was also called into question, as the belief is that these are slowing things 
down and unsuited to meet the demand for a highly flexible supply chain which is capable 
of quickly adapting to deliver urgently needed aid as disasters rapidly develop and change 
(Christopher, 2011; Harrison and van Hoek, 2011; Chopra and Meindl, 2010).  This lack of 
supply chain responsiveness and resilience (Christopher, 2011) clearly frustrated HOL who 
believes that if the associated issues can be addressed then the immediate response phase 
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can be shortened in a significant number of cases, allowing organisations to concentrate on 
the recovery and sustainment phases (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007).  It is his hope that 
with the right level of coordination and management, it will be possible to offer a combined 
approach across all phases of the relief effort as argued for by Thomas and Kopczak (2005).  
 
6.8.2 Understanding and Training 
 
In agreement with the academic arguments and calls for an increase in logistics training 
and professionalisation (Tatham and Altay, 2013; Bolshe et al, 2013; Moore and Taylor, 
2011; Thomas and Mizushima, 2005) all participants agree that there is a need for additional 
training, and that such an approach can only benefit the overall efficiency and effectiveness 
of their organisation in particular, and the overall disaster response in general.  Echoing the 
academic view (Tatham and Altay, 2013, Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011) the Group 
acknowledged that there is a lack of understanding and appreciation amongst some staff, 
particularly in respect of the roles and contribution of other organisations and participants 
within the sector as well as in areas such as the Cluster Concept (UN OCHA, 2011).  
However, there is also consensus that whilst the relatively high turnover of staff within 
Oxfam International itself might be problematic in respect of educational development, 
opportunities to professionalise within the sector could act as a retention tool; thereby 
concurring with the viewpoint offered by Lu et al, (2013).  HOL believes that the increasing 
number of disasters worldwide (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005) 
together with the high overall cost of logistics provision, (Guhu-Sapir, et al, 2011) can be 
used as a “lever” to justify greater investment in training, however, he does concede that 
given the current financial climate, this may be difficult to achieve.  ILM suggested that within 
Oxfam there is a tendency to recruit staff with previous knowledge of the sector, or those 
with a specific skill set gained within the business sector (for example supply chain 
managers), a strategy which would seem to align itself with a policy of “individual grafting” 
as suggested by Song et al (2003).  HOL agreed with this assertion and cited his own 
experience where he joined Oxfam after gaining 19 years of experience of the sector 
working with Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF).  
 
The Group discussed the need for the inclusion of local organisations and governments in 
training strategies and offered as an example the approach that had been adopted by 
Oxfam in Laos, a country which is prone to flooding and landslides during the regional 
monsoon season.   
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“We [Oxfam] help to train the vulnerable local communities so that they are better 
able to deal with their needs in times of disaster.  The locals are now able to adopt 
mitigation measures and be ready before the disaster strikes.  In the longer term, 
this training means that the local community is able to improve its own food security 
together with its own people’s livelihoods”. (ILM) 
 
This example of successful training delivery seems to echo the academic advice on 
integrated learning (Goffnet et al, 2013), as the strategy is facilitated in partnership with the 
local National Disaster Management Office in Laos where local residents are trained on 
how to take effective action should flooding occur.  Some 8000 community volunteers have 
already been trained in rescue and emergency response measures and are supplied and 
trained in the use of the required emergency equipment such as boats, life jackets and first 
aid kits. 
 
6.8.3 Relationships 
 
The Group echoed the academic discourse on the partnered approach and on who should 
be included in the management of successful supply chains (Christopher, 2011, Sadler, 
2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006; Patti, 2006); moreover, the discussion reflected the 
importance of local involvement and also the strategy that Oxfam adopts of striving to build 
what HOL describes as “grass roots relationships”.  However, the Group confirmed that 
whilst fine in principle relationship management with local authorities is not without its 
challenges in practice.  In order to illustrate this, 2 vignettes are included within this section 
which were discussed during the Focus Group and are based on Oxfam International 
projects within Somalia.  They serve to illustrate the value of, and the frustrations associated 
with achieving local cooperation whilst trying to preserve Oxfam International’s strict policy 
against making any payments to local armed groups.  
 
“Somalia is a classic example as insecurity and difficulty in identifying who is the 
government on the ground mean that it is very difficult to monitor movements of 
funds.  Another problem is that we [Oxfam International] find it very difficult to 
maintain humanitarian quality standards as well as transparency and accountability 
to our donors.  Because of this we try and use the long standing relationships that 
we have established with local partners to help ensure that our aid is actually getting 
through to the most vulnerable”.  (HOL) 
 
The Group agreed that whilst the above approach helps to illustrate Oxfam International’s 
efforts to maintain the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009) and, 
in particular impartiality, the strategy also meant that it was virtually impossible to offer 
predictable and timely delivery of aid to those who were in greatest need.  HOL went on to 
relate his experiences of an initiative in 2011 in Somalia under the WASH Cluster working 
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group (UNICEF, 2013) where Oxfam looked to expand an existing programme in an area 
of the country which was under the control of an armed opposition group:  
 
“Our plan included giving money to our local partners to directly help support their 
livelihoods.  On hearing of this the local authorities demanded 20% of the project 
budget, which our partner refused to pay.  The money was only available for a 3-
month period and as negotiations continued it looked like we would have to use the 
funding on another project.  On hearing this the local authorities finally gave their 
provisional and unconditional support.  It still took another 4 or 5 days before 
approval was finally given because the local commander was travelling to another 
part of the country.  This negotiation meant that the overall project and associated 
aid were delayed for around 2 months”. 
 
The Group consensus was that inter-organisational cooperation is a good idea in theory, 
however in practice such a strategy leads to “bureaucratic systems that slow down the 
overall response” (ILM). The consensus was that this is in no small part due to governmental 
influence on some organisations as discussed by Yaziji and Doh, (2009) and Doh and 
Teegan, (2003) and to the fact that some countries look upon humanitarian relief as a 
means of supporting their own economies, also concurring with the academic opinion on 
political influence (Steinberg, 2003; Porter and Kramer, 2002). 
   
Olson and Gregorian (2007) and Weiss and Collins (2000) contest that competition exists 
within the humanitarian sector in the same way as the business environment, and in 
agreement with these assertions DHOL returned to his discussion during Stage II of the 
research and to his assertion that humanitarian relief organisations are still businesses that 
will be driven by the market.  There was agreement within the Group to this idea and a clear 
consensus that:  
“Money talks, just like in any other industry” (DHOL).   
 
6.8.4 Military Involvement 
 
There was clear agreement within the Group with the proposition that there was a role for 
the military in the provision of humanitarian relief (Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011; Thompson; 
2010); however, the consensus was that wherever possible aid is most effectively delivered 
by civilian humanitarian organisations under the leadership of the UN.  Regional stability 
and with it security are enhanced and not undermined by the provision of impartial, needs-
based humanitarian aid and there is a potential for military involvement to lead to potentially 
dangerous consequences which may affect and limit civilian aid agencies’ ability to work.   
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The participants acknowledged the view that the overall military contribution to the 
humanitarian relief effort is growing (Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 2011) and that 
the increasing number of disasters worldwide is resulting in a correspondingly larger 
number of humanitarian relief operations where international and local military forces are 
working alongside civilian relief organisations.  There was also agreement that under the 
right circumstances, and Iraq and Afghanistan were offered as examples of such 
circumstances, military forces should be used to provide aid, particularly if the region is 
deemed to be too insecure for civilian agencies to operate safely.  All participants would 
welcome military support when it was not safe for them to work; however, referring back to 
the debate on the preservation of the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van 
Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008) there was also concern raised regarding the perception 
that such actions might have with the local community.   
 
“Neutrality and impartiality do not go cap in hand with a military uniform I am afraid.” 
(IAM) 
 
The overall feeling within the Group was that in order to ensure an appropriate response 
under the humanitarian principles all organisations involved, including those from the 
military should ensure that any aid delivered has as its primary aim the reduction of either 
poverty or suffering. 
 
The issue of longer term involvement for the military led to a discussion on the UK 
governments’ approach in Afghanistan, and to the implementation of the stabilisation 
doctrine (MOD, 2009), which effectively sees the change from a focus on rapid short term, 
high profile response to aid provision aimed at winning hearts and minds, in favour of a 
policy of involvement in highly-visible militarised aid units created to assist in building 
projects such as schools and hospitals.  These projects are funded by donor aid but owned 
and led by the local communities themselves and give the military an opportunity to facilitate 
and support developmental and structural improvements, whilst using their obvious 
expertise in ensuring security for the local community.  Whilst acknowledging that such 
measures may prove to be a step in the right direction, there were concerns voiced in that 
military involvement is used by some governments as a means of inflicting influence as they 
seek to use aid provision as a means to achieve longer term political objectives (Williamson, 
2011; Yaziji and Doh, 2009).  Consequently the Group felt that any military forces involved 
in the relief effort should adhere to the UN agreed civil-military guidelines that are issued 
for each humanitarian relief operation and that the associated military rules of engagement 
should prohibit the use of humanitarian assistance for military or governmental objectives.  
The consensus was that whilst there is a clear responsibility on governments to take action 
in such cases, there is also a role to play for NGOs and that Oxfam International and other 
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aid organisations have to ensure that their activities and donations do not directly or 
indirectly provide resources to be used to assist military conflict.  Consequently, participants 
felt that NGOs should refuse any donations which are conditional on them cooperating with 
military forces, or which require the recipient organisation to distribute aid based on the 
political or military cooperation of those receiving it.  Perhaps ILM best summed up the 
overall opinion within the Group: 
“All of those involved must ensure that the aid that we provide does not contribute 
in any way to any contravention of international human rights and the overall 
humanitarian principles” 
 
6.9 Conclusions and Overall Domain Themes and Issues  
 
As the third of four chapters presenting an analysis of the research findings, this chapter 
has drawn upon data gathered from participants within Oxfam International.  Having firstly 
established the key etic issues and themes through analysis of questionnaire responses, 
emic issues were developed and then investigated through a series of semi-structured 
interviews with Oxfam International participants.  Finally, additional analysis and application 
of relevant literature within the field informed the areas of discussion within a participant 
focus group.  Hence, in keeping with the final research strategy through triangulation of data 
gathered and findings from questionnaires, interviews and a focus group with key 
informants, the chapter has explored trends that describe the barriers to collaboration within 
humanitarian relief supply chains and also looked to identify how these barriers might be 
addressed to improve collaboration in the future.  Following the classic case study process 
(Yin, 2009) the findings and trends discussed within this section will be used during a final 
cross-domain analysis within Chapter 8 which will inform the final conclusions and academic 
contribution.  The section will now be broken down into the key emic themes and issues 
identified within Oxfam International arrived at through application of Stages I and II of the 
final research strategy and confirmed and expanded upon during Stage III.    
 
6.9.1  Management and Control 
 
The data gathered from Oxfam International concurs with the calls for agility and flexibility 
within humanitarian relief supply chains (Christopher, 2011).  However, the supply chain 
struggles to work in reality and efforts to facilitate effective collaboration are hampered by 
overall complexity.  In cases where an immediate response (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 
2007) is called for, there is little evidence of coordination and agreement with academic 
concern on the challenges presented by the growing number of donor agencies involved 
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within humanitarian relief zones (Heaslip, 2011; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van 
Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada et al, 2006).  The efforts of UN 
agencies does help to save lives and OCHA should take the lead in coordinating the overall 
relief effort.  However, there is also agreement with the academic discourse on the inherent 
lack of success with supply chain collaboration strategies (Senge, 2010) and also an 
acknowledgement that collaboration cannot be achieved with organisations who do not wish 
to do so (Kampstra and Ashayeri, 2006).  OCHA had already made a significant contribution 
to the relief effort by supporting international and local governments in planning and co-
ordinating humanitarian responses but, in keeping with the arguments for the inclusion of 
downstream customers in successful supply chains (Patti, 2006) more can and has to be 
done in this vital area.  The overall UN response is very slow at times, and this results in an 
aid effort that is equally slow.  There is a perception amongst some that the sector is 
dominated by the UN and a small number of western based international donor 
organisations, hence, there are ongoing strategies to create collaborative organisations 
away from UN and western influence.  Such strategies might offer a means of increasing 
overall global capacity for disaster response, but new models are based on the current UN 
structure so may well encounter similar bureaucratic frustrations as a consequence. 
 
Academic opinion on the benefits of new IT systems are echoed (Altay and Labonte, 2011) 
and the associated information sharing opportunities have significantly improved 
standardisation and interoperability across the sector.  An alternate view on the effects of 
collaboration was offered, and the suggestion made striving for collaboration within the 
sector was a red herring; an ad hoc approach might actually benefit the overall effectiveness 
of the humanitarian relief effort.  Arguing the case for an element of chaos and uncertainty 
and agreeing with the idea that uncertainty leads to decision making (Mullins, 2013) the 
view was that there was far too much time spent in trying to apply formal structure to the 
supply chain.  Contesting academic opinion on the benefits of applying business sector 
supply chain strategy to the humanitarian sector (Chandes and Paché, 2009; Oloruntoba 
and Gray, 2006; Beamon, 2006), efforts to establish structure and coordination within 
humanitarian relief zones are actually detrimental on occasion.  In keeping with the 
argument that classic market mechanisms will not guarantee a quality response within the 
sector (Dash et al, 2013; Olson and Gregorian, 2007) what is really needed is a more rigid 
system that can judge agencies on their performance, and that has the legitimacy to exclude 
those that have a history of letting the overall effort down.     
 
Porter (1998) suggested that “clusters allow companies to operate more productively whilst 
coordinating with related companies” (p.78), however the Oxfam participant view is that 
clusters and cluster leaders are notoriously bad at communicating with local actors and local 
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governmental organisations, clearly in disagreement with the advice on cluster membership 
within the supply chain context (Patti, 2006).  In keeping with academic discourse (Altay 
and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010) on the organisation’s aim to develop 
strategies from the bottom up, and following academic guidance on successful cluster 
implementation (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) Oxfam’s strategy is to develop approaches which 
help victims of humanitarian disasters to help themselves and this is being achieved by 
working closely with local communities and involving appropriate local authorities and 
organisations at an early stage.  The consensus echoes the academic discussion on the 
requirement for inter-cluster coordination (Stoddard et al, 2007; Street, 2007; OCHA, 2006) 
and mechanisms to provide comprehensive recommendations and directions on how to 
better assess and analyse future humanitarian disasters should be introduced.  The UN 
Cluster system is struggling due to a lack of experience amongst cluster coordinators in 
dealing with the immediate response phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007).  Moreover, 
in keeping with the academic debate on the negative effect that centralisation of staff and 
decision makers can bring (Handy, 1993, cited by Mullins, 2013; Bollinger and Hofstede, 
1987, cited by Chanlat et al, 2013) too many key UN staff are based centrally rather than in 
the field of operations. 
 
The critical bottleneck in the supply chain is not the availability of supplies but that of money 
and people.  Administrative procedures used to distribute funds to the relief organisations 
by some cluster leads are questioned as these are seen to slow things down and are 
regarded as unsuited to the demand for a highly flexible and adaptable supply chain 
(Christopher, 2011; Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Harrison and van Hoek, 2011).  If this lack 
of supply chain responsiveness and resilience (Christopher, 2011) can be addressed then 
the immediate response phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) could be significantly 
shortened.  Furthermore, with the right level of coordination and management, it will be 
possible to introduce a combined approach across all phases of the relief effort, as called 
for by Thomas and Kopczak (2005).  A real concern is in respect of the ability of the 
humanitarian relief community to respond to multiple disasters and the likelihood of having 
to cope with more than one disaster at the same time.  The belief is that whilst the response 
system is growing incrementally, the growth is at a slower rate than that required to cope 
with the complexity of the impending demand for multiple responses. 
 
6.9.2  Understanding and Training 
 
Oxfam International participants agree with the academic call for an increase in logistics 
training and professionalisation (Tatham and Altay, 2013; Bolshe et al, 2013; Allen et al, 
2013; Heaslip, 2011; Moore and Taylor, 2011; Thomas and Mizushima, 2005).  Echoing the 
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academic discourse (Tatham and Altay, 2103, Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011) there is 
a lack of understanding and appreciation amongst some relief workers particularly in 
respect of the roles and contribution of other organisations and contributors within the 
sector.  However, whilst there is concern that the relatively high turnover of staff within 
Oxfam International itself might be problematic in respect of educational development, there 
is agreement that opportunities to professionalise within the sector could act as a retention 
tool (Lu et al, 2013).  The increasing number of disasters worldwide (Oloruntoba and Gray, 
2006; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005) together with the high overall cost of logistics provision 
(Guhu-Sapir, et al, 2011) could be used as a means to justify greater investment in training, 
but there is pragmatic resignation that the current financial climate will make financial 
investment in training difficult to justify.  Moreover, Oxfam International tend to adopt an 
“individual grafting” (Song et al, 2003) approach to staff recruitment by employing those with 
previous knowledge of the sector, or those who possess specific skill sets gained within the 
business sector (for example supply chain managers).  
 
Echoing the academic advice on the benefits of integrated learning (Goffnet et al, 2013; 
Heaslip, 2011) participants acknowledge the need for the inclusion of local organisations 
and governments in training strategies and believe that such initiatives help to facilitate 
partnerships with the local communities; thereby, supporting Oxfam International’s bottom 
up approach to humanitarian relief provision.   
 
6.9.3  Relationships 
 
The data gathered echoes the academic discussion on the partnered approach and on who 
should be included in the management of successful supply chains (Christopher, 2011, 
Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006; Patti, 2006).  Oxfam International are happy to 
take the lead or be led within humanitarian relief operations, and place great importance on 
local involvement in building what were described as “grass roots relationships”.  However, 
whilst fine in principle, relationship management with local authorities can be problematic in 
practice, particularly in countries where there is conflict, instability and insecurity.  There is 
often difficulty in identifying who the local government is, hence it becomes difficult to 
monitor and control the movements of donor funding and to maintain humanitarian quality 
standards.  Hence, Oxfam International staff attempt to establish and utilise long standing 
relationships with local partners to help ensure that aid is delivered to the most vulnerable.  
Whilst this strategy helps to maintain the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van 
Wassenhove, 2009, DFID, 2008) it also means that it is virtually impossible to offer 
predictable and timely delivery of aid.  The bureaucratic processes associated with the 
approach mean that in some cases local militia demand percentage payments from project 
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funds.  Oxfam International’s refusal to not make such payments and the consequent 
negotiation process has delayed projects in the past and the associated delivery of aid (see 
vignettes in section 6.9.3).    
 
There are challenges associated with the formation of what Kumar and Havey (2013) term 
Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) at the onset of an immediate response operation (Kovács 
and Spens, 2008, 2007).  Oxfam International’s contribution to the WASH Cluster (UNICEF, 
2013) was included as an example of a possible route to swift trust (Tatham and Kovács, 
2010) within the sector.  The data gathered reflects agreement with the benefits of the value 
chain (Porter, 1990), and inter-organisational cooperation is seen as a good idea in theory; 
however, in practice such a strategy leads to bureaucratic systems that slow down the 
overall response.  In accord with the academic discourse (Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Doh and 
Teegan, 2003; Steinberg, 2003; Porter and Kramer, 2002) the participant view was that 
there is governmental influence on some organisations within the sector, and some 
countries regard humanitarian relief as a means of supporting their own economies and 
political agendas.   
 
In disagreement with academic opinion on the positive impact that collaboration and 
coordination can have on supply chain performance (Dash et al, 2013, Christopher, 2011, 
Patti, 2006; Porter 1998 and 1990) and on the concerns that that humanitarian 
organisations run the risk of entering into competition with other organisations (Chandes 
and Paché, 2010), the data offers empirical evidence that business opportunism does exist 
within the sector.  The overall analysis supports the contention that humanitarian relief 
organisations are still businesses that will be driven by the market and associated market 
forces, and that the desire to demonstrate superior effectiveness and efficiency to donors 
will sometimes occur to the detriment of quantifiable end results (The Lancet, 2010; Olson 
and Gregorian, 2007; Weiss and Collins, 2000). 
 
6.9.4  Military Involvement 
 
There is a role for the military in the provision of humanitarian relief (Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 
2011; Thompson; 2010, Beauregard, 1998); but there are also some reservations in that 
the military contribution has to be under the right circumstances and where there may be a 
need for military resources such as trucks and planes or for military manpower to boost 
capacity.  However, wherever possible aid is most effectively delivered by civilian 
humanitarian organisations under the leadership of the UN.  Regional stability and with it 
security, are enhanced and not undermined by the provision of impartial, needs-based 
humanitarian aid and there is a potential for military involvement to lead to dangerous 
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consequences which may affect and limit the ability of civilian aid agencies’ to work 
(Williamson, 2011).   
 
The overall military contribution to the humanitarian relief effort is growing (Heaslip, 2011; 
Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 2011, Lynch, 2010) and the increasing number of disasters 
worldwide are resulting in a correspondingly larger number of humanitarian relief operations 
where military forces are working alongside civilian relief organisations.  Under the right 
circumstances military forces should be used to provide aid, this is particularly true within 
regions which are deemed as unsafe for civilian agencies to operate in.  Referring back to 
the debate on the preservation of the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van 
Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008), concerns are raised regarding the perception that military 
involvement has within local communities; the data supports the academic view 
(Williamson, 2011; Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011) that the concepts of neutrality and 
impartiality do not sit well with military intervention within the humanitarian relief supply 
chain.  In order to ensure an appropriate response under the humanitarian principles all 
organisations involved, including those from the military should ensure that any aid 
delivered has as its primary aim the reduction of poverty or suffering. 
 
Trying to incorporate humanitarian relief within the larger political context is an impossible 
task as military and political objectives will always collide with humanitarian principles.  
Warfare will always conflict with humanitarian principles and consequently, there are 
occasions when the military want to wear 2 hats, one driven by the pressure to achieve 
political aims and the other to support the humanitarian relief effort.  Whilst offering 
agreement with Heaslip’s (2011) assertion that “military and humanitarian organisations 
need to establish clear blue water between one another” (p.163), Oxfam participants believe 
that the challenge for the military is to clarify which hat they are wearing at the outset of the 
relief effort and to consistently adopt that one role throughout the ensuing relief operation.  
In agreement with the observations made by Williamson (2011) the military idea of using 
humanitarian aid to win hearts and minds is a flawed one and does not constitute or assist 
humanitarian relief work. 
 
The implementation of the stabilisation doctrine (MOD, 2009) and the corresponding 
change of military focus away from purely rapid short term humanitarian support, in favour 
of a policy of involvement in longer term militarised aid and building projects is welcome; 
however, there are concerns voiced in agreement with the observation that some 
governments regarded military involvement as a means of achieving long term political 
influence (Williamson, 2011; Yaziji and Doh, 2009).  Consequently, any military forces 
involved in the relief effort should adhere to the UN agreed civil-military guidelines; 
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moreover, the associated military rules of engagement should prohibit the use of 
humanitarian assistance for the fulfilment of military or governmental objectives.  Whilst 
there is a clear responsibility on governments to take action in such cases there is also a 
role to play for NGOs and aid organisations who have to ensure that their activities and 
donations do not directly or indirectly provide resources to be used to assist military conflict.  
Consequently, NGOs should refuse any donations which are conditional on them 
cooperating with military forces and all agencies involved in the relief effort have to ensure 
that the aid that is provided does not contribute in any way to any contravention of 
international human rights and the overall humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van 
Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008). 
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CHAPTER 7 
TEARFUND – INDIVIDUAL DOMAIN ANALYSIS 
 
“Tearfund has a big vision which we've been bringing into being since 1968. We know 
there's God-given-potential in poor communities. We work with local churches to unlock 
this potential.” 
(Tearfund, 2011) 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The data gathered from participants within The Evangelical Alliance Relief (TEAR) Fund is 
presented and discussed concurrently with appropriate academic discourse within the field 
of research that was first introduced within Chapter 2.  By way of introduction a short 
background and history of Tearfund is included together with a look at its current (as at 
2012) portfolio of humanitarian programmes and structures.  The discussion then turns to 
an analysis of the key etic and emic issues and themes identified.  Final conclusions and 
overall domain themes and issues are then established through triangulation of the data 
gathered and the academic discourse.   
 
7.2 Background – Core Beliefs, Drivers and Scale  
Tearfund is a Christian international aid agency working globally to end poverty and injustice 
(DEC, 2012).  They are passionate about living out God’s kingdom values of love, hope and 
transformation (Tearfund, 2011).  One of the 14 members of the Disasters Emergency 
Committee (DEC) they are recognised for their professional expertise in development, 
disaster response, disaster risk reduction and advocacy. Tearfund believe that this level of 
professionalism and expertise, matched with the enduring, sustainable effectiveness of the 
local church, is a powerful force in the face of poverty.  They are committed to standards of 
conduct and good practice that ensure that they are always accountable for the work that 
they do.  Tearfund are signatories to the Red Cross Code of Conduct (IFRC, 2012) and 
members of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP, 2012).  
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Core to Tearfund’s Christian values is the belief that aid must be given regardless of race, 
religion, nationality or gender, and that it will never be used to further a particular political 
or religious standpoint.  This is of vital importance to Tearfund staff as this is seen as the 
kind of ‘development work’ that is described in the Bible.  They follow a biblical path in 
believing that helping communities in need is central to the purpose of local churches, 
wherever they may be (Tearfund, 2011).  
 
The 2011/12 Director’s Report and Accounts (Tearfund 2012) records total Tearfund 
income as £70 million and expenditure on charitable activities as £59 million.  All 
expenditure is overseen by the UK Charity Commission, and the Fund is committed to 
ensuring that as much as possible of the money donated to them is spent in ways that 
benefit the people who need it most.  Approximately 91% of all donations go towards 
emergency, development and humanitarian work, as well as other elements of Tearfund 
charitable work such as campaigning and advocacy.  Of the remaining funds, 8% is spent 
on fund raising activity (which compares well with similar size organisations) and around 
1% is spent on the costs of governance.  (Tearfund, 2011).   
 
7.3 A Brief History - Fighting Poverty since 1968 
Donations to the Evangelical Church during World Refugee Year in 1960, and subsequent 
donations in support of famine relief efforts in Biafra prompted the public launch of Tearfund 
in 1968.  Increasing publicity and public awareness prompted Cliff Richard to give his first 
fundraising concert for the cause in the Royal Albert Hall in 1969.  In the 1970s Tearfund 
expanded with facilities being created to enable supporters to sponsor children in 
Bangladesh; their donations being used to provide food, healthcare and education through 
Christian projects.  In 1980 Tearfund sent its own medical team to work in refugee camps 
in Somalia and in 1985 driven by the events surrounding Band Aid, the Fund established a 
regular donation programme to provide long-term support for aid development programmes.  
The 1990s were marked by civil unrest in the Balkans and Tearfund were at the forefront of 
the associated humanitarian relief efforts.  In 1994 Tearfund launched a significant appeal 
and relief response effort following the Rwandan genocide, and in response to the 
devastating effects of Hurricane Mitch on Central America (1998) joined the Disasters 
Emergency Committee of relief agencies to appeal for funds (DEC, 2012).  Tearfund ended 
the 1990’s by becoming a founder-member of the Jubilee 2000 movement, an international 
coalition movement in over 40 countries that called for cancellation of third world debt by 
the year 2000 (Dent and Peters, 1999).   
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Since 2000 Tearfund has been involved in all major disaster relief efforts across the globe, 
from severe floods in Africa and South Asia to helping to cope with the humanitarian impact 
of conflicts in Afghanistan and Darfur.  The Fund responded to the devastation following the 
Asian Tsunami (2004) and in 2005, acted as a leading member of the Make Poverty History 
(2005) coalition; a coalition of charities, religious groups, trade unions and campaigning 
groups aimed at holding governments to account to end world poverty (Nicholls, 2005).   
 
7.4 A Growing Portfolio - Current Humanitarian Programmes and Structures 
 
Tearfund’s meteoric rise within the humanitarian relief sector continues today as it has a 
policy of responding operationally to humanitarian disasters in situations of overwhelming 
need (Tearfund, 2011).  As at October 2012 operational programmes were on-going in 
Darfur, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Afghanistan and Haiti 
(Tearfund, 2012).  During financial year 2011/12 more than 7,300 new local churches were 
established to address the needs of poor, vulnerable and marginalised people in their 
communities.  Integral mission initiatives were increased to 109, across 59 countries 
including partnerships with support organisations in Nepal, Zimbabwe and Pakistan (p6).  A 
comprehensive and integrated approach to disasters and disaster vulnerability, undertaking 
disaster risk reduction and disaster response exists through the activities of Tearfund 
partners, their direct operational programmes, Tearfund UK teams, local churches and 
global networks.  Each programme is led by a programme director and a senior 
management team and each project location is under the responsibility of an Area 
Coordinator.  The Operational Team in the UK Head Office includes finance staff and 
technical services staff to ensure that programmes are effectively supported, along with a 
humanitarian support team which provides wider support to Tearfund staff and partners 
(Tearfund, 2012). 
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7.5 Data Collection, Respondents and Results 
 
Tearfund were first contacted in May 2012 through a series of introductory letters and 
questionnaires, as per Stage I in the research methodology.  Key respondents are shown 
in Table 7.1: 
 
Respondent Time 
with 
Tearfund 
(years) 
Practical Experience Role Code 
Head of 
International 
Finance and 
Logistics 
24 Involved in logistics 
support to every 
major humanitarian 
crisis since 1989 
To lead and manage 
the International 
Finance and Logistics 
team. 
 
HOL 
Deputy 
Programme 
Director 
19 Most major crises 
since joining the 
organisation 
Part of the Senior 
Management Team for 
a given relief 
programme with 
significant external 
representation of 
Tearfund. 
DPD 
International 
Logistics 
Manager 
7 Darfur, Pakistan, 
South Sudan, Liberia, 
Haiti, DRC 
To manage resources  
engaged in the delivery 
of specific operational 
projects  
ILM 
Area 
Coordinator 
7 Afghan National 
Solidarity 
Programme, Haiti 
Responsible for the 
management of specific 
financial, logistics and 
human resource 
functions engaged on 
one particular 
operation.  Regular 
communication with 
other agencies and 
partner organisations. 
AC 
Base 
Manager (x3) 
 
5 
 
 
DRC, Haiti 
Responsible for 
managing a project 
area office and 
delivering operational 
support to project sites 
in Logistics, Finance, 
HR and general 
administration. 
 
BM1 
 
3 
 
 
Haiti 
 
BM2 
 
2 
 
 
Haiti 
 
BM3 
 
Table 7.1 Tearfund – Key Respondents  
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7.6 Data Analysis – Stage I – Key Etic Themes and Issues 
 
Analysis of the data gathered via the introductory questionnaires (Appendix D), will now be 
discussed.  In achieving this due consideration will be given to the practical relevance of 
the initial etic issues and themes identified within the Literature Review as set out and 
codified at Appendix E.  Note that respondent codes within Table 7.1 will be used at this 
stage.  
 
7.6.1 General Processes, Power, Relationships and Collaboration 
 
All respondents agreed that the organisation operated a supply chain that was designed 
specifically for its particular role (COLRES).  However, senior respondents (HOL, DPD, ILM) 
stated that Tearfund do not operate under the UN Cluster Concept (COLCLU) whilst only 
one junior respondent (BM1) was aware of the strategy.  All respondents offered the view 
that Tearfund do not take the lead in any logistical activity along the humanitarian relief 
supply chain and the senior view was that they would not be willing to accept such 
responsibility in any future operations (HOL, DPD) (PWRPOS, PWRNEG, RMT, RMOPP).  
Facilities are shared with other NGOs (AC, BM1,2,3) but this is at a localised level 
(COLHOR) and there is no visibility of this in the higher operational sense (COLVER) (HOL, 
DPD, ILM).  When it comes to acceptance of military assistance there was a resounding 
answer of ‘Depends on the circumstances’ from all respondents (HUMSIND). 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.6.2 The Humanitarian Space 
 
When considering the Humanitarian Space and the 4 humanitarian principles, all principles 
were recognised and acknowledged by the respondents but whilst they were scored as 
being of equal importance by the senior respondents (HOL, DPD), it was interesting to note 
that the more junior respondents (ILM, AC, BM) were all happy to offer an opinion and to 
grade most and least important as in Fig 7.1 
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
UN Cluster Concept/ Lead Status/ Power/ 
Relationships/Sharing of Facilities/ Military 
Assistance 
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Fig 7.1 – Humanitarian Principles - Tearfund Junior Responses  
 
 
Humanity (HUMSHUM) and Impartiality (HUMSIMP) are clearly the most important with 
Neutrality (HUMSNEU) and Independence (HUMSIND) being the least important in the 
eyes of the Tearfund’s humanitarian relief practioners.  However, perhaps this could have 
been expected as if one considers the definitions of the 4 principles set out in the 
questionnaire (Appendix D), there are some close similarities between those offered for 
Humanity and Impartiality and Neutrality and Independence which should have perhaps, 
with hindsight been avoided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.6.3 Organisational Sustainment 
 
In prioritising the statements surrounding organisational sustainment the senior respondent 
(HOL) pointed to Tearfund’s membership of the interagency Humanitarian Accountability 
Partnership (HAP) and noted that one of the Fund’s most important aims was to adhere to 
the associated quality, accountability and performance improvement initiatives (HAP, 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Humanity Neutrality Impartiality Independence
Most Important
Least Important
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
Humanitarian Principles  
 
 216 
 
2012).  The senior respondent also noted that whilst there was a drive to demonstrate to 
donors that their presence and inputs into a humanitarian mission were valuable (SUSFR), 
this was only in the context of value for money.  Moreover, demonstrating competitive 
behaviour towards other humanitarian actors and organisations (SUSSTRAT) and seeking 
visible means of demonstrating active subscription to CSR, (SUSCSR) were not applicable 
in his eyes.  Other respondents (DPD, ILM, AC, BM) noted that it was important to 
demonstrate a presence (SUSFR) and this was particularly true of the junior respondents 
(LM), who regarded this to be a priority when working in a practical relief area.  
Demonstration of subscription to CSR (SUSCSR) was also an area of importance, but 
demonstration of competitive behaviour (SUSSTRAT) was considered to be not-applicable 
by all respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
Membership of HAP 
Demonstration of Value for money/ 
Presence 
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7.6.4 Summary - Key Etic Themes and Issues  
 
In completing Stage I of the research strategy with Tearfund the following key etic themes 
and issues were identified to inform Stage II of the research strategy. 
 
Theme 
 
Issue Description Notes 
General 
Processes, Power, 
Relationships and 
Collaboration 
 
UN Cluster 
Concept 
Senior vs junior 
knowledge  
 
Why Tearfund do not 
adopt the strategy 
LM not aware of 
concept 
 
 
Lead status Do not take the lead in 
any operational activity 
Who does? 
Happy to follow? 
Power/relationships? 
Sharing of 
facilities 
Facilities shared but at 
local level 
Why not at a higher 
level? 
What is shared? 
Who with? 
Military 
Assistance 
Acceptance will 
‘Depend on the 
Circumstances’ 
What circumstances? 
What type of/ how 
much assistance? 
 
The Humanitarian 
Space 
 
Humanity vs 
Impartiality Misunderstanding of 
definitions 
Clarify understanding 
and relevance of 
principles 
Neutrality vs 
Independence 
 
Organisational 
Sustainment 
 
Membership of 
HAP 
Adherence to the 
associated quality, 
accountability and 
performance 
improvement 
initiatives. 
Check general 
awareness of HAP 
membership and 
principles 
Demonstration 
of Value for 
money 
Must demonstrate 
value for money to 
donors 
How? 
Awareness at junior 
respondent level? 
Demonstration 
of Presence 
Must demonstrate 
presence to donors 
How? 
Senior vs Junior 
opinions. 
 
 
Table 7.2 Tearfund – Stage I Key Etic Themes and Issues 
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7.7 Data Analysis – Stage II – Developing Emic Themes and Issues 
 
Analysis of the data gathered during the semi structured interviews with members of 
Tearfund listed in Table 7.1 will now be discussed.  In keeping with Stage II of the final 
research strategy interviews were based around the schedule (Appendix F) which had been 
developed following cross-domain analysis of Stage I findings and the key etic themes and 
issues that had been identified as a result.  Note that respondent codes listed within Table 
7.1 will still be used throughout this discussion. 
 
7.7.1 General Processes, Coordination and Collaboration 
 
“The UN Cluster Approach is fine to a point but I have seen it work as both a 
bottleneck and an enabler……for it to be truly effective the controlling authorities 
must concentrate on the effective coordination of international agencies much more 
than they do at present…..they must take a more active role on the ground and not 
sit back and let things develop…” (HOL) 
 
The quote above echoes the feelings of all Tearfund respondents in respect of the 
effectiveness of the UN Cluster Approach (UN OCHA, 2011).  The data gathered 
demonstrates overall support for the theoretical concept of clusters (Patti, 2006; Porter, 
1998), but that the practical application of the concept in real time disaster relief operations 
is somewhat different.  The view is that there are too many priorities competing with each 
other and that the current approach clouds the issue and does not allow donors to have a 
clear understanding of what the immediate needs are (DPD).  Referring to his experiences 
during the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, when the Cluster Approach was first used ILM did 
feel that the overall relief effort was better coordinated than it would have been without it; 
however, there were clear areas for improvement and, in keeping with the thoughts of 
Jensen (2012) clusters contributed to unaccountability and inefficiencies in the response as 
many cluster leads had no delegated authority to make decisions.  Moreover, ILM was 
obviously frustrated as he discussed his experiences of the response to the Haitian 
earthquake (2010), where he agreed with the view offered by Lynch (2010) in that little had 
changed in the intervening 5 years.   
 
The data show a common perception amongst the Tearfund respondents that there are 
cultural barriers to effective collaboration: 
 
“The greatest limitation of the UN Cluster Approach is the failure by cluster lead 
agencies at a global level to adequately prioritise and resource cluster leadership 
and coordination responsibilities…..this is not just down to funding issues but also 
to inter-agency culture and rivalry” (HOL) 
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This view would seem to echo that offered by Reindorp and Wiles (2001) in a report 
commissioned by the UN OCHA, which ultimately informed the introduction of the UN 
Cluster Approach, where they note that “there is an institutional culture within humanitarian 
agencies in which cooperation is neither required nor rewarded” (p.50).  Views that would 
also seem to concur with comments on the reticence of some organisations to act alone 
(Heaslip, 2011; Senge, 2010) and on the simple fact that “You cannot collaborate with a 
party that lacks a genuine desire to collaborate” (Kampstra and Ashayeri, 2006, p.312).  
Moreover, and somewhat disappointingly, the practical observations of ILM would also 
seem to be confirmed in that little has in  fact changed since the introduction of the Cluster 
Approach in 2005 (Lynch, 2010).  AC sums up the overall Tearfund view on the Cluster 
Approach as he agreed with Patti (2006) in that the best way forward was to retain clusters, 
but to make them more concise by outlining clear priorities and including as many 
stakeholders as possible in the process.  
 
Christopher (2011) supported the need for a flexible and agile supply chain and BM1 
supports this idea as he calls for agencies to increase their capacity to respond speedily 
with skilled coordinators.  Furthermore, BM1 contends that this can be best achieved 
through the development of a classic partnered approach (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; 
Lysons and Farrington, 2006), adopting closer working relationships together with the 
sharing of assets, facilities and knowledge.  Referring to his experiences in Haiti (2010), 
BM1 felt that a more accurate analysis of the situation on the ground would have helped, 
and that the lack of reliable information sharing and communication mechanisms was the 
main contributor to an overall lack of knowledge and awareness.  BM3 supported this view 
and the observations made by Lynch (2010), as he discussed the limitations on offloading 
capability and storage capacity that he had experienced in Haiti; issues that he felt were as 
a direct result of the sheer scale of devastation to the airport, sea port and roads, combined 
with a lack of information sharing that had led to a very slow dispersal of aid.  BM3 also felt 
that partnerships and the sharing of assets is a key factor in the provision of effective 
humanitarian aid: 
 
“We [Tearfund] aim to be accountable to our donors and to those partners who we 
participate in projects with……Tearfund is about participation….because of this we 
are happy to share information and facilities”   
 
AC offered some very strong views on the acceptance of military assistance and reflected 
the observations offered by Williamson (2011) in believing that the military should never act 
as the lead organisation within natural disaster relief zones.  Heaslip (2011) suggests that 
there are 2 aspects of military support in humanitarian, the provision of security and the 
provision of resources; however, AC’s clear view was that the military should focus solely 
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on the first of these, as he believed that the military are in a humanitarian relief zone to 
protect him and his colleagues, and that military contributors should leave humanitarian 
organisations to carry out the actual relief effort: 
 
“They [the military] have a clear role to play in providing security for relief workers 
but should not try and interfere with NGOs and donors in the relief zone” 
 
His views are probably influenced by his personal experiences in Haiti, where he felt that in 
the immediate response to the natural disaster the US military had initially taken control but 
that they had done this without any clear authority, when perhaps it would have been better 
under the auspices of the UN.  DPD was a little more reserved on this issue and pointed to 
the fact that sensitivity over sovereignty will almost always rule out an international military 
role unless it is as part of the UN; thereby supporting the view that in response to natural 
disasters civil-military coordination should be strictly between governments and their 
military’s (UN OCHA, 2013a).  Echoing the academic discourse on the benefits of applying 
business sector supply chain strategy to the humanitarian sector (Chandes and Paché, 
2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Beamon, 2006) DPD believed that NGOs and aid 
agencies in general should operate on a business model in isolation from the military and 
in direct competition with each other.  His overall view was that although international 
military forces are useful in providing support to the supply, delivery and distribution of aid, 
a well-coordinated humanitarian response must look beyond the issue of distribution of relief 
and to the re-establishment of systems and livelihoods, thereby helping a population to 
recover as quickly as possible.  In sum, his overall view was that:  
 
“The military is not equipped nor really interested in dealing with this”. 
 
The data gathered suggests that these opinions are shared by the other Tearfund 
respondents, but that there is also general agreement with the view that military intervention 
does have a vital role to play in the overall relief effort (Heaslip, 2011; Tatham, 2011; 
Thompson, 2010).  However, the consensus would seem to support the argument proffered 
by Katoch (2006) in that foreign military assistance should only be provided at the request 
of the affected government and that any subsequent response must be coordinated through 
that government.  Moreover the data goes on to acknowledge the view that the UN is best 
placed to coordinate the relief effort given its position in relation to affected governments 
and the worldwide donor community (Reindorp and Wiles, 2001). 
 
 
 
  
Key Emic Themes and Issues 
Clusters/ Coordination/ Information Sharing 
and Knowledge/ Asset Sharing/ Military 
Assistance/ Links to local Government 
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7.7.2 Power and Relationships 
 
The data gathered concurred with academic views in support of a partnered approach 
(Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006) and on who should be included in the 
management of successful supply chains (Christopher, 2011; Patti, 2006); furthermore it 
confirms that a key tenant of Tearfund’s overall strategy is to work in partnership with other 
organisations within the humanitarian relief sector.  DPD discussed the organisation’s 
membership of numerous committees and groups within the sector and cited the Disasters 
Emergency Committee (DEC, 2012) and the Inter-Agency Procurement Group (IPAG, 
2013) as examples of Tearfund’s willingness to work with partner organisations, NGOs and 
governments who specialise in areas where they believed that they could have the greatest 
impact: 
 
“When we work with partners we do not try and impose on them…..we try and work 
with partners who share our values……we are always trying to improve the quality 
of our partnerships”. (DPD) 
 
Disappointingly for the sector as a whole, HOL offered support to the academic discourse 
on the negative effect that power can have on the workings of a successful supply chain, in 
that it negates co-operation and is not helpful in building relationships (Olson and Gregorian, 
2007; Naudé and Buttle, 2000; Doney and Cannon, 1997) as he added that, to his 
knowledge certain other smaller NGOs were not happy to join such organisations as there 
was a perception that they would not be treated on an equal basis.   
 
Tearfund participants were content with the idea that power imbalance is a first step towards 
successful relationship building, and were clearly content to operate within conditions of 
imbalanced power and reward (Hingley, 2005a, p.63), as they accepted that the size of their 
organisation meant that, realistically they will not be offered lead status in a relief zone.  The 
consensus was that trust and relationship management within what Kumar and Havey 
(2013) describe as Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) were of vital importance to them, and 
to the Tearfund’s overall strategy.  Chandes and Paché (2010) and Olson and Gregorian 
(2007) contend that business opportunism exists within the sector, but the data gathered 
demonstrates that competition was not an issue in the case of the Tearfund; however, this 
view can probably be explained by consideration of the core Christian values that drive 
overall organisational policy (Tearfund, 2011).  HOL was quick to refer to the Organisation’s 
overall belief that they should be open and accountable to their financial supporters and 
that “for every pound donated around 91 pence goes to our humanitarian field work” 
(according to the Tearfund website, approximately eight pence is spent raising funds and 
less than one penny in every pound is spent on the costs of governance (Tearfund, 2011)).  
HOL and DPD discussed Tearfund’s membership of the Humanitarian Accountability 
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Partnership (HAP, 2012) and the fact that the organisation is a signatory to the Red Cross 
Code of Conduct (IFRC, 2012): 
 
“Our Christian values mean that we are committed to living out God’s core values 
through our dedication to those who need us and relationships with other donor 
organisations” (HOL) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.7.3 The Humanitarian Space 
 
The data gathered demonstrates that the maintenance of all humanitarian principles 
(Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008) and Christian beliefs are a significant 
factor in the Tearfund’s overall strategy.  All respondents are clearly aware of the Tearfund’s 
Quality Standards (Tearfund, 2013) and Statement of Faith (Tearfund, 2013a): 
 
“God’s love for everyone is important to us and our Christian beliefs mean that we 
will always remain neutral…..we will try and reach all who need our help” (AC) 
 
“The Bible describes development work and that is what we do……we help local 
churches to help themselves wherever they are” (BM3) 
 
In disagreement with the academic view (Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; 
Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003), the data confirms that politics do not influence 
Tearfund policy or direction in respect of the humanitarian effort in the field and that 
respondents “would not let political barriers prevent us from carrying out God’s teaching” 
(BM3).   Typical of the responses in this area is that offered by ILM who felt that help must 
be provided on the basis of need, and that he and his colleagues must clearly identify those 
who are in greatest need regardless of political pressures.  However, in contrast DPD did 
acknowledge the view (Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003) that in recent years some 
NGOs had attempted to influence policy decisions to help shape global political 
perspectives on a wide range of humanitarian issues as he cited Tearfund’s involvement in 
the Enough Food for Everyone IF (2013) as an example of the organisation’s attempts to 
bring influence to bear on what he described as “key decision-makers”. 
 
 
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Partnerships 
Accountability to Donors 
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Influence Key Decision Makers  
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7.7.4 Organisational Sustainment 
 
Olson and Gregorian (2007) and Kent (1987) comment on the adverse influence that 
financial pressure and a fear of donor withdrawal can have on NGO behaviour within 
humanitarian relief zones, and the data gathered demonstrates acknowledgement of a 
commitment and accountability to the donor community.  HOL explained that Tearfund is 
dedicated to ensuring that the work that they do will have a lasting and positive impact and 
that the relief effort has been built on local need and local skills and resources.  He explained 
that Tearfund achieve this through a network of local churches and partner organisations 
and that the money donated is used to help to inspire Christian believers to challenge 
poverty and injustice and to help the most vulnerable as a result. ILM referred to the 
Tearfund Supporter’s Charter (Tearfund, 2013b): 
 
“Where we set out our commitment to our supporters, make clear promises to them 
and ask for their feedback on how we spend their donations” 
 
The data does not suggest that Tearfund actively seek publicity; they rely on their donors 
to keep abreast of their activities through a dedicated website and the publication of annual 
report and accounts.  The Organisation is aware of the impact on the environment and is 
committed to the key tenants of Corporate Social Responsibility: 
 
“We want to reduce our impact on the environment……when we work with the local 
churches we always ensure that we do not do anything that may harm the natural 
environment” (AC) 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Accountability to donors 
Impact on the Environment  
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7.7.5 Summary – Tearfund Key Emic Themes and Issues  
 
Theme 
 
Issue Description Notes 
Management and 
Control 
 
Coordination Practical reality  Competing priorities 
Clusters 
Areas for 
improvement 
No change since 
inception 
Inter-agency culture 
and rivalry 
Negative effect on 
clusters 
Make role more 
concise 
Outline priorities 
and include 
stakeholders 
 
Relationships 
 
Information and 
Knowledge Sharing 
Lack of reliable 
information 
Poor overall 
awareness 
Slow distribution of 
aid 
Asset sharing Increase capacity 
Speed up 
distribution 
Partnerships 
Unequal treatment  
Concern of smaller 
NGOs 
Quality of delivery Seek to improve 
Success achieved 
through Christian 
beliefs 
 
Influence key 
decision makers 
Aim to help poor 
and vulnerable 
Partnership with 
action groups 
Accountable to 
donors 
Feedback to donors 
Awareness 
Impact on the 
environment 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
Military 
Involvement 
 
Assistance Clarity of role  
Links to local 
government 
Maintenance of 
Sovereignty 
Establish control 
over external 
military participants Role of local military 
Interest beyond 
initial response 
Not just distribution 
but overall recovery 
Accelerate overall 
recovery 
 
 
Table 7.3 Tearfund – Stage II Key Emic Themes and Issues   
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7.8 Data Analysis – Stage III – Confirm Emic Themes and Issues 
 
Analysis of the data gathered during the Focus Group carried out with members of Tearfund 
will now be discussed.  Two of the participants list in Table 7.1 (BM2 and BM3) were unable 
to attend the Focus Group, hence membership was restricted to the five remaining 
members of Tearfund listed in Table 7.1.   In keeping with Stage III of the final research 
strategy discussion during the Focus Group was based around the Focus Group Topic 
Guide (Appendix G) which had been developed following analysis of the Stage II findings 
and the key emic themes and issues that had been identified as a result.  Note that 
respondent codes listed within Table 7.1 will still be used throughout this discussion. 
 
7.8.1 Management and Control 
 
There is a clear support amongst the Tearfund Focus Group for the view that all participant 
organisations have a part to play in the relief effort and that better coordination will benefit 
the overall provision and efficient delivery of aid.  However, the consensus was that OCHA 
has an impossible task (ILM); moreover, the Group also acknowledged the increasing 
demands being placed on OCHA in light of the growing number of donor agencies involved 
within the overall humanitarian relief effort (Heaslip, 2011; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini 
and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada et al, 2006).  Coordination 
of the relief effort is required but the belief was that the task is too big for one organisation: 
 
“The competing agendas and open rivalry at times between international 
organisations means that little coordinated activity can actually take place…… We 
prefer to do our own thing if possible and to work by establishing close links with the 
local community at an early stage”. (ILM). 
 
Handfield and Nichols (1999) argue that a critical component to a successful supply chain 
strategy is relationship management and to counter the ILM’s assertions the remaining 
participants acknowledged that the Tearfund has to work with other agencies in order to 
gain access to vital resources and expertise.  The overall view was that the Tearfund is not 
a large enough organisation to act in isolation and that consequently, it has to rely on other 
agencies for resources such as transport and storage space.  However, the bureaucracy 
involved in such a strategy can lead to significant delays in getting aid to those who need it 
most.  Tearfund also relies on other organisations for strategic information on the disaster 
area itself, but in keeping with the observations made by Heaslip (2011) and Lynch (2010) 
there was agreement and noticeable frustration at the slow and at times inaccurate 
information flow: 
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“In Haiti we really struggled for information at the beginning as there was no central 
point…..we were also regarded by some as a small organisation so we had to search 
out information when it would have been better to have been given it” (BM1) 
 
This statement highlights another area of concern for the Group in the way that NGOs, in 
their experience are ranked within disaster relief areas (HOL).  The Group felt that those 
larger organisations in the field lacked an understanding of what others had to contribute, 
and that an increase in knowledge would help the overall effort.   
 
Turning to the UN Cluster Concept, participant opinion echoed with that of Jensen (2112), 
in that whilst clusters were fine in principle, in practice they were ineffective and slowed 
things down in the field.  Whilst there was clear acknowledgement of, and support for the 
academic concept of clusters (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) the overall opinion agreed with 
Jensen (2101) in that they can prove to be cumbersome and difficult to manage, leading to 
significant delays in relief provision.  This is due in no small part to the fact that clusters and 
their leaders are not held accountable and in most cases are not empowered to make 
decisions and to sanction actions.  The view was that the link between the clusters and 
OCHA is not clear and that some cluster leaders keep referring back to the UN to make 
decisions, whilst others carry out their own ideas without any consultation.  The idea of 
performance management (Kaplan and Norton, 1996) and cluster accountability was well 
received and there was agreement that some clearer guidelines on cluster implementation 
and management will help to address the inherent confusion amongst participant 
organisations.  There was also a strong consensus that in keeping with the academic view, 
in order to be effective clusters should include both “upstream suppliers and downstream 
customers” (Patti, p.266); consequently the inclusion of local governments and 
organisations is paramount to any successful strategy.  Moreover, the involvement of local 
communities and authorities in the cluster concept would serve to enhance its overall 
success and to prevent a sense of distrust amongst recipient communities. 
 
“Local communities are at the heart of all Tearfund activity and this works for 
us……why should the cluster approach be any different…..leaving them out makes 
them suspicious and unsure…include local authorities and communities and they 
can begin to take responsibility for their own well-being and recovery at an early 
stage in the relief effort” (AC) 
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7.8.2 Understanding and Training 
 
There was clear agreement with the view that training and professionalisation is a vital 
aspect of humanitarian provision (Tatham and Altay, 2013; Moore and Taylor, 2011; 
Thomas and Mizushima, 2005); however, the Group and HOL in particular were pragmatic 
in respect of the financial restrictions that are associated with the provision of specific 
training within the Tearfund.  The overall consensus was that given its size and budget, the 
Tearfund is restricted in respect of training funding.  The organisation’s aim is to turn as 
much of its donations into aid as possible, hence, the organisation could not really justify 
committing funding to professional training for its staff.  As a consequence, the overall 
approach to training within Tearfund is one that takes advantage of employing staff from 
other organisations with appropriate knowledge, a process referred to as “Individual 
Grafting” by Song et al (2003) or one that encompasses a strategy of experiential learning 
within the organisation itself (Huber, 1991). 
 
“Tearfund recruit predominantly volunteers who are driven to them by Christian 
belief, if these volunteers can offer additional and relevant skills then so much the 
better but we are happy for them to learn through experience and from others within 
the organisation” (HOL)  
 
The size of the Tearfund was also raised as an issue in respect of joint training and 
exercises as whilst it was acknowledged that this is a good idea in theory (Goffnet et al, 
2013; Heaslip, 2011), there was a fear that such a strategy might detract from ongoing relief 
provision and effort.  Indeed, the question was raised as to how organisations, and in 
particular those smaller ones such as the Tearfund can spare staff to take part in joint 
training exercises as the vast majority of their volunteers are constantly engaged in aid 
provision across the world. 
 
The Group were keen to discuss Tearfund’s approach to local training and the successes 
that they have had.  The following vignettes serve to illustrate the Tearfund strategy in 
respect of local engagement and training:  
 
“After the initial response to the Haiti earthquake, Tearfund started to help the local 
communities to deal with the flooding and landslides that affect them every year after 
the huge storms which pass over the country.  We identified that the residents of the 
very difficult to access communities had to be equipped with the training and 
understanding to reduce the risks and hard ship using their own resources.’ (ILM) 
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Also based in Haiti, AC spoke of a school building project: 
 
“Through our local partner in Haiti, the Union of Baptist Churches, we opened a 
school to train builders of the future.  Part of the training was also to prepare local 
communities for future earthquakes or disasters”.   
 
7.8.3 Relationships 
 
In keeping with the view that customer/supplier relationships should be based on 
partnership and that successful supply chains will be those based on mutuality and trust 
where there is a constant search for win-win solutions (Lysons and Farrington, 2006; Sadler, 
2007; Christopher, 2011), Tearfund’s fund raising and aid delivery strategies rely on 
successful relationships and effective use of partnered working.  The Group discussed 
Tearfund’s membership of organisations such as the DEC and HAP (see earlier discussion 
in this Chapter), together with its affiliation to the Micah Network, “a global Christian 
community of organisations and individuals, often operating in isolation, drawn together to 
significantly enhance their capacity and impact as well as develop their ability to act 
collectively in key areas of concern” (Micah Network, 2013).  The Focus Group agreed that 
memberships such as these were vital in helping Tearfund and other similar sized or smaller 
humanitarian relief organisations to have a more significant say in proceedings and disaster 
relief operations in general; thereby, suggesting that there is an inherent power imbalance 
(Hingley, 2005a) within humanitarian relief zones, but also acknowledging the Tearfund’s 
position within it.  By way of illustration, DPD felt that: 
 
“We know that will never be in a position of power, but we don’t want to be……our 
aim is to improve the quality of our partnerships to the benefit of those in need”. 
(DPD) 
 
Referring to the work on Hastily Formed Networks (Kumar and Havey, 2013; Tatham and 
Kovács, 2010) the consensus was that a significant challenge is to establish working 
relationships at an early stage of any relief project; in keeping with Tatham and Kovács 
development of Chung’s work on swift trust (2010) the aim is to try and build relationships 
through trust and common Christian belief.  Tearfund’s Open Door strategy of tailored 
relationships (Tearfund, 2011) was discussed as an example of the organisation’s creation 
of such relationships:    
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“We [Tearfund] encourage local churches to join with us to establish a project within 
an area of community.  These projects stretch far and wide with a number of UK 
churches establishing links across nations” (DPD) 
 
This approach has seen significant funds raised by UK based churches and dioceses in 
support of long term projects in South America, Africa and Asia (Tearfund, 2011) and the 
belief amongst participants is that they offer a great illustration of what can be achieved by 
working together in close partnership.  Although the projects discussed by the Focus Group 
are longer term the consensus was that they serve to illustrate what likeminded Christian 
people and organisations can achieve by working together.  The Group also believed that 
their strategy of working with local organisations within disaster relief areas was another 
key to the organisation’s overall success.   
 
“We [Tearfund] give financial grants to partner churches to fund specific projects and 
also encourage our partners to develop their own capacity within individual 
communities”. (AC) 
 
There were also further discussions around the organisation’s training initiatives with local 
partners on the development of disaster management and risk reduction schemes. 
 
7.8.4 Military Involvement 
 
There was clear acknowledgement that the military has a role to play in the provision of 
humanitarian relief (Heaslip, 2011; Thompson; 2010) and also agreement that the overall 
military contribution to the relief effort was growing; however, whilst the Group did agree 
that the military might possess the will and the expertise to make a larger contribution, some 
participants clearly found it difficult to align military involvement in disaster relief with the 
maintenance of the humanitarian (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008), 
and Christian principles.  AC was quick to reaffirm the views that he had offered during 
Stage II of the research: 
 
“The military have a clear role, to maintain security and to protect the aid workers 
when required…….they [the military] should not try to involve themselves in aid 
provision itself as this type of involvement confuses the local communities who may 
well live in fear of a military uniform”    
 
There was acknowledgement that the UN blue beret might help to address some of these 
fears, but also agreement with the worry that a military uniform will always be a sign of 
conflict and suffering to some.  In keeping with the views offered by Heslip (2011) and 
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Williamson (2011) the belief was that the military would always struggle to address differing 
roles within a humanitarian relief zone, or indeed to change roles part way through a disaster 
relief operation.  In essence, the Group support clear guidelines and UN control of military 
resources and felt that there would never be a situation where the military should be given 
a controlling influence over the disaster relief effort.  In sum, the UN and OCHA are given a 
controlling role and they should maintain it in close liaison with local governments and 
authorities.  
 
The data gathered demonstrates agreement with the thoughts of Doh and Teegan (2003) 
in that the Tearfund regards itself as a political lobbyist which tries to influence governments 
and organisations to help the needy and vulnerable around the world: 
 
“We don’t just respond to disasters but look to actively influence authorities and 
governments in support of those who do not have a voice……we do this through our 
membership of organisations and groups which have similar hopes and desires” 
(HOL) 
 
There was agreement with the view that politics does have a role to play in the relief effort 
itself and that some organisations are influenced by political agendas (Williamson, 2011; 
Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Olson and Gregorian, 2007).  The overall consensus was that political 
influence was inevitable as a lot of donors are large multi-national organisations who want 
to be seen to be making a contribution by their shareholders.  However, the Group did feel 
that this is why Tearfund and similar organisations do prove attractive to some donors, as 
they believe that their strategy based around common belief was appealing to what they 
termed as “the average Christian man in the street”. 
 
7.9 Conclusions and Overall Domain Themes and Issues  
 
As the last of four chapters presenting an analysis of the research findings, this chapter has 
drawn upon data gathered from participants within the Tearfund.  Having firstly established 
the key etic issues and themes through analysis of questionnaire responses, emic issues 
were developed and then investigated through a series of semi-structured interviews with 
Tearfund participants.  Finally, additional analysis and application of relevant literature 
within the field informed the areas of discussion within a participant focus group.  Hence, in 
keeping with the final research strategy through triangulation of data gathered and findings 
from questionnaires, interviews and a focus group with key informants, the chapter has 
explored trends that describe the barriers to collaboration within humanitarian relief supply 
chains and also looked to identify how these barriers might be addressed to improve 
collaboration in the future.  Following the classic case study process (Yin, 2009) the findings 
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and trends discussed within this section will be used during a final cross-domain analysis 
within Chapter 8 which will inform the final conclusions and academic contribution.  The 
section will now be broken down into the key emic themes and issues identified within the 
Tearfund arrived at through application of Stages I and II of the final research strategy and 
confirmed and expanded upon during Stage III.    
 
7.9.1 Management and Control 
 
All participant organisations have a part to play in the relief effort and a more coordinated 
approach will benefit the overall delivery of aid.  However, OCHA has an impossible task 
as the growing number of donor agencies involved within the overall humanitarian relief 
effort (Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 
2007; Yamada et al, 2006) means that the coordination role is too big for one organisation.  
Competing agendas and open rivalry at times between international relief organisations, 
means that little coordinated activity actually takes place; as a result on occasion, the 
Tearfund preferred to work alone and to concentrate on establishing close links with the 
local community.  When the Tearfund does work with other agencies it is as a result of a 
need to gain access to vital resources such as transport and storage space, this strategy 
relies on sound relationship management along the supply chain (Handfield and Nichols, 
1999).  However, the bureaucracy involved in such a strategy can lead to significant delays 
in getting aid to those who needed it most.  The Tearfund also looks to other humanitarian 
organisations for strategic information on the disaster area itself, but in keeping with the 
observations made by Heaslip (2011) and Lynch (2010) there was agreement and 
noticeable frustration at the slow and at times inaccurate flow of such information.   
 
NGOs are effectively ranked within disaster relief areas, and larger organisations in the 
sector lack an understanding of what others have to contribute; an increase in knowledge 
in this area will significantly help the overall effort.  Concurring with Jensen (2012), clusters 
are fine in principle, but in practice are ineffective and slow things down in the field.  The 
concept of clusters (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) has support but did prove to be cumbersome 
in practice as cluster leaders are not held accountable and are not empowered to make 
decisions or to sanction actions.  Competing priorities within relief zones mean that the 
cluster approach clouds the issues at hand and does little to allow donors to have a clear 
understanding of what the immediate needs are.  The link between clusters and OCHA is 
not clear and many cluster leaders appear to have no delegated authority; consequently, 
some leaders refer back to the UN to make decisions whilst others carry out their own ideas 
without any consultation.  Some form of performance management (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996) strategy which makes cluster leaders accountable is required, as are clearer 
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guidelines on cluster implementation and management.  The Tearfund participants agreed 
that little has changed since the introduction of clusters and that in order to be effective, 
clusters should include both “upstream suppliers and downstream customers” (Patti, p.266); 
hence, the inclusion of local governments and organisations at an early stage is considered 
as paramount to any successful strategy.  The involvement of local communities and 
authorities is at the heart of the Tearfund’s activity and a similar approach within clusters 
will serve to enhance overall success and help to prevent a sense of distrust amongst 
recipient communities.  There is a common perception that there are cultural barriers to 
effective collaboration and the greatest limitation of the UN Cluster Approach is the failure 
by cluster lead agencies at a global level to adequately prioritise and resource cluster 
leadership and coordination responsibilities.  These failings are due to inherent rivalries 
within an inter-agency culture; as reflected in the associated academic discourse (Heaslip, 
2011; Lynch, 2010; Senge, 2010; Kampstra and Ashayeri, 2006; Reindorp and Wiles, 
2001). 
 
7.9.2  Understanding and Training 
 
Training is a vital aspect of humanitarian provision (Tatham and Altay, 2013; Moore and 
Taylor, 2011; Thomas and Mizushima in 2005); however the size of the Tearfund’s budget 
means that the justification of funding for training programmes is difficult.  The organisation’s 
stated aim is to turn as much of its donations into aid as possible, hence it struggles to 
commit funding to professionalise its staff.  Consequently, the overall approach to training 
is one of Individual Grafting (Song et al, 2003) with staff being employed who already have 
appropriate training and knowledge or one that encompasses experiential learning within 
the organisation itself (Huber, 1991). 
 
The size of the Tearfund is also a factor in respect of participation in joint training and 
exercises and whilst the concept is acknowledged as a good one in theory (Goffnet et al, 
2013; Heaslip, 2011), there is a fear that such a strategy may detract from ongoing relief 
provision.  Smaller organisations cannot spare staff to take part in training exercises as the 
vast majority of their volunteers are constantly engaged in aid provision across the world.  
The Tearfund’s approach to local training and the resulting successes with residents being 
equipped with the training and understanding to reduce the risks and hardship of future 
disasters, was highlighted as an example of the merits of local engagement in any training 
initiatives.    
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7.9.3  Relationships 
 
Christopher (2011) supports the need for a flexible and agile humanitarian relief supply 
chain and there was support for this idea and a call for disaster relief agencies to increase 
their capacity to respond speedily with skilled coordinators.  There is agreement with the 
argument that customer/supplier relationships should be based on partnerships and that 
successful supply chains will be those based on mutuality and trust (Lysons and Farrington, 
2006; Sadler, 2007; Christopher, 2011).  Fund raising and aid delivery strategies within the 
Tearfund rely on successful relationship management (Upadhye and Battacharya cited by 
Sadler, 2007; Christopher et al, 1991) and on the effective use of partnered working.  The 
Tearfund’s membership of organisations such as the DEC and HAP (see earlier discussion 
in this Chapter), together with its affiliation to the Micah Network (2013), are vital in helping 
it and other similar sized or smaller humanitarian relief organisations to have a more 
significant say in disaster relief operations.  
  
There is support for academic arguments (Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Olson and Gregorian, 
2007; Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003) on the impact of political influence within 
the sector, in that the Tearfund regards itself as a political lobbyist that tries to influence 
governments and organisations.  The Tearfund does not just respond to disasters, but 
seeks to influence authorities and governments through its membership of organisations 
and groups which have similar hopes and desires and who aim to act as a single voice for 
the needy and vulnerable around the world.  From Tearfund’s perspective, politics and 
political agendas do not have a role to play in the relief effort in the field; however, some 
participants agreed that some organisations’ contribution to the relief effort is influenced by 
political agendas (Williamson, 2011; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Yaziji and Doh, 2009).  
The view was that this is inevitable as a significant number of donations come from large 
multi-national organisations who want to be seen to be making a telling contribution by their 
shareholders.  However, the hope is that the Tearfund and similar organisations will prove 
attractive to some donors, as their funding strategies are based around common beliefs 
which will hopefully appeal to what Tearfund participants regard as the “average Christian 
man in the street”.  In sum, aid must be provided on the basis of need and the Tearfund’s 
role is to make best use of donations by identifying those who are in greatest need, 
irrespective of political pressures.   
 
The inherent power imbalance (Hingley, 2005a) within humanitarian relief zones is 
accepted, and the Tearfund is content with its position within it.  It is acknowledged that the 
organisation has neither the expertise nor the desire to be placed in a position of power, 
relying instead on its ability to improve the quality of its partnerships to the benefit of those 
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in need.  A significant challenge is to establish working relationships at the early stages of 
any relief project (Kumar and Havey, 2013; Tatham and Kovács, 2010) and these 
relationships should be developed through trust and common Christian belief.  Tearfund’s 
Open Door strategy of tailored relationships (Tearfund, 2011), which encourages UK 
churches and churches within disaster relief zones to establish joint projects within local 
communities, was offered as an example of the success that the creation of such 
relationships with likeminded Christian groups can bring.  The Tearfund is also a member 
of numerous committees and groups within the sector such as the Disasters Emergency 
Committee (DEC, 2012) and the Inter-Agency Procurement Group, (IPAG, 2013) but certain 
other smaller NGOs elect to not join such organisations as there is a perception that they 
will not be treated on an equal basis.  
 
Handfield and Nichols (1999) argue that information flow is a critical component to a 
successful supply chain strategy and Tearfund participants agreed that a more accurate 
analysis of the situation on the ground is required.  In keeping with Heaslip (2011), a general 
lack of reliable information sharing and communication mechanisms is a main contributor 
to an overall lack of knowledge and awareness, and is a key contributor to the resultant 
slow dispersal of aid.   
 
7.9.4  Military Involvement 
 
The military has a role to play in the provision of humanitarian relief (Heaslip, 2011; 
Thompson; 2010) and the overall military contribution to the relief effort is growing (Tatham, 
2011); however, whilst the military might possess the will and the expertise to make a larger 
contribution, some Tearfund participants found it difficult to align military involvement in 
disaster relief with the maintenance of the humanitarian (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 
2009; DFID, 2008), and Christian principles; principles which are clearly a significant factor 
in Tearfund’s overall strategy, Quality Standards and overall Statement of Faith (Tearfund, 
2013, 2013a).   
 
The Tearfund view is that the military should maintain security and protect aid workers when 
required, and should not be involve itself in aid provision, as this may confuse local 
communities who might already be living in fear of military uniforms.  The belief is that whilst 
the UN blue berry might help to address some of these fears, a military uniform will always 
be a sign of conflict and suffering to some.  Following the views of Heaslip (2011) and 
Williamson (2011) the consensus is that the military will always struggle to maintain 2 roles, 
or indeed to change roles part way through a disaster relief operation; consequently, clear 
guidelines should always be issued clarifying the military contribution and foreign military 
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assistance should only be provided at the request of the affected government, with the UN 
maintaining control of international military resources at all times.  Sensitivity over 
sovereignty will almost always rule out an international military role unless it is as part of the 
UN, and civil-military coordination should be strictly between governments and their 
military’s (UN OCHA, 2013a).  There should never be a scenario where the military are 
given a controlling influence over the disaster relief effort.  The UN are given a controlling 
role and they should maintain it in close liaison with local governments and authorities. 
  
Echoing the academic discourse on the benefits of applying business sector supply chain 
strategy to the humanitarian sector (Chandes and Paché, 2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 
2006; Beamon, 2006) NGOs and aid agencies in general should operate on a business 
model in isolation from the military and in direct competition with each other.  International 
military forces are useful in providing support to the supply, delivery and distribution of aid; 
however, a well-coordinated humanitarian response must look beyond the issue of 
distribution of relief and to the re-establishment of systems and livelihoods; thereby helping 
the affected population to recover as quickly as possible.  The overall belief was that the 
military are not equipped nor really interested in dealing with this type of longer term 
approach. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
THESIS CONCLUSIONS AND OVERALL CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
 
“Most scholars are not going to generate a new theory from scratch.  Instead, they work 
on improving that which already exists” 
 
(Whetten, 1989, p.492) 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The ultimate aim of any study such as this is to spell out the final significant contribution to 
knowledge (Phillips and Pugh, 2005; Rugg and Petre, 2004).  Consequently, the overall aim 
of this thesis was to make a theoretical contribution to academic perspectives and a 
functional contribution to existing practical business and humanitarian supply chain practice.  
The study was designed to fill the identified gap (established within Chapter 2) in the 
knowledge surrounding the effective planning and coordination of the provision of 
emergency logistics and in doing so answer the following research question: 
 
When considering the Immediate Response to Natural Disasters what are the 
key drivers within the Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain that will help to 
improve future collaborative working? 
 
Thus far the thesis has, in keeping with the classic case study process (Yin, 2009) 
considered each of the research domains in isolation (Chapters 4 through 7).  Hence, if the 
final findings and overall academic contribution are to be established this Chapter must 
discuss the results of a cross-domain analysis and use as its basis the 4 significant emic 
themes and issues that emerged during the individual domain analyses.  These were: 
  
1. Management and Control 
2. Understanding and Training 
3. Relationships 
4. Military Involvement 
 
Each emic theme will be discussed separately, with the latter part of the Chapter drawing 
out the significance of the overall cross-domain analysis and with it the final findings and 
overall contribution to knowledge.   
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There is increasing support for the view that the traditional concept of a predictable and 
stable commercial supply chain should no longer be the accepted norm and that, as a 
consequence supply chain managers employed within the business sector are increasingly 
forced to adopt the more event driven approaches utilised by their humanitarian relief 
counterparts (Kovács, 2012; Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011).  Hence, the 
implications of this research and the associated findings will be considered within the 
context of the business supply chain.  Furthermore, in common with all research this study 
suffers from a number of limitations.  Whilst these limitations do not detract from the overall 
significance of the findings, it would be remiss to not comment on them at some stage in 
the final reporting process.  Similarly, whilst the final Research Strategy proved, on the 
whole to be successful, it was not without its difficulties and challenges; hence, by way of 
lessons learned some comment is included on the implications for methodology.  Finally, 
the findings of this research reveal a number of opportunities for further research that would 
both enhance the contributions identified here and generate new contributions to the body 
of knowledge.  Hence, in closing the Chapter a number of suggestions for further research 
are offered. 
 
8.2 Cross - Domain Analysis and Final Research Findings 
 
8.2.1  Management and Control 
 
8.2.1.1  Collaboration and the Humanitarian Supply Chain 
 
Many academic commentators (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 
2006; Kalafatis, 2000; Dyer et al, 1998 to name but a few), advocate a partnered approach 
to the management of the supply chain.  Cross-domain analysis of the data gathered during 
this research provides empirical evidence that this approach is not just the preserve of the 
business sector and that the merits of the value chain concept are also fully appreciated 
and supported by logistics practitioners engaged in the provision of humanitarian relief.  
Indeed, as will be discussed and developed later in this Chapter, the data demonstrate that 
the humanitarian sector is analogous to the business sector, in that humanitarian relief 
organisations are in effect businesses that are driven by the need to demonstrate and 
establish competitive advantage within a humanitarian market that is driven by market 
forces within the sector.  The data also offer support to the view that SCM techniques are 
becoming more prevalent within the humanitarian sector and that theoretical views offered 
on the drive to encompass cross-functional and inter-agency approaches (Tomansini and 
van Wassenhove, 2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006) should be extended to include the 
humanitarian sector.  Moreover, participant experiences also contributed to the traditional 
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theoretical position that planning and coordination would always make the supply chain 
more effective and efficient by helping to reduce overall waste (Slack et al, 2010).   
 
A recurring theme within the empirical investigation is a call for agility and flexibility within 
humanitarian supply chains, corroborating that within the literature (Christopher, 2011); 
however, the data gathered during this research from both participant NGOs is not 
consistent with theory as it demonstrates that the supply chain is ineffective in reality and in 
particular when faced with a demand for an immediate response (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 
2007).  The critical bottleneck in the humanitarian supply chain is not the availability of 
supplies but that of money and people.  There is agreement with the broader concept of a 
highly flexible and adaptable supply chain (Christopher, 2011; Chopra and Meindl, 2010; 
Harrison and van Hoek, 2011) but administrative procedures used to distribute funds to 
relief organisations are slowing the relief effort down and are, therefore regarded as 
unsuited to the sector’s requirements.  The data gathered add empirical support to the view 
that resolution of the inherent issues surrounding supply chain responsiveness and 
resilience (Christopher, 2011) would significantly reduce the length of the immediate 
response phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007).  Furthermore, there is also support for 
the assertion that the right level of coordination and management within the humanitarian 
supply chain will make it possible to introduce a combined approach across all phases of 
the relief effort (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005).   
 
In essence, efforts to facilitate effective collaboration within the supply chain are hampered 
by overall complexity.  The view amongst Tearfund participants adds  empirical support to 
the view identified within the literature review on the inherent competition within the sector 
(The Lancet, 2010; Chandes and Paché, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Fenton 2003), 
as participants believe that competing agendas and open rivalry at times between 
international relief organisations, means that little coordinated activity actually takes place; 
indeed when smaller agencies turn to larger organisations for strategic assistance the 
response is frustratingly slow.  Further analysis of Tearfund data reflects the view that NGOs 
are effectively ranked within disaster relief areas, meaning that they are classified by order 
of size; moreover, the view expressed by all Tearfund participants is that larger 
organisations working in the sector lack an understanding of what other, smaller 
organisations have to contribute.  Finally, the research moves the academic discussion 
forward as analysis of the data gathered suggests that a perception exists amongst some 
that the sector is dominated by the UN and a small number of western based international 
donor organisations.  No significant study within the field seems to refer to these issues 
surrounding organisational perception and positioning hence a theoretical finding of this 
study is: 
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The data gathered reveal that participants from all four research domains agree with the 
academic stance on the positive nature of, and clear requirement for, collaboration and 
coordination within the humanitarian supply chain (Dash et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011 and 
2010; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Rickard, 2003); moreover, the data reflect that the efforts of 
the UN agencies involved in the provision of humanitarian aid do help to save lives and that 
OCHA should take the lead in coordinating the overall relief effort.  However, the data also 
add to the literary discussion on the inherent lack of success within the business sector in 
respect of supply chain collaboration (Senge, 2010; Kampstra et al, 2006).  Furthermore, 
the data gathered serve to extend existing theory into a field where it is yet to be applied, 
as it confirms that the same issues are prevalent within the humanitarian sector, in that 
collaboration cannot be achieved amongst organisations who do not wish to do so.  This 
study offers empirical evidence that to achieve the panacea of collaboration, the greatest 
challenge for the humanitarian supply chain is to facilitate and manage the effective 
coordination of the overall collaborative effort.  The concerns raised by participants link back 
to discussions within the literature review regarding the challenges that OCHA face in light 
of the growing number of actors within humanitarian relief zones (Heaslip, 2011; Carroll and 
Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007; Yamada 
et al, 2006), and also to the ever increasing number of humanitarian disasters that are 
occurring worldwide.  Participant opinion is that whilst the response system is growing 
incrementally, the growth is at a slower rate than that required to cope with the complexity 
of the impending demand for multiple responses.  Specifically, this research moves the 
academic trajectory forward from its current position, as data gathered demonstrate that 
participants are not only concerned with the increasing scale and number of crises, but also 
with the fact that such events are likely to occur simultaneously.  Furthermore, the fact that 
current emergencies are made worse by long term problems such as extreme poverty, 
population growth and climate change will also have to be a consideration in the on-going 
debate.  Hence a practical finding of this study is:  
 
 
 
Finding 1:  Smaller NGOs who are operating within the humanitarian relief supply 
chain believe that they are ranked according to size and that the sector is 
dominated by the UN and a small number of western based international donor 
organisations. 
 
Finding 2:  The demands placed on the humanitarian supply chain during the 
immediate response phase, the threat of simultaneously occurring disasters and 
the effect of longer term environmental problems mean that effective collaborative 
working is not achieved. 
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8.2.1.2  The UN Cluster Concept 
 
In presenting his economic cluster theory, Porter (1998) suggests that being part of a cluster 
will allow organisations to “operate more productively whilst coordinating with related 
companies” (p.81).  Patti (2006) extends the concept into the supply chain context, as he 
contends that clusters should “include upstream suppliers and downstream customers and 
may often extend horizontally to include the makers of similar and complementary products” 
(p.266).  Martin and Sunley (2003, p.5) question the success of a clustered approach and 
debate the influential nature of such an approach and the fact that “its overall seductiveness 
has resulted in a rush to apply the concept in some business arenas, in advance of 
theoretical and empirical assessments of the strategy” (p.35).  This thesis contributes to the 
theoretical discussion on clusters by moving its trajectory on from the traditional business 
arena into that of the humanitarian sector.  Specifically, the study concerns itself with the 
UN Cluster Concept and with gathering empirical data in respect of the logistics cluster in 
particular.   
 
The data add to the discussion within the literature review in confirming that the use of 
clusters in general, and the UN Cluster Concept (UN OCHA, 2011) in particular, was 
considered by all participants to be a good idea in theory and that, as such the Concept 
should have a role to play in the future provision of humanitarian relief.  However, a recurring 
finding that emerged during this research, was a clear concern amongst participants 
surrounding the practical implementation and the leadership and management of clusters.  
Indeed, the data extends Asheim et al’s (2009) theoretical criticism of Porter’s (1998) 
original work from the business into the humanitarian sector whilst adding empirical 
evidence in support of their contention that the cluster concept has been “oversold” (p.23).  
The data also reflects an inherent mismatch between the theoretical concept of clusters and 
practical reality; thereby, serving to demonstrate that Simmie’s (2009) observation that 
many industrial regions and areas of the business sector cannot be fully analysed and 
driven using a clustered approach, is a theoretical position that is equally applicable to the 
humanitarian sector.  Moreover, this research concurs with Jensen’s (2012) argument that 
whilst the use of clusters in the humanitarian sector is fine in principle, in practice they are 
ineffective and cumbersome as they slow things down in the field.  Adding to Jensen’s 
stance, and extending his theoretical debate, questions were raised during this study 
regarding the overall effectiveness and aims of the UN Cluster Concept, as participants felt 
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that the concept served to ‘stove pipe’ the relief effort and effectively acted as a hindrance 
in some cases.  The perception amongst study participants was that there were cultural 
barriers to effective collaboration and that the greatest limitation of the Cluster Approach 
was the failure by cluster lead agencies at a global level to adequately prioritise and 
resource cluster leadership and coordination responsibilities.   
 
The data gathered here offer empirical support to the discussion on the negative impact 
that inherent organisational rivalries can have within an inter-agency culture (Heaslip, 2011; 
Lynch, 2010; Senge, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Kampstra and Ashayeri, 2006; 
Reindorp and Wiles, 2001).  In addition, the data also demonstrate support for academic 
debate on the requirement for inter-cluster coordination (Stoddard et al, 2007; Street, 2007; 
OCHA, 2006) and there was a call amongst study participants for the introduction of 
mechanisms to provide comprehensive recommendations and directions on how to better 
assess and analyse future humanitarian disasters.  The view amongst JFLogC participants 
is that the UN Cluster Concept gives those involved an excuse to work in isolation from 
other humanitarian organisations; furthermore analysis of the data gathered from the 
participant NGOs suggests a conflict with the theoretical views on the importance of cluster 
involvement and engagement (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998), as participants believe that 
clusters and cluster leaders are notoriously bad at communicating with local actors and local 
governmental organisations.  In practice, cluster leaders are not held accountable for their 
actions and are not empowered to make decisions or to sanction actions.  Consequently, 
the data reflect the view that what is really needed is a more rigid system that can judge 
agencies on their performance (Heaslip, 2011) and add to the theoretical debate by 
suggesting that such a system should have the authority and legitimacy to exclude those 
that have a history of letting the overall effort down.  Competing priorities within relief zones 
mean that the cluster approach clouds the issues at hand and does not allow donors to 
have a clear understanding of what the immediate needs are.  The link between clusters 
and OCHA is not clear and many cluster leaders appear to have no delegated authority; 
consequently, some leaders refer back to the UN to make decisions whilst others carry out 
their own ideas without any consultation.  Thus in light of these concerns, a theoretical 
finding of this study is to move the academic trajectory on to consider the introduction of 
some form of performance management strategy and to extend the use of Kaplan and 
Norton’s (1996) theory on the Balanced Score Card Performance to encompass the 
humanitarian sector, thereby making cluster leaders accountable for their actions and 
decisions.  Additionally, the findings also give empirical support to the need for a practical 
discussion on the development of clearer guidelines on cluster implementation and 
management.   
 Finding 3: Ineffective cluster leadership and unclear cluster implementation 
guidelines within the humanitarian supply chain have a negative effect on 
collaborative working.   
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8.2.2  Understanding and Training 
 
8.2.2.1  Understanding 
 
The data offer empirical support to the concepts of relationship management and 
understanding within supply chain partnerships (Christopher, 2011; Monczka et al, 2010; 
Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006).  The issues surrounding relationship 
management will be considered in the next section of this thesis, but the data gathered 
demonstrates the clear similarities between the humanitarian and business sectors.  The 
data gathered effectively extend the theoretical debate on mutual understanding away from 
the traditional business context, and into that of the humanitarian relief sector; where 
understanding amongst partners is considered to be of equal importance if successful 
collaborations are to be achieved.  Specific examples that arise serve to supplement 
ongoing discussion on the lack of understanding and appreciation amongst some relief 
workers, particularly in respect of the roles and contribution of other organisations within the 
sector (Tatham and Altay, 2013, Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011).  JFLogC participants 
concede that they do not fully appreciate the different roles and responsibilities of the 
organisations engaged in disaster relief, nor do they have an understanding of the specific 
logistics skill sets possessed by NGOs and other donor organisations; however, in keeping 
with Heaslip (2011) they also suggest that the reverse is true in that other humanitarian 
organisations do not seem to understand what the military can offer to the overall relief 
effort.  The data gathered from the participant NGOs reflects a similar perception with an 
evident lack of understanding of military logistical capabilities and skills.  Moreover, the 
Tearfund participant view is that the military role is to maintain security and protect aid 
workers when required, and should not involve aid provision itself as this may cause 
confusion within local communities.  Hence, this research suggests that there is a 
requirement for an extension of the current theoretical debate on how practical 
understanding, particularly between the military and humanitarian relief NGOs can be 
improved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Finding 4:  The lack of understanding amongst humanitarian relief practitioners 
and military contributors of the logistical capabilities of other organisations 
operating within the supply chain has a negative impact on collaborative working.     
 
 243 
 
8.2.2.2  Humanitarian Logistics Training and Professionalisation 
 
A recurring theme that emerges within this research is that of training and the requirement 
for a professionalisation strategy within the humanitarian logistics field.  The empirical 
evidence gathered reflects the debate that is already evident within the literature and the 
associated regular calls for appropriate training and skills development programmes within 
the sector (Allen et al, 2013; Bolsche et al, 2013; Tatham and Altay, 2013; Fawcett and 
Waller, 2013; Heaslip, 2011; Moore and Taylor, 2011; Thomas and Mizushima, 2005; 
Thomas and Kopczak, 2005).   The data gathered here offers agreement that there is a 
clear requirement for experienced and professional humanitarian logisticians, and an 
acknowledgement that such skills are not easy to find.  However, the data also suggest a 
new trajectory to the theoretical debate as they demonstrate concerns amongst the NGO 
participants that their relatively high turnover of staff may be problematic in respect of 
educational development, and that despite the increasing number of disasters worldwide 
and the corresponding rise in overall logistics costs (Guhu-Sapir, et al, 2011), the current 
financial climate and budgetary constraints make financial investment in training difficult for 
humanitarian organisations to justify.  In contrast to these concerns, the data also serve to 
corroborate the argument that opportunities to professionalise within the sector could act as 
a retention tool (Lu et al, 2013).  This study does offer empirical support to the concepts 
and discussions on the approaches to training and recruitment that are currently being 
adopted within the humanitarian sector.  Specifically, the data gathered from the participant 
NGOs confirms that both Oxfam International and Tearfund favour an individual grafting 
(Song et al, 2003) approach to staff recruitment, as they seek to employ those with previous 
knowledge of the sector, or those who possess specific skill sets gained within the business 
sector (for example supply chain managers). 
  
The data also support the view that humanitarian relief workers have some significant 
lessons to learn from their private sector counterparts in a number of areas including risk 
management and logistics and that consequently, there is a need to create relationships 
with logisticians in the private sector which are aimed at bridging the educational and 
capability gaps that exist within the overall response (Christopher and Tatham, 2011; 
Larson, 2011).  The data also show that OCHA is attempting to answer calls for more 
educational cross-fertilisation between military, UN and NGO humanitarian contributors 
(Heaslip, 2011, p.164) by providing a variety of training courses which are designed to 
establish partnerships with a wide variety of global humanitarian relief organisations 
(OCHA, 2013b), thereby also promoting collaborative working.  Moreover, referring back to 
the last section of this thesis and to finding 4 of this study, the data confirm that the content 
of these courses aims to develop the knowledge necessary between humanitarian and 
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military actors within the field, and to facilitate communication and successful coordination 
and interaction.  However, the data also demonstrate that attendance on these courses is 
difficult for some NGOs and very low from the smaller humanitarian organisations in 
particular.  Indeed, Tearfund participants suggest that the courses are not attractive or 
readily accessible to their staff in particular, and to smaller humanitarian organisations in 
general; in effect, smaller organisations within the sector cannot spare staff to take part in 
training and educational programmes as their policy’s and donors dictate that the vast 
majority of their volunteers are constantly engaged in aid provision activities across the 
world.  Hence, given that there is no significant study in this area, a finding of this research 
is to suggest that the theoretical trajectory should be extended to consider the whole issue 
of OCHA training courses and in particular to consider ways to make such courses more 
readily accessible and attractive to a larger number of humanitarian organisations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.2.2.3  Local Engagement and Joint Training 
 
Linking back to the discussions within Chapter 2 on the importance of local engagement 
within the supply chain (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) and on the advantages of an integrated 
approach to learning within the sector (Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011), the data gathered 
corroborates the theoretical call for the inclusion of local organisations and governments 
within training strategies, and confirms the assertion that such initiatives help to facilitate 
the development of working partnerships with local communities.  Moreover, the data 
illustrate that the inclusion of local representation and all agencies involved will help to 
develop and facilitate successful exit strategies following the final reconstruction phase.  
Reflecting the academic discussion on the practical relevance and advantages of an 
integrated approach to learning within the humanitarian sector (Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 
2011), JFLogC participants believe that a joint approach to training, similar to that adopted 
by the military would be of great benefit to the future success of the overall relief effort.  
Furthermore, JFLogC participants are keen to be given the opportunity to utilise their military 
expertise in quick reaction, expeditionary logistics to assist with the development of such 
courses or training programmes, although there is a pragmatic acceptance amongst military 
participants that this may not be politically acceptable in reality.  Hence, a finding of this 
study is to offer empirical evidence to support the extension of the current theoretical and 
practical discussions to consider the implementation of a concept of training within the 
Finding 5:  Current OCHA humanitarian relief training programmes are designed 
to promote collaborative working, however the courses are not readily accessible 
or attractive to a large proportion of organisations within the sector. 
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sector where integrated exercises have a role to play in the overall promotion of 
collaborative working.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.2.3  Relationships 
 
8.2.3.1  Competition within the Humanitarian Supply Chain and Defining Value 
 
It has been suggested that the practice of partnership sourcing is now widespread and that 
the benefits of such an approach can include improved quality, innovation sharing, reduced 
costs and integrated scheduling of production and delivery (Christopher, 2011).  At the route 
of this argument are the concepts of Relationship Marketing (RM) and Partnering; however, 
Handfield and Nichols (1999) offer the view that relationship management is the most fragile 
and tenuous component in any successful supply chain.  Whilst offering support to this 
assertion, the data gathered during this research reveal that the relationships that exist 
between actors within the humanitarian supply chain will change depending on the type of 
emergency, and on the initial roles and responsibilities that are agreed and established with 
and for contributors to the overall relief effort.  Despite the added complexity associated 
with the humanitarian supply chain, this research adds empirical support to the findings of 
the literature review and confirms the need for mutual trust and openness within successful 
partnerships in general, and within the humanitarian supply chain in particular (Heaslip, 
2011; Tatham and Kovács, 2010; Upadhye and Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 2007; Sadler, 
2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006; Patti, 2006). 
   
Furthermore, the data demonstrate agreement amongst participants that coordination 
within humanitarian relief zones has improved significantly since the formation of OCHA 
and that inter-organisational cooperation is a good idea in theory; however, in practice such 
a strategy leads to bureaucratic systems that slow down the overall response.  Hence, there 
is an ongoing requirement for improvement in this area and for the establishment of stronger 
relationships between all actors within the humanitarian supply chain.  In direct contrast with 
these aspirations, the data also offer empirical support to the view that humanitarian 
organisations run the risk of entering into competition with other organisations within the 
sector, as in order to be successful NGOs often find themselves competing for resources, 
ground and other assets (Chandes and Paché, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007).  In short, 
Finding 6:  Joint training initiatives which include all participant organisations 
would improve collaborative working within the humanitarian relief supply chain.   
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triangulation of the data gathered from participant NGOs demonstrates the existence of 
business opportunism within the humanitarian sector.  Whilst revealing this mismatch with 
the view that market competition does not really influence organisations within the 
humanitarian supply chain (Dash et al, 2013; Mays et al, 2102) the data also provide 
empirical evidence that this competition between donor organisations has a negative effect 
on the overall relief effort.  Furthermore, the data show a propensity amongst donor 
organisations to try and be noticed through involvement in the higher profile elements of the 
disaster relief process such as those that may appear on the worldwide media.  There is 
also a reticence amongst some donor organisations to be seen to act alone and to 
demonstrate overall presence on the ground, findings which concur with the observations 
offered by Olson and Gregorian (2007) and Kent (1987) on NGO’s actions in light of funding 
pressures and a fear of donor withdrawal.  Hence, the data corroborate the contention that 
humanitarian relief organisations are businesses that will be driven by the market and the 
associated market forces, and that the desire to demonstrate superior effectiveness and 
efficiency to donors is inherent within the supply chain to the detriment of quantifiable end 
results (The Lancet, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Weiss and Collins, 2000).   
 
Adding to the earlier discussion on the broader concept of a value chain approach to supply 
chain management (Porter, 1990), and to the assertions offered on the negative impact that 
the use of different language and terminology can have on overall perception and trust 
(Heaslip, 2011), a recurring theme that emerged during this research was the lack of a 
common understanding and definition of the term value amongst participants within the 
humanitarian sector and the detrimental impact that this has on the final efficient and 
effective delivery of aid.  Lindgreen et al (2012) argue that academics and practitioners alike 
agree that they have only just begun to understand what value means within a business 
context (p.207); hence, this research suggests that this theoretical debate should be taken 
into a new sector as it demonstrates that this same lack of understanding exists within the 
humanitarian sector.  Indeed, the data gathered demonstrates a conflict within the sector in 
respect of what humanitarian value actually is.  In support of Porter’s (1990) concept of 
value, Lindgreen et al (2012) suggest that in order to action what they term value delivery, 
managers need to leverage their resources by executing decisions that mobilise, 
coordinate, and deploy them in efficient and effective ways (p.212); the contention being 
that this form of leveraging is essential to provide an offering that satisfies end customer 
need.  Value should be specified from the end-customer perspective (Harrison and van 
Hoek, 2011), however, this research demonstrates that what constitutes value to the end 
customer within the humanitarian supply chain contrasts with that of contributing 
organisations.  Whilst the end customer (the victim of the disaster) regards the provision of 
the means to survive post the onset of a disaster as the value of the supply chain, 
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contributing NGOs must factor in their own sustainability and seek to address inherent 
market forces and donor pressure as they seek to agree their definition of value, whilst 
military contributors seek to demonstrate value in terms of political and governmental 
expectation.     
 
Given the foregoing discussion, a finding of this study is to move the theoretical debate on 
to a new academic trajectory highlighting the negative impact that competition is having on 
efforts to establish collaborative working within humanitarian supply chains.  Furthermore, 
given the lack of a significant study in this area, the debate must also be linked to the need 
for agreement on a common definition and understanding of what constitutes value by all 
organisations operating within the humanitarian sector.    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.2.3.2  Hastily Formed Networks and Local Engagement 
 
Whilst corroborating the argument that customer/supplier relationships should be based on 
partnerships, this research also concurs that successful supply chains will be those based 
on mutuality and trust (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006).  A 
recurring theme within the data gathered here links back to the earlier discussion within the 
literature review and acknowledges the challenges associated with the formation of what 
Kumar and Havey (2013) term Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) at the onset of an immediate 
response operation (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007).  Furthermore, the data gathered 
reveal the increasing contribution from the business sector to the humanitarian relief supply 
chain and an associated growth in the number of partnerships between the business and 
humanitarian sectors as a whole.  However, the data also demonstrate that this is not 
reflected by a corresponding growth in a spirit of community within the sector, thereby giving 
empirical support not only to the issues surrounding the theoretical concept of a HFN 
(Kumar and Havey, 2013) but also agreeing with the academic views on the lack of trust 
and propensity for transactional relationships within modern day supply chains in general 
(Senge, 2010), and within humanitarian relief supply chains in particular (Heaslip, 2011).  
This research gives empirical evidence to support the view that inter-organisational 
relationships within the humanitarian sector are organised and agreed against project 
timelines and that this results in a culture of working within siloes, leading to unnecessary 
Finding 7:  Market competition between donor organisations within the 
humanitarian sector and the lack of common agreement of what constitutes value 
has a negative impact on collaborative working and on the overall effectiveness 
and efficiency of the humanitarian supply chain.   
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duplication of effort and to a lack of collaborative working and trust within the supply chain 
itself.  In essence, support is offered for the view that the humanitarian sector is 
predominantly governed by transactional relationships, based on authority and bureaucratic 
structure rather than by transformational partnerships, with an emphasis on a joint vision 
and a feeling of loyalty and trust (Mullins, 2013, p.385; Heaslip, 2011).   
 
This research offers evidence to support the contention that one of the main characteristics 
of the final HFNs that are formed within humanitarian relief operations is that they will 
inevitably involve participants from different communities, organisations and cultures 
(Heaslip, 2011; Tatham and Kovács, 2010).  However, despite adding to the overall 
complexity of the resultant HFNs, early engagement with local authorities is considered to 
be a key to the overall effectiveness of the humanitarian relief supply chain; thereby 
extending Vincent and Bagshaw’s (2005) existing theoretical position on the importance of 
early local engagement within business sector supply chains and associated HFNs into the 
humanitarian sector itself.  Moreover, the data gathered on the challenges faced by 
humanitarian organisations as they attempt to build relationships with local authorities, also 
offer empirical evidence to support assertions that similar challenges are faced by supply 
chain managers working within business sector organisations (Iglesias et al, 2011; Upadhye 
and Battacharya cited by Sadler, 2007).  However, this research also demonstrates that 
whilst this concept and approach is considered to be fine in principle, relationship 
management with local authorities within the humanitarian sector can be problematic in 
practice, particularly in countries where there is conflict, instability and insecurity.  
Participants in this research believe that it is OCHA’s role to facilitate such initiatives and 
that OCHA should also aim to return control to local government at the earliest opportunity.  
The clear view is that such strategies help communities to take ownership of the recovery 
and also assist aid relief agencies in the development of exit strategies at an earlier stage; 
but the data also acknowledge that in reality identification of appropriate local authorities is 
not always an easy task.  Moreover, a lack of a clearly identified local authority means that 
it becomes difficult to monitor and control the movements of donor funding and to maintain 
humanitarian quality standards.  The data gathered from Oxfam International in particular 
demonstrate that as a result of these problems the organisation favour a strategy which 
relies on the establishment and utilisation of long standing relationships with local partners, 
which helps to ensure that aid is delivered to the most vulnerable; a strategy that is 
acknowledged to perhaps better suit the preparation and reconstruction phases rather than 
the immediate response phase of the relief effort.  Hence, a finding of this study is to move 
the theoretical debate forward from its current position on the formation of HFNs within the 
humanitarian relief supply chain, to one that discusses what measures can be taken to 
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identify appropriate local authorities at an early stage in the disaster relief response and 
considers how these authorities can then be included as the HFNs develop.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.2.3.3  Power Imbalance and the Gatekeepers 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, power as a construct in business to business relationships has 
received irregular and contrasting treatment from analysts (Hingley, 2005a, p.848).  
Contrasting views surround the idea that on the one hand power can have a negative effect 
on the workings of a successful supply chain, in that it negates co-operation and is not 
helpful in building relationships (Naudé and Buttle, 2000; Doney and Cannon, 1997); 
however, there are some commentators (Kalafatis, 2000; Earp et al, 1999; Blois, 1998; 
Campbell, 1997) who support the view that power can have a positive influence and that 
diversity within relationships is a good thing.  The data gathered here demonstrate that all 
participants are happy to act in a subordinate role and readily accept the inherent power 
imbalances (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley, 2005b) within the overall humanitarian 
supply chain structure.  Data from the JFLogC reveal that military policy documents (MOD, 
2008 and 2003) are written to reflect the coordinating responsibilities that the UN and its 
associated offices have to play in humanitarian relief areas, and concur with the concept 
that the UN is to act as the power broker (Burt, 2005) within such areas.  Although not 
previously applied, extending existing theory into the humanitarian sector helps to explain 
the inherent power structure as JFLogC is aware of what Thompson (2010) describes as 
the “sensitivities” (p.2) surrounding their presence within humanitarian relief zones and of 
the “clashes” that these can generate (Heaslip, 2010); consequently, JFLogC is content to 
carry out all tasks given to it under the coordination of the UN which they regard as the 
gatekeeper within the humanitarian supply chain (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley et 
al, 2010).  However, a recurring theme within the data gathered is that despite the 
acknowledged role that the UN and OCHA has, there is still an inherent lack of clear control 
and coordination within the humanitarian supply chain; findings that offer empirical evidence 
that is clearly inconsistent with the theoretical view that control and coordination have 
improved in recent humanitarian relief operations (Altay and Labonte, 2011).  Indeed, the 
data gathered from the participant NGOs and the JFLogC during this research reveal that 
it is difficult at times to identify who has overall responsibility for elements of the relief effort 
on the ground.  Moreover, this research suggests that although OCHA claim to be, and are 
Finding 8:  The Hastily Formed Networks which develop during the immediate 
response phase to a disaster must include identified local authorities.   
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recognised as the coordinating organisation (OCHA, 2012a), the command structures that 
the organisation implement do not have the desired practical effect.  Hence, a finding of this 
research is that through the application of existing theory the power structure within the 
humanitarian supply chain can be explained, with OCHA being afforded power broker (Burt, 
2005) and gatekeeper status (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley et al, 2010); however, 
challenging theoretical and practical debates should now take place to address why this 
structure is not resulting in a coordinated humanitarian response.  
 
 
 
 
 
8.2.4  Military Involvement 
 
8.2.4.1  The Escalating MOD Contribution to Humanitarian Relief 
 
The 1998 Strategic Defence Review (MOD, 1998) signalled a greater emphasis on, and an 
acknowledgement of the provision of ‘Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations’ (p22), 
whilst the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (2011) highlighted the fact that the 
UK Government is keen that the military look to demonstrate more high profile involvement 
in humanitarian relief.  The data gathered during this research, and in particular analysis of 
the findings from participants within the JFLogC, adds empirical evidence to support these 
governmental aspirations and also serve to expand the earlier discussions within this thesis 
on the escalating MOD Contribution to the overall disaster relief effort. 
 
The data support the view that the increasing number of disasters worldwide are resulting 
in a correspondingly larger number of humanitarian relief operations where military forces 
are working alongside civilian relief organisations (Heaslip, 2011; Tatham, 2011).  The 
inevitability of military involvement within disaster relief provision is accepted and research 
participants agree with the theoretical assertion that such involvement offers a means of 
maintaining supply chain resilience, particularly in disasters where there is a clear risk to 
the well-being of humanitarian actors (Christopher, 2011).  However, the data also 
contribute to the discussion by demonstrating that there should never be a scenario where 
the military is given a controlling influence over the disaster relief effort.  The UN has a 
controlling role and should maintain it through close liaison with local governments and 
authorities. 
 
Finding 9:  UN OCHA are not effectively coordinating the humanitarian supply 
chain in the field. 
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Analysis of the data gathered from the NGO participants offers empirical support to 
theoretical discussion on the benefits of applying business sector supply chain strategy to 
the humanitarian sector (Chandes and Paché, 2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Beamon, 
2006), and to the overall view that whenever possible NGOs and aid agencies in general 
should aim to operate on a business model which is in isolation from the military, but on one 
that is also in direct competition with each other.  International military forces are useful in 
providing support to the supply, delivery and distribution of aid; however, triangulation of the 
data gathered demonstrates that a well-coordinated humanitarian response must look 
beyond the issue of distribution of relief and to the re-establishment of systems and 
livelihoods, thereby helping the affected population to recover as quickly as possible.  In 
essence, the overall assertion amongst NGO participants is that the military is not equipped, 
nor really interested in dealing with this type of longer term approach.  In a similar vein this 
research also confirms that OCHA is trying to establish a more predictable approach to the 
involvement of military resources within humanitarian relief zones, by taking measures to 
encourage the use of such resources not just in the immediate response phase of the 
disaster, but also in the build-up and recovery phases.  Such results extend the findings of 
the literature review and clearly link to Kovács and Spens’ (2008, 2007) calls for an increase 
in the military finding within the preparation and reconstruction phases.  Hence, the 
foregoing discussion leads to a practical finding of this study: 
 
   
 
8.2.4.2  The Humanitarian Principles - a Conflict of Interests? 
 
A recurring theme within this research echoes existing theoretical discussion on military 
involvement in the humanitarian supply chain, in that any escalation in military involvement 
could prove to be difficult, given that most NGOs are reluctant to work alongside the military 
(Heaslip, 2011; Tatham, 2011; Beauregard, 1998).  Whilst the data gathered from the NGO 
participants are consistent with the view that there is a role for the military in the provision 
of humanitarian relief (Heaslip, 2011; Thompson; 2010, Beauregard, 1998); this research 
also demonstrates a belief amongst NGO participants that the military contribution has to 
be under the right circumstances; specific examples offered are situations where there may 
be a need to boost capacity through the utilisation of military resources such as trucks, 
aircraft and manpower.  The empirical investigation adds support to the discussion within 
the literature review on the inherent difficulty amongst some participants within the 
humanitarian supply chain to align military involvement in disaster relief with the 
maintenance of the humanitarian principles (Heaslip, 2011; Tomansini and van 
Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008).  The data also highlight concern regarding the perception 
Finding 10:  Military organisations must seek to expand their contribution within 
the humanitarian supply chain from the immediate response phase to encompass 
the longer term phases of disaster relief. 
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that military involvement has within local communities; furthermore, analysis of data 
gathered from Tearfund participants supports the view that the role for the military should 
be to maintain security and to protect aid workers when required.  In short, donor 
governments should not involve their military forces’ in aid provision itself, as this may lead 
to confusion amongst local communities who might already be living in fear of military 
uniforms.  Moreover, the findings are also consistent with OCHA policy, as triangulation of 
the data gathered from non-military participants demonstrates agreement that sensitivity 
over sovereignty will almost always rule out an international military role, unless it is as part 
of the UN and civil-military coordination between governments and their military’s (UN 
OCHA, 2013a).  Effectively the findings demonstrate linkage to the theoretical concepts 
already discussed within Chapter 2, in that neutrality and impartiality do not sit well with 
military intervention within the humanitarian supply chain.  Indeed, in order to ensure an 
appropriate response under the humanitarian principles all organisations involved, including 
those from the military should ensure that any aid delivered has as its primary aim the 
reduction of poverty or suffering.  Moreover, NGOs and aid organisations have to ensure 
that their activities and donations do not directly or indirectly provide resources to be used 
to assist military conflict and consequently, should refuse any donations which are 
conditional on cooperation with military forces.  Finally, all agencies involved in the relief 
effort have to ensure that the aid that is provided does not contribute in any way to any 
contravention of international human rights and the overall humanitarian principles. 
 
The data gathered from the NGO participants corroborated the theoretical views offered by 
Williamson (2011), in that the military idea of using humanitarian aid to win hearts and minds 
is a flawed one, and one that does not constitute or assist humanitarian relief work; in 
essence, aid is most effectively delivered by civilian humanitarian organisations under the 
leadership of the UN.  Analysis of the JFLogC data adds additional support to this discussion 
as the organisation’s strategy is to avoid a military response whenever possible, and to 
refrain from the use of visible and restrictive contributions such as armed escorts or 
centralised safe working areas.  The data support the concept of the overall UN security 
management strategy, which aims to establish a secure working environment for 
humanitarian relief organisations through successful collaborative initiatives with foreign 
military contributors (UN OCHA, 2013a).  Moreover, this study provides empirical evidence 
that regional stability and with it security, are enhanced and not undermined by the provision 
of impartial needs-based humanitarian aid.  However, whilst there is a potential for military 
involvement within the humanitarian supply chain, there is also a danger that such 
involvement can destabilise situations which may lead to potentially dangerous 
consequences that may ultimately affect and limit the ability of civilian aid agencies to 
efficiently and effectively deliver aid.  As a result, donor organisations tend to resist adopting 
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collaborative working strategies with military contributors within the humanitarian supply 
chain.  Given this discussion, this study demonstrates consistency with the existing 
theoretical position on the influence on the humanitarian principles (Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 
2011; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009; Spearin, 2001; Slim, 2000).  However, as 
highlighted earlier in this Chapter the UK Government is still keen that its’ military look to 
demonstrate more high profile involvement in humanitarian relief, hence from a practical 
viewpoint the following finding is highlighted:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.2.4.3  Two Hats - The Political Dimension  
 
This research moves the trajectory of the theoretical debate into the political arena, as the 
data gathered offers empirical support to the view that military intervention is regarded by 
some international governments as a means of demonstrating a rapid and visible response 
immediately following the onset of a natural humanitarian disaster.  Moreover, this empirical 
research also corroborates the discussion within the literature review in that some 
governments regard military involvement as a means of achieving longer term political 
influence (Williamson, 2011; Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Weiss and Collins, 2000).  A recurring 
theme of the research is that any military forces involved in the relief effort should adhere 
to the UN agreed civil-military guidelines, and that the associated military rules of 
engagement should prohibit the use of humanitarian assistance for the fulfilment of military 
or governmental objectives.  However, the data gathered here demonstrate that 
incorporating humanitarian relief within the larger political context is an impossible task in 
reality as military and political objectives contradict and collide.  In addition, this conflict of 
interests is leading to confusion, not only between humanitarian donor organisations 
working within the supply chain, but also amongst the final recipients of the aid itself.  
Analysis of the data supports the view that a military uniform will always be viewed by some 
as a symbol of an organisation that operates in contravention of the humanitarian principles, 
and that attempts to reduce the impact of a uniform, such as the adoption of the UN blue 
beret are on the whole ineffective; ultimately, a military uniform will always be a symbol of 
conflict and suffering to some.  In short, as discussed in the previous section of this thesis, 
warfare will always conflict with the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van 
Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008).   
Finding 11:  Preservation of the humanitarian principles has a negative impact on 
the adoption of collaborative working strategies between humanitarian relief 
organisations and military contributors within the humanitarian supply chain.  
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As a result of these circumstances, there are occasions when the military attempt to wear 
2 hats, one driven by the pressure to achieve political aims and the other to support the 
humanitarian relief effort itself.  The data gathered demonstrates that the challenge for the 
military is to clarify which hat they are wearing at the outset of the relief effort and, as 
importantly to avoid confusion by consistently adopting the single role associated with the 
chosen hat throughout the relief operation.  The recurring theme in this research is that 
whilst military organisations involved in the humanitarian supply chain will always struggle 
to wear 2 hats, there is also a propensity to try and change hats part way through a disaster 
relief operation as military contributors attempt to move from a political to a humanitarian 
stance.  Ironically, this process may actually involve a physical change of hat from the 
standard military one to the UN blue beret but, as discussed earlier this proves to have little 
impact on this issue in reality.  Moreover, analysis of data gathered within the JFLogC 
reveals that the current UK military chain of command will never sanction humanitarian 
supply chain management as an individual profession per se, thereby dismissing the idea 
of creating separate organisations within the military to deal with the humanitarian and 
political elements of the overall contribution.  However, the impact of this repositioning by 
military contributors will not only destabilise the overall effectiveness of the humanitarian 
supply chain, but also deter any efforts to work collaboratively on the part of the 
humanitarian NGOs.   
 
Consequently, in light of this analysis and given that no significant study has considered 
these issues, a finding of this study is to offer empirical evidence that a theoretical debate 
should be initiated that takes the current discussions forward to consider how clear 
guidelines can be issued clarifying the military contribution at the outset of a disaster relief 
operation.  In effect theory should be established which offers advice on methods to make 
it clear to all involved which hat the military organisation is to wear within that particular 
relief operation.  Moreover, the academic trajectory should also consider the role that 
national governments have to play in ensuring that their military force’s contributions are 
consistent throughout a humanitarian operation, and that the underpinning direction of the 
military contribution does not change part way through the relief effort.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Finding 12:  Changing the underpinning stance of the military contribution from a 
political to a humanitarian one has a destabilising effect on the overall 
effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian supply chain.  
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8.3 Summary of Development of the Final Research Findings 
 
By way of summary, Table 8.1 illustrates the development of the final findings from the 
initial etic themes through identified emic themes and discussion of the cross-domain 
analysis within this research.  The table also serves to highlight the separate findings 
which will help to formulate the overall contribution to the body of knowledge, together 
with overall influences on the practical management of the humanitarian supply chain.   
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 etic issue emic issue Discussion Final Finding 
     Theory Practice 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Collaboration 
and 
Coordination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Management 
and Control 
 
Smaller NGOs operating within the humanitarian supply chain believe that they are 
effectively ranked by order of size; moreover, the larger organisations working in the 
sector lack an understanding of what other, smaller organisations have to contribute.  A 
perception also exists amongst some that the sector is dominated by the UN and a small 
number of western based international donor organisations.  No significant study within 
the field seems to refer to these issues surrounding organisational perception and 
positioning. 
 
Smaller NGOs who are 
operating within the 
humanitarian supply chain 
believe that they are ranked 
according to size and that the 
sector is dominated by the UN 
and a small number of western 
based international donor 
organisations. 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
The humanitarian supply chain faces increasing challenges in light of the growing number 
of actors within it and also the ever increasing number of humanitarian disasters that are 
occurring worldwide and at the same time.  Whilst the response system is growing 
incrementally, the growth is at a slower rate than that required to cope with the complexity 
of the impending demand for multiple responses.  Consequently, participants within the 
supply chain are not only concerned with the increasing scale and number of crises but 
also with the fact that such events are occurring simultaneously.  
  
 
The demands placed on the 
humanitarian supply chain 
during the immediate response 
phase, the threat of 
simultaneously occurring 
disasters and the effect of longer 
term environmental problems 
mean that effective collaborative 
working is not achieved. 
  
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
Organisation 
and Power 
Competing priorities within relief zones mean that the cluster approach clouds the issues 
at hand and does not allow donors to have a clear understanding of what the immediate 
needs are.  The link between clusters and OCHA is not clear and many cluster leaders 
appear to have no delegated authority; some leaders refer back to the UN to make 
decisions whilst others carry out their own ideas without any consultation.  Some form of 
performance management strategy which makes cluster leaders accountable for their 
actions and decisions should be implemented.  There is also a requirement for clearer 
guidelines on cluster management. 
 
Ineffective cluster leadership 
and unclear cluster 
implementation guidelines within 
the humanitarian supply chain 
have a negative effect on 
collaborative working.  
 
√ 
 
√ 
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 etic issue emic issue Discussion Final Finding 
     Theory Practice 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Training and 
Professionalis
ation (2.9) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Understanding 
and Training 
 
JFLogC participants concede that they do not fully appreciate the different roles and 
responsibilities of the organisations engaged in disaster relief, nor do they have an 
understanding of the specific logistics skill sets possessed by NGOs and other donor 
organisations.  They also suggest that other humanitarian organisations do not 
understand what the military can offer to the overall relief effort.  Hence, there is a 
requirement for a debate on how practical understanding, particularly between the military 
and humanitarian relief NGOs can be improved. 
 
 
The lack of understanding 
amongst humanitarian relief 
practitioners and military 
contributors of the logistical 
capabilities of other 
organisations operating within 
the supply chain has a negative 
impact on collaborative working.     
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
OCHA provide a variety of training courses which are designed to establish partnerships 
between global humanitarian relief organisations and to promote collaborative working.  
Courses also aim to develop the knowledge necessary between humanitarian and military 
actors to facilitate successful coordination.  However, attendance on courses is difficult for 
some NGOs and very low from the smaller humanitarian organisations.  The academic 
trajectory should move forward to consider ways to make current training courses more 
readily accessible and attractive to a larger number of humanitarian organisations. 
 
 
Current OCHA humanitarian 
relief training programmes are 
designed to promote 
collaborative working, however 
the courses are not readily 
accessible or attractive to a 
large proportion of organisations 
within the sector. 
 
 
 
  √ 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
A joint approach to training would be of great benefit to the future success of the overall 
relief effort.  The academic debate should move forward to consider a concept of training 
within the sector where integrated exercises have a role to play in the overall promotion of 
collaborative working. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint training initiatives which 
include all participant 
organisations would improve 
collaborative working within the 
humanitarian supply chain.   
 
 
  √ 
 
 
  √ 
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 etic issue emic issue Discussion Final Finding 
     Theory Practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisational 
Sustainment, 
Power and 
Relationships  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relationships 
 
Humanitarian relief organisations are businesses that will be driven by the market and the 
associated forces.  The desire to demonstrate superior effectiveness to donors is inherent 
within the humanitarian supply chain to the detriment of quantifiable results.  There is 
conflict within the sector in respect of what humanitarian value actually is.  What 
constitutes value to the end customer within the humanitarian supply chain contrasts with 
that of contributing organisations.  The end customer (the victim of the disaster) views the 
provision of the means to survive post the onset of a disaster as the value; but 
contributing NGOs must factor in their own sustainability and seek to address inherent 
market forces and donor pressure as they define value, whilst military contributors 
demonstrate value in terms of political and governmental expectation.  The academic 
trajectory should move forward to discuss ways to highlight the negative impact that 
competition is having on collaborative working.  The debate must also be linked to the 
need for a common definition and understanding of what constitutes value within the 
humanitarian sector.     
 
 
 
Market competition between 
donor organisations within the 
humanitarian sector and the lack 
of common agreement of what 
constitutes value has a negative 
impact on collaborative working 
and on the overall effectiveness 
and efficiency of the 
humanitarian supply chain.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
Strategies which help local communities to take ownership of the recovery assist aid 
agencies in the development of early exit strategies.  Identification of appropriate local 
authorities is not easy.  A lack of a clearly identified local authority means that it becomes 
difficult to monitor and control the movement of donor funding and to maintain standards. 
The academic debate should move forward to discuss measures to identify appropriate 
authorities at an early stage in the response and how these authorities can be included in 
HFNs. 
 
 
The Hastily Formed Networks 
which develop during the 
immediate response phase to a 
disaster must include identified 
local authorities.   
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
9 
OCHA has power broker (Burt, 2005) and gatekeeper status (Hingley and Lindgreen, 
2013; Hingley et al, 2010) within the humanitarian supply chain, but the command and 
control structures which it implements are ineffective.  The academic debate should move 
on to address why OCHA is failing to effectively coordinate the humanitarian supply 
chain. 
 
UN OCHA are not effectively 
coordinating the humanitarian 
supply chain in the field. 
 
 
√ 
 
 
√ 
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 etic issue emic issue Discussion Final Finding 
     Theory Practice 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Humanitarian 
Space and 
Political 
Influence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Military 
Involvement 
 
NGOs believe that the military are not interested in dealing with the longer term relief 
effort.  OCHA are trying to establish more predictable approaches to the involvement of 
military resources within humanitarian supply chains by encouraging the use of military 
resources during all response phases. 
  
 
Military organisations must seek 
to expand their contribution 
within the humanitarian supply 
chain from the immediate 
response phase to encompass 
the longer term phases of 
disaster relief. 
  
 
√ 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Regional stability and security are enhanced by the provision of impartial, needs-based 
humanitarian aid.  There is a potential for military involvement within the humanitarian 
supply chain, but such involvement can destabilise situations leading to potentially 
dangerous consequences, affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the relief effort.  
Consequently, donor organisations tend to resist collaborative working strategies with 
military contributors within the humanitarian supply chain.   
 
 
Preservation of the humanitarian 
principles has a negative impact 
on the adoption of collaborative 
working strategies between 
humanitarian relief organisations 
and military contributors within 
the humanitarian supply chain. 
  
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
Military contributors attempt to move from a political to a humanitarian stance as the 
humanitarian response develops.  This not only destabilises the overall effectiveness of 
the humanitarian supply chain, but also deters collaborative working.  The academic 
debate should move forward to discuss how guidelines can be issued clarifying the 
military contribution at the outset of a disaster response.  The discussion should also 
consider the role that national governments have to play in ensuring that military 
contributions are consistent throughout the operation and that the underpinning direction 
of the military contribution does not change part way through the relief effort. 
 
 
Changing the underpinning 
stance of the military 
contribution from a political to a 
humanitarian one has a 
destabilising effect on the overall 
effectiveness and efficiency of 
the humanitarian supply chain. 
 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
Table 8.1 Summary of the Development of the Final Research Findings  
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8.4 The Final Contribution to the Body of Knowledge 
 
As discussed earlier in this thesis the field of humanitarian SCM has developed as a 
research area, and consequently researchers are now beginning to lay the foundations for 
a core body of knowledge.  However, numerous academic commentators (Fawcett and 
Waller, 2013; Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Mangan et al, 2012; Overstreet et al, 2011; Kovács 
and Spens, 2011, 2008 and 2007; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 
2009; Thomas and Fritz, 2006; Beamon, 2006; Yamada et al, 2006; Lyles, 2005; Murray, 
2005; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005; Rickard, 2003) suggest that the research field of 
humanitarian SCM is relatively new and is still in its infancy.   Moreover, Larson (2011) 
highlights the importance of further research into the role that intra- and inter-organisational 
relationships have to play in the “greater coordination” (p29) of the supply chain itself.  
Similarly, Kovács and Spens (2011) suggest that humanitarian supply chain collaboration 
should be a key research area (p8), and go on  to contend that humanitarian SCM requires 
more research with empirical data being gathered through the use of case studies or other 
qualitative methodologies.  Indeed, a poll of Editorial Advisory and Review Board members 
carried out to establish the scope of the first publication of the JHLSCM (Kovács and Spens, 
2011) led to specific criticism of the reliance on the use of quantitative methodologies and 
Kunz and Reiner (2012) offer the view that “empirical methodologies such as cross-
organisational case studies should be used more in order to increase knowledge in the field” 
(p.133).  This research serves to address these calls for more qualitative, case study based 
research within the field as appropriate and topical rich empirical data has been gathered 
that, as discussed in this chapter and illustrated in Table 8.1 contributes to the body of 
knowledge in a variety of ways.  Consequently, this section of the thesis will draw together 
the previous discussion within this chapter and set out the associated contribution to 
knowledge that develops from consideration of the final findings.  By way of summary, a 
final generic conceptual model is offered (Fig 8.1), which illustrates the key drivers that 
emerged as a result of this research, which will help to improve future collaborative working 
within the Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain (the grey box).  The power broker (Burt, 2005) 
and gatekeeper (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley et al, 2010) has a central role in the 
achievement of the panacea of overall collaboration and hence, is depicted at the centre of 
the model.  External influences on the humanitarian supply chain are shown in green, whilst 
the internal drivers are those which appear in blue.   
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As discussed in Chapter 2, power as a construct in business to business relationships and 
the inherent power imbalances that exist have received irregular and contrasting treatment 
from analysts (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley, 2005b, Hingley, 2005a, p.848).  On 
the one hand power is regarded as having a negative effect on the workings of a successful 
supply chain (Naudé and Buttle, 2000; Doney and Cannon, 1997); however, some 
commentators favour the opposite view and argue that power can have a positive influence 
and that diversity within relationships is a good thing (Kalafatis, 2000; Earp et al, 1999; 
Blois, 1998; Campbell, 1997).  The theory discussed here restricts itself to the business 
sector; however, the findings of this research demonstrate that by applying the same 
theoretical concepts to the humanitarian sector, analysis of the associated results evince 
that UN and OCHA are afforded power broker (Burt, 2005) and gatekeeper (Hingley and 
Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley et al, 2010) status within the humanitarian supply chain.  However, 
a recurring theme within the data gathered is that despite this acknowledgment, there is a 
lack of clear supply chain control and coordination.  Moreover, the data gathered from the 
participant NGOs and the JFLogC during this research reveal that it is difficult to identify at 
times who has overall responsibility for elements of the humanitarian effort on the ground.  
In short, the findings of this study suggest that although UN OCHA claim to be, and are 
recognised as the coordinating organisation (OCHA, 2012a), the command structures that 
the organisation implement do not have the desired practical effect.  Hence, an element of 
the final contribution of this thesis is that through the application of existing theory the power 
structure within the humanitarian supply chain can be explained, however, a theoretical 
debate should now take place to address why this structure is not resulting in a coordinated 
overall humanitarian response.  Most importantly the discussion should address who should 
be given the role of power broker and gatekeeper for the humanitarian supply chain.   
 
In order to develop an overall view of the final findings of this thesis and the subsequent 
overall contribution, four internal pillars have been identified during this research which have 
an equally significant bearing on overall collaboration within the humanitarian supply chain, 
namely, Management and Control; Understanding and Training; Relationships and Military 
Involvement.  Fig 8.1 offers a conceptual illustration of these pillars, together with a depiction 
of the underlying drivers which influence them.  By way of explanation each of these pillars 
will now be considered in turn. 
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8.5  Management and Control 
 
8.5.1  Participant Perception 
 
This study identifies a new debate on the perceived influence that the larger agencies within 
the sector have on those smaller contributing organisations.  Moreover, the data gathered 
also gives empirical support to an additional notion amongst smaller NGOs within the field, 
that the sector is dominated by the UN and a small number of western based international 
donor organisations.  Hence, as no significant study within the field refers to these issues 
surrounding organisational perception and positioning, a significant element of the final 
contribution is the identification of participant perception as an underpinning factor in the 
overall management and control of the humanitarian supply chain. 
 
8.5.2  Effective Cluster Management 
 
As highlighted within Chapter 2, substantial research already exists on the UN Cluster 
Concept (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010; ActionAid, 2007; Stoddard et 
al 2007; Cosgrave et al, 2007; Street, 2007; Barratt, 2004), with more recent analysis 
suggesting that the Concept offers a step in the right direction towards a collaborative 
approach within the humanitarian supply chain (Altay and Labonte, 2011, Kovács, 2011).  
However, the data gathered during this study demonstrate clear inconsistency with this 
view, and show that the cluster concept should not be regarded as the silver bullet that it is 
argued to be in previous research.  Earlier research into UN clusters (Jahre and Jensen, 
2010; ActionAid, 2007; Stoddard et al 2007; Cosgrave et al, 2007; Street, 2007) notes 
confusion amongst humanitarian field workers, in respect of the role of each cluster and the 
associated cluster leads and the findings of this study identify that this is still the case as 
cluster management is identified as ineffective.  Current criticisms of the cluster concept 
(Asheim et al, 2009; Simmie, 2009) are based on analysis of the business sector; hence, 
part of the final contribution of this research is to extend such commentary into the 
humanitarian sector, with the empirical evidence gathered here demonstrating that the 
concept has been equally “oversold” (Simmie, 2009, p.23).  Furthermore, the findings of this 
research also show that cluster leaders are not held accountable for their actions and are 
not empowered to make decisions or to sanction actions.  Consequently, this study serves 
to support the view that what is really needed within the humanitarian supply chain is a more 
rigid system that can judge agencies on their performance (Heaslip, 2011), but also adds 
to the current debate by suggesting that such a system should have the authority and 
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legitimacy to exclude those that have a history of letting the overall humanitarian effort 
down.  Hence, an additional element of the overall contribution is the call for the introduction 
of a performance management strategy and to suggest that an extension of Kaplan and 
Norton’s (1996) Balanced Score Card Performance approach will serve to make cluster 
leaders accountable for their actions and decisions within the humanitarian supply chain.   
 
8.6  Understanding and Training 
 
8.6.1  Joint Training Initiatives 
 
Analysis of data gathered evince support to calls for a joint approach to training within the 
humanitarian sector (Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011).  Moreover, analysis of the data 
also reflect discussion within Chapter 2 on the significance of local engagement within the 
supply chain (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998), and triangulation of the findings corroborate 
theoretical calls for the inclusion of local organisations and governments within training 
strategies.  Hence, part of the final contribution is to add to the current academic trajectory, 
by providing empirical evidence to support the extension of current thinking considering the 
implementation of integrated training strategies within the sector, which encompass all 
members of the humanitarian supply chain.   
 
8.6.2  Appreciating Capability 
 
This research offers specific examples that supplement ongoing discussion on the lack of 
understanding and appreciation amongst humanitarian workers in respect of the roles and 
contribution of all organisations within the sector (Tatham and Altay, 2013, Goffnet et al, 
2013; Heaslip, 2011).  Hence, the final contribution also calls for an extension of the current 
theoretical debate on how practical understanding, and in particular that between military 
and humanitarian organisations operating within the humanitarian supply chain can be 
improved.   
 
8.6.3  Involvement in Training Courses 
 
The data gathered during this research evince that a variety of training courses are available 
which are designed to provide opportunities to establish partnerships and collaborative 
working amongst all humanitarian relief organisations (OCHA, 2013b).  However, the data 
also demonstrate that attendance on these courses is difficult for some NGOs and very low 
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from the smaller humanitarian organisations in particular.  Hence, given the absence of a 
significant study in this area, an addition to the final contribution of this research is to 
highlight the requirement for the development of a theoretical trajectory which considers 
attendance on, and involvement in training courses, and has as its focus consideration of 
strategies which will make such courses more readily accessible and attractive to a larger 
number of the smaller humanitarian organisations. 
 
8.7 Relationships 
 
8.7.1 Defining Value  
 
Adding to the discussion on the negative impact that the use of different language and 
terminology can have on overall perception and trust (Heaslip, 2011), a recurring theme 
that emerged during this research was the lack of a common understanding and definition 
of the term value amongst participants within the humanitarian sector.  Lindgreen et al 
(2012) argue that academics and practitioners have only just begun to understand what 
value means within a business context (p.207); hence, as research in this area is currently 
restricted to the business sector, an element of the final contribution is to highlight the need 
to take this theoretical debate into the humanitarian sector.  However, the data gathered 
here demonstrates that any such research will not be without its challenges as in this 
context, the end customer (the victim of the disaster) regards the provision of humanitarian 
aid and with it the means to survive, as the value of the chain; whilst contributing NGOs 
must factor in their own sustainability and address inherent market forces and donor 
pressure as they seek their definition of value, whilst military contributors are expected to 
demonstrate value in terms of political and governmental expectation.     
 
8.7.2 Market Competition 
 
The data gathered offers empirical support to the view that humanitarian organisations run 
the risk of entering into direct competition with other organisations within the sector, as in 
order to be successful NGOs often find themselves competing for resources, ground and 
other assets (Chandes and Paché, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007).  In essence, the data 
demonstrate the existence of business opportunism within the humanitarian sector.  Whilst 
revealing this mismatch with the view that market competition does not really influence 
organisations within the humanitarian supply chain (Dash et al, 2013; Mays et al, 2102) the 
data also provide empirical evidence that this competition between donor organisations has 
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a negative effect on the overall relief effort.  There is also a reticence amongst some donor 
organisations to be seen to act alone and to demonstrate overall presence on the ground, 
findings which concur with the observations offered by Olson and Gregorian (2007) and 
Kent (1987) on NGO’s actions in light of funding pressures and a fear of donor withdrawal.  
Hence, the data corroborate the contention that humanitarian relief organisations are 
businesses that will be driven by the market and the associated market forces, and that the 
desire to demonstrate superior effectiveness and efficiency to donors is inherent within the 
supply chain to the detriment of quantifiable end results (The Lancet, 2010; Olson and 
Gregorian, 2007; Weiss and Collins, 2000).  Given these findings, a significant element of 
the final contribution is acknowledgement of the impact of market competition within the 
humanitarian supply chain.   
 
8.7.3 Hastily Formed Networks  
 
Theoretical discussion and research on the importance of early local engagement has thus 
far restricted itself to consideration of business sector supply chains (Vincent and Bagshaw, 
2005), hence the final contribution of this study serves to provide empirical evidence that 
early engagement with local authorities is also regarded as key to the overall effectiveness 
of the humanitarian supply chain.  Local authorities should be included as the HFNs that 
are an inevitable consequence of the immediate response phase are formed.  However, the 
findings of this research also show that the management of relationships with such authority 
within the humanitarian sector can be somewhat problematic, particularly in countries where 
there is conflict, instability and insecurity.  The data gathered supports the proposition that 
whilst such strategies can help local communities to take ownership of the recovery, and 
will also assist humanitarian agencies in the development of early exit strategies, the 
identification of appropriate local authorities is not always an easy task.  Moreover, the lack 
of clearly identified authorities mean that it becomes difficult to monitor and control the 
movement of donor funding and to maintain humanitarian quality standards.  This 
discussion leads to the assertion that the theoretical debate and research agenda should 
move towards a trajectory that seeks to identify what measures can be taken to identify 
appropriate local authorities at an early stage in the humanitarian response, and also 
consider how these authorities can be included as HFNs develop. 
 
  
 
 
267 
 
 
8.8 Military Role 
 
8.8.1 Political vs Humanitarian  
 
The empirical data gathered during this research corroborates the discussion within Chapter 
2 as it confirms that some governments regard military involvement in the humanitarian 
supply chain as a means of achieving longer term political influence (Williamson, 2011; 
Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Weiss and Collins, 2000).  However, the findings of this study also 
demonstrate that incorporating humanitarian relief within the larger political context is an 
impossible task in reality as military and political objectives contradict and collide.  Hence, 
a contribution of this thesis is the proposition that there are occasions when the military 
attempt to wear 2 hats within the humanitarian supply chain, one driven by the pressure to 
achieve political aims and the other to support the humanitarian effort itself, this causes 
confusion for the local recipients of the aid, as well as for other organisations engaged in 
the overall humanitarian effort.   Hence, the findings of this research show that military 
contributors should clarify which hat they are wearing at the outset of the relief effort and 
consistently adopt the single role associated with their chosen hat throughout the 
humanitarian operation.  Consequently, given that no significant study has considered these 
conceptual issues in the past, a part of the final contribution is to call for a theoretical debate 
and associated research to be initiated that considers how guidelines can be issued which 
clarify the military contribution at the outset of a humanitarian operation, and also ensure 
that the associated role is consistently maintained throughout. 
 
8.8.2 Expanding Contribution 
 
The data gathered during this research, and in particular analysis of the findings from 
participants within the JFLogC, adds empirical evidence to support the reported desiore of 
the UK Government to escalate the existing MOD Contribution to the overall disaster relief 
effort, as set out in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (MOD, 1998) and more recently in 
the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (2011).  In a similar vein this research also 
confirms that OCHA is trying to establish a more predictable approach to the involvement 
of military resources within humanitarian relief zones by taking measures to encourage the 
use of such resources not just in the immediate response phase of the disaster, but also in 
the build-up and recovery phases.  Hence a final element of the contribution is join Kovács 
and Spens’ (2008, 2007) calls for an increase in the military contribution by calling for an 
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academic debate on the measures needed to expand the current military contribution to 
include both the preparation and reconstruction phases of the humanitarian effort.   
 
8.9 Implications for Business Sector Supply Chain Management and General 
Theory 
 
Whilst the previous sections of this Chapter have discussed the implications of the findings 
within the specialised context and domains investigated relating to the humanitarian supply 
chain, a constant consideration throughout this research has been the potential for 
generalisation of the findings to the wider body of knowledge and in particular to that 
associated within the management of business sector supply chains.  Large scale 
disruptions with very short lead times are emerging as one of the most pressing issues for 
commercial supply chains, consequently business sector supply chain managers can learn 
from their humanitarian sector counterparts who are expected to respond to disasters with 
very short lead times (Decker et al, 2013, p238).  Larson (2011) offers the view that 
humanitarian logisticians have much to learn from their business counterparts arguing that 
there has been limited knowledge transfer between business and humanitarian logistics 
practitioners and that, as a result aid agencies are many years behind business 
organisations in the adoption of modern supply chain practices (p15). However, there is 
also increasing support for the reciprocal view in that the traditional concept of a predictable 
and stable commercial supply chain should no longer be the accepted norm, and the 
findings of this research serve to offer empirical evidence that some aspects of commercial 
logistics and supply chain practice utilised in support of everyday business activity are 
markedly similar to those that are evident within the humanitarian supply chain (Kovács, 
2012; Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011).  Commercial supply chain managers 
are increasingly faced with challenges that no longer obey the traditional rules of forecast 
driven certainty and are therefore, forced to adopt the more event driven approaches utilised 
by their humanitarian relief counterparts.  Consequently, the implications of some of the 
findings of this research and elements of the final contribution should be considered in the 
context of the business supply chain.   
 
8.9.1 Barriers to Collaborative Working 
 
The findings reveal that in keeping with their business sector counterparts, supply chain 
managers employed within the humanitarian sector appreciate the concept of the value 
chain (Porter, 1990) and understand that in applying this principle they should look beyond 
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what are the traditional boundaries associated with competition and to identify what in 
business terms will give them a competitive advantage.  However, this research 
demonstrates that despite this acknowledgement, there are still barriers that exist to 
achieving the panacea of collaborative working.  The findings add support to the opinions 
offered by Senge (2010) in relation to the business sector, in that a key factor in the 
construction of a successful collaborative supply chain must be the elimination of 
managerial inertia in favour of a managerial approach that seeks to develop joint initiatives, 
to ensure that each contributor has a stake in overall success by delivering value to the end 
customer.  In effect whilst the supply chain managers can see the benefit of collaborative 
working, they are still averse to applying the concept in reality.  Hence, the academic 
theoretical trajectory should take the empirical evidence gathered during this research and 
move the debate forward to address the reasons why this is the case, not just within the 
humanitarian sector but also within corresponding business supply chains.   
  
8.9.2 Combating Supply Chain Complexity 
 
Resilience, flexibly and agility are all called for if a modern day business sector supply chain 
is to be successful, and a common feature of the resulting chains is the growing complexity 
resulting from the corresponding rise in the number of contributors (Christopher, 2011; 
Slack et al, 2010; Greasley, 2009).  The findings of this research confirm that all of these 
factors are a feature of the humanitarian supply chain and can therefore, inform business 
practice as the data gathered here serves to illustrate empirically the challenges associated 
with the management and control of such supply chains.  Analysis of the data gathered 
confirms that if raising the number of contributors and the corresponding increasing supply 
chain complexity are to be successful, then a controlling authority that is empowered to 
coordinate overall activity and end customer delivery is essential.  However, in order for this 
to happen in reality, a collaborative supply chain should seek to develop appropriate and 
common performance measures, integrated policies, information sharing, and incentive 
alignment.  Discourse in respect of the business sector suggests clusters as a means of 
addressing these challenges as they provide a means to “…operate more productively 
whilst coordinating with related companies; and measuring and motivating improvement” 
(Porter 1998, p.81).  However, whilst the findings of this research support the demand for 
appropriate performance measurement, they suggest that the business sector should also 
be aware that for clusters to be effective there is a reliance on appropriately empowered 
and accountable cluster leaders and a demand for clear cluster implementation guidelines. 
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8.9.3 Joint Training Initiatives 
 
Analysis of the findings offers empirical support to the view that joint training initiatives and 
training programmes will promote understanding and appreciation amongst members of the 
humanitarian supply chain (Heaslip, 2011), thereby establishing a vehicle to promote 
collaborative working.  Given the earlier discussion on the growing similarities between 
business and humanitarian supply chains, the assertion in light of this research is that this 
proposal will apply equally to the business sector, and that supply chain managers in 
general should consider the adoption of joint training initiatives as they seek to work 
collaboratively with partners to benefit overall value.   
 
8.9.4 Suppression of Market Forces 
 
This research confirms that as in the business sector, market competition does have a role 
to play in the effectiveness and overall dynamics of the humanitarian supply chain.  Analysis 
of the data demonstrates that external forces acting on the supply chain such as political 
motives and donor pressure, effectively create competition within the humanitarian market 
which has a negative impact on the willingness of participants to adopt collaborative working 
strategies.  This empirical evidence should have a bearing on the business sector in helping 
to develop an academic trajectory that debates how market forces might be suppressed by 
supply chain managers, to benefit overall supply chain success and end customer value. 
 
8.9.5 Defining Value in the Value Chain 
 
Heaslip (2011) suggests that the use of different language and terminology within the 
humanitarian supply chain obscures understanding and leads to misperception and 
mistrust.  Moreover, Lindgreen et al (2012) argue that academics and practioners alike 
agree that they have only just begun to understand what value means within a business 
context (p.207) and Harrison and van Hoek (2011) contend that value should be specified 
from the end-customer perspective.  However, a recurring theme that emerged during this 
research was the lack of a common understanding and definition of the term value amongst 
participants within the humanitarian supply chain.  Triangulation of the data gathered 
demonstrates that what constitutes value to the end-customer within the humanitarian 
supply chain contrasts with that of contributing organisations.  Porter’s (1990) original 
conceptual argument was that a common understanding of value will result in an efficient 
and effective value chain; by way of confirmation of this view the findings of this research 
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reveal that a conflicting understanding of what constitutes value amongst contributors and 
end-customers has a negative overall impact on delivery to the end-customer and also on 
the success of the value chain itself.  Hence, given the similarities between humanitarian 
and business sector value chains, the proposal is that the empirical evidence gathered 
during this research should be used to move the general academic trajectory forward to 
discuss the impact that a lack of a common language, and in particular clear agreement on 
what constitutes value can have on overall value chain effectiveness and efficiency.  
 
8.9.6 Supply Chain Structures and Power 
 
The data gathered adds to the findings of the literature review and to the discussion on the 
barriers and facilitators to the development of sustainable supply chains, and to the 
associated arguments for a clearer understanding of the potential benefits of a structured 
approach within the business context (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley et al, 2010).  
The empirical evidence gathered during this research highlights that participants within the 
humanitarian supply chain accept the power relationships that exist within the sector and 
are also content to acknowledge the role of lead organisations within the chain itself.  Hence, 
these findings support the view that not all organisations are averse to playing a subordinate 
role within the supply chain structure.  Moreover, given the similarities with the chains 
formed within the business sector, the proposition is that business sector supply chain 
managers, and indeed more general managers operating in a variety of contexts and 
domains and not simply those that are analogous with the context and domains of this study, 
should be content with the assertion that power is not necessarily a negative concept.   
 
8.10 Limitations of the Study and Implications for Methodology 
 
In common with all research, but perhaps even more so at this level of professional and 
academic development, this study suffers from a number of limitations.  Whilst these 
limitations do not detract from the overall significance of the findings, it would be remiss to 
not comment on them at some stage in the final reporting process.  Moreover, whilst the 
final Research Strategy proved, on the whole to be successful, it was not without its 
difficulties and challenges; hence, it would be wrong not to offer, by way of lessons learned 
some comment on the implications for methodology.   
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8.10.1 Research Boundaries 
 
The focus of this research was to gain an in-depth and thorough understanding of existing 
practices within the humanitarian supply chain as perceived by the study participants.  
Academic discourse suggests that this type of research lends itself to exploratory qualitative 
techniques, including case studies and in-depth interviews, which have been shown to be 
an effective means of gathering a large amount of data rich information about a particular 
subject area while being closely involved with the subject participants (Silverman, 2010; 
2011a; 2011b; Brabour, 2009).  Moreover, the approach also served to answer the calls for 
an increase in the use of such empirical methodology within the field of humanitarian relief, 
and also those for good and applicable research within the field where data is gathered 
through the use of appropriate qualitative method (Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács and 
Spens, 2011).  Given this approach, appropriate boundary setting based on associated 
research boundary work (Gieryn 1983) was a key feature at the outset of this research as 
the decision was taken to limit the overall scope.  This measure was taken as a means of 
addressing issues surrounding the generalisability of a purely qualitative approach and also 
to help maintain control over the volume of data gathered.  Hence, the research took as its 
focus the response immediately following the onset of a humanitarian disaster.  Whilst this 
may be viewed by some as a limitation, the analysis of the data gathered and the resultant 
contributions to knowledge demonstrate that this approach should be regarded as a 
strength of the study as it presented ample opportunities for significant theoretical and 
practical contribution.  Moreover, the approach assisted with data control, thereby lending 
itself to the rich analysis required to fulfil the requirements of the final research question and 
should, therefore be considered as an appropriate methodology for similar research in the 
future. 
 
8.10.2 Multiple Domains 
 
As this thesis was concerned with identifying reasons why participant actors within the 
humanitarian supply chain were struggling to collaborate, it was felt that the associated field 
work was well suited to the use of multiple-case studies based on different actors within the 
supply chain itself.   However, consideration of the definition of a classic case (Yin, 2009, 
Simons, 2009, Stake, 1995) and its suggestion that the selected organisations should be 
considered from all angles and all aspects, led to the conclusion that this research was not 
really concerned with cases per se; hence in order to locate the cases within the general 
context the decision was taken to use the term domain in preference to case.  This may be 
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seen as a limitation by some, but the depth of the analysis and associated findings produced 
as a result of this approach supports the argument that it should be regarded as an overall 
strength of this thesis and one that could be adopted in future research which seeks rich 
analysis of organisations or areas which do not necessarily fit the classic definition of a 
case. 
 
Similarly, consideration of the number of organisations involved within the humanitarian 
supply chain may call into question the selection of only 4 research domains.  However, in 
keeping with any research project this one suffered from resourcing challenges particularly 
in relation to time and researcher availability, as well as those associated with the limited 
word count allowance for the final thesis.  In short, a pragmatic decision had to be taken if 
the required field work and data analysis were to be completed and the word count 
restrictions adhered to.  In defence of this limitation the 4 organisations all had a key role to 
play in the humanitarian supply chain and as a result were considered to represent the 
supply chain as a whole.  Moreover, this study used multiple sources of “data source 
triangulation” (Yin, 2009, p.116) which were aimed at corroborating the same facts or 
phenomenon.  Convergence of Evidence was achieved as data was gathered through the 
form of interviews and focus groups with deliberately diverse organisations within the 
humanitarian supply chain and with different types of participants at all strategic and 
operational levels.  Furthermore, the use of multiple settings to gather data enhanced the 
generalisability of the research (Miles and Huberman, 1994) and checks were also made 
as to whether the findings were plausible to the subjects of the research through respondent 
validation feedback following each stage of the research. Whilst the use of a high number 
of domains would have been desirable, the rich data gathered, final findings and 
contribution all support the assertion that this approach was a justifiable and credible one. 
 
8.10.3 Interviews, Focus Groups and Observation 
 
While the main purpose of the interview is to gather in-depth information relating to the 
subject area, it is recommended (Flick, 2009; Yin, 2009, Denzin and Lincoln, 2008; Miles 
and Huberman, 1994) that the researcher seeks to utilise additional techniques in 
conjunction with this strategy to establish further data rich information in order to address 
issues surrounding corroboration and generalisability.  Consequently, the decision was 
taken to utilise focus groups as an additional method which would allow for collective 
exploration of themes and issues (Liamputtong, 2011; Cameron and Price, 2009; Krueger 
and Casey, 2008; Bryman and Bell, 2007).  Moreover, following the advice offered by 
 
 
274 
 
 
Barbour (2009) observation was identified as a method that would not only serve to enhance 
the data gathered during the interview stage, but one that would also add to the overall 
richness and extent of the data recorded during the focus groups.  However, an 
acknowledged limitation of this approach surrounds the use of Skype for some interviews 
and focus groups.  As discussed in Chapter three, the choice of the UN OCHA as a domain 
was considered to be critical to the outcomes of this research, but the practical reality of 
interviewing participants during stage II and facilitating a focus group during stage III of the 
final research strategy presented specific problems given that the participants were all 
based in Geneva, Switzerland.  A visit to Switzerland was out of the question, hence Skype 
was used to carry out interviews and focus groups.  Whilst the system was adequate for the 
interview process, the use of observation as an additional data gathering method was 
severely limited.  Moreover, facilitation of a focus group via Skype was virtually impossible 
under these circumstances, with the resulting session being akin to a conference call rather 
than a facilitated focus group.  Hence, whilst analysis of the data gathered from UN OCHA 
participants made a telling contribution to the final findings of this research, future 
researchers would be advised to consider how to address issues surrounding face-to-face 
access to participants as they seek to develop similar methodologies and take decisions on 
final methods.       
 
Finally, in acknowledging these limitations and explaining the background to them the 
contention is that they in no way detract from the significance of the final findings and 
contribution as discussed earlier within this chapter.  Indeed the proposition is that when 
properly identified and developed in addition to informing future methodologies, the 
limitations serve two main purposes in respect of this particular thesis. Firstly, they highlight 
the overall breadth of theoretical development realistically achievable by the researcher and 
consequently, that expected by the reader; and secondly, they act as a provocation for 
further research which may take as its starting point resolution of the identified limitations. 
 
8.11 Opportunities for Further Research 
 
The findings of this study offer a number of opportunities for further research that would 
both embellish the contributions identified here and generate new contributions to the body 
of knowledge.  However, one of the most seductive characteristics of research is that the 
options are virtually unbounded, hence discussion within this section will be restricted to 
those topics which are closely linked to the final findings, contribution and limitations that 
have already been discussed. 
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8.11.1 Further Generalisation and Triangulation 
 
The limited number of domains under consideration during this research has already been 
discussed and acknowledged as a limitation.  Hence, a repeat of this methodology across 
a wider section of the humanitarian relief community which encompasses more participant 
organisations, would serve as a test of the contended generalisability and triangulation of 
the final contribution and Research Proposition.  Given the final issues surrounding the lack 
of face-to-face access to UN OCHA participants during this research, and the significant 
role that the organisation has to play in the coordination of the humanitarian supply chain, 
any such studies should try and encompass a visit to the UN OCHA offices in Geneva, 
Switzerland.  
 
8.11.2 Organisational Perception and Positioning 
 
Analysis of Tearfund data reflects the view that NGOs are effectively ranked within disaster 
relief areas, and are effectively classified by order of size.  Moreover, the view expressed 
by all Tearfund participants is that larger organisations working in the sector lack an 
understanding of what other, smaller organisations have to contribute.  Finally, the findings 
serve to move the academic discussion forward, as analysis of the data suggests that a 
perception exists amongst some that the sector is dominated by the UN and a small number 
of western based international donor organisations.  Hence, as no significant study within 
the field currently exists, additional research is required to gather more rich empirical data 
on the issues surrounding organisational perception and positioning within the humanitarian 
supply chain. 
 
8.11.3 Cluster Performance Management and Leadership 
 
The findings of this research offer empirical evidence that the link between the UN Clusters 
(UN OCHA, 2011) and OCHA is not clear and that many cluster leaders appear to have no 
delegated authority.  Moreover, analysis of the data gathered suggests that some form of 
performance management strategy which makes cluster leaders accountable for their 
actions and decisions is required.  Hence, additional research which is focussed on the 
effectiveness of the UN Cluster Concept as a whole is required which takes as its focus the 
effective management of the concept, and considers measures to make cluster leaders 
accountable for their actions. 
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8.11.4 Practical Understanding within the Humanitarian Supply Chain 
 
The findings of this research offer empirical evidence in support of the discussion on the 
overall lack of understanding amongst humanitarian relief practitioners and military 
contributors, in respect of the logistical capabilities of other organisations operating within 
the humanitarian relief supply chain (Heaslip, 2011).  JFLogC participants concede that they 
do not fully appreciate the different roles and responsibilities of the organisations engaged 
in disaster relief; moreover analysis of the data gathered from NGOs confirms that 
humanitarian organisations do not understand what the military can offer to the overall relief 
effort.  Hence, there is a clear requirement for additional research which seeks to analyse 
the reasons behind this lack of understanding and which aims to offer ways to address how 
practical understanding, particularly between the military and humanitarian relief NGOs can 
be improved. 
 
8.11.5 UN OCHA Courses and Joint Training Initiatives 
 
This research has identified that the UN OCHA provide a variety of training courses which 
are designed to establish partnerships between global humanitarian relief organisations and 
to promote collaborative working.  However, the findings reveal that attendance on courses 
is difficult for some NGOs and that participation is very low amongst the smaller 
humanitarian organisations.  Hence, research is required to consider ways to make current 
training courses more readily accessible and attractive to a larger number of humanitarian 
organisations.  Linked to this are the ongoing discussions on the merits of a joint approach 
to training (Heaslip, 2011) and the assertion, particularly by JFLogC participants that such 
a strategy would be of great benefit to the future success of the overall relief effort.  Hence 
any future research in this area should also consider a concept of training within the sector 
where integrated exercises have a role to play in the overall promotion of collaborative 
working. 
 
8.11.6 Command, Control and Competition in the Humanitarian Market 
 
The findings of this research demonstrate that the UN OCHA has acknowledged power 
broker (Burt, 2005) and gatekeeper status (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley et al, 
2010) within the humanitarian supply chain, but also reveal that the command and control 
structures which are implemented by the UN OCHA within humanitarian relief zones are not 
effective.  In addition, this research offers empirical support to the assertion that 
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humanitarian relief organisations are businesses that will be driven by the associated 
market forces within the sector (The Lancet, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Weiss and 
Collins, 2000).   Analysis of the data reveals that these market forces, and the inherent 
desire to demonstrate superior effectiveness to donors by some humanitarian 
organisations, is having a negative impact on the overall effectiveness of the humanitarian 
relief supply chain.  In effect, humanitarian organisations are forced to act independently 
and as a result, outside of the UN OCHA command and control structures.  Hence, further 
research is required to consider the influence of market forces within the humanitarian 
sector and the negative impact that they are having on OCHA’s efforts to coordinate the 
humanitarian supply chain.   
 
8.11.7 The Humanitarian Space and the Military Contribution 
 
The findings of this research confirm that the UK MOD are keen to expand their role within 
the humanitarian supply chain (HERR, 2011).  However, analysis of the data gathered 
amongst NGO participants also reveals a direct conflict between this military aspiration and 
the humanitarian organisations’ desire to preserve the humanitarian principles. Moreover, 
the findings offer empirical evidence of a concern amongst NGOs that any military 
involvement in the humanitarian supply chain serves to destabilise it and to have a negative 
impact on the overall effectiveness of the relief effort.  To add to this, the findings also 
demonstrate that military contributors are often forced by governmental pressure to move 
from a political to a humanitarian stance as the response develops.  This not only serves to 
destabilise situations still further, but also to deter any desire to adopt collaborative working.  
Hence, further research is required into how this conflict between the military aspiration to 
increase involvement in the humanitarian supply chain and the NGO desire to maintain the 
humanitarian principles can be addressed.  Any such research should also consider the 
role that national governments have to play in ensuring that military contributions are 
consistent throughout the relief effort and do not change direction part way through the relief 
effort. 
 
But what of the future for this particular researcher?  As has been discussed earlier in this 
thesis humanitarian disasters are here to stay and are sadly, on the increase.  Hence, the 
aim will be to continue to conduct research along a similar academic trajectory and in 
particular within the theme of relationship management.  The concept of how to develop 
managerial strategies which will help to facilitate collaborative working amongst 
organisations and individuals which, whilst sharing a common desire to help those in need 
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are clearly poles apart is a real challenge and one that appeals.  Hence, the intention will 
be to continue to develop the insights that the research has revealed thus far into a more 
comprehensive theoretical position.   
 
8.12 A Final Thought 
 
Above all else this research has served to demonstrate the significance of the overall 
contribution that the supply chain and associated managerial discipline have to make to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian relief effort in response to immediate 
disasters.  The findings confirm that in keeping with the corresponding organisations in the 
business sector, those who operate in the humanitarian sector are acutely aware of the 
importance that the effective management of their resources has to offer.  However, the 
data gathered here serves to demonstrate that the humanitarian sector still has some 
significant challenges ahead if this appreciation is to turn into practical results.  The lack of 
awareness and trust amongst participants within the humanitarian supply chain identified 
within this thesis, and the confirmation of a corresponding unwillingness to adopt 
collaborative working is having a negative effect on what is the bottom line for the 
humanitarian sector; which, in the final analysis is improved efficiency and effectiveness 
within the humanitarian supply chain leading to reduced response times, the delivery of 
more aid and ultimately an increase in the number of lives saved.  In short, organisations 
and individuals working within the humanitarian relief sector would be well advised to put 
aside their differences and to consider the thoughts of Sun-Tzu (translated by Ames, 1993): 
 
“The line between order and disorder lies in logistics” 
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Appendix A 
Key Words used Throughout the Research Process 
Key Words Notes 
“Humanitarian (Aid) Logistics” 
 
“Humanitarian (Aid) Supply Chains” 
 
“Humanitarian (Aid)” and “Supply Chain”/ “Logistics Management” 
 
“Humanitarian Supply Chain Collaboration”/ “Coordination” 
 
“Supply Chain Coordination”/ “Coordination” 
 
“Disaster Relief” and “Logistics”/ “Emergency Relief” and “Logistics”/ “Supply Chain Management” 
 
“Humanitarian Logistics”/ “Supply Chain Operations” 
 
“Humanitarian”, “Disaster” and “Emergency” Supply Chain”/ “Logistics” and “Efficiency”/ “Effectiveness” 
 
“NGO” and “Coordination”/ “Collaboration” and “Military” 
 
“UN” and “Cluster Approach” 
 
“Power” and “Relationship Management”/ “Relationship Marketing” 
General overview of topic area accounting for common 
link between ‘logistics’ & ‘Supply Chains’. 
More specific focus on management of chains and in 
particular collaboration and/or coordination. 
Some authors write about ‘Disaster Relief’ as opposed 
to ‘humanitarian relief’  
‘Disaster’ seems to be interchangeable with the terms 
‘Humanitarian’ and ‘Emergency’ 
Specifics of current approaches to collaboration/ 
coordination. 
 
Investigate the role that power plays within 
collaborative relationships 
“Qualitative Research” 
 
“Case Study” and “Research” 
 
“Qualitative Data” and “Analysis” 
 
“Observation” and “Research” 
 
“Focus Groups” and “Research” 
 
“Grounded Theory” and “Ethnography” 
Increase working knowledge of research tools/ 
techniques available in order to arrive at informed  
justification of final methodology  
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Appendix B 
Humanitarian and Non-Governmental Organisations Contacted and Responses 
Ser Organisation Address E mail Participate? Response 
1 Action Aid Chataway House,  
Leach Road,  
Chard,  
Somerset,  
TA20 1FR 
mail@actionaid.org   
 
 
 
 
N 
“I am very sorry but due to the high volume of 
requests of this nature that we receive we find 
ourselves unable to answer them individually but 
we are happy to point you in the direction of 
publically available materials”.  
 
Please feel free to visit www.actionaid.org.uk (our 
UK website) www.actionaid.org (our International 
website) and our financial report: 
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/101399/trustees_re
port_and_accounts.html  
2 International 
Federation of 
Red Cross and 
Red Crescent  
(IFRC) though: 
British Red 
Cross 
44 Moorfields,  
London  
EC2Y 9AL 
information@redcross.org.uk   
Y 
Willing to Participate 
3 Catholic Fund 
for Overseas 
Development 
(CAFOD) 
Romero House,  
55 Westminster Bridge 
Road, London,  
SE1 7JB 
cafod@cafod.org.uk  N NONE 
4 CARE 
International 
UK 
9th Floor,  
89 Albert Embankment,  
London,  
SE1 7TP  
info@careinternational.org.uk  Y Willing to Participate 
5 Christian Aid PO Box 100,  
London,  
SE1 7RT 
info@christian-aid.org  N NONE 
6 Comic Relief 
UK 
89 Albert Embankment 
London 
info@comicrelief.com   
Y 
 
Willing to Participate 
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SE1 7TP 
Ser Organisation Address E mail Participate? Response 
7 Concern 
Worldwide 
13/14 Calico House ,  
Clove Hitch Quay ,  
London,  
SW11 3TN 
info@concern.net   
Y 
 
Willing to Participate 
8 Islamic Relief 
UK 
Head Office,  
16 Lower Marsh,  
London,  
SE1 7RJ 
info@islamic-relief.org.uk  N NONE 
9 MOD Joint 
Force Logistic 
Component HQ 
Joint Forces Command, 
Northwood HQ,  
Sandy Lane,  
Middlesex,  
HA6 3HP 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Y 
Willing to Participate 
10 Médecins Sans 
Frontières/Doct
ors Without 
Borders (MSF)  
67-74 Saffron Hill 
London  
EC1N 8QX 
 
 
office-ldn@london.msf.org   
N 
“We are a small team in London and are 
unable to assist students with research, but 
we would urge you to consult the MSF 
websites where there is a wealth of 
information that should help you”. 
11 Merlin Head office, 12th Floor, 207 
Old Street, London EC1V 
9NR 
hq@merlin.org.uk  N NONE 
12 Oxfam Oxfam House,  
John Smith Drive,  
Cowley,  
Oxford.  
OX4 2JY 
enquiries@oxfam.org.uk   
Y 
“We welcome the opportunity to discuss our 
responses further” 
13 Plan UK Finsgate,  
5-7 Cranwood Street,  
London,  
EC1V 9LH 
 
 
 N NONE 
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Ser Organisation Address E mail Participate? Response 
14 Save the 
Children UK 
Head Office,  
1 St John's Lane,  
London  
EC1M 4AR 
 
 
supporter.care@savethechildren.or
g.uk  
N NONE 
15 Tearfund 100 Church Road,  
Teddington,  
TW11 8QE 
 
 
enquiry@tearfund.org  Y “We are a relatively small NGO and I am very 
happy to discuss further if this is of interest to 
you” 
16 UNICEF UK UNICEF Supply Division 
UNICEF Plads, Freeport 
2100 Copenhagen Ø 
Denmark 
Telephone +(45) 35 27 35 27 
Facsimile + (45) 35 26 94 21 
 
 
supply@unicef.org  Y Willing to Participate 
17 UN OCHA Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
Palais des Nations, 1211 
Geneva 10, Switzerland 
ocha@un.org Y Willing to Participate 
18 World Vision 
UK 
Opal Drive,  
Fox Milne,  
Milton Keynes,  
MK15 0ZR 
info@worldvision.org.uk  N None 
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Appendix C 
 
University of Lincoln 
Lincoln Business School 
Brayford Pool 
Lincoln 
LN6 7TS 
UK 
 
T:  +44 (0) 1522 835629 
M:  +44 (0) 7894 511131 
 
E:  gramsden@lincoln.ac.uk 
 
Director Logistics Operations 
[ 
 
     ] 
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
RESEARCH PROJECT – HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS COLLABORATION 
 
I am a senior lecturer at the University of Lincoln and am currently engaged in a Doctoral 
Research Project which will consider the management of the supply chains and logistics 
activities associated with provision of humanitarian relief; in particular my research will 
consider how Non-Governmental Organisations collaborate within humanitarian relief areas 
and, in light of past practitioner experiences how collaboration might be managed within such 
areas in the future. 
 
Whilst I fully appreciate how busy you must be, I enclose a short questionnaire of what are, 
hopefully straightforward questions which I trust that you will be able to find the time to 
answer.  This questionnaire has been sent to a number of NGO logistics practitioners and my 
aim at present is to establish some preliminary data; once I have analysed this data my 
intention will be to conduct more in-depth research into the trends and issues raised.  
 
Ultimately, my aim is to make a lasting contribution to knowledge within what is a vital area 
for the humanitarian relief supply chain and, to that end, I will be happy for you to review my 
findings as and when they become available. 
 
With many thanks in anticipation 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
 
Gary Ramsden 
Senior Lecturer Logistics and Operations Management 
 
Enc: 
 
1 x Humanitarian Logistics & Supply Chain Management Questionnaire 
1 x Stamped Addressed Envelope 
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Appendix D 
Humanitarian Logistics & Supply Chain Management Questionnaire 
Background Details: 
Name 
 
 
Job Title   
 
Organisation  
 
Time employed with this organisation  
 
Name of any other humanitarian relief 
organisations that you have worked 
for 
 
 
 
 
Total time employed within 
humanitarian relief provision 
 
Operational Experience:  
 
Please list all relief operations that 
you have had some involvement in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please turn over for some short questions associated with Humanitarian 
Logistics & Supply Chain Management 
 
 
309 
 
 
Humanitarian Logistics & Supply Chain Management: 
Do you believe that  your organisation 
operates a supply chain designed 
specifically for its particular role/needs? 
Yes No 
UK NGOs only: 
Is your organisation affiliated to the 
Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC)? 
Yes No 
Does your organisation operate within the 
United Nations Cluster concept? 
Yes No 
If yes, please tick the areas for which your 
organisation has (or would) use the UN 
Cluster concept 
Fill logistics gaps and alleviate 
bottlenecks 
 
 
Prioritize logistics interventions and 
investments 
 
Collect/ share information and 
assets 
 
Coordinate port and corridor 
movements to reduce congestion 
 
Provide details of transporters and 
rough indication of market rates 
 
Provide guidance on customs 
issues 
 
Provide information on equipment 
and/or relief supply items 
 
Co-ordination with other UN 
Agencies 
 
Co-ordination with other NGOs  
Co-ordination with the military  
Which of these principles do you believe 
that your organisation would consider to 
be of the greatest importance in respect of 
the provision of humanitarian relief (please 
rank as 1 (most important) to 4 (least 
important)) 
Humanity  
(Humankind shall be treated humanely 
in all circumstances by saving lives 
and alleviating suffering, while 
ensuring respect for the individual) 
 
Neutrality  
(Advocation of a non-interventionist 
strategy in conflict) 
 
Impartiality  
(Decisions should be based on 
objective criteria, rather than on the 
basis of bias, prejudice, or preferring 
the benefit to one person over another) 
 
Independence 
(Actions must be kept separate from 
political, economic, military or other 
objectives) 
 
All are of equal importance  
Does your organisation take the lead in 
any logistical activity along the 
humanitarian relief supply chain? 
Yes No 
If Yes please state which activities and in 
which operations 
 
 
 
 
Activity: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operation: 
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If No would your organisation be happy to 
take the lead in any future operations? 
Yes No 
Does your organisation share facilities with 
other NGOs? 
Yes No 
If Yes please list which facilities and who 
they are shared with 
Facility: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisation Shared 
with: 
Is your organisation prepared to accept 
military assistance from armed forces 
working under a UN mandate?  
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Depends on the circumstances 
 
Within a relief zone which of these aims 
are the most important to your 
organisation (please rank as 1 (most 
important) to 3 (least important)) 
Demonstrating to donors that their 
presence and inputs into a 
humanitarian mission are valuable 
 
Demonstrating competitive 
behaviour towards other 
humanitarian actors and 
organisations 
 
Seeking visible means of 
demonstrating active subscription 
to the concepts of Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
 
All are of equal importance 
 
 
Would you be happy to discuss your 
responses in greater depth at a future 
date? 
Yes No 
 Many thanks for taking the time to complete this questionnaire 
Please return it to: 
G P Ramsden 
University of Lincoln 
Lincoln Business School 
Brayford Pool 
Lincoln 
LN6 7TS 
UK 
in the Stamped Addressed Envelope provided or e mail back to: 
gramsden@lincoln.ac.uk 
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Appendix E 
Initial Etic Data Analysis Codes (adapted from Miles and Huberman, 1994) 
Theme (Section in Literature Review) Description Code 
Humanitarian Space 
(2.5.1) 
Humanity 
Humankind shall be treated humanely in all circumstances by saving lives and alleviating suffering, while 
ensuring respect for the individual 
HUMSHUM 
Neutrality Advocation of a non-interventionist strategy in conflict HUMSNEU 
Impartiality 
Decisions should be based on objective criteria, rather than on the basis of bias, prejudice, or preferring the 
benefit to one person over another 
HUMSIMP 
Independence Humanitarian action must be kept separate from political, economic, military or other objectives. HUMSIND 
 
Politics (2.5.2) 
Influence  Looking to influence policy decisions and to shape global political perspectives POLINF 
Motivation A perceived moral authority to promote ideological and political causes  POLMOT 
 
World Economy 
(2.5.3) 
Influence 
Finding neutral ways to operationalize mandates without compromising underlying principles or producing a 
negative impact  
WEINF 
International Pressure Asserting economic pressure on countries and organisations to further individually stated goals or missions   WEIP 
 
Organisational 
Sustainment (2.5.4) 
Fund Raising Demonstrating to donors that their presence and inputs into a humanitarian mission are valuable SUSFR 
Strategy Demonstrating competitive behaviour towards other humanitarian actors and organisations SUSSTRAT 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) 
Seeking visible means of demonstrating active subscription to the concepts of CSR SUSCSR 
 
Societal Wealth (2.5.5) 
Interference Applying advance measures to limit the overall effect of disasters  SWINT 
Influence 
Attempts to influence long-term change arising from both the initial impact effects and corresponding 
responses to disasters 
SWINF 
 
Power (2.10.3) 
Positive Positive aspects of power on collaboration and co-operation  PWRPOS 
Negative Negative effects of power  PWRNEG 
 
Relationship 
Management (2.8) 
 
 
 
 
Trust Mutual working, partnerships, win-win opportunities exploited RMT 
Opportunism Self-interest and associated gain are prevalent RMOPP 
 
 
312 
 
 
Theme (Section in Literature Review) Description Code 
Collaboration 
(Optimisation) (2.8/ 
2.9) 
Clusters Concept adopted and appreciated, upstream and downstream customers are included in supply chain 
planning and operations 
COLCLU 
Horizontal Experts in the same functional area working together COLHOR 
Vertical Synchronise different functional levels of supply chain for overall efficiency  COLVER 
Alliances Seen to benefit all involved – encouraged COLALL 
Resilience Supply chain is designed to cope with disturbance COLRES 
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Appendix F 
Stage II - Interview Schedule 
  
Introductions 
 
This interview is being recorded – it will only be heard by myself – all materials will 
be kept confidential as per the consent agreement.  
 
For the purposes of the digital recording…………………………..  
 
Date 
 
Time  
 
Organisation 
  
Name 
 
Job Title  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
This interview should take between 1 and 1.5 hours.  
 
The interview is semi-structured and informal – basically I want it to be a 
conversation and to offer you the opportunity to tell me what you want me to know 
about your views on collaboration along humanitarian relief supply chains.  
However, I do have some key issues that I hope we will cover, so I will check my 
prompts occasionally to make sure we are more-or-less on track.  
 
This interview has four parts; 
  
A. General Processes, Coordination & Collaboration. 
B. Power and Relationships 
C. The Humanitarian Space 
D. Organisational Sustainment 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
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SECTION A: General Processes, Coordination and 
Collaboration  
 
A1. Definitions  
 
To confirm understanding at the outset of the interview, how do you define 
collaboration?  
 
What is coordination and how does it differ from collaboration? 
 
What do the terms mean to you? 
 
A2. UN Cluster Concept 
 
What is your understanding of the concept? 
 
 Is it a good thing – or are there problems with it?  
 
o What examples would you offer both good and bad, of the concept’s 
practical implementation?  
 
 In your experience does the concept help to facilitate the following: 
 
o Information and Asset Sharing 
 
o Prioritising of events and interventions 
 
 In your experience does the concept work in reality? 
 
A3. Sharing of Facilities 
 
Does your organisation share facilities with other NGO’s? 
 
 How is this instigated? 
 
 Are agreements in place or established? 
 
 Can you offer any examples of successes and/or failures of such 
agreements? 
 
A4. Military Assistance 
 
Does your organisation accept military assistance? 
 
 Under what circumstances? 
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 When is military assistance acceptable to your organisation? 
 
 Can you offer specific examples of the use of military assistance 
 
Section B: Power and Relationships 
 
B1. Lead Status 
 
Is your organisation willing to accept lead status in a humanitarian relief effort? 
 
 Can you offer me some practical examples of where this has happened? 
 
B2. Trust 
 
Is your organisation happy to be led by another? 
 
 Can you offer me some practical examples of where this has happened? 
 
B3. Relationship Management 
 
How does your organisation manage its relationships with other NGOs and 
contributing organisations? 
 
 Do you regard other organisations as competition? 
 
 Are there conflicts of interest? 
 
 How are these managed? 
 
o Can you offer practical examples? 
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Section C: The Humanitarian Space 
  
C1. Humanitarian Principles 
 
What do you understand to be the Humanitarian Principles? 
 
 How are these principles maintained by your organisation? 
 
 Do they have a bearing on approaches and attitudes? 
 
 Can you offer practical examples? 
 
C2. The Oslo Guidelines 
 
What do you understand to be the Oslo Guidelines? 
 
 How are these principles maintained by your organisation? 
 
 Do they have a bearing on approaches and attitudes? 
 
 Can you offer practical examples? 
 
C3. Politics 
 
Does politics play a role in the overall decision making process for your 
organisation? 
 
 Can you offer any practical examples? 
 
C4. The Military Role 
 
How does the role of the military in humanitarian relief conflict with the 
humanitarian principles? 
 
Is there a role for the military in humanitarian relief? 
 
 Should there be dividing lines and where are they? 
 
 When is military assistance acceptable/ not acceptable? 
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Section D: Organisational Sustainment 
 
D1. Demonstration to the Donor Community 
How important is the demonstration of the following to your organisation and its 
donor community: 
 Organisational presence 
 Corporate Social Responsibility 
 Value for money 
How does your organisation achieve the above? 
 Can you offer practical examples? 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Finally  
 
 Many thanks for your help and time.   
 If you think of anything else, or have any queries, please contact me.   
 I plan to hold a series of focus groups to discuss my findings in about a 
year’s time as this will give me the time to analyse the data that I have 
collected through the interview process.  Obviously you would be more than 
welcome at one of these and I will contact you with an invitation. 
 I aim to have the final research report finished in 2015 and this will be 
accessible to you via the internet.   
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Appendix G 
Stage III - Focus Group Topic Guide  
  
Introductions 
 
This focus group is being recorded – it will only be heard by myself – all materials 
will be kept confidential as per the consent agreement.  
 
For the purposes of the digital recording…………………………..  
 
Date 
 
Time  
 
Organisation 
  
Individual Names and Job Titles  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
This session should take about 1 hour.  
 
You should notice that the areas covered during this session will be very similar to 
those which were raised during our one-to-one interviews.  We have already 
exchanged feedback on your individual interviews but now the idea is to expand 
on some of the key issues that were raised in this open forum.  I will introduce the 
discussion topics and key issues that I hope we will cover and then it’s over to you 
to discuss with my occasional prompting.  In essence I will act as chairman, so I 
will check my prompts occasionally to make sure that we are more-or-less on 
track.  
 
The generic areas that I would like us to cover will cover are: 
  
A. Management and Control 
B. Understanding and Training 
C. Relationships 
D. Military Involvement 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
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Section A: Management & Control 
A1. Coordination 
Discuss the practical realities:  
 Competing agendas 
 UN Strategic Framework 
o Role of OCHA 
 Does coordination restrict the overall relief effort? 
o Does an Ad Hoc approach work? 
o Lack of coordination has benefits? 
 Experiences 
o Problems? 
o Successes? 
A2. Cluster Concept 
Discuss experiences of and opinions on the Concept: 
 Is Performance Measurement required? 
o Make Cluster Leads Accountable 
 Should Local Governments be involved? 
o Exclusivity leads to distrust 
 Links to OCHA 
o Loose? 
 Are Implementation Guidelines required 
o Prevent confusion? 
 Experiences 
o Problems? 
o Successes? 
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Section B:  Understanding & Training 
B1. Joint Training 
Opinions on the idea of joint training and exercises 
 Promote wider understanding of roles 
o OCHA 
o NGOs 
o Military 
o Local Governmental Organisations 
 Promote appreciation of the Humanitarian Landscape 
o Environment 
o Demands 
o Problems 
o Experiences 
 Include Local Organisations and Governments? 
o Promote local ownership and responsibility 
o Long term exit strategy? 
B2. Professionalisation 
The adoption of Humanitarian Logistics as a ‘profession’ 
 Career Paths 
 Improve efficiency/effectiveness? 
 Academic requirements 
o European Qualifications Framework (EQF) 
 Experiences? 
o Existing Programmes 
B3. Cluster Training 
Is training required in this area? 
 Promote understanding 
o Structures 
o Roles 
o Responsibilities 
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Section C:  Relationships 
C1. Local 
Discuss relationships with local organisations 
 Experiences? 
 How to establish 
 Value? 
 How to promote a sense of community? 
C2. Inter-Organisational 
Discuss the idea of collaboration and working together 
 Positive or negative? 
 Should NGOs be regarded like any other business? 
o Market forces 
o Competition 
 How should this be managed 
o By who? 
 Communication 
 Resource sharing 
o Examples 
o Successes? 
o Problems? 
C3. Power and Trust 
Where does/should the power lie? 
 Power Broker(s) 
o OCHA 
o Cluster Leads 
o Local Government 
o Military 
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Section D:  Military Involvement 
D1. Perceptions  
Discuss organisational and individual perceptions of the military role  
 Pressure on military to demonstrate more humanitarian involvement 
o How to expand the current agenda 
o Longer term involvement beyond initial response 
 Security vs Conflict 
o Clash of interests 
o Achievable 
o Experiences? 
 Maintenance of Humanitarian Principles 
o Humanity; Neutrality; Impartiality; Independence 
o Is this a military responsibility/role 
 What is the overall military role? 
o Can the military wear 2 hats? 
D2. Political Influence 
Political pressures and influence of international and local military 
 Hearts and minds initiatives  
o Humanitarian relief? 
 Rules of Engagement 
o OSLO Guidelines 
o OCHA Guidelines 
 Links to Local Governments 
o How to establish and maintain sovereignty   
o Who has/should have overall control? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
